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黑人氣味與南方羞恥：

以情動力閱讀威廉·福克納《八月之光》與《墳墓的闖入者》

**The Smell of the Negro and the Shame of the South:
An Affective Reading of William Faulkner's *Light in August* and
*Intruder in the Dust***

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中文摘要

本論文旨在探討威廉·福克納《八月之光》與《墳墓的闖入者》中種族與情動力複雜的交互作用與相互影響。種族在福克納的作品中一直扮演著重要的因素。福克納的小說展現了他對種族議題的關注與偏好——其作品主題多圍繞在南北內戰的鬼魅記憶、南方白人對種族通婚的恐懼，以及黑人在佃農制度下所受到的壓迫。不同領域的學者以不同的觀點與理論架構來探討福克納小說中的種族關係，而本文則提出以情動力的角度來閱讀《八月之光》與《墳墓的闖入者》中福克納如何處理與再現種族歧視和種族關係。透過與研究情動力學者們的對話，本論文主張情動力在種族建構上扮演著重要的角色，透過在日常生活情境中與他者和環境的互動，情動力得以鬆動種族界線。

論文分成四個章節。第一章為論文概要，並回顧了福克納小說中種族建構的現有理論，以及情動力研究中幾個重要的觀點。第二章探討了《八月之光》中負面情動力與味道/氣味的交互作用。透過喬·聖誕與他人氣味相遇而引發出的情動力，我分析喬不安且混亂的種族身分認同。我認為味道/氣味能引出喬負面的情動力，如焦慮與厭惡；氣味也同時引出了喬自我認同中一直存在的他者性。第三章討論羞恥如何能對《墳墓的闖入者》中的白人男孩契克·莫里遜對種族歧視的看法產生影響。羞恥感不只能動搖契克自身的種族身分認同，透過他和黑人路喀斯·布香相遇的歷程，也進一步促使他重新認識種族與種族關係。最後一章我連結到當代的種族議題，並思考情動力其過去與現在複雜的糾葛如何能指向未來、如何能為種族歧視與固有的種族關係帶來改變。

關鍵字：威廉·福克納、《八月之光》、《墳墓的闖入者》、情動力、種族

Abstract

This thesis aims to investigate the complexity and interplay of race and affect in William Faulkner's *Light in August* and *Intruder in the Dust*. Race has been an important factor in Faulkner's works as he demonstrates his thematic preoccupation with issues of race—from the haunting memories of Civil War, the white South's anxiety over miscegenation, to the oppression of the black under plantation system. While the question of race and race relations in Faulkner's novels has been explored by scholars of different fields and through various frameworks, the thesis proposes to read how Faulkner represents race in *Light* and *Intruder* through the lens of affect. By engaging in dialogue with different affect theorists, the thesis argues that affect plays a vital role in formulating race and challenging racial lines through dynamic interactions with others in the context of everyday experiences.

The thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter one serves as an introduction to the whole project and reviews both existing approaches to Faulkner's construction of race and theories of affect. Chapter two looks into the workings of negative affect and its intersection with smell in *Light in August*. I delve into Joe Christmas' troubled racial identity through his affective encounters with the smell of others. I argue that smell plays a crucial part in generating negative affect in Joe yet at the same time catalyzing his sense of being an other from within. Chapter three investigates what shame does to Chick Mallison, a young white boy, and his stance toward racism in *Intruder in the Dust*. I look into how shame not only unsettles Chick's racial identity but also pushes for his new way of understanding race and race relations through his encounters with Lucas Beauchamp, a black man to whom Chick owes money. In the concluding chapter, I evoke contemporary issue of "Black Lives Matters" to see how affect speaks to current racial issues and to think about how the future-oriented effect of affect can challenge and unmoor current race relations.

Key words: William Faulkner, *Light in August*, *Intruder in the Dust*, affect, race

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
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Chapter One

Introduction

William Faulkner, a twentieth-century American writer, is primarily known for his novels and short stories set in the fictional Yoknapatawpha County, based on Lafayette County in Mississippi, where he spent most of his life. Faulkner is one of the most celebrated writers in American literature and Southern literature in particular. From the early 1920s to the late 1930s, Faulkner published thirteen novels and many short stories. Such a body of work formed the basis of his reputation and earned him the Nobel Prize at the age of fifty two. Faulkner's prodigious output includes his most celebrated novels such as *The Sound and the Fury* (1929), *As I Lay Dying* (1930), *Light in August* (1932), and *Absalom, Absalom!* (1936). In his Yoknapatawpha fiction, Faulkner tried to “create a cosmos of [his] own” (Stein 82), to proliferate characters, families and communities, with his imagination leaping from one possibility to the next. On the map of Yoknapatawpha, several characters Faulkner drew upon in his earlier works reappear in the novels of later years. For example, Sam Fathers of *Go Down, Moses* (1942), a collection of short stories on the genealogy of the McCaslin family, appears in “A Justice” (1931). Nancy Mannigoe of *Requiem for a Nun* (1951), is a central figure in “That Evening Sun” (1930). Flem Snopes, the central character throughout the Snopes trilogy—*The Hamlet* (1940), *The Town* (1957) and *The Mansion* (1959)—appears in *Flags in the Dust* (1927) and *As I Lay Dying* (1930).

In addition to the interconnectedness of characters within his works, Faulkner, in his “cosmos,” built a community as a given locality with a history and processes of its own. With most his major novels—*Light in August* and *Absalom, Absalom!* for instance—set in a period of time spanning from the antebellum years to the 1930s, Faulkner demonstrated his interest in depicting and situating race and racism in the South in a particular historical period.

The Sound and the Fury centers on the fall of the Compson family, former Southern aristocrats who are struggling to deal with the dissolution of their family and its reputation after the Civil War. The white Southerners' anxiety and fear of "mixed blood" are manifest in Quentin Compson's desperate attempt to claim false responsibility for his sister Caddy's pregnancy. Since Caddy is unable to name the father of the child, Quentin feels that he has to protect his sister's "purity" from the threatening miscegenation. In a similar vein, Faulkner placed the theme of miscegenation against the backdrop of slavery and the Civil War in *Absalom, Absalom!*. In the story of the Sutpen household in the antebellum South, miscegenation starts with Thomas Sutpen's repudiation of his first wife and their son Charles Bon upon discovery of her Negro blood. Henry, Sutpen's white son from his second marriage, upon realizing that Bon is not only his half-brother but also part Negro, murders Bon to prevent the union between Bon and his half-sister Judith, and to prevent the possible threat of miscegenation. The fear of mixed race in the white South continues to seep from the antebellum period to the Jim Crow era. *Light in August* narrates the tragedy of Joe Christmas, who is said to have black ancestry. Without knowing whether Joe murders Joanna Burden, the townspeople in Jefferson manage to hunt him down simply because Joe is a "nigger," which makes a murderer and a rapist.

It seems that Faulkner's works, especially the aforementioned novels, represent a "condensed and concentrated version of a general racial system in the South" (Faulkner in the University 94). Indeed, in his Yoknapatawpha fiction, Faulkner was preoccupied with themes that reflect the mindset and concerns of the white Southerners in the 1920s/1930s, such as the defeat of the Civil War, the fall of the Southern aristocratic family and the anxiety over miscegenation. However, race in Faulkner's "cosmos" does not end in his exposing racism in the Jim Crow South. What makes race in Faulkner's fiction special and important lies in his delicate portrayal and imagination of how race relations and racism can be contrived, passed

on and even transformed from generation (person) to generation (person). Through Faulkner's novels, we can see that white men's racist assumptions of the Negro—to view Negroes as inferior, sinister and menacing—are learned and passed on from families and the white community through psychical effects and affective structure. In *Absalom, Absalom!*, as Henry Sutpen identifies with his father and thus “inherits” from his father's attitude toward racial mixing, Henry revolts against Bon, his mixed race brother, in a way that even the idea of the incestuous engagement between Bon and Caddy does not—on the day Bon arrives to marry Judith, Henry murders him in front of the gates of the Sutpen plantation. In *Intruder in the Dust*, admiring and identifying with his lawyer uncle Gavin Stevens, Chick Mallison assumes and takes his uncle's white supremacist view toward the black and thus expects the Negroes he encounters to act according to a set of Southern racial codes. While race and racism in the South can be contrived and learned through psychical effects, the idea of race in Faulkner's Yoknapatawpha may be transformed and changed through emotions and affect. In *The Sound and the Fury*, Quentin Compson, a displaced Southerner attending Harvard, is shamed by three boys due to his Southern accent. Quentin's accent oddly positions him in the North as someone who “talks like they do in minstrel shows,” someone who talks “like a colored man” (120). With a sense of shame at his “racechange” and his year in the North, where black people are called colored people instead of “niggers,” Quentin's view toward blackness/whiteness starts to change as he comes to realize that “a nigger is not a person so much as a form of behavior; a sort of obverse reflection of the white people he lives among” (86).

Faulkner's treatment of race, in this way, goes beyond the textual level that records and exposes racism in the white South. Although the conception of race and racism is continuously reproduced and inherited through affective bonds in families and the community, Faulkner's “cosmos” proffer readers a possibility that the decades-long racist

perspectives of the black might undergo a change through affective encounters with others. As Faulkner puts emphasis on the psychic and affective role when dealing with racism and race relations, this thesis aims to further explore the interplay of race and affect in fictional Yoknapatawpha and how racism is contrived or transformed through affect. I focus on two texts—*Light in August* and *Intruder in the Dust*—because the affect in *Light* and the affect in *Intruder* operate for different effects. *Light in August* depicts how Joe Christmas, a white man with alleged black blood, comes to learn the meaning of “niggers” and racism, and become “black” through the workings of negative feelings. After thirty years of wandering and searching for who he is, Joe still cannot anchor his identity. His search for a fixed racial identity is constantly deterred by the smell of disgust, fear and anxiety. Do these negative affects account for Joe’s wandering and prevent him from situating himself in one single identity? Besides, I’m intrigued by Faulkner’s recurring references to smell in the text, which assigns smell with women, men and Negroes and coins several terms such as “pinkwomansmelling,” “mansmelling” and the smell of “womanshenegro.” Seeing that the smell of woman and Negro arouses Joe Christmas’ negative feelings, I become interested in looking into how smell and affect work together in Joe’s development of a racial identity.

On the other hand, *Intruder in the Dust* dwells on how a white little boy Chick Mallison changes his view on race relations and racism embedded in the South through the feeling of shame. Chick, like Joe, is under the influence of affect; yet, unlike Joe, Chick seems to be pushed by the affect of shame and think differently in terms of the race relations in the South. I’m interested in how Chick’s shame is deployed in the entire narrative and how shame triggers a change in Chick and the South toward the end of the story. By bringing these two texts into discussion, I believe that more insights into the interaction and interplay between race and affect in Faulkner’s Yoknapatawpha County will be gained.

By studying Faulkner’s treatment of race and affect in *Light in August* and *Intruder in*

the Dust, I wish to ask: what is affect? What has affect done to Joe and Chick? What is the relationship between affect and race? In this chapter, I will first review the existing scholarship on race in Faulkner's novels. Then, I move toward theories of affect to examine the possible role of affect in the construction of identity and race.

I. Race in Faulkner's Novels

Race has been an important factor in William Faulkner's works. In his fictional Yoknapatawpha County, Faulkner demonstrates his thematic preoccupation with issues of race—from the haunting memories of Civil War, the fall of Southern aristocratic families, the white South's anxiety over miscegenation, to the oppression of the black under plantation system. Faulkner also creates unforgettable black characters like Dilsey Gibson, a brave black servant that plays an integral role in *The Sound and the Fury*. With characters like Joe Christmas, a man who cannot be easily categorized as black or white, and Charles Bon, a seemingly godlike creature who is admired by all until his drop of black blood is revealed, Faulkner has resolutely probed the deeply repressed dimensions of race, depicting in novel after novel the perplexing race relations in the South. Thadious M. Davis argues that the construction of race is central to Faulkner's fiction, a remarkable literary achievement “for its insistent racial consciousness, for enabling discourses on race and racial transgressions and transactions not merely in the South but in the United States as a whole” (*Games of Property* 208). With race at the heart of Faulknerian project and his race-infused narratives, how does Faulkner represent race and tackle racism in his fictional Mississippi County? How can we understand Faulkner's treatment of race and the meaning of such design? And how does his construction of race affect our perception of racial identity and subjectivity?

The question of race/race relations in Faulkner's novels has been explored by scholars of different fields and through various perspectives and frameworks. The biologicistic view of

race sees racial differences as part of a natural order of humankind. It equates race with distinct hereditary characteristics. In contrast, the socio-historical approaches, which challenge the social Darwinist and eugenicist assumptions of biologicistic paradigm, understand race based on history and culture. According to Michael Omi and Howard Winant, the decade of the 1920s, during which Faulkner published his first four novels, marks a turning point in the orientation of American racial projects: biologicistic accounts of race rooted in the nineteenth-century science were called into question by the Chicago socialists led by Robert E. Park and Progressivism led by Horace Kallen, whose approach became a key current of ethnicity theory. In other words, race began to move away from a biological absolute to “a *social* category,” “a formation process based on culture and descent” (Omi and Winant 15).

In fact, a great deal of Faulknerian scholarship examines race in Faulkner’s novels as a socio-historical category and approach race/race relations through the lens of Southern historiography. W. J. Cash’s 1941 classic study *The Mind of the South* not only provides a historical background for understanding Faulkner’s two conflicting images of the South—the traditional Old South and the progressive New South—but also conducts a historical inquiry into Southern temperament/feelings (i.e. the sectional pride as frontiersmen and Virginians, or the group identity/mind of white Southerners). Following the analysis of Cash, both Eric J. Sundquist’s *Faulkner: The House Divided* and Thadious M. Davis’ *Faulkner’s “Negro”: Art and the Southern Context* believe that race has already been embedded in Southern history. Sundquist recognizes miscegenation as the “dynamic” of Faulkner’s fiction and identifies the issue of race at the center of the South’s troubled history. His work pays attention to the historical climate of Faulkner’s fiction and aims to examine Faulkner’s treatment of racial issues within relevant historical contexts. Davis’ *Faulkner’s “Negro”* also locates the issue of race and racial identity in the Southern historical context. Davis sees “the Negro” as part of

an abiding pattern of Southern life and reads Faulkner's "Negro" in the cultural contexts of the twenties and thirties. By concentrating on the post Reconstruction era and the Jim Crow South, when white supremacy was not merely ingrained patterns of Southern thought but also accepted institutions, Davis demonstrates that "to consider the social or the historical context of Faulkner's fiction is to evoke the association of 'the Negro'" (14). As the South and "the Negro" are irrevocably intertwined in history, "blackness" becomes an integral part in the collective identity formation of the white South.

Although reading race through the lens of Southern historiography and culture offers thorough accounts of how race relations and "the Negro" are uniquely developed/formed through time and in the American South, the historical approach to race has its limitation. Such a historical/cultural view, similar to biological approaches, still treats race as something rooted in history and social practices, as something fixed and concrete. Seeing race as a historical fact, as the accumulation of history and culture, is thus to take blackness for granted without considering the possibility of moving beyond the fixed models of Southern whites vs. Southern blacks. What's more, to view race/blackness as embedded in Southern historical and social contexts is to see blackness as something with a stable historical content, a content that can be represented and re-articulated again and again. As a result, scholarship which adopts socio-historical approach to race tends to center on the question of whether Faulkner accurately represented the black. Sundquist's essay "Faulkner, Race, and the Forms of American Fiction" addresses the problem of representation by asking: can the black experience be formulated by a white writer? Scholars' opinions vary on whether Faulkner's depiction of black lives is flawed. Craig Werner's "Minstrel Nightmares: Black Dreams of Faulkner's Dreams of Blacks" argues that Faulkner frequently misperceived the underlying dynamic of Afro-American experience. Walter Taylor's "Faulkner's *Reivers*: How to Change the Joke without Slipping the Yoke" suggests that readers could learn little from *Reivers* of

what really happened in the age of Jim Crow since historical events like the lynching of Nelse Patton are never presented in the novel. Rather, Faulkner asks readers to “accept a mind-bending version of history orchestrated to sanctify the social outlook of an archaic class” (128). Ned McCaslin’s comic characterization, Taylor contends, “beams the very loud political message that Jim Crow was not so bad” (128): if a vigorous and intelligent black like Ned could thrive in that era, others could thrive as well. While critics demand for an “authentic” representation of Southern history and black reality, they are at the same time trapped in the somehow fruitless argument as to who among Faulkner’s characters are “stereotypes” and thus “anti-black,” and who are “individuals” and thus “humane and pro-black.”

Other approaches to race, departing from the historical perspective, think of race as abstraction, trope, and metaphor. Lee Jenkins’ *Faulkner and Black-White Relations* takes a psychoanalytic approach to race in Faulkner’s fiction. Jenkins bases his analysis on the premise that in the minds of whites (especially white men), “the black” has become the mythic personification of repressed impulses and desires of whites since the black-white racial lines are projections from fractures in the white ego. Davis’ *Faulkner’s “Negro,”* in addition to reading race as historical product, tackles race from the question of form: she argues that “the Negro” functions not only as character but also as an artistic abstraction, as an aesthetic and cultural form, a disembodied myth in the South’s psyche, from which derives Faulkner’s creativity. Lothar Honnighausen’s “Black as White Metaphor: A European View of Faulkner’s Fiction” is aware of the metaphoric dimension of Faulkner’s character drawing: by studying Quentin Compson’s stream of consciousness in *The Sound and the Fury*. Honnighausen observes a white imagination at work, which generates black metaphors. The black, especially in Faulkner’s earlier novels, appear as a cultural metaphor, as “a form of behaviour,” and as “an indicator of the moral condition of white society” (196).

James A. Snead, Philip M. Weinstein, and Theresa Towner all deal with race and race-bound identity through language practices. Snead's "*Light in August* and the Rhetorics of Racial Division" believes that Faulkner's racial construction lies not in his actual black/white characters but in his rhetorical modes: by studying the role of racist tropes in Faulkner's discourse readers are able to see how Joe Christmas resists the signification of either black or white. Weinstein's "Race" suggests that race in Faulkner's fiction is a mode of writing, a discursive dynamic. Both Weinstein's essay and Towner's *Faulkner on the Color Line* examine the racialized language in Faulkner's fiction and focus on Lucas Beauchamp's subjectivity and racial identity by analyzing "the language games" (Weinstein 65). Also, both Weinstein and Towner pay attention to how Faulkner revisits his materials, submits them to new perspectives: he rescripts his materials, sees them as "objects with no inherent meaning but rather capable of taking on new meanings when inserted within new signifying economies" (80). That is, Faulkner's writing and rewriting lead to the understanding that subjects are produced in and by language, and to the discovery that racial identity may be a matter more of discursive practice than of biological destiny.

Laura Doyle's "The Body against Itself in Faulkner's Phenomenology of Race" discusses the phenomenology of race in *Light in August* by studying the slippages of the novel's narrative form and Joe's race. Aside from the central textual loophole of the murder scene, the narrative keeps eliding Joe's racial identity and leaves such a narrative gap as the blank moment onto which the social body projects its problematics. Race in Faulkner's work, Doyle argues, is exposed as "an empty category, undefinable and unverifiable, projected on the 'coloured' or 'white' body from the outside" (340). John N. Duvall's *Race and White Identity in Southern Fiction* reads the relation between blackness and whiteness through the performance of race: by investigating Faulkner's use of the minstrels in whiteface (i.e. white characters perform blackness), Duvall suggests that "blackness" is never an essence but a

cultural trope for otherness and dissonance. The blackness of Faulkner's white characters is often associated with their problematic relation to other categories of identity, such as sexuality or class, with a variety of non-heteronormativity (e.g. homosexual, bisexual, incestuous) that defies cultural taboos. Therefore, blackness as figuration, unhinged from "the Negro," does not belong to any one individual or group. Instead, individuals or groups appropriate this nuanced racial signifier in order to circumscribe its boundaries or to exclude other individuals or groups.

Approaching race as an abstraction, as a metaphor, as discursive practices, or as a cultural trope suggests that race is not something fixed and stable but a form/signifier with no inherent meaning. In this way, reading Faulkner's construction of race as figuration challenges the taken-for-grantedness of blackness as a result of historical formation, and questions the rigid binary of black and white. In other words, race as trope/metaphor brings us to rethink what it means by blackness and its relation to whiteness. The creation of minstrels in whiteface in Duvall's *Race and White Identity*, for example, exhibits the ambiguity of black-white opposition: Faulkner's use of figurative blackness to imagine a way to perform Southern white male identity indicates "the fissures in the white-Negro opposition" (27) and calls the existing binary racial model into question.

In this thesis, to continue existing scholarly efforts to de-essentialize racial categories, I move toward the theories of affect and propose to approach Faulkner's construction of race through the lens of affect, based on my readings of two novels: *Light in August* and *Intruder in the Dust*. The affective approach to race continues to question in Faulkner's texts the Southern racial thinking that opposes blacks to whites, and to reveal the fact that the racial divisions are ambiguous and unstable. In addition, the affective approach complicates the relation between race as historical category and race as trope. Through affect, an important but often neglected element in race/race relations, we are able to discover that race is not *just*

a historical product or an abstraction but an intricate entanglement/interplay of history and form. The study of affect provides further insights on Faulkner's construction of race: affect not only highlights the interstices between historical and figurative dimension of race but also demonstrates its capacity to actively intervene in the representation of black-white relations; affect proffers a possibility to move beyond historical models of racial relations, and to imagine racial boundaries/lines not as premised upon genealogy or historical formation but as a sense of affiliation. Before delving into how affect can better inform the racial complexity in Faulkner's fiction, I will first discuss the specific qualities of affect and how these qualities may open up an affective perspective on racial discourse.

II. Affect and Race

Both Patricia Ticineto Clough's *The Affective Turn* and Ruth Leys' "The Turn to Affect" observe an "affective turn" in humanities and social sciences. Such a focus on affect is in fact in line with some of the existing trends in research that challenges how the mind and body, reason and the passions have been thought to operate. Clough suggests that the focus on the body, which has been extensively advanced by feminist theorists such as Judith Butler and Elizabeth Grosz, is also the concern of affect theorists. In a similar vein, Leys highlights the significance of affect in forming judgments. Drawing from Brian Massumi's account that "affects must be noncognitive, corporeal processes or states [. . .] prior to intentions, meanings, reasons, and beliefs" (437), Leys argues that philosophers and critics (Kantians, neo-Kantians, Habermasians) have overvalued the role of reason and rationality and "largely neglected the important role our corporeal affective dispositions play in thinking, reasoning, and reflection" (436).

In fact, Massumi's "The Autonomy of Affect" and *Parables for the Virtual* have proffered a thorough discussion on the relation of affect and reasons and argue that "affect is

irreducibly bodily and autonomic” (*Parables for the Virtual* 28). He defines affect as nonsignifying, nonconscious experiences of bodily energy/intensity, disconnected from the subjective, signifying, functional-meaning making axis. Although affect is registered in the bodily experiences, it is *nonconscious* in that it is outside the individual’s conscious awareness. There is a gap between affect system and intention/meaning/cognition. In other words, affect is a matter of autonomic responses to the stimuli impinging on the body; such responses precede cognitive processing.

The specific quality of affect as autonomous calls the self-determination of individuals into question. The autonomy of affect is beyond the ability of any individual to direct or control, posing a direct challenge to the autonomy of the individual. In other words, affect challenges the humanist concept of “man” as a subject that possesses free will, a subject that can freely determine his/her actions through reasoning. Massumi’s “The Autonomy of Affect” problematizes individual’s free will, suggesting that will and consciousness are “limitative, derived functions that reduce a complexity too rich to be functionally expressed” (90). Indeed, affect supersedes the polarized system of human free will and “unfree” drives: affect’s forces, prior to intentions and reasons, are not subject to individual’s will but help determine actions. Silvan Tomkins also suggests that in terms of affect, human beings should be thought of as a “feedback system rather than a communication system” (Sedgwick and Frank 36). Affect therefore pushes us to rethink what it means by individuality, and to contest the idea of autonomy and free will.

In addition to questioning the concept of an individual who acts at its own will, affect theories continue to explore the question of self in relation to the social. While affect is autonomic, involuntary and physiological, it is also inseparably intertwined with the social. Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth’s “An Inventory of Shimmers” identifies affect as “*in-between-ness*,” a body’s capacity to affect and to be affected. Seigworth and Gregg

consider affect synonymous with *force-relations* or *forces of encounter*. Affect thus is not self-contained individual feelings but derives from bodily responses to the environment and circulates among bodies. In other words, affect is found in the passages of forces/intensities between bodies, moving in and out of a body as a response to the environment. In this ever-gathering accretion of force-relations lie the real powers of affect: affect can drive a body, marked in its various encounters with forces, to shift its affections (its being-affected) into action (capacity to affect). That is to say, affect moves beyond its bodily autonomic response and can become its own extra-bodily force, in relation to a world populated by other beings and things. Affect is thus a body's processing of and responding to social conditions.

Teresa Brennan's *The Transmission of Affect* further delves into the sociality of affect, its bodily processes in relation to social phenomenon. Like Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, Brennan sees affect as mobile force that moves across bodies, and thus argues that affect is transmittable: one can feel the others' affect or the "atmosphere." Transmission of affect captures "a process that is social in origin but physical/biological in effect" (3): the energetic affect of others enter the person, and the person's affect, in turn, is transmitted to the environment. Thus, affect does not only arise within a particular person but also comes from interactions with other people and an environment.

How does the sociality of affect challenge the idea of a racial identity as intact and distinct from others? What does Brennan's theory on the transmission of affect push one to reconsider the relation between selves and others? First, the transmission of affect, Brennan argues, indicates that our affect is not exclusively ours and that there is no secure distinction between individuals and their surroundings since affect continuously flows in and out of both. That is, the idea of transmitted affect undermines and breaches the dichotomy between the individual and the environment. Second, as the taken-for-granted boundary between an individual and the environment is called into question, the fluidity/mobility of affect, as

Brennan claims, challenges “the self-contained Western identity” (12). Brennan’s historical inquiry shows that the transmission of affect did not fade from the history until the idea of self-contained individual came to the fore. Indeed, ideas of transmitted affect were current in premodern European history. They lost ground only after the seventeenth century, when the development of the concept of self-contained self and individual rationality denied that an individual was indebted to what is beyond the boundary of a physical body. The new “free” individual was born at the expense of the operation of affect.

Brennan further demonstrates that such a “self-contained Western identity” is formed by the self’s “projecting outside” unwanted affects such as anxiety and depression in a process commonly known as “othering.” That is, identity is based on forming “boundaries” by projection. Brennan terms such a projection of unwanted, negative affect onto the other—usually a woman, a subjugated race—as “the foundational fantasy.” For Brennan, this foundational fantasy governs Western modernity, creating the binary divisions between selves and others, subjects and objects. In contrast, by highlighting the transmission of affect, Brennan brings up a new paradigm: the mobility and sociality of transmitted affect is able to bypass the foundational fantasy and proffer a possibility to see identity not as premised on self-containment but as a dynamic interaction with other people and the surroundings.

By challenging the self-contained identity and calling the boundaries between selves and others, subjects and objects into question, the theories of affect shed new light on the construction of race. Sara Ahmed’s *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* shows how racism, or relations of othering, works through emotions. She considers racism a dynamic of affect, an affective form of contact. When a white racist subject encounters a racial other, he/she may experience an intensity of emotions (fear, hate, disgust and pain): the intensification involves moving away from the body of the other, or moving towards that body in an act of violence. The moment of contact is influenced by past histories of contact (e.g. legends, stories, and

history), which allow the proximity of a racial other to be perceived as threatening. Ahmed takes Frantz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* for example to show how a white little boy's fear of a Negro passing by—the fear that “the nigger's going to eat me up” (63)—is generated by rehearsing the past associations (i.e. the anecdotes of “the Negro” the child learned in the past). Yet, affect is not simply defined in relationship to the past, nor as a mere reaction to fixed accounts of the other's being; affect may instead move/slide across signs and bodies, and open up unexpected ways of perceptions and interactions with “others” in different everyday contexts. Ahmed takes Audre Lorde's *Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches* for example. In her critiques of racism against black women, Lorde writes powerfully that her anger of racism “express[es] and translate[s] into action in the service of [feminists'] vision [. . .] Anger is loaded with information and energy” (175). For Lorde, anger as an affect expresses and translates her experiences with racism into feminist knowledge and action. Anger is visionary. It pushes for one's imagining a different kind of world in its very energy by energizing subjects to “move from anger into a different bodily world” (175). For Ahmed, who pays attention to how affect impacts on racism, affect is not always determined by the past; more often than not it evokes a movement toward the different and the future.

As in Lorde's case, wherein anger becomes an affective force to translate her racial experience into action, shame might be another affect that possesses such transformative power. Elspeth Probyn's *Blush: Faces of Shame* discusses shame's positive and productive role and proposes a possibility to challenge the ideals in shame. Probyn argues that the feeling of shame teaches us to recognize our relations to others, makes us feel proximity differently, and enables us to understand the body's relation to itself. She suggests: “In shame, the feeling and minding and thinking and social body comes alive. It's in this sense that shame is positive and productive, even or especially when it feels bad” (34-35). Drawing on

Silvan Tomkins' study on shame, moreover, Probyn shows that shame and interest are intimately connected: we would not feel shame if we don't care for the other, or ourselves. Once interest has been felt and when it has been ripped from us, the disappointment of loss would translate into shame that attacks our sense of self: the inside of who we think we are is suddenly displayed for all to judge. Thus, shame not only reminds us of what we hold dear, or what constitutes an essential part of ourselves, but also questions our value system. In this way, shame is productive and transformative in that it compels an involuntary and immediate reassessment of self.

With the aforementioned discussions on affect, I would like to ask in my thesis: how can theories of affect shed fresh light on the construction of race in Faulkner's fiction? By considering race and racism a dynamic of affect, as Ahmed has suggested, can race and race relations in Faulkner's fiction be read as an effect of affect, or an affective form of encounter? In addition, could Brennan's ideas of transmitted affect, which put emphasis on affect's mobility and sociality, help provide an alternative for us to investigate racial identities in Faulkner's texts not as premised upon self-containment, but as dynamic interactions with other people and the environment? As Ahmed demonstrates how racism works through emotions, affect, in some scenarios of racial encounters, is confined to past histories of contact (e.g. the white little boy's fear of a Negro in Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*); in other cases, affect may explore unexpected ways of everyday interactions and motivate subjects to imagine a different kind of relations of othering (e.g. Audre Lorde's anger of racism). With affect's complex relation with the past and present, the perspective of affect, I presume, can open up possibilities to situate racial relations in Faulkner's fiction not simply within historical confinements but in the dynamics of everyday experiences. Such dynamics push for a different way of understanding race that is not fully determined by the past and points toward the future.

III. Chapters

This thesis consists of three main chapters. In this introductory chapter, I propose to read how Faulkner represents race in *Light in August* and *Intruder in the Dust* through the lens of affect. First, I review existing approaches to Faulkner's construction of race. Then, I move toward theories of affect. By engaging in dialogue with different affect theorists, I argue that affect plays an important role in formulating race and challenging racial lines through its dynamic interactions with others in the context of everyday experiences.

Chapter two looks into the workings of negative affect and its intersection with smell in *Light in August*. I delve into Joe Christmas' troubled racial identity through his affective encounters with the smell of others—the dietitian, Mr. McEachern, the black girl, Bobbie Allen, and Joanna Burden. I argue that smell plays an important part in generating negative affect—disgust, fear and anxiety—in Joe yet at the same time catalyzing his sense of being an other from within. I demonstrate how each olfactory encounter arouses Joe's anxiety and disgust and pushes him off any stable self-identification. From these, I further attach the concept of “blackness” to the sense of self-uncertainty and identity instability. That being said, to examine Joe's racial identity is to investigate the process of his becoming “black” through the interplay of olfaction, disgust, fear and anxiety.

Chapter three investigates what shame does to Chick Mallison, a young white boy, and his stance toward racism in *Intruder in the Dust*. I look into how shame not only unsettles Chick's racial identity but also pushes for his new way of understanding race and race relations through his encounters with Lucas Beauchamp, a black man to whom Chick owes money. I argue that shame as the affective force works to move Chick out of his original racial position and unmoors the boundaries of race and racial identity. I suggest that in *Intruder in the Dust*, shame is the ultimate binding force throughout the story, urging the protagonist Chick to take action. Shame not only confronts and re-formulates Chick's sense

of self and racial identity, but also changes his perception of race relations in Jefferson community. Such affective force compels Chick to save the wronged Lucas while his fellow townspeople refuse to do so. As in *Light in August* where affect works at the core of racial relations and the formulation of Joe's racial identity, shame propels Chick's changing perception of his racial position and demonstrates that racial lines are changeable through how one feels.



Chapter Two

The Smell of “Womanshenegro”:

Negative Affect and Identity Instability in *Light in August*

William Faulkner’s *Light in August* is a book of outcasts, of those who breach social, racial and gender codes in the white South of America. Set in the climate of racial segregation during the thirties, the story centers on two “foreigners” who come at different times to the small town of Jefferson in Mississippi. The novel in fact interweaves the stories of several white characters who are seen as strangers and outcasts in the community: Lena Grove, a pregnant young girl in search for her baby’s father; Reverend Gail Hightower, a forced retired minister leading an isolated life in the community; Joanna Burden, a spinster of forty, despised by Jefferson citizens because of her Yankee abolitionist father; and Joe Christmas, who is said to have black ancestry and thus receives scorn and contempt from Jefferson community. Eventually, Faulkner drew these characters into the mysteries revolving around Joe Christmas, who is accused of murdering Joanna Burden and is therefore shot by a white vigilante.

As Eric J. Sundquist suggests that the Negro and the problem of miscegenation constitute the tragic center of Faulkner’s major work and the South’s troubled history, Joe Christmas, in particular, embodies the South’s anxiety over miscegenation and transgression due to his racial and even sexual ambiguity. When asked at the University of Virginia about Joe’s uncertain racial background, Faulkner ascribed Joe’s tragedy to not knowing what he was—“that was his tragedy, that to me was the tragic, central idea of the story—that he didn’t know what he was and there was no way possible in life for him to find out” (Gwynn and Blotner 72). Indeed, it is hard to pin down who Joe is since his racial ambiguity is “at the root of many of his problems and the problems of those who try to define him” (Robinson 119).

Yet, critics have tried to interpret and make sense of Joe's identity from different perspectives. Philip M. Weinstein suggests that ideological narratives construct Joe's race: major characters such as McEachern and Joanna Burden play crucial roles in forming Joe's racial identity in that these people are "not so much single human beings as ideological sites" (124) that bespeak the long-established Southern norms. Laura L. Bush and Lisa K. Nelson identify both biblical mythology and the black rapist myth as crucial factors in constructing Joe's racial and gender identity. While Bush reads Joe with biblical allusions and sees him as a Christ-like victim, Nelson argues that Faulkner critiques such myths by having Joe perform within both ideological narratives but at the same time refuse confinement by either narrative. Sharing a similar view with Nelson, Seongho Yoon reads Joe Christmas as an undecipherable sign of race in the South: on the one hand, he is raced since his body could project all the racial anxieties of the South; on the other, he is unraced since he is a trope of "nothing" that calls into question the presuppositions of fixed and stable racial identity. Other critics such as Krister Friday, Owen Robinson, and Michael Cobb examine Joe's identity through its relation with language and time. Friday sees race in *Light in August* not as an ontology but as a temporal condition and a means of figuring an always unfinished relationship to the past. While Robinson suggests that to consider Joe's identity is to engage with a network of voices to "write" him since his life is framed by the constant use of key terms such as "Negro" and "nigger," Cobb argues that Joe's blasphemous rhetoric of religion confuses and challenges the temporal taxonomy of black and white (i.e. whites live in historical narratives of progress whereas blacks live outside of Western historical events).

Most critics attend to Joe's "rootlessness" right from the start and read Joe's identity as a troubled construct, a construct by ideological narratives, by racial anxieties, by the rhetoric of Southern racial codes or by temporality. Continuing with the perception of Joe's identity as a construct, I intend to look into the construction of his race-bound identity through the role

affect and smell play in his encounters/interactions with other characters. In *Light in August*, Faulkner devotes a great length to depicting Joe's past, his history of encountering with other people. In fact, Joe Christmas is one of the most thoroughly portrayed characters in Faulkner's work: the "history" of Joe—from his childhood days at the orphanage and in his foster father McEachern's house, to the relationships with Bobbie in his teens and Joanna in his thirties—goes on for hundreds of pages in the novel. Weinstein even remarks in *Faulkner's Subject*, "there is no body in Faulkner's work more patiently depicted, none more variously abused, than Joe Christmas" (124). What's more, the detailed depiction of Joe's encounters with others are mostly mediated by smell and the affect evoked by smell: Joe constantly experiences negative affect such as anxiety and disgust when he is in contact with "womansmelling" and "negro smell." What does such smell do to Joe? Why would smell generate anxiety and disgust in Joe? How have Joe's affective encounters with the smell of others influenced the development of his racial identity?

The attention to the effect of smell in *Light in August* is significant also because the study of olfaction has received so far little attention in philosophical, scientific and literary studies. Danuta Fjellestad traces the references to smell in the philosophical discourse and notices that few philosophers hold positive views on smell. Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* even dismisses smell as the most dispensable organic sense, which produces the act of aversion and the feeling of nausea and disgust. Both Fjellestad and Constance Classen attribute the marginalization of smell to the Enlightenment project of deodorizing the public space and privilege the intellect over the body. What's more, regression of smell is seen as a must of the development of human civilization by some psychologists. For example, Sigmund Freud in *Civilization and its Discontents* posits a direct connection between olfaction and sexuality, and claims that the gradual atrophy of smell is

coupled by an increased role of visual stimulation in sexual attraction.¹ In addition, in the realm of literary criticism, smell is one of the most neglected subjects in comparison with other senses. So far the only book-length investigation into literary imagination of smell, Fjellestad suggests, is Hans J. Rindisbacher's *The Smell of Books: A Cultural-Historical Study of Olfactory Perception in Literature* published in 1992. The lack of critical investment in the representation of smell in literature shows that the body in Western culture is gendered, raced and classed but remains odorless.

Despite the absence of literary criticism, there are plenty of references to smell in literature. Fjellestad suggests that while the sense of smell rarely plays a structural and thematic role in pre-modernist literary texts, in modernist literature the olfactory surfaces as an essential element of the plot in the novel. She lists various modernist novels, such as Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past*, Joyce's *Ulysses* and Faulkner's *As I Lay Dying*, where odors and smell occupy an important place. Rindisbacher even sees the olfactory as the defining feature of modernism.² In particular, Faulkner's use of multiple senses across several of his novels has gained a growing attention in Faulkner studies. Paul Carmignani sketches out the recurrence and convergence of smell and scents across Faulkner's multiple texts in his "Olfaction in Faulkner's Fiction." Carmignani classifies Faulkner's olfactory language into three categories: smell as the sense of reminiscence (childhood scents), smell as carnal (odor di femina), and smell as moral judgment (fragrances and miasmas). Terri

¹ In *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud notes the "organic repression" of the role of smell. As man assumed an upright position, his visual sensations replaced the olfactory as the primary source of sexual stimulation. When man's nostrils moved from their close proximity to the ground, and therefore to intermittent odors of menstruation—odors which regulated sexual functions—the role of smell became less important. Man's rise resulted in a more constant sexual process based on visual stimulus.

² Hans J. Rindisbacher's *The Smell of Books: A Cultural Historical Study of Olfactory Perception in Literature* suggests that it is sufficient to define modernism from the phenomenological angle in that "the surfacing of the olfactory is an essential element in [modernist] writing" (146). Authors such as Hugo (1802-85), Baudelaire (1821-67), Zola (1841-1902), Huysmans (1848-1907), Wild (1854-1900), and a little later, Proust (1871-1922) and Joyce (1882-1941) all use the olfactory element in their oeuvres. The above list of authors demonstrate the olfactory as an important component in their textual strategies to an extent unimaginable for their bourgeois realist and Victorian predecessors.

Smith Ruckel's dissertation expands our understanding of the senses by showing how Faulkner's repeated incorporation of smells in his texts reveals his resistance to Enlightenment thinking that has privileged mind over matter. Following Carmignani's categorization, Ruckel delves into how smell is connected to memory, sexuality and ethical response to the Other. A more recent dissertation by Laura R. Davis focuses on how smell and other senses are used to divide and identify the race, class gender and queer, and to unify members of the same identity categories. Briefly, in Faulkner's novels, male and female, white and black are categorized by smell, which is used to maintain power structures and dominance in the South.

While these three scholars all engage with the categorization and connotations of smell in Faulkner's fiction, what smell does to each character and the affective response smell generates remain largely unexamined. Instead of seeing smell as an indication of the boundaries of racial and gender identity, I intend to explore the affective role of smell in *Light in August*. I argue that smell plays an important part in generating negative affect—disgust, fear and anxiety—in Joe which further catalyzes his sense of being an other from within. As Faulkner has suggested, Joe's tragedy lies in his not knowing what he is. The novel's frequent references to the "parchment color" of Joe's skin keeps reminding the reader of the uncertainty of his racial identity. Alfred Kazin even sees Joe as a "*tabula rasa*, a white sheet of paper" (248) that can be written out any identity. Without knowing his "core," Joe, as "a white sheet of paper," spends his life seeking for a secure and stable identity and continues to experiment on who/what he is with people he encounters. In what follows, I will probe into the passages of Joe's identity search and the development of his "black" identification through his olfactory encounters with the dietitian, his stepfather McEachern, the black girl, a black neighborhood, Bobbie Allen and Joanna Burden.

I. The Dietitian

Joe's earliest understanding of who he is comes from the smell of the dietitian at the orphanage, his feeling of disgust and the word "nigger." At first, he associates "womansmelling" with the dietitian's "pink worm coil smooth and cool" toothpaste (112). For him, the paste, as well as the dietitian, is sweet. As a five-year-old child, Joe links the dietitian with something pleasing—young, smooth, pink-and-white—which also makes his mouth think of something pinkcolored, "something sweet and sticky to eat" (112). However, such a "pinkwomansmelling" (114) association with the dietitian is transformed into disgust, a bad taste, after Joe's accidental encounter with the dietitian's lovemaking with the young intern doctor in the orphanage. Once, as he sneaks into her room to steal some of her toothpaste as usual, the dietitian and her companion enter the room, which drives Joe to hide behind a cloth curtain, among soft womangarments. While listening to the dietitian's tense whispering voice and other sounds he does not know, Joe squeezes and ruins the entire cylinder tube, automatically smearing one "cool invisible worm" of paste after another into his mouth. The overwhelming sweet paste, intertwined with the "soft womansmelling garments and shoes" (113) and the strange rustlings, sickens Joe: he begins to sweat as he forces himself to smear another worm of paste which his stomach does not want. Eating too much, Joe feels the swallowed paste inside him is "trying to get back out" (114) into the air. What is within him becomes something unfamiliar and unrecognizable, an object which threatens to break the boundary between inside and outside. Eventually, he vomits. The dietitian drags him out of his "pinkfoamed" vomit behind the curtain: the paste now is no longer sweet. It has transformed from sweetness into vomit, into disgust, and the dietitian's pink-and-white face, which used to have pleasing associations, has changed into a furious woman hissing him as "little nigger bastard" (114). In this way, the dietitian's sweet paste is no longer an object of love and pleasure but of "astonishment, shock, outrage" (117). The

“pinkwomansmelling” dietitian now does not arouse Joe’s desire for candy but disgust and aversion. While the dietitian afterwards tries to bribe Joe with a silver dollar to prevent him from telling the director of the orphanage what he has seen, the dollar she offers only evokes in Joe “ranked tubes of toothpaste” and therefore his whole being “coil[s] in a rich and passionate revulsion” (117). Why does Joe feel disgusted? How do the toothpaste and the dietitian turn from Joe’s object of love, of pleasure, into an object of aversion? How does this incident relate to the formulation of Joe’s racial identity?

Before I move on to answer these questions, it is important to first unpack the meaning of “feeling disgust.” Generally, disgust, which etymologically means “bad taste,” derives from bad objects that we are afraid to incorporate. We assume such quality of “badness” is inherent in the objects. However, the question of what “tastes bad” is bound up with the question of familiarity and strangeness: objects that appear stranger-than-me, or stranger-to-me might trigger disgust. The badness, or the “offensiveness” of an object, therefore is not an inherent quality but is attributed to the object. It is also a question of proximity: the proximity of the bodies of others is the cause of our sickness. The object must have got close enough to make us feel disgusted. Oftentimes, disgust is provoked by smell or food not only because disgust is a matter of taste and touch, but also because smell and food are “inhaled” and “taken into” the subject’s body. The fear of contamination that provokes the nausea of disgust reactions hence makes food and smell the very “stuff” of disgust. In other words, disgust happens within the mouth/lungs of the one who tastes/smells, within the “inter-corporeal encounter of incorporation and ingestion” (Ahmed 83).

Sarah Ahmed further complicates the idea of disgust. She suggests that disgust is deeply ambivalent: it involves a desire for, or an attraction by, the very objects that are felt to be repellent. On the one hand, disgust pulls us away from the object, a pulling that feels almost involuntary. On the other hand, a desire would pull us towards the objects, and opens us up to

the bodies of others, “keep[ing] the orifices of the body open” (83). That is, disgust involves not simply distantiation (recoiling), but also the intensification of bodily contact that “disturbs” the skin with the possibility of desire. Other scholars also demonstrate that desire and disgust “are dialectically conjoined” (Ngai 333). As William Miller notes, “even as the disgusting repels, it rarely does so without also capturing our attention. It imposes itself upon us. We find it hard not to sneak a second look or, less voluntarily, we find our eyes doing ‘double-takes’ at the very things that disgust us” (x).³

We can now return to the dietitian’s case. Joe’s encounter with the dietitian vividly demonstrates how one’s desire is turned into disgust. Joe’s disgust originates from his desire and attraction to something sweet to eat and the “pinkwomansmelling” dietitian. With his witness of her lovemaking with the intern doctor in a close distance, with the sweet paste transformed into vomit, and with the pink-and-white dietitian changed into a woman with “wild and disheveled hair” (114) bashing at him, Joe’s desire is reversed into disgust, along with shame and terror. After the incident, when offered a dollar by the dietitian, Joe cannot help but feel repulsive: the feeling of disgust pulls him away from her and makes him exclaim, “I don’t want no more” (117). In addition, Joe’s disgust at the dietitian also indicates a sense of self-disgust—the disgust directed at his object of love is also directed at himself. Hence, the dietitian’s hissing him as “nigger bastard” for one thing links Joe with “nigger” and for another associates “nigger/Negro” with the feeling of disgust. Through Joe’s olfactory encounter with the dietitian, the sign of “nigger,” coupled with disgust and fear, is attached to his own identity. Such a connection between him and “nigger” and disgust persists in Joe’s other encounters later on, and contributes to his becoming “black” as the narrative moves on.

³ What Miller brings up here is derived from Freud’s discussion on the relation between disgust and desire. Miller suggests that “the disgusting itself has the power to allure,” particularly as an object created by social taboos and prohibitions (111). Disgust “acts as a barrier to satisfying unconscious desire. [. . .] a reaction formation, in which role disgust joins with shame and morality to work as a dam to hold back the sexual instinct” (109).

II. McEachern

Being adopted by Mr. and Mrs. McEachern at age five, Joe tried hard to follow his foster father as McEachern attempts to mold Joe into his own design, his belief of what a Southern man should be. Harsh and ruthless, McEachern asks Joe to act in a certain way: to memorize the catechism, to work hard on the farm, and to avoid women. It seems that Joe has assumed the white male values McEachern passes on to him—being willful, strong, virile and ruthless. More than once, Joe expresses his solidarity and likeness with his foster father—how he and McEachern could always “count upon one another” (149)—despite McEachern’s constant corporal punishment and injustice on him. Even if whipped by McEachern’s harness strap, Joe seems to identify with the strap—“an odor of clean hard virile living leather” (139), which smells like the man smells. While Joe appears to internalize the white male code in the South, he shows extreme aversion and anger at Mrs. McEachern. Soft and timid, Mrs. McEachern has always been kind to Joe. As a silent, cringing and somewhat invisible presence in the family, she tries to earn her son’s love and respect by countering her husband’s violence with excessive doting and kindness. Whenever Joe is punished by his foster father and not allowed to eat, Mrs. McEachern would bring him a tray of food, which Joe takes and angrily dumps upside down in the corner. It seems that it is not Mr. McEachern and the stern punishment he hates, but Mrs. McEachern, his foster mother, “that soft kindness which he [Joe] believed himself doomed to be forever victim of and which he hated worse than he did the hard and ruthless justice of men” (158).

In fact, Joe’s aversion and anger are not directed at Mrs. McEachern but at what she does. She acts the opposite of the white male code, of what Mr. McEachern has taught him—to be strong, willful and ruthless. Just as his foster father imposes on Joe an identity of a white Southern male, Mrs. McEachern demonstrates to Joe, by treating him with her excessive kindness and by secretly breaking the rules Mr. McEachern sets, that there is

another set of codes to perform. Yet, without a concrete identity from the outset, Joe does not know if the identity Mrs. McEachern suggests is what he wants. As Joe manages to identify himself with Mr. McEachern, with the “odor of clean hard virile living leather” and to assimilate the white male values, Mrs. McEachern’s attempt terrifies and unsettles him. In order to secure his identity as a white man, he reacts with violence and disgust: he throws away the food his foster mother brings him with revulsion, and accuses her that ““she was trying to make me cry. Then she thinks that they would have had me”” (158). Joe’s aversion and disgust at Mrs. McEachern thus works as his defense mechanism to secure the identity he assumes and the racial codes he upholds.

III. The Black Girl

As Joe identifies himself as a white Southern man, links the (white) male smell with the quality of cleanness, sternness and virility, and acts accordingly, it seems that Joe finally pins down what he is. However, his contact with the smell of the black girl shows otherwise. At the age of fourteen, Joe and the other farm boys lure a young black woman into a darkened shed to have sex. When it is Joe’s turn, he enters into the shed:

At once, he was overcome by a terrible haste. There was *something* in him trying to get out, like when he had used to think of toothpaste. But he could not move at once, standing there, smelling the woman, smelling the negro all at once; *enclosed* by the womanshenegro [. . .] Then it seemed to him he could see her—something, prone, abject: her eyes perhaps. Leaning, he seemed to look down into a black well and at the bottom saw two glints like reflection of dead stars. [. . .] He kicked her hard, kicking into and through a choked wail of surprise and fear. She began to scream, he jerking her up, clutching her by the arm, hitting at her with wide, wild blows, striking at the voice perhaps, feeling her flesh anyway, enclosed by the

womanshenegro and the haste (emphasis mine 147).

Upon entering the black shed, Joe is stepping into an unfamiliar contact zone with the black girl. Enclosed in the shed, he is encompassed by black air and black smell, which overcome him with “a terrible haste.” Then, the smell of the “womanshenegro” is taken into Joe’s body through his sensuous proximity with the black girl—he is moving and his foot touches her. Once the smell permeates into his entire body, the fear of contamination prompts Joe to react: feeling disgusted, he tries to expel the smell of womanshenegro by kicking the black girl repeatedly. The fear of incorporation, of being “enclosed by the womanshenegro” and by “the black well” generates Joe’s feeling of disgust and his eagerness to secure the borderline between his body and “the abject.” However, it is Joe’s attempt to maintain the border that suggests the insecurity of the boundary: there is “something in him” trying to get out as soon as he “smells” the black girl. As disgust also involves with a desire for, an attraction by the very object that is felt repulsive, Joe’s olfactory contact with the black girl seems to elicit his ambivalent desire—his attraction to the women and the black, or to be more precise, to the womanliness and blackness. With Kristeva’s concept of abjection, what Joe abjects and disgusts—the undesirable quality of weakness and submissiveness—comes from within rather than from without. Like the pink worms of toothpaste that threaten to get out, the smell of womanshenegro generates both Joe’s repulsion and attraction to the womanliness and blackness within him.

With Ahmed’s discussion on the relation between disgust and borderline, I intend to push forward: Why is Joe attracted to, or prone to the impact of “blackness” and “womanliness”? What do blackness and womanliness suggest? Studying the ambivalence of the borderline between subjects and objects, Ahmed argues that disgust at once strives to maintain the distinction and undo the boundaries in the moment of encounter. We’ve learned that disgust operates in the contact zone: it is not that the object has the quality of “badness”

but the proximity of the object to the body is felt as bad. It is through such a sensuous proximity that the object is felt offensive and “over takes the body” (85). In other words, proximity renders the body/subject a certain vulnerability, “an openness to be affected” (89). While the subject seeks to secure the border through pulling away as a response of being disgusted, it also indicates that what makes the boundary insecure is the possibility that what is “me” can slide into what is *not* me, a slippage that would threaten the ontology of being “apart” from others. Drawing from Silva Tomkins’ *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness: The Negative Affects*, Ahmed concludes, “anything which has had contact with disgusting things itself becomes disgusting” (87).

In the case of Joe, as Ahmed suggests, in the moment of proximity of the smell of the “womanshenegro,” the intimate contact renders Joe’s body vulnerable to certain extent: it opens up the body to be affected by the object, “keep[ing] the orifices of the body open” (83). The contact zone thus becomes contagious as Joe’s body is prone to all kinds of forces and smell. However, in addition to the proximity, the uncertainty of Joe’s identity subjects him even more to the impact of affective forces and of womanliness and blackness. That is, Joe’s attraction and susceptibility to womanliness and blackness stem from the fact that he is not sure of his racial identity. Although Joe tries to stick to the identity as a white man, not being sure of what he is, his contact with the smell of “womanshenegro” triggers his anxiety, arousing his fear of not being white enough. Joe’s turning away in disgust, in order to secure the boundary between subject and the “womanshenegro,” between his “whiteness/manliness” and her “blackness/womanliness,” demonstrates that the border of self and other is insecure in the first place. Ahmed pinpoints that in the moment of proximity, the insecurity of the boundary is manifested in the slippage that what is “me” can slide into what is “not me.” In Joe’s encounter with the black girl, his racial uncertainty not only indicates that he is prone to the influence and attraction of blackness and womanliness but also suggests that what is “not

me”—the blackness and womanliness—might have already existed within “me.” With his biological father unknown, Joe’s fear that he might be “an other,” a part Negro, a white man that is not white and manly enough, is rooted in his idea of self from the start. Thus, Joe’s sense of otherness both comes from within (i.e. his racial uncertainty casts a sense of being an other at the core of his identity) and without (i.e. the slippage of what is “not me” into what is “me” at the moment of proximity). While Joe strives to assimilate himself into the category of “white man,” the possibility that he is *not*, the possibility of his being an other, constantly lurks behind. Moreover, Joe’s disgust at the “womanshenegro” is also a result of past histories of association. Joe starts to associate “negro” with the feeling of disgust after his encounter with the dietitian, with her scream of “nigger bastard.” The smell of the “womanshenegro” thus reminds him of his previous experience. It is connected to the feeling of self-disgust and leads to Joe’s overt disgust at the black girl. In sum, Joe’s disgust at the black girl originates not only from the proximity of the smell, but also from his attraction to womanliness and blackness and from the association of his past contact. The feeling of disgust reminds Joe of his sense of being an other from within. It further prevents him from settling for a stable identity.

IV. The Negro Section

In addition to disgust, fear and anxiety can be aroused through the contact with the “negro smell.” The episode that transcribes Joe’s fear through black smell occurs when he accidentally comes across a predominantly black part of the town. Two nights before the mysterious murder of Joanna Burden, Joe becomes incessantly anxious as if he has already known “*something is going to happen to [him]*” and “[*he is*] *going to do something*” (97). As he wonders around the town desperately, he passes through the negro section, Freedman Town:

[He is] surrounded by the summer smell and the summer voices of invisible negroes. They seemed to enclose him like bodiless voices murmuring, talking, laughing, in a language not his. As from the bottom of a thick black pit he saw himself enclosed by cabinshapes, vague, kerosenelit, so that the street lamps themselves seemed to be further spaced, as if the black life, the black breathing had compounded the substance of breath so that not only voices but moving bodies and light itself must become fluid and accrete slowly from particle to particle, of and with the now ponderable night inseparable and one. (107)

Like disgust, fear also develops from senses of proximity. Upon entering the black area, Joe is “enclosed” by the summer smell, summer voices of the black. The proximity of the black odor, black voices and black bodies has triggered Joe’s anxiety and fear. Various senses interact with and dissolve one another into “the substance of breath,” into fluid and particles. Joe’s body is thus invaded by these force-relations as he sees himself incorporated within “the thick black pit,” the black-shaped cabin and the faint kerosene lamps. As the boundaries between bodies are disrupted, Joe’s fear intensifies because of the possibility that the black breathing and black murmuring might “pass on to him” (15). To borrow words from Ahmed: on all sides, “even within him,” Joe feels “the bodiless fecundmellow voices of negro women murmured” as if he has returned to “the lightless hot wet primogenitive Female” (107). While the borderline between Joe’s body and the blackness is interrupted, all the black senses permeate Joe. In this episode, not only the proximity of the black odor but also the uncertainty of what he is renders Joe subject to the affective impact of the black breathing and black murmuring. Yet, as an effect of encounter, fear also moves the subject away from the intimate encounter. Feared, Joe runs away from the negro section “with drumming heart and glaring lips” (108). Reaching the white neighborhood, Joe feels secured: “the cold hard air of white people” cools him down while “the negro smell, the negro voices, were behind

and below him now” (107).

V. Bobbie Allen

Joe’s encounter and relationship with Bobbie Allen give rise to the feeling of shame and disgust. At seventeen, Joe meets Bobbie, a thirty-year-old white waitress, when he accompanies his stepfather on a trip to town. Through his affair with Bobbie, Joe attempts to assume and reaffirm his identity as a white male, yet it ends up in failure, a futile act of insistence. During his first encounter with Bobbie, Joe is attracted to her. However, what happens next shames him, pushing him off assuming the role of a capable white man: after ordering pie and coffee from Bobbie, Joe realizes that he doesn’t have enough money. In the end, Bobbie covers for him. When he returns to the restaurant and tries to pay the nickel for the coffee he ordered last time, he is laughed at by other men at the restaurant and quickly leaves. Still, Joe’s next encounter with Bobbie turns out to be another frustration: two days later, Joe is early for the nighttime rendezvous that they have planned. Bobbie saunters up and tries to explain to him why she cannot sleep with him and that she is menstruating. Joe’s thoughts flee back to a few years ago, when he learns from one of his adolescent friend’s description of menstruation—“the temporary and abject helplessness of that which tantalised and frustrated desire” (173). Unfamiliar with what it is, however, as the peer draws “a picture, physical, actual, to be discerned by the sense of smell and even of sight” (173), Joe feels terrified and disgusted by women’s “periodical filth” (173). Linking Bobbie with the abject and the filth, Joe strikes her, runs off and vomits in the woods. Joe’s frustrated male identity by “periodical filth” is somehow compensated with violence. Joe marks himself as male with the blow and distinguishes him from the flow of abjection. Despite Joe’s failure to assume an identity as a white male through his affair with Bobbie, violence offers him an illusion of a consistent identity: he can be a man by appropriating the patrimony of violent acts.

Uncertain about his racial identity, with Bobbie, Joe also experiments with what he can be. After having slept with Bobbie, Joe deliberately tells her, “I think I got some nigger blood in me. I don’t know. I believe I have” (184). However, Bobbie does not believe it and only whispers, “I thought maybe you were a foreigner” (175). Later on, after realizing that Bobbie is a prostitute, which shames Joe once again, and after leaving McEachern at the dance, where he finds out Joe’s affair with Bobbie, Joe is confronted by her and her pimps. Bobbie now uses Joe’s earlier confession against him: “He told me himself he was a nigger! Me taking for nothing a nigger son of a bitch that would get me in a jam with clodhopper police” (204). As Joe tries to forge a fixed identity via his interactions with Bobbie, a consistent racial identity always eludes him: through his affair with Bobbie, he can hardly identify himself as a white man since most of the time he does not live up to the white male codes and what he experiences with Bobbie is nothing but the feeling of shame and disgust. On the other hand, neither can Joe be a “nigger”: when he tells Bobbie that he has nigger blood, she refuses to believe him, saying that he looks like a foreigner.

VI. Joanna Burden

After Joe runs away from McEachern’s home due to his possible murder of his stepfather, not knowing where he belongs, he wanders, hitching rides and working odd jobs for fifteen years. During his years of wandering, Joe seems to give up on anchoring his identity as a white Southerner. Instead, he seeks to be a “nigger” as Bobbie calls him during their final confrontation. On one occasion when he travels to Chicago, he decides to shun white people and lives with blacks. By living in close proximity with the black, Joe wishes to become a “nigger.” He eats with them and sleeps with them. At night, he would lie beside the black woman, trying to “breath into himself the dark odor, the dark and inscrutable thinking and being of negroes” in order to “expel from himself the white blood and white being” (212).

Yet, every time he attempts to take in the black smell to make his own, his nostrils would “whiten and tauten” (212). It seems that breathing in the black odor frightens him and the black odor pushes him off any stable identification with blacks.

Eventually at thirty-three, Joe’s wanderings bring him to Jefferson, where he meets Joanna Burden. Joe’s interactions with Joanna is full of violence. Just as what he does with Mrs. McEachern and Bobbie, repeating the same violent gesture, he hurls against a wall dishes of food prepared for him by Joanna. As I have discussed in the previous section, violence allows Joe to be temporarily marked as male since this role/position entails violent acts. However, with Joanna Burden, even the violence that supports Joe’s maleness becomes resignified as either femaleness or something not quite defineable:

“My God,” he thought, “it was like I was the woman and she was the man.” But that was not right, either. Because she had resisted to the very last. But it was not woman resistance, that resistance which, if really meant, cannot be overcome by any man for the reason that the woman observes no rules of physical combat. But she had resisted fair, by the rules that decreed that upon a certain crisis one was defeated, whether the end of resistance had come or not. (222)


As Joe tries to be a male through having violent sex with Joanna, how she acts—“it was like I was the woman and she was the man”—prevents him from being consistently marked as male. Instead of presupposing Joe’s gendered consistency, the assaults and rough sex upon Joanna expose that Joe’s search for a single, stable identity is incomplete. The more he assaults Joanna, the more he needs to assault her again, and the more he undermines his masculinity through the claim of violence.

In addition to gender identity, Joe’s rage and repulsion at Joanna further demonstrate that it is impossible for Joe to take on a single and consistent racial identity. He attributes his outrage to Joanna’s lying about her age. He begins to curse her. Each week Joe would take

from the family wash his own garments on which Joanna solicitously has replaced missing buttons. Remembering which buttons are missing and have been restored, he would cut off the new buttons “with the cold and bloodless deliberation of a surgeon” (100). Joe becomes even more enraged when one day, she offers to send him to a black college and then have him learn the legal trade in her black lawyer’s office in Memphis, all in preparation for taking over her affairs. Joe is outraged by the suggestion and repeatedly strikes her. What truly infuriates and unsettles Joe is not Joanna’s offer but her insistence of a fixed identity as a black man on him. As Joe questions Joanna that it is “a nigger college” and “a nigger lawyer,” Joanna simply asks Joe to tell people there that he is a “nigger” so that he won’t be charged anything. Joe’s repulsion and violence against Joanna result from the uncertainty of his “race” and whether the identity Joanna attempts to force on him is what he wants. Similarly, when Joanna repeatedly prays over Joe and even tries to coax him back to God and asks him to kneel with her, Joe’s disgust and repulsion is not directed at her prayers but her attempt to construct him according to certain codes. With no concrete “core” of his race, and with disgust and rage constantly deterring him from any stable self-identification, Joe is in a constant movement of intensification and distantiation: when attracted to Joanna, Joe moves toward her. But after he discovers that he cannot fully assimilate the identity she tries to forge on him, Joe pulls away in anger and disgust.

Toward the end of the novel, as the sheriff and the townspeople are about to chase him down, Joe returns to Mottstown in the borrowed shoes of a Negro. Joe looks down at the brogans exchanged from the black woman, “the black shoes smelling of negro: that mark on his ankles the gauge definite and ineradicable of the black tide creeping up his legs, moving from his feet upward as death moves” (321). Is Joe finally made into a Negro? Does he

become “black” in the end? In the eyes of the townspeople, by assuming Joe, the alleged black to be the murderer and by capturing him in Mottstown, the town does cast him into the category of “nigger.” It seems that the townspeople succeeds in forcing Joe into a singular identity of a black man even if Joe resists that identity for thirty years. Yet Joe is never a black with ontological essence; rather, he is rendered “black” for he never lives up to the role of a white male. And this sense of inadequacy is reinforced through each encounter with the smell of others. The “womansmelling” and “negrosmelling” create sites for us to look into the relation between affect and the emergence of Joe’s race-bound identity. Uncertain about what he is, Joe experiences the feeling of disgust, fear and anxiety in the contact zone between subjects and objects. The negative affect of disgust, fear and anxiety, evoked by smell, discloses Joe’s sense of being an other from within and further pushes Joe off any stable, singular identification.



Chapter Three

Unsettling Racial Lines: Shame in *Intruder in the Dust*

In 1955, six years after winning the Nobel Prize in literature, Faulkner visited Japan for three weeks as part of a round-the-world trip designed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of State, principally to participate in the Nagano Seminar Colloquies. While on behalf of the U.S. to better Japanese-American cultural relations after World War II, Faulkner's attitude toward his own country was ambivalent—due to the decades-long division between North and South and his position as a white Southerner. As a cultural ambassador, however, Faulkner attempted to link postbellum South with postwar Japan in his seminars and talks held in Nagano and Tokyo. He showed his understanding of the feeling of the Japanese young people since the American South was in a similar situation. In addition, diverging from Ruth Benedict's assertion that Japan is a shame culture whereas America is a guilt culture, Faulkner argued that both the American South and Japan were characterized by shame for they shared similar histories, social systems and traditions. First, he compared the Southern aristocrats to the *samurai*—the former as defenders of the peasantry and agricultural traditions, and the latter of cotton/rice-farming. Besides, both Japan and the South were defeated nations in a sense—both defeated by industrial America. Like Japan, the South was “conquered” by the North, underwent massive reconstruction, and therefore encouraged collective behavior as a form of defense. Another significant link between Japan and the American South is their emphasis on old traditions of decorum and courtesy. Faulkner admired Japan for its long history: “The westerner's tradition is not much older than his grandfather, but the oriental tradition goes back past a hundred grandfathers” (*Faulkner at Nagano* 22). In most of Faulkner's writings, however, the history of the Old South is at once the Southerners' pride (the long-established decorum and honor) and disgrace (the history of

slavery). Finally, both Japan and the South were embroiled in racial controversies: as many Japanese were reluctant to integrate or intermarry with members of the Burakumin caste, the Southerners resisted the desegregation and interracial marriages with the black.

The connection between Japan and the American South is a topic worthy of further exploration. In this chapter, however, I am more interested in how Faulkner's stress on the South's "shame culture" demonstrates his interest in exploring the relation between shame and the white South. In "On Fear: Deep South in Labor: Mississippi," a chapter read at the meeting in Nagano and later published, he argued that it was shame for his fellow Southerners to object to the 1954 Supreme Court's rule to abolish segregation in schools: "it is our southern white man's shame that in our present economy the Negro must not have economic equality; our double shame that we fear that giving him more social equality will jeopardise his present economic status; our triple shame that even then, to justify our stand, we must becloud the issue with the bugaboo of miscegenation" (129).

Indeed, critics suggest that the motif of shame has been prevalent in Faulkner's narratives and his Yoknapatawpha County is populated with shame-prone subjects. Helen Merrell Lynd, for instance, identifies Faulkner's preoccupation with shame. She calls *Light in August* a study of shame: Joe Christmas feels shame in the uncertainty about his Negro blood, and in his relation with Bobbie—the discovery that he doesn't have enough money to pay for the coffee, and his ignorance of what one should do when making love. Lynd suggests that shame lies in these small details that "probe the depths of pain" (41) and reveal narcissistic injuries. Both Philip Collington and Bryan Conn associate *Absalom, Absalom!* with the notion of shame. Collington states that the novel presents four generations of "fugitives," who have been the objects of shame in the white community. Conn argues that *Absalom, Absalom!* depicts a pride/shame dialectic at the center of white Southern male identifications. For example, by shaming black slaves Thomas Sutpen intensifies the pride of his racial

identity and legal supremacy as a white man. Shame also lies behind Henry Sutpen's and Thomas Sutpen's attempt to prevent mixed raced Charles Bon from marrying his half sister Judith: Henry cannot bear the shame of miscegenation whereas Thomas Sutpen cannot stand the shame of the familial tie to slaves. With Lynd's pioneering studies on shame in 1958 and with the reading of shame in *Absalom, Absalom!* by Collington and Conn, the current scholarship on shame in Faulkner's fiction recognizes shame's important role in the psychology/mindset of white Southerners. Yet, besides reading shame as inextricably tied to white male identifications in the novels, what shame can do to these white Southerners and to the race relations in the South remain unexamined.

Among the critical studies on shame in Faulkner's works, little attention has been given to *Intruder in the Dust*. Set in the late 1940s, *Intruder*, one of Faulkner's later works, follows quite a straightforward plot of a mystery: Lucas Beauchamp, a black descendant of the old slave owner Carothers McCaslin, is arrested for shooting Vinson Gowrie in the back; in the meantime, Chick Mallison, a sixteen-year-old white boy who is once saved by Lucas and thus feels indebted to him, tries to prove Lucas' innocence by working together with his black servant Aleck Sander and an old white lady Miss Habersham. In the small town Jefferson, only Chick and Miss Habersham defend Lucas and have the courage to act. Although considering Lucas guilty, lawyer Gavin Stevens, at Chick's request, joins with Chick to dig up Vinson's body, only to discover that it is Vinson's brother Crawford Gowrie that commits the crime. In the end, Chick succeeds in preventing Lucas from the lynch mob and clearing his name.

Although *Intruder* takes the form of a detective story and Faulkner even expressed his attempt to write a mystery that "the solver is a Negro" (Bassett, 207), the absence of Lucas in the second half of the novel tells it otherwise. As the real murderer is about to emerge, the mystery narrative is constantly interrupted by Chick's remembering and the conversations on

slavery and racial problems in the South between Gavin and Chick. In this way, the interest of the novel does not lie in solving the murder but in Chick's transformation—his decision to prove Lucas' innocence indicates his change in attitude toward Lucas, toward the "Negro" in the Jefferson community. In fact, several critics view *Intruder* as an initiation story. Dayton Kohler reads the story as "Chick's initiation into the obligations of his humanity and the involvement of a whole society in history that linked the white men and the Negro in the South" (125). Donna Gerstenberger argues that the stripping away of Chick's clothing symbolizes his "maturation process" (223). John E. Bassett also sees this novel as Chick's initiation, through which the optimism of the ending could be made possible. If *Intruder* is about a young Southerner's maturation, who or what initiates his growth? It seems that critics who read the novel as an initiation story often associate Chick's growth with the hope of resolving the South's racial problems. How can such a hope for change in the South be made possible through Chick's maturation? Who or what in the first place initiates Chick's growth? Lucas Beauchamp seems to be the most straightforward answer as Kohler observes in his essay that the arrest of Lucas sets the story in motion. However, Chick's transformation starts way before Lucas' imprisonment. I suggest that Chick's shameful encounter with Lucas four years ago, when Chick fell into an icy creek, has already signaled this process of maturation/transformation.

The motif of shame pervades *Intruder*. From the outset, shame filters down through Chick's memory and stream of consciousness. The story starts with a flashback of the protagonist Chick Mallison's shameful encounter with Lucas Beauchamp: being saved and his money being rejected by a Negro, Chick felt shamed. Later, every time Chick tried to repay Lucas with a gift, he received another gift from Lucas in return. Chick was thus frustrated and ashamed of being indebted to a black man. After playing the "contest" of gift giving with Lucas for four years, and after Lucas was imprisoned, Chick experiences another

layer of shame when he sees the mob threatening to lynch Lucas. Finally, in Chick's debate with his uncle Gavin Stevens on why the mob flees, Chick interprets that the crowd is running away from shame. With the feeling of shame predominating Chick's story, I wish to ask: why does Chick feel shamed? What is he ashamed of? Is Chick's shame at Lucas' refusal to take his money the same as his shame at the mob? If Chick's shameful encounter with Lucas signals the beginning of his change, what exactly does shame do to Chick and his stance towards racism? I argue that shame as an affective force prompts Chick to take action and make changes. The affective force of shame not only unsettles Chick's racial identity but also pushes for his new way of understanding racism and race relations. In what follows, I will start with a theoretical framework on shame and guilt. Then, I will examine the process of Chick's change through his shameful encounter with Lucas and his failure to repay him. Next, I will show how Chick's changed perception on his racial identity prompts him to feel ashamed of the mob and to question Gavin Stevens. Finally, I will look into what Chick refers to as "our shame" toward the end of the story and how this shame, as an affective force, challenges racial lines and helps imagine a different South.

I. Theories on Shame

Faulkner's reference to "a shame culture" can date back to American anthropologist Ruth Benedict's study on shame and guilt in *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*. In this book, she argues that America is a typical guilt culture while Japan is a shame culture. She compares guilt and shame through how they instruct people respectively in America and Japan to act properly. America is a typical guilt culture, which "inculcates absolute standards of morality and relies on men's developing a conscience" (Benedict 29). Guilt asks people to avoid sins based on their consciences or sanctions like religion. Therefore, guilt for sins can be purged by confession and atonement. On the other hand, shame cultures rely on ridicule or rejection

to discourage undesirable behavior. Benedict sees the notion of shame in Japan as “the root of virtue” (31) since a man who knows shame is sometimes translated from Japanese “virtuous man” or man of honor” (31). A man who is sensitive to virtues will carry out all the rules of good behavior. Comparing guilt cultures with shame cultures, Benedict suggests, “[s]hame has the same place of authority in Japanese ethics that ‘a clear conscience,’ ‘being right with God,’ and the avoidance of sin have in Western ethics” (31). Therefore, Benedict contends that guilt comes from (religious) conscience and individualism whereas shame derives from conformism, the conformity to their group ethics and codes of good behavior. As shame requires audience since it is a reaction to other people’s criticism, the most devastating punishment for a Japanese child is derisive laughter: “all his life ostracism is more dreaded than violence. He is allergic to threats of ridicule and rejection, even when he merely conjures them up in his own mind” (36).

Sara Ahmed’s discussion reinforces Benedict’s distinction of guilt and shame. On one hand, Ahmed describes shame as a feeling of self-negation, an intense and painful sensation that is bound up with how the self feels about itself, “the subject being against itself” (103). In experiences of shame, the bad feeling, or the “badness,” is attributed to oneself, rather than to an object or other; that is, I feel myself to be bad and I am ashamed of what I *am*. Whereas guilt refers to punishment for violation of rules, for wrongdoings and to borrow Benedict’s words “sins” one commits, shame is about some quality of the self. In other words, guilt implies action while shame implies that some quality of the self has been brought into question. On the other, just as Benedict argues that shame stems from the judgment of the public, “the verdict of others” (371), Ahmed suggests that shame, which is taken on by the subject as a sign of its own failure, is usually experienced before another. Shame requires a witness, to witness one’s failure. That is, I am ashamed of myself as I *appear* to the Other. Thus, shame is not only an intensification of the subject’s relation to itself but also how the

subject is seen or found out by others as bad and thus as a shamed subject. In addition, the subject's relation to its others who witness the shame, Ahmed suggests, has already been mediated by idealization. The other who witnesses failure needs not be a "real," physical other: even if a subject is alone, he or she can feel shame through the imagined view of an other, "the gaze of an ideal other" (106). For instance, I remember an action that I committed, and burn with shame in the present, as long as my memory is a memory of *myself*. That is to say, in shame, the ideal other is also "the ideal self" since "I" am at once the subject of the feeling and the witness/the object of shame. What's more, the ideal other, to borrow psychoanalytic terms, is defined as an ego ideal, what a self desires to be. In Freud's account, ego ideal originates from a boy's identification with the father: the little boy "would exhibit a special interest in his father; he would like to grow like him and be like him" (*Group Psychology* 60). Such identification with the father creates an ideal: an ego ideal, which the ego would like to be. Hence, the conflict of shame is a conflict between an ego and its ego ideal. In shame, the exposure of one's "badness" before an other suggests a self's failure to identify with and become his/her ego ideal.

Ahmed goes on to situate ego ideal, or the ideal other in shame, in a community. The ideal other/ideal self is in fact a creation of a collective "self" that belongs to a community, a "proximate we": if we feel shame, we feel shame because we have failed to approximate a collective ideal self that has been given to us in a community (106). Such a collective ideal self, or the *social ideal* in Ahmed's terms, sticks members of a community together through their desire to be like the social ideal and be recognized by other community members. As a result, shame appears at the moment of failure to live up to the social ideal; it is a reminder for one to re-enter the community. Ahmed sees shame as "a deterrent" and as a social control (107): the fear of shame prevents the subject from deviating from the social ideal and the script of social norms. In order to avoid shame, subjects must enter the contract of the social

bond, and seek to approximate the social ideal.

Following Benedict's and Ahmed's investigation that shame involves not purely a negative relation of self to self but also a self's desire for the recognition from others, Elspeth Probyn also sees shame as more than self-negation and highlights the importance of interest in shame. Drawing on Silvan Tomkins' study on shame, she suggests that shame and interest are intimately connected: one would not feel shame if one doesn't care for the other, or oneself.⁴ Once interest has been felt and when it has been ripped, the disappointment of loss would translate into shame that attacks one's sense of self. Shame puts one's self-esteem on the line: the inside of who one thought he/she is suddenly displayed for all to judge. Thus, shame reminds one of what he/she holds dear, what is an essential part of himself/herself, and questions one's value system. Although Probyn, like Benedict and Ahmed, admits that values involved in shame are socially and culturally constructed, in Probyn's view, it doesn't mean that shame would lose its capacity to examine those values and interest embedded within the social domain. What's more, shame is not entirely implicated in the social. In "Writing Shame," Probyn probes into Deleuze's discussion of T. E. Lawrence's shame. Through Deleuze's analysis, she argues that shame is the product of many forces: it combines both the inherent and lived experiences of social structures. That is, shame arises from "a collision of bodies, ideas, history and place" (83).

Therefore, Probyn's *Blush: Faces of Shame* provides us another way to look at shame—she considers shame positive and productive and identifies individuals' ability to challenge the social codes and ideals embedded in shame. She then goes on to discuss the productive role of shame. For one thing, shame always produces effects—small and large, individual and collective. When one feels shame, he/she blushes and is made visible at the very moment he/she wants to cover the face and hide. For another, shame is inherently

⁴ Tomkins argues that shame "operates only after interest or enjoyment has been activated" (*Shame and Its Sisters* 5). Only something or someone that has interested a person can produce a flush of shame.

value-oriented. Shame compels an involuntary and immediate reassessment of oneself: why am I ashamed? Why did I say or do that? Can I rectify the wrongs? In this way, shame is positive and productive as it helps self-evaluation and self-transformation. Seeing shame as productive and transformative, Probyn asks her reader to acknowledge rather than avoid individual and collective shame in national and cultural narratives, and to use shame to re-evaluate how one is positioned in relation to others and the past.

In the following section, I will probe into how Chick's shame reveals his sense of self and values in crisis and how shame flags a point of departure of his change.

II. Chick's shame

Right from the beginning, shame structures Chick's encounter with Lucas Beauchamp and disturbs his sense of self and his relation with Lucas. The story starts with a flashback: the third-person narrator recalls how Chick first met Lucas four years ago. Focalizing on Chick, the narrator recollected this episode through Chick's stream of consciousness and his affective memory. As a twelve-year-old boy, while on a rabbit hunting trip in Carothers Edmonds' place, Chick fell into an icy creek. This accident was unexpected and baffling to Chick as the narrator keeps repeating "he didn't know how it happened" (7). In fact, what really bothered Chick was the feeling of shame: falling into the water shamed Chick's manhood because it was "something *a girl* might have been expected and even excused for doing but nobody else" (7; my emphasis). Chick's manhood was bruised to a greater degree when he realized that it was Lucas Beauchamp, "a Negro," who "saved" him by ordering Aleck Sander to move the pole out of the way so that he could climb ashore. Getting out of the cold water, Chick saw Lucas for the first time. Lucas' image, however, aroused a mixed feeling in Chick: the Negro man "in a heavy sheep-lined coat and a broad pale felt hat" (8) oddly reminded Chick of what his grandfather had used to wear. Standing in proximity,

Lucas, with an “intractable and composed” face—“not arrogant, not even scornful”—looked at Chick gasping and shaking from the shock of the cold water (8). Lucas’ demeanor, like a white Southern man, further confused Chick’s common knowledge of what a Negro should be like. At this moment of encounter, Chick’s role as a white Southern boy in relation to Lucas’ as a black man seemed to be reversed: Chick assumed the role of the inferior and Lucas, the superior since Chick was not “manly” enough to prevent and save himself from the creek; Lucas, on the other hand, acted “white” enough to make Chick unable to disobey his “order” and follow him to his cabin.

On his way to Lucas’ cabin, Chick more than once wanted to run away but he couldn’t: as Lucas strode on ahead of him “like his grandfather,” Chick didn’t dare to contradict Lucas just as he didn’t dare to defy his grandfather, who saw him as a child. After Chick entered into Lucas’ “painless wooden house” (9), Lucas asked Chick to strip off his wet clothes with a direct command, “strip off” (11) despite Chick’s protest. Later, Chick ate “the nigger food” (12) which was supposed to be Lucas’ dinner. When he tried to pay Lucas for “his service”—for saving him and for his food—with a half dollar in four coins, Lucas refused to accept his money, without even the bother to look downward at what was on Chick’s palm. Ashamed with “the four shameful fragments of milled and minted dross” on his “dumb hand open” (13), Chick turned into rage and spurned the coins onto the floor. What’s even more humiliating for Chick was that Lucas ignored his command of picking up the coins. Lucas didn’t move at all. With hands clasped behind him, Lucas commanded someone else to “pick up his money” (14) and Aleck Sander and Edmonds’ boy rushed to drop the coins into Chick’s palm.

Without a doubt, Chick experienced shame at the moment when he extended the coins to Lucas, anticipating him to take the money; yet he didn’t—he even asked Chick, “what’s that for” (13). Failing to have Lucas accept payment, Chick felt “the rush of hot dead heavy blood”

(14) up his neck and face. Why did Chick feel shame? Did Chick feel shame because he was rejected by Lucas? In fact, Chick was shamed not just because Lucas refused to accept the money, but because Chick himself failed to perform the role of a white Southern man. What Lucas did—saving Chick, bringing him to his house and giving him his meal—is considered an act of hospitality. However, knowing that a white Southerner could not accept hospitality from a Negro as a white man would from white people, Chick tried to pay Lucas with what money he had. If Lucas took the money, his saving Chick would be read not as a favor but as a service, and thus Chick, the white man, was still superior to Lucas, the Negro. However, Lucas' refusal to take the money rendered his deed a hospitable act. Unable to repay the black man for his hospitality, Chick took up a position of socially inferior to a Negro. That is to say, Chick felt shamed because he failed to measure up the expectations of Southern honor—he became indebted to Lucas. As “the debt of honor” is allowed to take place only between white gentlemen (Dussere 38), it does not conform to the codes of Southern honor that Chick became indebted to a black man. In addition to his failure to act as a white Southerner, Chick's shame also came from his failure to be a man. As I have mentioned earlier, falling into the water shamed Chick for it was what a girl, not a boy, would do.

As Chick went home lying in bed that night, he couldn't get over with the entire shameful incident: “writhing with impotent fury” (15), he felt that the creek, Lucas, Lucas' “paintless” house, “the nigger food” and the half-dollar had “debased not merely his manhood but his whole race” (17). For Chick, the four coins rejected by Lucas were transposed into “the one coin one integer in mass and weight out of all proportion to its mere convertible value” (17). The round hard big coin had integrated not only his mistake, but “the Negro, the room, the moment and the day itself” (17). In other words, the coin, now swelling into its gigantic maximum, became a symbol of Chick's indelible shame hung forever like “the last dead and waneless moon” (17) in the black vault of his anguish. Chick, seeing

himself as a puny shadow, tried to cover in frantic this immense “waneless moon” of his shame.

In the following four years, in order to erase his shame, and to regain “his masculinity and white blood” (20), Chick managed to pay back Lucas’ hospitality with gifts and thus cleared his debt of honor. Chick could not become a White Southerner again unless he made Lucas “a nigger”: by giving Lucas his gifts, Chick was able to regain a position socially superior to Lucas and would once again be “aligned with the whole white community” (Dussere 42). In the next four years, Chick sent cigars and the tumbler of snuff as Christmas gifts to Lucas. With his allowance and the money his uncle paid him as office salary, he also bought a silk dress for Lucas’ wife. After sending these gifts by mail in two packages, Chick had the feeling of ease as the coin, the disc of shame had become paler and “glareless” (18). Yet, the gifts Chick sent were answered with another gift from Lucas—a bucket of homemade sorghum sweetening brought by a white boy on a mule. Chick was frustrated because Lucas’ gift pushed him back to where he had started. He had to do it all over again to reject Lucas’ hospitality. But Chick soon realized that gifts were useless. To take the can of molasses back and fling it into Luca’s house would only be like giving Lucas the coins again, and Lucas again would command someone to pick up and return.

After his failure to give Lucas gifts, Chick’s final means to eradicate his shame lies in Lucas’ forgetting. Chick believed that if Lucas had forgotten him, what happened in the cabin as well as his shame would be cancelled out. Hence, Chick tried to meet Lucas on the Square in town. The first time when he saw Lucas, Lucas had recognized him and even told him not to fall in creeks this winter. The second time when Chick met Lucas, Lucas just looked straight and passed him. Chick said to himself with a relief: “*he has forgotten me [. . .] he doesn’t even remember me anymore*” (19). Yet later he found out that Lucas’ wife had died just then so Lucas didn’t look at him. For the third time, after coming out of the courthouse,

Lucas looked into Chick's eyes and went away. Chick thought, "*he didn't even fail to remember me this time. He didn't even know me*" (20). Feeling a sort of peace, Chick believed that "it's over because he was free" (20). However, if Chick's shame was really "over" and he was no longer indebted to Lucas, why should Chick try to help Lucas and to prove him innocent in the case of murder?

I would suggest that Chick changed through the years of his failed attempts to repay Lucas. He gained a new perception on "race" in the South. Despite Chick's continuous efforts to re-incorporate Lucas into the Southern honor system the spells a clear line between whites and blacks, Lucas' insistence to stay outside the racist system propelled Chick to re-examine the racial codes inscribed in Southern cultures: why is a Negro inferior to a white man? Why shouldn't a white Southerner accept hospitality from a black man? In addition, Lucas' demeanor and behavior, atypical of a Negro, disturbed the unquestioned racist assumptions embedded in Chick's identity: is Lucas a Negro? What does it mean to be a white man? What does it mean to be a Negro? In fact, Lucas doesn't act like "a nigger." Whenever Chick sees Lucas, he is "intolerant inflexible and composed" (12). After being shamed by Lucas in the cabin, Chick began to learn a good deal about him from the townspeople—he learned that every white man in the town wanted to make Lucas "a nigger" because Lucas would say "ma'am" to women and "sir" to white men, "just as any white man did" (15). Chick's encounters with Lucas on the Square further unsettled his common knowledge on what a Negro should be like. When Chick first met Lucas on the Square, he observed that Lucas wouldn't come to the town on weekends, when other Negroes and the whites from the country would come to town. Instead, he would come during weekdays, "like the white men who were not farmers but planters, who wore neckties and vests like the merchants and doctors and lawyers themselves" (19). The third time when he met Lucas, he saw Lucas come in to town to pay the yearly taxes on his land, just as other white men would

do.

The odd connection between Lucas and Chick's grandfather also destabilized Chick's relation with Lucas and his perception on black-white relationship. From the first time Chick met Lucas, Lucas reminded Chick of his grandfather: Lucas' "heavy sheep-lined coat and a broad pale felt hat" (8) were like the clothes Chick's grandfather used to wear; Lucas' "gold toothpick" was "like the one his own grandfather had carried in his upper vest pocket" (19). When later Chick saw Lucas on the Square, Lucas "in the black suit and tieless shire" with "the gold toothpick" (20) still reminded Chick of his grandfather. Such a connection aroused the feeling of intimacy in Chick. He was somehow able to relate to Lucas since Lucas bore a resemblance to his grandfather. When learning from his uncle that Lucas' wife Molly died, Chick reflected, "*she [Molly] had died then. That was why he didn't see me. [. . .] He was grieving. You don't have to not be a nigger in order to grieve*" (20). At this moment, Chick realized that Lucas was not as much a "nigger" as an individual, a human being able to express feelings.

Through Chick's failure to repay Lucas and through Lucas' demeanor, Chick's stance toward racial relations changed. Before his encounter with Lucas, Chick took it for granted that a white man was socially and economically superior to a black man. Yet, after Chick's shameful encounter with Lucas and his failure to repay him, he could no longer take the Southern racial codes for granted: he became able to view Lucas not as a Negro but as a human being. The feeling of shame, along with the Southern racial norms that were called into doubt, propelled Chick to question the racist presumptions inherent in the race relations in the South. In this way, four years later, when Lucas was arrested for shooting Vinson Gowrie in the back, Chick's changing attitude toward race relations prompted him to make the decision to prove Lucas' innocence. Even though the townspeople, including his uncle Gavin Stevens, were convinced that Lucas was the murderer judging from the fact that Lucas

was “a nigger,” Chick decided to help Lucas and to dig Vinson’s grave at Lucas’ request.

III. Chick’s Shame for the Crowd

Through the process of Chick’s trying to save Lucas, he also became a witness of the shame of racism in the Jefferson community. When Chick returned from the jail and asked his uncle for help, Gavin kept interrupting his hypotheses that Lucas might be innocent with a series of “but suppose—” (54) and considered it the greatest bliss for Lucas, a black murderer, to stay in jail away from the lynch mob. Recalling old Ephriam’s words and Miss Habersham’s comment that men were concerned with evidence while children and women worked on circumstances, Chick realized that the sense of white supremacy had blocked his uncle and the Southern white men from seeing beyond their assumptions and the racial structures in the South.

For example, seen as an intellectual representative of the South, Gavin argued that the racial integration could not be implemented by the federal government because it involved the Northern interference of Southern homogeneity. The Southerners should defend the South to preserve the economy and the history that belong solely to the South. “Someday” Gavin suggest, Lucas, the black population, will be freed, but it should be the Southerners’ “privilege of setting him free,” instead of the “simple ratification of votes” that “compels” the equal rights of the blacks (100). Gavin believed in whites’ superiority over Negroes. Only white Southerners could free the Southern blacks. Gavin’s eloquent speeches used to shape Chick’s understanding of racial relations in the community, but Chick now felt ashamed of being superior as he witnessed the lynch mob on the Square.

Chick first saw the lynch mob, “the Face” (118) on the Square on Sunday morning, when Lucas was brought to jail by the sheriff. Actually, at that time, Chick was among the crowd, watching Lucas emerge from the sheriff’s car with the townsmen whom he knew and

recognized all: from the bachelors and the homeless he saw in the barbershop to truckdrivers and garagehands. They were all jubilant for finally they could “make Lucas a nigger.” Yet, after Chick, Miss Habersham and Alex Sander—along with the help of his uncle and the sheriff—proved that it was not Lucas but Vinson’s brother Crawford that killed Vinson, the packed crowd on the streets dispersed and disappeared in a second. “A Face,” “an Expression” (117), “faces myriad yet identical in their lack of individual identity, their complete relinquishment of individual identity into one We” (90), shocked and shamed Chick as he kept repeating to himself, “they ran” (122).

Chick’s interpretation of the fled crowd is different from his uncle’s. In fact, it was the first time in the novel when Chick openly disagreed with Gavin Stevens, who had long been Chick’s role model and shaped his moral conscience as a Southerner. Chick believed that the crowd dispersed because they refused to admit their mistake. They ran so that they did not have to “say out loud that they were wrong” (126). Gavin Stevens on the other hand asserted that “at least they were moving” (126): they ran because they went home to do chores before dark and because “they had forgotten about [Lucas]” (127). Chick then argued that the townspeople ran because they didn’t want to send Lucas a can of tobacco to show they had forgiven him while his uncle, assuming the stance of gradualism⁵, suggested that Lucas and “*Lucas: Sambo*” (127) would ultimately get his can of tobacco. Gavin stressed that the issue at stake was not whether Lucas, or all Southern blacks, would obtain equal rights but the taboo of fratricide: “[The crowd] are not running away from Lucas, they are running away from Crawford Gowrie” (128). In Gavin’s view, the lynch mob ran away from Crawford in order to “repudiate” him who had violated the taboo “*thou shall not kill thy mother’s child*”

⁵ Gradualism, or gradualist economic strategy, was primarily advocated by Booker T. Washington. In Washington’s “Atlanta Compromise” address, he called on white America to provide jobs and industrial-agricultural education for Negroes. In exchange, blacks would give up demands for social equality and civil rights. His message to the Negro was that political and social equality were less important as immediate goals than economic respectability and independence. Washington believed that if blacks gained an economic foothold, and proved themselves useful to whites, then civil rights and social equality would eventually be given to them. See McPherson’s “Booker T. Washington and the Reaffirmation of Gradualism.”

under the moral precept of “*thou shall not kill*”(128). The fratricide taboo should remain “unblemished and scarless” so that “*thou shall not kill all*” would be reached one day. Chick countered his uncle’s lengthy rhetoric of humanity and citizenship by simply stating: “[y]ou’re a lawyer” (130). He then came up with his final interpretation of the dispersed crowd: “they were not running from Crawford Gowrie or Lucas Beauchamp either. They were running from themselves. They ran home to hide their heads under the bedclothes from their own *shame*” (130, emphasis mine). Chick continued to accuse the crowd, or the community, of doing nothing, leaving “the vomit” for “somebody” to clean it, yet Gavin contended that he himself was actually defending Lucas, the “Sambo,” from the North’s intrusion and the freedom of Lucas and Southern blacks will come one day because of their “capacity to survive and absorb and endure” (131). Without overtly objecting to or consenting Gavin’s assertion, Chick ended the conversation by calmly stating: “you’re still a lawyer and they still ran” (131).

In Section II, I have discussed how shame prompted Chick to question his values and unsettled his relation with the black. Since shame at once points to the self and to the community as Ahmed suggests, Chick’s feeling of shame also challenged the social ideal that bound the subjects in the community. Hence, shame not only confronted Chick’s identity as a White Southerner but also drove him to re-examine the Jefferson community. The dialectical debate of why the lynch mob ran away between Chick and Gavin shows that Chick had started to re-evaluate the black-white relationship and the racial hierarchy in Jefferson. Toward the end the their dialogue, Chick attempted to urge Gavin, or the Jefferson community in general, to take practical action, instead of remaining static, waiting that “our injustice” will be expiated and abolished by ourselves someday. With Chick’s reference to Tenderfoot scout and the English boys leading troops in 1918 Gavin once mentioned to him, Chick seemed to express his intention to take action out of the “unbearable injustice and

outrage and dishonor and shame” (132). While Gavin Stevens asked Chick to “just *regret* it [the unjust situation in the racial South]; don’t be *ashamed*” (132), Chick apparently did not agree: to be regretful is to live with the status quo, but to feel ashamed compels one to question the unjust and thus to take action to change. Gavin, the sheriff, and the townspeople failed to see the power of shame: shame as a force could push one to examine the unquestioned racism in the community and enact changes of the racial structures.

IV. The Collective Shame

After the “debate” with his uncle, Chick continued to reflect upon the “shameful” Jefferson crowd. The shame Chick felt now, was not only his personal shame but also the shame of the crowd and the shame of the entire Jefferson community, which chose to do nothing in the past and present. Such a shame was both his and Jefferson’s as he identifies himself with the Jefferson community: he could not separate the shameful crowd on the street from himself because “they were his and his was theirs” (134); his shame was inseparable from the collective shame of the white community, in which he had a share of interest because he too was “bred of it” (90).

As shame is often regarded as an affect of individual morality, the collective shame seems to indicate the collective responsibility of each individual within the community. Toward the end of *Intruder*, the feeling of shame for Chick seems to become a permanent condition of life. Shame gets himself “into the world” (133): like the act of chewing and swallowing, as Chick pondered, shame incorporates substances, translating into “a part of himself and his memory, the whole history of man” (133). Shame, now an integral part of Chick’s identity, memory and the Southern history, not only bound Chick with his community as he saw his shame as “our own shame” (134) but also motivated him to shoulder responsibility and take action, “to do it right” (134) this time with his fellow

countrymen. Here, shame is not a feeling that needs to be eradicated so that one can regain pride again; it is a feeling that serves as an ethical reminder to constantly question the values embedded in the South and to prompt Chick, and hopefully the townsmen in Jefferson as well, to take action for the possibility of change in the racial South.



Chapter Four

Conclusion

On November 13, 2014, Tanisha Anderson, a 37-year-old African American woman, was killed when the Cleveland police slammed her to the ground, remaining on top of her until her body went limp (Backwell). Prior to the killing of Anderson, a series of incidents of the police shooting and killing black people were reported. On August 9, 2014, an 18-year-old African American Mike Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, was fatally shot by the white police officer Darren Wilson, who had fired twelve bullets in total (Clarke and Castillo). Brown's death ignited a rebellion in a small group, called Ferguson. Later on, what began as a demand for justice for Mike Brown erupted into a movement largely identified by the slogan "Black Lives Matter." Spanning from the summer and fall of 2014 into the winter and spring of 2015, the United States was rocked by mass protests. The people of Ferguson, Missouri, rose up and brought the world's attention to the crisis of racist policing practices in the United States. From the Civil War to the Jim Crow period and to the contemporary racial conflict/movement of "Black Lives Matter," the issues of race and racism continue to influence people's lives in the United States. As I have demonstrated in the thesis, race in Faulkner's fiction can be read as an affective form of encounter, which may open up unexpected ways of perceptions and interactions with others. If affect could enable subjects in Faulkner's novels to imagine a different kind of relations of othering, which has yet to be articulated in the present, what can affect do to the racial conflicts and racism of today? What is affect's relation to the past, present and future?

I have asked in Introduction: what is affect? What can affect do? What is the relation between affect and race? Engaging in dialogue with various affect theorists, I have demonstrated that affect is autonomic, involuntary and intertwined with the social. As

Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth see affect as *force-relations* or *forces of encounter*, affect can drive a body, to shift its affections (its being-affected) into action (capacity to affect). Continuing with Gregg and Seigworth's view, Teresa Brennan's idea on the sociality of affect challenges the boundaries between selves and others, subjects and objects. Bringing affect into the discourse of race, through Sara Ahmed's discussion, we can see that race is an affective form of contact. Such an affective form of encounter can be influenced by past histories of contact; however, in some cases, the affective perspective of race may open up unexpected ways of interactions with others and thus situate racial relations not just in history but in the dynamics of everyday experiences.

Faulkner's *Light in August* shows how the concept of 'nigger,' coupled with disgust and fear, is attached to Joe's identity through his olfactory encounter with the dietitian when he is five. The connection between "nigger" and disgust persists in Joe's other encounters. It accounts for Joe's negative affect of disgust and anxiety whenever he approximates a Negro. When Joe encounters a black girl, he again feels disgusted. His disgust and anxiety come not only from the proximity of the smell of "womanshenegro" but also from the uncertainty of his own racial identity: because Joe is not sure of what he is, his contact with the black girl triggers his anxiety, arousing his fear of not being white enough. In addition, Joe's racial uncertainty subjects him even more to the impact of "womanliness" and "blackness": uncertain about his race, Joe is at once attracted to "the other" and feel disgusted by "the other." In sum, the negative affect of disgust, fear and anxiety originated from Joe's encounter with the dietitian. The negative affect associated with smell reminds Joe of his sense of being an other and prevents him from settling for a stable identity.

Intruder in the Dust, on the other hand, demonstrates how shame can serve as an affective force to destabilize Chick's perception on racial relations and motivate him to change. At first, Chick feels ashamed because Lucas refuses to take his money. He is

ashamed of being inferior to Lucas. However, driven by shame, Chick feels compelled to pay Lucas back with gifts. Through the years of Chick's failed attempts to repay Lucas, Chick gains a new perception on "race" in the South: different from what the white Southerners have believed in, Chick now sees Lucas, or Negroes, as an individual instead of someone inferior to white men. Chick's changing attitude toward race also makes him ashamed of the lynch mob and questions his uncle Gavin Steven's interpretation of the mob: Gavin refuses to admit it is a racial issue; instead he puts emphasis on fratricide. In Chick's case, shame is an affective force that pushes for Chick's new way of understanding racism in the South. As Chick questions the racist assumptions embedded in the long-established Southern norms, his doubts also demonstrate the possibility of the affective force of shame to challenge the racial models and racial lines in the South.

With the workings of shame in *Intruder in the Dust*, Faulkner's novels in fact proffer readers a possibility to go beyond the text and think beyond the racial structure in the Jefferson community. Through the dynamic interactions of affect, white subjects and the black, Faulkner created an affective site for us to experiment with different scenarios of racial encounters in the context of everyday experiences, and to open up different ways of understanding race relations and racism. To go back to the questions I ask in the beginning of this chapter, what can affect do to contemporary racial problems? By highlighting the role of affect in different scripts of racial encounters, I believe that affect as a force would explore unexpected ways of interactions with others, and push one to move beyond current racial boundaries and race relations, and to imagine a different kind of relations of othering, which is yet to be found in the present. That is to say, the future-oriented effect of affect, the not-yetness of affect, may work to destabilize and unmoor current racial lines and imagine a different way of racial identification that is not constrained to the past.

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