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國際語言的在地想像：

論英文在台灣社會語境的意識形態化

Global Language and Local Imagination:

On the Ideologizing Process of English in the Taiwanese

Context

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CHINESE ABSTRACT

透過分析英語相關的言談是如何由說話者視為既有的語言觀念和對其現有觀念的評價堆疊而成，本研究旨在描繪英語在臺灣社會語境中被意識形態化的過程。約定俗成的語言使用讓說話者過度概括語言複雜的意義構建過程。本文討論如何由言談分析窺知錯縱的意識形態過程和互動。檢視英文在三種公眾言談情境中所被賦予的角色和意義，本文探究下列五個問題。 1. 英文在臺灣語境中如何被評論？ 2. 由媒體言談中的幽默英語表演，投射臺灣社會如何定義英文與英文能力？ 3. 在當前的語言政策辯論中，英語和臺灣的語言如何在意識形態上互動？ 4. 在喧騰一時的注音及羅馬拼音爭議中，說話者對於英語的語言認知和價值如何形塑與詮釋非英語的語言使用？ 5. 鑑於三種公眾言談情境中所勾勒出的意識形態化過程，本文所提出的「語言意識形態網絡」(the ideologization web) 如何呈現出意識形態化的動態？

本研究提出了「語言意識形態網絡」以呈現意識型態在言談中持續推進的動態過程。在理論層面上，本研究嘗試將其動態過程與言談元素連結，以識別意識形態化的分層。在語境層面上，本文探討臺灣的英語的意識形態動態。進一步發現這些意識形態上的分層與立場常被視為二元且相互駁斥的。而這些看似對立的語言意識形態立場常源於相同的、共有的既有語言觀念。在臺灣社會語境中占主導地位的語言意識形態為「英語代表全球競爭力」和「臺灣人英語講不好」。說話者在言談中透露出仰賴這兩個語言意識形態作為建構語言意義的基礎。然而，隨著情境更動的眾多語言意識形態立場透露出英語的意識形態化過程遠比我們認知的更為生動。

本研究執行時適逢臺灣正在規劃官方雙語制。因此，本文希冀在描述英語在台灣社會情境下的意義建構過程與動態之餘，也能提供一個市場及資本導向以外的觀點討論，以呈現英文在台灣社會的多維面向。

關鍵字：語言意識形態、語言態度、後設言談、多語性、英文（語）

ENGLISH ABSTRACT

The study aims to sketch the dynamics of the ideologizing process of English by analyzing how discourse about English is layered with what speakers take for granted and how speakers responds to what is taken for granted. The taken-for-grantedness leads us to overgeneralize the complicated meaning-making process of language. The study suggests that the complicated ideologizing process is embodied in discourse elements. Through examining how English is presented in 3 public discourses, the present study answers five questions. (1) How do speakers talk about English in Taiwan? (2) What norms about English are observed in conversational joking about English in media discourse? (3) How does English interact with local languages at ideological level in the current language planning debate? (4) In the debate of phonetic systems for Taiwan Mandarin, what role does speakers' knowledge about English play in the meaning-making of both English and non-English linguistic practice? (5) In light of the ideologization process of English in the three public discourses in the Taiwanese context, how does the layered ideologizing process connect to discourse structure, summarized in the ideologization web?

The study proposes 'the ideologization web' to depict the complex ideologizing process in linguistic practice. When speakers respond to others' discourse, the speakers' discourse reveals their values and beliefs concerning not others' prior discourse, but the ideological understanding of such discourse. The study terms the outperformed evaluations 'ideological stances.' The study terms the backgrounded and implicit social experiences about languages 'established language ideologies' because they are pieces of available knowledge with which speakers make sense of others' discourse. Theoretically the study contributes to identifying the ideologizing process by linking it with discursive elements. Empirically, the study recognizes the ideological dynamics in English in the Taiwanese context. These ideological distinctions are further found to be discursively constructed as binary and conflicting. However, they background a limited number of shared established language ideologies. The dominant language ideologies "English represents global competitiveness" and "Taiwanese speak bad English" are the decontextualized norms that speakers take for granted in discursive practice related to English. The various ideological stances reveal the ideologizing process of English as dynamic and ongoing.

This study is completed during the time when Taiwan is in the process of planning official bilingualism. The dissertation thus has the humble goal to contextualize English in Taiwan. The study hopes to advocate the necessity to acknowledge multi-dimensional aspects of English in addition to a capitalized, marked-oriented perspective.

Keywords: language ideology, language attitudes, metadiscourse, multilingualism, English

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview and Research Questions

This study starts from an online advertisement. This advertisement by an English institute caught my attention one day when I browsed through the homepage of Yahoo Taiwan. As a native speaker of Mandarin Chinese, an English user, and a linguistics major, I am impressed by how the advertisement is packed with information about English in the Taiwanese context and yet how there is barely unfamiliar information to me. The advertisement consists of two major texts, situated respectively at the top and the center of the entire advertisement. The two texts can be decoded with different weighing based on a visual semiotic analysis (Kress & van Leeuwen 1996; Scollon & Scollon 2003). The top of the advertisement reads 不想一輩子當英文啞吧！她這樣克服結巴英文 *Buxiang yibeizi dang Yingwen yaba! Ta zheyang kefu jieba yingwen* ‘She doesn’t want to be mute in English. This is how she overcame her stammering English.’ The expression 不想 *bu xiang* ‘do not want to’ describes an undesired situation of being a 英文啞巴 *yingwen yaba* ‘English illiterate.’ The term 克服 *kefu* ‘overcome’ describes necessary efforts required to overcome the obstacle. The top of the advertisement, where “ideal” information is placed (Kress & van Leeuwen 1998), foregrounds English learning as desired and importantly, strenuously manageable. The center of the advertisement reads 英語力大翻身 *yingyu li da fanshen*

‘English competence changeover,’ with the words 大翻身 in boldface. Right below the sentence has the 學習快捷鍵 *xuexi kuaijie jian* ‘button to fast-forward learning.’ The changeover could mean both the changeover of one’s English abilities or a person *with* English abilities. Put differently, the center where the focus of the information lies (Kress & van Leeuwen 1998) specifies that improving English is beneficial and could be effortless. In semiotics, how languages, together with elements such as logos, colors and fonts, are arranged spatially and visually is accounted for. Various pieces of information available on one sign also play different roles with varying degree of information weight. Upon seeing this advertisement, a speaker can totally ‘buy it’ with the hope of strengthening their English ability. Conversely, another speaker can potentially sneer at the advertisement with the realization that this will not help to improve English. As a linguistic major and a language teacher, I am busy using all the knowledge I have to judge the language (the advertisement uses) about the language (English). As readers we do not read the discourse like this in this advertisement about English in a textual and denotational way. Instead, we process and interpret it with hard-earned social knowledge about English. Such an advertisement communicates with us not merely about English itself, but also about English in this particular social context. The communication is neither downright straightforward nor linear. However, through repeated social learning, the taken-for-grantedness leads us to overlook the complicated interpreting process and to view the interpretation as the way it is. This

non-linear, dynamic, but perceivably normalized meaning-making process about English is where this study starts.

The meaning-making process involves our selection of beliefs about languages. Our social knowledge about language that speakers take for granted are termed language ideologies (Schieffelin, Woolard & Kroskrity 1998; Blommaert 1999; Cameron 2003). The study aims to investigate the meaning-making process of English through examining how English is presented in 3 discourses—in humorous crosslinguistic contexts of infotainment programs, namely, the broadcasts that offer both information and entertainment, in directly elicited online discussion about English in language planning, and in indirectly elicited online discussion surrounding English caused by the proposal of replacing the traditional phonetic system for Mandarin Chinese with Romanized phonetic symbols. The study draws from the three discourses for several noteworthy considerations out of their similarities and distinctions. The three discourses individually contribute to a distinctive dimension of vitality of English in the Taiwanese context. Together they complement and triangulate each other. Similarly, the three public discourses are easily accessible. These discourses operate and reproduce the ideologizing process. They publicize how the ideologization of language is progressive. It is speculated that these public discourses about English both speak to and speak for the audience in a way that comprehension and alignment are sought and maximized. The three types of discourse thus allow a glimpse at how English is generally presented and

profiled outside the language learning context, a niche that is always worth the academic attention.

To better account for the dynamics, the study proposes a model called ‘the ideologization web’ to sketch the complex ideologizing process in linguistic practice. The advertisement in Figure 1 shows that our interpretation is filtered and guided by long-held beliefs about English which are mostly presented as background information. It does not have to be widely accepted by the public. It is considered a convenient, readily available piece of knowledge to understand why language users behave in certain ways. A backgrounded belief can be unspoken, yet shared among speakers. A backgrounded belief is therefore called an ‘established language ideology’ in the present study. Reflexivity on an established language ideology shows speakers’ context-specific evaluations shaped by or directed at an established language ideology in this particular context. It is called ‘ideological stance’ in this study, following Jaffe’s (2016) terminology. Figure 1 shows how the ideologization web presents the relation among others’ discourse, speakers’ established language ideologies and their ideological stances.




Figure 1. An ideologization web sketches the connection among input discourse, established language ideologies and ideological stances.

Others' discourse and ideological stances are presented in concrete lines and frames as they are overt in discourse representation. Established language ideologies mediate in-between are presented in dotted frames and lines because they often remain relatively implicit and backgrounded. This model captures language ideologization as ongoing, constantly changing and context-dependent. Woolard (1998) illustrates that a term like 'language ideology' seems to focus more on the ideologization product rather than process, though this is never intended. The ideologization web presents the ideologizing process via analyzing discursive structure. As discourse is recursive, the ideologization could be extended. More elaborated ideologization webs will be presented with data in the following sections.

A number of theoretical notions are so critical to the study that they have to be defined

before they are used pervasively in this study. The study uses ‘discourse,’ ‘contexts,’ and ‘metadiscourse’ with caution. The study uses ‘context’ to refer to the macro-sociological environment where discursive practice is embedded and interpreted. Simply put, contexts in this study refer to the Taiwanese social contexts. The study sees ‘discourse’ both as a product and an influential element of social experiences (Fairclough 1992a; van Dijk 1996). Moreover, as English does not popularly serve as a daily language in Taiwan, an interesting phenomenon is that speakers talk more *about* the language than *in* the language. The present study uses the term ‘metadiscourse’ to refer to speakers’ discourse about discourse (Kádár & Haugh 2013; Hyland 2017).

The present study is aimed at answering the following questions.

1. How do speakers talk about English and English use in Taiwan?
2. What assumptions and norms about English are observed in conversational joking about English in media discourse?
3. How does English interact with local languages at ideological level in the current language planning debate?
4. In the debate of phonetic systems, what role does speakers’ knowledge about English play in the meaning-making of both English and non-English linguistic practice?
5. In light of the ideologization process of English in the three public discourses in the Taiwanese context, how does the layered ideologizing process connect to discourse

structure, summarized in the ideologization web?

Theoretically, the study aims to specify the ideologization process of English in everyday discourse by relating the processes with discourse elements. Moreover, the study also hopes to argue that mediated communication contributes to studies on language ideologies. According to Page, Barton, Unger and Zappavigna (2014), media communication has long been compared to face-to-face interaction as a less ideal source of data. However, the swiftness and online anonymity teach viewers to quickly evaluate a piece of information and to steer an event toward the public expectation. Kádár and Haugh (2013) call these netizens ‘metaparticipants.’ The study demonstrates that speakers behind mediatized discourse, including TV show artists, YouTubers and netizens, can actively participate in the ideologizing and indexicalizing process. Empirically, built on known studies on attitudes toward English in Taiwan (C.W.-Y. Chen 2006; S.-y. Huang 2006; H.-Y. Lin 2007; Y.F. Chang 2008; Tsai 2010; J.-L. Hsu 2013; H.-Y. Lin 2014; Price 2014), the present study presents a dynamic sociolinguistic profile of English in the Taiwanese context in addition to a market-oriented perspective of language .

1.2 Context

1.2.1 Sociolinguistic situation of Taiwan

Taiwan is both individually and societally multilingual. Individual multilingualism in

Taiwan refers to the fact that an individual speaks more than one language, mostly Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese (Wei 2006). Societal multilingualism (Sridhar 1996) is observed in the fact that speakers in Taiwan are broadly categorized into four ethnolinguistic communities, including Mandarin Chinese, Taiwanese (also referred to as Tai-gi, Taiyu, Taiwan Southern Min, and less frequently as Southern Min), Hakka and Austronesian languages (Tsao 1999; Chiung 2001; Sandel, Chao & Liang 2006; Wei 2006; Liao 2008; S.-C. Chen 2010; Tsai 2010; M.-H. Wu 2011; Price 2014). The concept of four major ethnic languages/groups in Taiwan is taken to be fundamental in identity issues in Taiwan (Makeham 2005). In recent years, the population of Taiwanese new immigrants is rising. The sociolinguistic landscape of Taiwan is further vivified with a call for a new definition of multilingualism (S.-C. Chen in press 2021). The contemporary sociolinguistic situation of Taiwan mirrors its history. Studies on the historical development of language use tend to note the influences brought by South Chinese immigration, the Japanese colonization, the KMT era, the lifting of Martial law and labor mobility and intermarriage. The language development of Taiwan locks intimately with different political powers through time.

Though Taiwan remains a multilingual society, the sociolinguistic profile of languages in Taiwan shows legacy of immigration and top-down, long-term monolingual language policies of different eras (S.-C. Chen 2010). Qing dynasty marks the time when South Chinese immigrants outnumbered the aborigines in Taiwan (Simpson 2007). These immigrant

brought Hakka and Southern Min to Taiwan. Southern Min became the dominant language (Tsao 2008) till Taiwan was taken over by Japan in 1895. The Japanese colonization left a lasting mark of language planning in Taiwan. Aimed to assimilate and identify with Japanese language and culture, Japanese became the dominant language in Taiwan while mother tongues were restricted to affective domains (Simpson 2007). Though the assimilation made Japanese prevalent, it however did not lead to monolingualism.

After Taiwan was returned to the Chinese government in 1945 and, KMT relocated to Taiwan in 1945, the government initiated re-Sinicizing Taiwan. The Chinese nationalist control was construed through banning Japanese and promoting Mandarin Chinese, which was “foreign” to most Taiwanese at that time. The banning was then extended to Southern Min, accompanied by campaigns which attempted to denigrate local languages (Wachman 1994). Hsiau (2000), P. Chen (2001), and Simpson (2007) suggest that the Chinese national control by KMT exerted pressure for language assimilation and oppression as Japanese did. The National Language Policy, or ‘Mandarin-only policy’ as some studies may term (Sandel et al. 2006; Scott & Tiun 2007) imposed Mandarin Chinese as the national language and prohibited other languages being used in public domains (S.-C. Chen 2006). To this day, Mandarin Chinese is pervasive across domains, followed by Taiwanese, Hakka and aboriginal languages (S.-C. Chen 2010).

Despite a hegemonic background, Mandarin Chinese is currently accepted as “a default

national language” of Taiwan (Tsao 2008: 297). The phenomenon proves how successful the language planning is. Tsai (2010) and Dupré (2013) also suggest that Mandarin is the lingua franca in Taiwan. Younger generations are less likely to relate the use of Mandarin to earlier political oppression or to an alignment with Mainland China (Scott & Tiun 2007). The Mandarin Chinese variety spoken in Taiwan is gradually indigenized. The phenomenon turns this variety to be termed and gradually recognized as Taiwan Mandarin (Cheng 1985; Tsao 1999; Her 2009; Tan 2012; Su 2018). As the lingua franca of Taiwan (S.-C. Chen 2010; Dupré 2013), Taiwan Mandarin is also commonly referred to as 國語 *Guoyu* ‘national language’ and 中文 *Zhongwen* ‘Mandarin Chinese.’ The label *Guoyu* speaks volume for its role in Taiwan. It has also to be noted that to some, the label carries the ideological implication of downgrading other local languages.

Equally ideological of the label *Guoyu* to refer to Mandarin Chinese, the term 台語 *Taiyu*, literally Taiwan’s/Taiwanese’ language, to refer to Southern Min spoken in Taiwan is ideology-laden. The relation between Mandarin and Taiwanese (referred to as Southern Min in Chen’s study) is found diglossic (S.-C. Chen 2010), with the former being the High language and the latter the Low language. Sandel (2003) discusses that the diglossia between Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese (termed ‘Tai-gi’ in his paper) is a legacy of Mandarin-only policy. Taiwanese started to gain more recognition after the lifting of Martial law in 1987. The prohibition of speaking languages other than Mandarin Chinese was abolished. The

appeal to promote major local languages mark a contesting political ideology of de-Sinicizing Taiwan (S.-C. Chen in press 2021), particularly evident in the increased awareness of speaking Taiwanese. According to Thompson (2007), Taiwanese was used “in a defiant way as a new weapon” (248) to confront the Chinese hegemony. In fact, both Mandarin and Taiwanese are taken as markers of solidarity (S.-C. Chen 2010). Dupré (2013) also states that no individual language alone is considered essential and representative enough to act as the national identity marker of Taiwan. A more recent survey by Liu, Gijzen and Tsai (2016) find that the common language in lower, private domain, such as the language used at home, has shifted from Taiwanese to Mandarin. The labeling is not always embraced, especially by speakers from the other two major ethnic groups, namely, Hakka and aborigines (Thompson 2007). Under the influence of the Mandarin-only National Language Policy, the local languages were severely marginalized until 1987, when Martial Law was lifted. The subsequent democratization also led to indigenization, where people recognizes local language rights. A series of language planning aimed to revitalize local languages emerged. The term Taiwanese, compared to Southern Min, is believed to be more neutral politically. Due to the complex historical and ideological implications behind these terms, all the terms to refer to languages in the data will retain in the discussion.

1.2.2 English in Taiwan

The situation with English is no less complicated than those with local languages. Just as seen in the advertisement, speakers are exposed to information-packed advertisements about English. Though speakers are entitled to evaluate the advertisement as either appealing or unconvincing, the existence of the advertisement speaks volume for the ideological process of English in Taiwan. The language has been generally treated as fundamentally ‘foreign’ but important. Chen (2010) notes that as a foreign language English is still used by a comparatively small number of speakers and in restricted domains. The perceived instrumental value which English is thought to possess surpasses its actual use (S.-C. Chen 2010). Its perceived importance is probably best evidenced in parents’ eagerness for their children to master English. Parents expect their children to start learning the language at a young age (Y.F. Chang 2008). Moreover, undergraduates in Taiwan who are preparing themselves to enter labor market believe English to be the ticket to move up the social ladder and to enter the global community as intellectuals (S.-y. Huang 2006). Exposure to English at the receiving end and for instrumental purposes probably best describes how English is seen in Taiwan. As far as language production is concerned, English lexical insertion in Taiwanese- or Chinese- dominated discourse is frequent. On the study of conventionalized codeswitching in Taiwan, Wasserfall (in press 2021) finds that the common English borrowings in the Chinese contexts have been conventionalized. For example, the word ‘fu’

(pronounced as [fju:]) to refer to ‘feeling’ undergoes tonal change. The verb ‘po’ for ‘post’ is adjusted (Wasserfall in press 2021). Nonetheless, codeswitching at daily sectors can potentially invite negative evaluations. A trendy expression, 撻英文 *lao yingwen*, labels the perceivably insincere, pretentious and inauthentic use of English (Su in press 2021).

English learning has come a long way to establish the social recognition it enjoys nowadays. According to S.-C. Chen (in press 2021), English was taught as a required subject since 1968, but English-in-education could date back as early as the Japanese colonization period. Before people could realize, the use of English had already connected to internalization and globalization (S.-C. Chen 2010). Although other foreign languages started to thrive, English still occupies an eminent position for foreign language learning, as S.-C. Chen (in press 2021) states and as my earlier study on interview data (Lee 2012) shows. Tsao (2008) reasons that the government’s attempt to brand Taiwan as the center of Asian-Pacific business was practiced via building Taiwan as an English-friendly environment for international trade. The yearning to gain global visibility, according to Tsao (2008), is a consequence of Taiwan’s obscure political state with China. English was originally incorporated only in middle school curriculum until 2001. In 2001, English education started in the fifth year in elementary school. This policy celebrated an earlier-than-ever exposure to English in school education. The belief that early exposure to English is beneficial furthered English-in-education when English education started in the third grade in elementary school

in 2003 (Tsao 2008). The government has kept telling its citizens, through language management, the increasing importance of English by lengthening the class hours of English in school curriculum. English gradually plays a more critical role in the selection and elimination in education and labor market in Taiwan, just as discussed by Song (2011) in the South Korean context.

A capitalist view of language and its influence on price-tagging see prevalence of a language as a corollary of competition under free trade. In neoliberal view, languages are openly available for all language consumers to choose from. Nonetheless, Price (2014) states that acquiring English is more of a necessity than a choice in Taiwan and that the presumed choice is never equally available to all. When English is implemented in education, as Price explains, English language education manifests two contesting ideologies. First, when it is taught as a required subject, acquiring English becomes mandatory for all students, an ideology that Price (2014) terms ‘English for all.’ Second, as English language education in Taiwan has been severely influenced by resources provided by the government and by students’ own familial background, Price finds that English learning is also socially stratified. ‘English for all,’ according to Price’s discussion (2014), is ‘English for a few’ in essence. The similar situation is also observed in higher education, where the approach of English as a medium of instruction (EMI) is treated as a measure to promote English, to boost international competitiveness and ranking, and to recruit more international students.

Professors could have higher hourly pay and universities could apply for extra funding if EMI is practiced. However, only universities that are competitive enough to have received sufficient funding previously could afford to conduct EMI (S.-C. Chen in press 2021). The view corresponds largely to Park and Wee's (2012) claim that English learning reflects and reproduces social inequality. These findings reveal that academic attention to English in the Taiwanese context should critically reflect on what has been taken as 'nothing wrong,' so as to capture the meaning-making as dynamic and ideological and to make social contributions with the findings. English tends to be separated from the discussion on local languages or national language planning as a 'foreign' language, just as this study does in reviewing the sociolinguistic background of Taiwan. However, the study will present that from lay perspectives, the then implementation of Japanese and Chinese and the current implementation of English could show perceived similarities in their ideologizing process.

1.3 Outline of the Dissertation

The dissertation is outlined as followed. Chapter 2 reviews theoretical frameworks and relevant known studies. Theoretical frameworks that the study adopts include language ideology, indexicality, and the sociolinguistics of globalization. Discussion on conversational joking, and language planning is also reviewed. Chapter 3 describes the methodology concerning how data will be collected and analyzed in three discourses. The analysis of

crosslinguistic conversational joking is presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses the currently ongoing implementation of English. A language policy proposal to change the phonetic system of Taiwan Mandarin unexpectedly stirred a debate around English. The debate is presented in Chapter 6. This dissertation ends with summaries and implications in Chapter 7.



CHAPTER 2 **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS & LITERATURE**

The study attempts to address the dynamic ideologizing process of English in the Taiwanese context by drawing from everyday discourse concerning English. Though the three discourses individually invite a large body of literature, together they share the theoretical frameworks of language ideology, indexicality, and the globalization-oriented perspective of sociolinguistics. Past studies on linguistic humor, discursive approaches to language planning and intertextuality will also be reviewed.

2.1 Language Ideology and Language Evaluation

Language ideology is predominantly understood as the bridge between linguistic forms and their meanings in macro social contexts. Language ideology as theoretical frameworks diverse in researchers' distinct remarks of what language ideology is, how it can be approached as an inquiry and at what levels of discursive explicitness it is manifested. The variations contribute to an abundance of discussion on its definitions, its relation to power and dominance, and its 'siting' in language use (Woolard 1998).

Language ideology does not have a unified definition. Even terminologies vary, depending on dimensions that different academic strands choose to attend to. One of the most frequently-cited definitions by Silverstein (1979) describes language ideology as "sets of

beliefs about language articulated by the users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use” (193). Silverstein does not distinguish between ‘ideology about language’ and ‘linguistic ideologies.’ He further states that the moment speakers put their social experiences in real world in language, they also “presuppose (or reflect) and create (or fashion) a good deal of social reality by the very activity of using language” (Silverstein 1979: 194). That is, putting social experiences into words both reflects and further accentuates social experiences. The similar concept is termed ‘linguistic ideology’ by Irvine (1989), who defines linguistic ideology as “the cultural (or subcultural) system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests” (255). Rather than characterizing language ideologies as ‘beliefs’ (Silverstein 1979), Irvine refers language ideologies to ‘ideas’ and rejects a causal and predictable relation between linguistic phenomena and social differentiation. Linguistic ideology is taken as the mediating factor between linguistic phenomena and social differentiation (Irvine 1989). Woolard explains that language ideologies are “[r]epresentations, whether explicit or implicit, that construe the intersection of language and human beings in the social world” (1998: 3), and states that ‘linguistic ideology,’ ‘language ideology,’ and ‘ideologies of language’ are used interchangeably by her regardless of differences these terms may denote in their own separate fields. Woolard’s definition (1998) addresses agentivity. Cameron (2003), who aligns with Irvine (1989) and Woolard (1998), summarizes definitions

in the past literature and defines language ideologies as “sets of representations through which language is imbued with cultural meaning for a certain community” (447). Similarly, Eagleton (2007) states that ideology defines uniqueness but manifests itself as what “[e]verybody knows that, a kind of anonymous universal truth” (20). The definition also suggests that language ideologies reside in social actors of shared cultural practices. Ideologies, in other words, “are social constructs” (Cameron 2003: 448) which reveal “what people think, or take for granted about, language and communication” (Woolard & Schieffelin 1994: 56). These definition all point to a regulating, evaluative function which (language) ideologies serve.

Despite the use of different terminologies and the lack of a unified definition, according to Woolard (1998), the majority of scholarly attention of language ideology addresses 4 salient themes. First, with the use of ‘beliefs’ and ‘ideas’ to describe language ideology, ideologies are ideational and therefore “internally contradictory” (Woolard 1998: 6). The second strand addresses that ideologies are “derived from, rooted in, reflective of, or responsive to the experience or interests of a particular social position” (Woolard 1998: 6). The third property, which is also the most recognized one, notes the role of language ideology as a medium between linguistic practice and social distinction. Ideologies are power-laden and can be exercised for power sustaining or contestation. Last, ideology is considered to be deviant from objective truth. It portrays our rationalizations of language. According to

Woolard (1998), the third strand that language ideology could be deployed for power sustention is commonly seen as an extension from the second strand but diverges from it. The second property about reflexivity of language ideologies addresses a neutral view on language ideology while the third property about power contestation and social distinction emphasizes a critical view of it (Woolard & Schieffelin 1994). The neutral view sees language ideology as constituted by and constitutive of social experiences (Woolard 1998) while the critical view is “reserved for only aspects of representation and social cognition, with particular social origins or functional or formal characteristics” (Woolard & Schieffelin 1994: 57). John B. Thompson (1990), who defines ideology as “meaning in the service of power” (7), also emphasizes this third property. The study will examine the data with the four properties to pinpoint the ideologizing process.

Though ‘language ideology,’ ‘linguistic ideology,’ ‘ideologies of language,’ or simply ‘ideology,’ are considered interchangeable in works such as Woolard’s (1998) and Silverstein’s (1979), the adaptation of definitions themselves are open to further debate. Following Silverstein’s definition of treating language ideology as sets of ‘beliefs,’ the noun ‘belief’ has used as an alternative in defining language ideologies (see the discussion in Cameron (2003)). Cameron (2003) states that some academic commentators are reluctant to view ‘language ideologies’ as synonymous to ‘beliefs.’ Verschueren (2012) states that ‘beliefs,’ ‘ideas’ and ‘opinions’ “are merely ‘contents of thinking,’ whereas ideology is

associated with underlying patterns of meaning, frames of interpretation, world views, or forms of everyday thinking and explanation” (2012: 7). Whereas a belief connotes falsified, individual, mental construct, ideology places greater emphasis on shared, socially-fostered constructs (Cameron 2003). On the other hand, the word ‘representation’ adopted by Woolard (1998) and later by Cameron (2003) brings forth the property of language ideology being both a product and a process of reshaping linguistic perceptions. Having said so, the use of ‘belief’ as an explanatory term for ideology still prevails. This study uses the term ‘lay beliefs’ interchangeably to mean a cluster of language ideologies. It must be noted that the study does not see representations and beliefs as theoretically contradictory. The study adopts a broad definition of language ideology and locks the discussion on ideologization with metalinguistic evaluation. Instead of anchoring the study with a definition whether language ideologies are beliefs, representations, or others to begin with, the study is more eager to start with evaluation and appraisal to see how the act reflects the social knowledge of English in the Taiwanese context.

Theoretical orientations to language ideologies also concern the sites where language ideologies are at work and thus observable. The ‘siting’ (Woolard 1998) of language ideologies is discussion-worthy because language ideologies get by unnoticed most of the time. Eagleton (2007) states that normalcy empowers language ideologies. According to Eagleton, ideology “is always most effective when invisible” (2007: xvii). Woolard (1998)

summarizes in the introductory chapter of *Language Ideology: Practice and Theory* that three major focal areas are of importance for investigation on language ideology. Two of the three focal areas directly pertain to everyday communicative practice and therefore they are in direct reference to the present study. One focal area to look into language ideologies is metapragmatics, which refers to either explicit or implicit evaluation-laden discourse of language use (Silverstein 1979; 1985; 1993). The second focal area lies in the perceived contrasts among language varieties. Take Coupland and Bishop's (2007) study on British accent as an example. Language ideologies help build up a speaker's understanding of language practice in specific socio-cultural contexts. As such, speakers of a standardized language acquire and structure their social experience in a culture where the existence of a standard language and using the standardized language are collectively perceived to be normal and normative (Coupland and Bishop 2007). Milroy (2001) also offers a similar account that language ideologies impact on our perception of what is defined as language and in what way it is considered the standard. The study draws from everyday (meta)discourse of English to investigate how discourse and the ideologizing process of English interacts.

Ideology is understood not as truth but as rationalizations manifested in discursive practice (Silverstein 1979; Woolard 1998; Irvine & Gal 2000; Verschueren 2012). Representations of linguistic differences are suggested to involve three semiotic processes (Irvine & Gal 2000). 'Iconization,' which is later termed 'rhemetization' by Gal and Irvine

(2019), describes the conventional and inherent relations between linguistic features and social images. According Gal and Irvine (2019), rhemetization relies on essentialized links between a linguistic feature and an identity for its manifestation. ‘Fractal recursivity’ addresses linguistic differences which language users detect, pick up and further reproduce for socially emblematic opposition against outgroups. ‘Erasure’ refers to simplification of recognizing only socially meaningful linguistic distinctions and overlooking those conflicting with ideological norms. Intragroup heterogeneity, and intergroup homogeneity, for example, are not addressed in the process of othering. The three semiotic processes explicate that language ideologies contribute to speakers’ understanding of objective linguistic facts in a non-objective, socioculturally specific way.

A main focus of this study addresses the ideologizing process of English by analyzing how English as a language and English use in localized Taiwanese contexts are talked about, namely, speakers’ out-performed attitudes and evaluations of English. The study therefore draws upon research on language evaluation. As will be argued throughout, the present study attends to discursive levels of language ideologization. Some rationalizations are treated as simply *out there* and some take on a more critical view to evaluate rationalizations that are taken for granted. The dimension the present study approaches builds on stance, but develops it further to ideological stance. Theoretical frameworks of stance orient to multi-facet nature of speakers’ reflexivity on language. Stance, according to Berman (2005), “reflects a key

facet of human discourse in general: the fact that any state of affairs in the worlds of fact or fantasy can be described in multiple ways” (2005: 109). Berman’s definition of stance identifies the ‘discursive’ aspect of evaluation. Biber and Finegan (1989) perceive stance to be “the lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgments, or commitment concerning the propositional content of a message” (1989: 92). The definition notes the evaluative nature of stance (Englebretson 2007). A well-cited definition by Du Bois (2007) regards stance as “a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects, and aligning with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural field” (Du Bois 2007: 163). In addition to the evaluative nature, the definition by Du Bois (2007) also explicates the public, accessible aspect of stance. The evaluation nature of stance is attended to by Englebretson (2007), who states that the term ‘stance’ has been defined differently or referred to as other labels such as ‘evaluation’ (Hunston & Thompson 2000) and ‘subjectivity’ (Lyons 1981; Athanasiadou, Canakis & Cornillie 2006). These known studies suggest that stance, evaluation, metapragmatics and language ideologies are close-knit. This study investigates the layered ideologizing process of English through analyzing evaluative metapragmatic discourse surrounding linguistic practice of English. When similar evaluations are performed repetitively, the occurrences entrench the relation between certain linguistic practice and evaluative terms. These evaluations can be further evaluated (Du Bois

2007; Davies 2018), leading to inconsistency and contestation in discourse. Put differently, discourse resides existing, established indexes, which point to both speakers' identities and the historical development of a linguistic form, and new newly emergent indexes. Social meanings of linguistic practice tolerate indeterminacy which relies on contextual information for meaning invocation (Ochs 1996). Consequently, indeterminacy, as well as individual interpretations, foster new meanings and gives rise to contesting linguistic indexicalities (Jaffe 2016).

2.2 Indexicality

Speakers make numerous choices in terms of ways of speaking. These choices are never neutral. The situational adjustment of speech, or style differences (Coupland 2007), carry information including speakers' backgrounds and evaluations. By the same token, a hearer evaluates a speaker by relating his/her style to known categories based on his/her social experiences. Therefore, stylistic differences indirectly point to differences in social sense. As Eckert (2008) states, "Every stylistic move is the result of an interpretation of the social world and of the meanings of elements within it, as well as a positioning of the stylizer with respect to that world" (456). John Gumperz (1968) categorizes variations into dialectal and superposed. Labov (1971) proposes a trichotomy among markers, indicators and stereotypes. The two frameworks explicate that stylistic differences can go from carrying

information about group identification to indexing social differentiation. They also reveal how discourse simultaneously uncovers and reinforces the link between variables and their social meanings. Nonetheless, stylistic differences can indirectly point to a pool of potential social meanings (Silverstein 1985). Besides, these social meanings which linguistic practice indexes are not static. They shift over time (Eckert 2008). Silverstein (2003) proposes N+1st order of indexicality to account for the dynamics of sense-making in linguistic variations.

Silverstein states,

for any indexical phenomenon at order n , an indexical phenomenon at order $n+1$ is always immanent, lurking in the potential of an ethno-metapragmatically driven native interpretation of the n -th-order paradigmatic contextual variation that it creates or constitutes as a register phenomenon (2003: 212).

Silverstein's model emphasizes the function of metapragmatic indexicalization. A first-order index, similar to an 'indicator' (Labov 1971), connects a variant to group identification and involves nearly no metapragmatic judgments. A second-order index, similar to Gumperz's 'superposed variability' (1968), involves speakers' selection of available variations and relates these linguistic variations to social evaluations, the relations between the two are reinforced through metapragmatic discourse. Different levels of indexicalities are immanent (Silverstein 2003). Different levels of indexicals are ideologically associated with one another (Eckert 2008), as Eckert (2008) points out, "Ideology is at the center of stylistic practice" (456).

Indexical values are not in a linear sequence as the framework N+1st order indexicality might lead people to bear the assumption of linearity. Eckert (2008) clarifies that linearity is never intended in Silverstein's model. Rather, these meanings are immanent and ideologically interconnected (Eckert 2008). An indexical field, "constellation of meanings that are ideologically related meanings, any one of which can be activated in the situated use of the variable" (Eckert 2008, 454), graphically presents that meanings are on the one hand immanent and on the other available for reinterpretation. Campbell-Kibler (2007) states that the connection between a variation to meanings in an indexical field relies on a hearer's own perception and on both sociocultural and linguistic contents in which the variation occurs. With shared social experiences, stylistic differences are perceived, evaluated, and interpreted differently across social groups. Significantly, Campbell-Kibler (2007) also remarks that the indexing of a variation to its interpreted meanings can go in a reverse direction. A hearer's previously obtained information about a speaker acts as a model in helping them decide which variation, among all available variations, they believe to hear. That indexicality works in either direction implicates how essential indexicality is in communication.

This study draws from the theoretical framework of indexicalization to account for the observation how language choices and differences in linguistic practice rely heavily on established indexical links and are further interpreted to carry further social meanings. Though indexicality addresses mostly on choices on variables, such as the variation analysis

by Eckert (2000; 2008; 2016) and Q. Zhang (2005), the study adopts the framework to account for language preferences and language choices.

2.3 Globalist Discourse of Language, English, and Commodification

A study on how English is situated in a social context where it is reckoned as foreign draws the attention to interconnection of people from various parts of the world. Mobility is frequently associated to globalization. A ‘global village’ is a common metaphor for the increasing interconnection among people from different parts of the world thanks to technology advancement. Nonetheless, the enhancing interconnectedness and mobility do not bring forth ‘a village’ (Blommaert 2010). Rather, they further complicate social practice in nearly every aspect. Globalization also impacts on sociolinguistics as a research inquiry. When speakers move, they bring with them their linguistic repertoire to a different space. Linguistic repertoire is cultivated through, and thus reflexive of, a speaker’s accumulated social and bodily experiences with other speakers and with the space where these experiences take place (Johnstone 2004). Competence is spatially defined, not objectively measured and mobility can mute speakers. Blommaert, Collins and Slembrouck (2005) use ‘regime’ to refer to agentivity of space in both situating different language resources and ordering them. Mobility urges the need for a new definition of competence, which is no longer viewed as an objective, full-fledged control of a language. Competence, as Blommaert et al. (2005) put it,

“is about being positioned” (211). This way, competence is more similar to linguistic resources which speakers select when they move across different regimes. This points to another key feature of globalization—a shift from talking about *languages* to discussing *linguistic resources* (Blommaert 2010). It is linguistic resources, not languages, that are deterritorialized.

Blommaert (2010) suggests the need for new vocabulary in accounting for newly emergent phenomena under globalization. Blommaert (2010) proposes a framework in which linguistic resources move vertically at different levels. ‘Scales,’ (e.g. Uitermark 2002), originally a concept from the inquiry of geography, is adopted to describe how linguistic resources are anchored in TimeSpace and structured in vertical layers. The notion of TimeSpace is coined to treat time and space of a speech event as a “single dimension,” rather than two separate notions (Wallerstein 1998; Fals Borda 2000). The spatiotemporal notion of TimeSpace specifies that by locking a physical object in TimeSpace, the phenomenon is “made social” (Blommaert 2010: 34). Both scales and space are therefore theoretically closely-knit in the discussion regarding sociolinguistic implications of globalization (Vandenbroucke 2015). With scales, semiotic practice is found to adhere to a variety of norms based on when and where practice occurs. Space is seen as stratified and norm-regulating. Scales can be conceptualized as ‘a continuum’ (Blommaert 2007) where norms can range from transient and local to static and established. These resources are not evenly distributed

among speakers and thus movement across scales, i.e. ‘scale-jumping’ (Uitermark 2002), is indexical. ‘Order of indexicality,’ the second new terminology by Blommaert (2010), describes how these linguistic resources can point to power, authority, and struggle in social contexts. When speakers regulate their speech by making reference to norms and conventions at a particular scale, these norms are recognized as a situated center. A center shifts when semiotic practice occurs in a different TimeSpace. Expectedly, interaction under ever-changing mobility never adheres to monocentric norms. The multiplicity of norms at different scales shows the existence of numerous centers, a character of globalization which Blommaert (2010) terms ‘polycentricity.’ Scales, orders of indexicality and polycentricity are the new vocabulary Blommaert proposes to emphasize both multiplicity and situatedness of communication in globalization.

The spread of English and globalization are commonly found to serve as evidence to justify each other, making it nearly implausible to address one of them without mentioning the other. The global dominance of English is taken by many as a current phenomenon. However, in theoretically accounting for the spread of English as a global language, stances differ and voices diverge in how this phenomenon has come to where it is, and how this phenomenon is understood. The first strand of studies connects the global prominence of English to West domination for monopoly (Spolsky 2004). This perspective assimilates the evolution of the spread of English to power-related terms. This strand suggests that English

dominance poses threat to the survival of minority languages, as the term ‘linguicism’ (Phillipson 1992) describes. Linguistic imperialism (Phillipson 1992) views the contemporary spread of a dominant language as legacy of its imperial past. Threats to the vitality of less powerful languages or local languages are addressed from the perspective of linguistic human rights (Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas 1995), and linguistic ecology (Mühlhäusler 1996). This strand of studies is criticized for an overall military and political account of language vitality and overlooking the interaction between language and other social indexes, such as economy and culture (Spolsky 2004). As Spolsky (2004) cites Bourdieu’s (1991) discussion on globalization, language is only one manifestation of power, which can be realized in many more different facets.

Distinctive from the imperialist view, the second strand of studies attends to the fact that non-native speakers of English have outnumbered native speakers. The growing English-speaking population calls for a reexamination of correlations between the spread of English and British and American colonization (Spolsky 2004). Spolsky claims that the global spread of English in places intact from colonization implicates that communication purposes also devote to the geographical expansion of English. Kachru (1985) categorizes countries in concentric circles based on the distribution of English use. Inner Circle countries refer to the norm-providing Anglophone countries. Outer Circle countries are those with British colonial history and those using English on a daily basis. English in Expanding Circle

countries is acquired as a foreign language and used in restricted domains only. The three-circle framework is influential in providing a panoramic view in the global distribution of English. House (2003) also challenges the imperialism-oriented view that a global language poses threats to other languages. According to House (2003), a lingua franca like English hardly functions as an identification marker, unlike a speaker's first language. The allocation of distinctive functions makes doubtful the claim that English jeopardizes the survival of less powerful languages. Rather, the spread of English urges minority groups to preserve their own languages and cultures (House 2003). Smolicz and Secombe (2003) also suggest that speakers' awareness of minority languages is heightened. The increased awareness leads to revitalization of local language as a result of resistance to English. The term 'World Englishes' (e.g. Kachru 1985) addresses the power behind the increasing number of non-native users of English and its impacts on the native norms. The word 'Englishes' describes the existence of more than one standard of English. The acknowledgement of multiple standards is thought to help to diminish the dichotomous discrimination between native and non-native speakers. Blommaert (2010) also reflects that mobility "does not preclude locality from being a powerful frame for the organization of meanings" (22). In sum, the second strand of research challenges the centralized, inner-circle norms and debunks the myth that a powerful global language put powerless, indigenous languages at risk.

The second strand of research also leaves several issues unattended to. English as a

lingua franca commonly refers to the adaptation of English for communication by speakers from non-Inner Circle countries. The ideal distribution of English and local languages function-wise is termed 'laissez-faire liberalism' by Pennycook (2000; 2001). The rationalization that there lies a harmonious division between English and local languages, as Park (2009) summarizes, still places English and local language hierarchically. The hierarchy is constantly overlooked in the discussion that adopts apolitical perspectives to global spread of English. This implies that these speakers still make reference to inner-circle norms. The act further reinforces the already entrenched dichotomy between native speakers and non-native speakers (Jenkins 2009). A possible consequence of reinforcing NS-NNS dichotomy is that standardized English will end up being more prevailing than it already. J.S.-Y. Park and Wee (2009) discuss the relation between the appropriation of English and ideological beliefs. In response to the further entrenched dichotomy between native speakers and nonnative speakers, the idea of ownership, speakers' self-perceived legitimacy in recognizing themselves as English users, is proposed (Higgins 2003). When non-native speakers start to 'own' the language, it indicates that English is undergoing the process of 'de-owning' (House 2003) on the part of native speakers. The issue of ownership in contrast with nativeness gives rise to the discussion of identity (Higgins 2003). House (2003) claims that English for identification is less likely to develop in the context of using English as a lingua franca. Bamgbose (2001) and Gupta (2001) also argue that English is gradually dissociated from its

Anglophone identification in the process of language teaching and learning.

Another criticism that the second strand of research on global English suffers, particularly Kachru's model (1985), lies in labeling English use at a national level. It inevitably overlooks the heterogeneity that goes beyond national lines (J.S.-Y. Park & Wee 2009). Bruthiaux (2003) suggests that the concentric trichotomy still leans toward a typology of English use in accord with a country's political history. The model also entails homogeneity within nation (Jenkins 2009). Intra-nation varieties and its relation with other social variables, such as gender and ethnicity, are unaccounted for in Kachru's model. The homogenization at national level, or the 'erasure' as Park and Wee (2012) characterize it with Irvine and Gal's (2000) framework, overlooks the heterogeneity below national level and highlight distinctions across nations. Furthermore, as a foreign languages used in restricted domains, English is unaddressed in the domain of popular cultures, which surely impacts on the global spread of English. Put simply, English as a lingua franca decontextualizes language use from its agency and its contexts (Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 2010). The selected emphasis at national level and thus ignorance of other aspects affects how speakers view English. The distinction among the three circles and its presupposed inequality will only be reproduced and reinforced (Park & Wee 2009) as a consequence of ideological work (Woolard 1998).

The third strand of research, a market-theoretic perspective on English, corresponds

largely to Heller's commodification of language (2003, 2010a, 2010b). This strand sees the expansion of English as governed by capitalist market. Park and Wee (2012) suggests that the time when different critiques about English and globalization are thriving coincides with the onset of knowledge economy. An economic approach to contemporary language practice calls for not merely a reconceptualization of language, but also a redefinition of market where linguistic exchange generates profits. Once unsellable entities start to generate profit in globalized economy, a phenomenon which Heller (2010b) refers to as 'capital expansion.'

Accompanied by capital expansion are the interests in search of new markets (Heller 2010a, 2010b) where these entities are priced. The new development of economic activities lead to four new phenomena of language—that more people are involved in linguistic exchange, that forms of communication evolve due to technology advancement, that tensions between decontextualized standardization of language practice and situated, local representation of authenticity emerge, and that language becomes the product itself (Heller 2010b). These four phenomena show that language in globalized economy is gradually playing an increasingly central role in economy than ever (Heller 2003; 2010b; 2010a). The new trend of treating language as something profitable in the new market demands reflections on language and its exchange values at two aspects—an emphasis on language exchanges which were not for economic exchange are now economics-centered, and a focus on circulation of goods which did not rely on the language is now language-mediated.

Languages can be commodified in two senses, as a measurable skill and as a symbol of authenticity (Heller 2003; 2010b; 2010a). Traditionally, the power of the speakers, particularly politics-wise and military-wise, contributes to the international status and use (Crystal 2003). As far as a foreign language is concerned, economic strength is definitely one of the chief determinants for acquisition (Ammon 2010). Mufwene (2010) points out that the spread of English in Expanding Circles “correlates more or less with the extent to which particular countries participate in the world-wide globalized economy” (46). This explicates how dominant English and its speakers are in linguistic market at the global level. De Swaan (2001) offers an economic account on the spread of English by assimilating language to goods, and learning language to investing. Wee (2008) terms the phenomenon of judging values of language based on its usefulness in socioeconomic and materialistic sense ‘linguistic instrumentalism’. However, an economics-oriented account to English poses both conceptual and methodological challenges in defining the relation between English and economic activities. To justify that English brings monetary profit, the interaction between English competence and income constantly suffers from circularity when the connection is explained to be sequential and downright straightforward (Grin 2001). The economy-driven account regards the contemporary spread of English as consequences of language selection by individuals, as Spolsky (2004) summarizes, “the development of English into global language ... reflects local and individual language acquisition decisions, responding to

change in the complex ecology of the world's language system" (90). The market transformation leads to new possibilities of English to develop and for language consumers to reflect on this new development.

The exchange value of language is probably best explained by the observed blooming of 'language industries' with the development of economic activities surrounding competence-required jobs, such as translation and language teaching (Heller 2010a, 2010b). On the one hand, speakers exchange their competence in the market with job opportunities and higher income. On the other, consumers purchase communication-related product to cater to their own needs. To acquire language is to acquire knowledge that comes in the form of goods (Fairclough 2002). Heller (2010a; 2010b) further adds that economic concerns surpass political ones in capital expansion. The idea of market by Bourdieu (1977) is metaphorical and, to an extent, local and closed (Blommaert 2010). Blommaert (2010) suggests that markets under globalization are also mobile with less transparency compared to Bourdieu's market. Language is treated as merchandize with two seemingly contradictory ideologies. First, to assimilate language skills to job skills relies on the ideology of treating linguistic knowledge as knowledge equally accessible and objectively measurable with a decontextualized standard (Heller 2010a; 2010b). Yet, language with local variations suggests a sense of authenticity and is profitable in industries such as heritage tourism. Language commodification, both as a skill and as one of the authentic artifacts in the package of

heritage tourism, reveals the contrast and negotiability between language standardization and variability (Heller 2010a; 2010b). The concept of language commodification challenges the traditional nationalist ideology of language, which relates the use of language to national identity and to the power deployment of nation-state (Heller 2010a). In an updated discussion on commodification, Heller and Duchêne (2016) further states that newly added economic values to products for niche markets have started to expand to semiosis and cause national languages to be branded in the market. The observation has several remarkable implications. First, as Heller and Duchêne (2016) also note, language consumers find themselves tangled in the emergent tussle over different ideologies, including ideology of authority, that of authenticity and that of legitimacy. Second, the search for niche markets in the neoliberal capitalism has profound influence on how language is viewed and used.

An economic account of linguistic practice calls on attention to the distinction between language commodification (Heller 2003; 2010a; Heller & Duchêne 2016) and language economics (Grin & Vaillancourt 2012). Language commodification is seen as a process “in which elements of the ideological construction of the nation-state are inscribed more directly into the workings of capitalism than they were before” (Heller & Duchêne 2016, 146). On the other hand, language economics adopts “the concepts and tools of economics in the study of relationships featuring linguistic variables” (Grin 1996, 6). Language commodification addresses value addition to language as a response to the changing global economy whereas

language economics provides predicative models in explaining the relation between competence and income. An economic account of language has been under investigation in the past few decades, and yet faces the problem of having a fragmentary body of literature (W. Zhang & Grenier 2013), with varying terms such as ‘economics of language,’ ‘language economics,’ and ‘economics and language’ used by different strands of studies. The traditional economic-orientation to language investigates the connection between language and earning (e.g. Grin 2001), the connection between economy and language vitality (e.g. De Swaan 2010), and the association between economics and language planning (e.g. Zhang & Grenier 2015). The study accounts for the observations in the metadiscourse with the framework of language commodification. The study suggests how English is discursively presented with values shows how it is commodified.

2.4 Studies about the Three Public Discourses

The study investigates the ideologizing process of English by drawing from how the use of English is discussed and evaluated in three public discourse, in crosslinguistic conversational joking in media, in the online discussion of incorporating English as a working language in Taiwan, and in the online debate deciding a phonetic system for Taiwan Mandarin. In addition to the general theoretical frameworks which ground the current discussion, the study also refers to known studies on conversational joking and language

planning. To further develop the analysis on the indexicalizing process of English, studies on intertextuality are also reviewed.

2.4.1 Conversational joking and epistemics

The first analysis of this study, in Chapter 4, centers on crosslinguistic conversational joking in TV programs. The analysis draws heavily upon studies on humor, epistemics (Heritage & Raymond 2005; 2011; Stivers, Mondada & Steensig 2011; Heritage 2013) and codeswitching (Siegel 1995; Myers-Scotton 1998; Myers-Scotton & Bolonyai 2001). Prior to the rise of linguistic accounts on humor in 1980s and 1990s, three strands of psychological research were influential. Theories of incongruity (Monro 1951) emphasize the elements of surprise and unexpectedness that reside in the punchline in a joke text. The theories of disparagement (Suls 1972) depict the sense of superiority and hostility when we see others' minor misfortune. Last, humor is thought to generate laughter, which in turn frees us from negative emotions. The release theory, as summarized in Monro (1951), with a long history as early as back to Freud, illustrates the lifted emotion caused by humor. According to Raskin (1985), theories of incongruity address the role of stimuli. Theories of disparagement have social-behavioral significance because they focus on the social relations among speakers. The release theory discusses humor from a hearer/audience perspective. The three fields on humor also suggest how complicated it is to theoretically account for humor.

Linguistic inquiries about humor only came in the limelight in recent decades. One of the well-cited accounts to humor is the Script-based Semantic Theory of Humor by Raskin, who first introduced this theoretical framework in 1979 and later published the influential *Semantic Mechanisms of Humor* (1985). A script has been broadly defined as a piece of information regarding ways of doing or understanding (Raskin 1985; Attardo 1994). The Script-based Semantic Theory of Humor explains speakers' competence on humor, rather than their performance related to joke-telling (Attardo 1994). A text is considered to be humorous if "the text is compatible, fully or in part, with two different scripts" and if "the two scripts with which the text is compatible are opposite in a special sense" (Raskin 1985, 99). The script-based semantic account on humor illustrates that humor is ambiguity-based. A joke text involves a non-bona-fide communication (Raskin 1985) because speakers breach Grice's Cooperative Principle (1975) by offering insufficient or incorrect amount of information. However, Raskin also outlines that humor seems to work within a set of maxims of its own because speakers and hearers still work cooperatively to tell and to identify jokes. The observation leads him to propose the cooperative principle for the non-bona-fide communication (see Raskin 1985, 100-104). The success, or harmony, of joke-telling and joke-understanding suggest that humor requires shared knowledge to evoke similar scripts. The Script-based Semantic Theory of Humor, as influential as it is, is suggested by Attardo (1994) to have overlook other non-semantic elements of joke telling. General Theory of

Verbal Humor, “the revised version” (Attardo 1994, 222) of the Script-based Semantic Theory of Humor, attempts to fix its limitations (Attardo & Raskin 1991) and elaborates on all humorous text types. Having suggested so, Norrick (2003) still categorizes the General Theory of Verbal Humor as a theoretical account on competence, instead of on performance.

Studies on linguistic humor began with investigation of linguistic competence, a legacy of generative linguistics (Attardo 1994), before conversational joking came to the fore. Humor in conversation can be further divided into joke telling and conversational joking (Boxer & Cortés-Conde 1997). Joke telling is described to be “a play frame created by participants, with a backdrop of ingroup knowledge, encompassing not only verbal features but also suprasegmentals and non-verbal communication” (Boxer & Cortés-Conde 1997, 277). Conversational joking is identified according to who the target is. Joking targeted at a present party is labeled as ‘teasing’ (Boxer & Cortés-Conde 1997). Joking targeted at an absent other, ‘gossiping,’ enhances ingroup solidarity among present interactants (Jaworski & Coupland 2005). Self-deprecating humor projects a positive image for the speaker (Norrick 1993). Among these types of joking, teasing is the most risky with regards to face work for it is directed at a present party in interaction (Boxer & Cortés-Conde 1997). Teasing can be achieved through various discursive strategies. For example, Norrick and Babel (2009) look into the use of direct address terms and find that incongruity can reside in inappropriate use of vocatives, such as jokingly calling a nagging friend “Mother.” Haugh (2010) studies how

jocular mockery, “teasing where participants are orienting to fostering solidarity, rapport or affiliation” (2107), is interactionally achieved by examining response to a speaker’s overdone complaints and the speaker’s further response to the hearer’s stance. Haugh (2010) states that jocular mockery, or teasing, is both interpersonally rewarding and risky, a finding in line with Boxer and Cortés-Conde’s (1997) that teasing either bonds or bites. This is also the case in the Taiwanese context with conversational joking related to English. Who and what are deployed as the ‘butt’ of the teasing mirror how knowledge of English is given social meanings.

Invoking humorous readings relies on ingroup, shared knowledge (Boxer & Cortés-Conde 1997), including both linguistic knowledge and knowledge in general. How one’s access to knowledge is presumed shapes interaction. Stivers et al. (2011) identify three dimensions of knowledge management in interaction, with evidence from interlocutors’ epistemic stances. ‘Epistemic access’ refers to speakers’ judgments of addressees’ knowledge and speakers’ own speech adjustment to addressees’ knowledge. When speakers successfully provide addressees with information previously unknown to them, ‘epistemic congruence’ is reached. That is, knowledge transmit from the knowing party to the unknowing is the default and thus the most preferred interaction. ‘Epistemic primacy’ deals with the relative right of access to knowledge. Speakers who know more than their addressees, speakers who maintain more intimate relationships with the addressees than other interlocutors, and speakers with


higher authority are more entitled to assert and manage knowledge transmit. In a word, interpersonal distance, interaction roles, and the relative degree of access to knowledge impact on the immediate knowledge-exchange conversation. ‘Epistemic responsibilities,’ the third dimension, address the obligations to know. Heritage and Raymond (2005; 2011) and Heritage (2013) also attend to the management of knowledge in interaction. Heritage and Raymond (2005; 2011) and Heritage (2013) use K+ and K- to note the relative access to knowledge among interactants. Speakers who inquire about information are in a K- position. Recipients of a question tend to be in a K+ position because supposedly they possess more knowledge than speakers who ask questions. Interlocutors’ discursive devices in negotiating epistemic stances to maintain interaction and to secure interpersonal relations highlight the cooperative nature in interaction. Thus, a question elicits an answer, ‘alignment’ as termed by Stivers (2008), and an assessment expects an agreement, ‘affiliation’ as Stivers (2008) calls it. There are numerous possible ways to breach expectations to make epistemic discrepancy a potential source of humor.

Humor in multilingual contexts works distinctively from humor in monolingual contexts. Two research trends are observed. The first trend, which so far has received the most of the academic attention, discusses the role of sufficient multilingual competence in producing and comprehending humorous discourse. In multilingual settings, languages are bestowed separate or even conflicting social values. Code alternation on the basis of different

values could be a source of humor (Siegel 1995) because code alternation is metaphorical (Appel & Muysken 1987), marked and calculating (Myers-Scotton 1998; Myers-Scotton & Bolonyai 2001), and indicative of group membership and social distance (Rampton 1995). Codeswitching serves as a contextual cue (John Gumperz 1982) which helps listeners differentiate what is said from what is really meant. This explains why, with identical propositional contents, codeswitching may create a sense of amusement which its monolingual counterpart may not achieve.

Since competence carries social significances, the absence of it is equally socially implicative and deployable to serve other functions. Competence, or the lack of it, could be the target of humor. J.S.-Y. Park (2003) investigates how English is presented in Korean media and finds that incompetence in English is strategically constructed to be the target of humor. Treating incompetence as a source of humor requires the ideological manifestation of regarding competence as a necessity. Lacking English competence therefore becomes undesired (because it goes against the norm) but expected (because not many people speak fluent English). As a foreign language probably not as widely distributed as the lingua franca in a speech community, English competence can be treated as event knowledge. It does not require native-like proficiency to deploy or comprehend a humorous setting. The type of humor is crosslinguistic in form, but it has to be understood in social contexts where the linguistic resources are not equally distributed. Blommaert states that under globalization

where linguistic contact is getting frequent, language competence can be seen as resources, truncated and mobile (Blommaert 2010). Chapter 4 will discuss how knowledge of English and one's lack of English knowledge are exploited to generate humorous effect. The investigation of crosslinguistic humor is therefore three-folded. Linguistically, the study observes how English-related humor is verbally presented to its target audience via multimodal media discourse. Epistemically, the study investigates how knowledge of English is presented. Ideologically, the chapter discusses how both the conversational joking among interactants on the program and multimodal communication between the media and the audience reveals the ideologizing process of English. Remarkably, this chapter discusses how the deployment serves solidarity functions in media by constructing crosslinguistic conversational joking as a 'we-code'.



2.4.2 Discursive approaches to language policy and planning

This second analysis of the study, in Chapter 5, draws from how English in language planning is talked about. The purpose is to investigate how layers of language ideologies are unfolded and interacting in such metadiscourse. Language planning, according to Weinstein (1980), describes “a government authorized, long-term, sustained, and conscious effort to alter a language’s function in a society for the purpose of solving communication problems” (56). Language policy, on the other hand, acts as an umbrella term for a wider range of

language management. Spolsky (2004) provides a broad generalization to include “all the language practices, beliefs and management decisions of a community or polity” (9). With this definition, language policy does not necessarily involve institution-directed implementation. Rather, any conventions about language use could be a form of language policy. It is also necessary to make distinctions between ‘language policies’ and ‘language policy.’ Policies, according to Spolsky (2004), are usually explicitly written plans about language use. Yet, several complexities are also addressed by Spolsky (2004). First, he clarifies that a language policy does not always lead to its actual implementation. Implementation would not necessarily promise successful stipulation to impact on existing language use. Second, the interaction between a social factor in favor of certain language policies and the policies themselves to be probable, instead of causal. Besides, as far as national languages are concerned, they are not always specified in constitutions. These observations lead Spolsky (2004) to propose that language use develops even without making references to explicitly written interventions. By the same token, language use is never free from constraints even without written regulations. Spolsky’s (2004) language policy addresses all the regulations and management on language use. Language policy is understood as rules, either written or unwritten, of language use which is imposed on a social unit of people. Such rules need not be imposed by institutional power, though discussion on institutional influences on language policy prevails.

Discourse contributes tremendously to meaning making of language policy. Mortimer (2016) suggests two ways of understanding policy. Policy could be viewed as representations which are open for interpretation, a property Mortimer assimilates to Gee's little-d discourse (1999). Policy could also be seen as Discourse in Gee's terminology (1999) because it embodies socially shared decorum of using and viewing language. Scholarly attention on how language policy is talked about notes a gradual emphasis on addressing socially constituted understanding of language management (Barakos 2016). This trend called for discursive approaches to language policy (Johnson 2011; 2016; Savski 2016). Discursive approaches to language policy center on reflexivity and account for shared assumptions about language through metapragmatic discourse (Mortimer 2016). As Savski (2016) notes, "policy meaning is discursively constructed and that 'discourse about policy' can thus be considered constitutive of policy meaning and constituted by it" (55). Through talking about language policy, social actors interpret language policy and reveal their beliefs about languages. Discourse about language policy thus serves as a site where language ideologies are manifested, evaluated, and contested (Lawton 2016; van Splunder 2016; Weber 2016).

The relationship between language ideology and language policy is summarized in Spolsky (2004), who notes "language ideology is language policy with the manager left out" (14). Language ideology (Silverstein 1979; Rumsey 1990; Irvine 1998; Schieffelin et al. 1998), which refers to beliefs about language speakers accumulate along their social

experiences, could be both a motive and a result of policy enactment (Shohamy 2006). Rumsey defines language ideology as “shared bodies of commonsense notions about the nature of language in the world” (1990: 346). Rumsey’s definition focuses on the homogeneity of language ideology and addresses less about dynamics and multiplicity of language ideologies (Kroskrity 2004). Metapragmatic discourse serves as a site for investigation into language ideologies (Woolard 1998). This study takes this a step further and suggests that metapragmatic discourse about language policy could be molded by prevailing language ideologies which serve as shared knowledge for communication, and which are also further evaluated by speakers.

The study thereby adopts a discursive analysis to metadiscourse on English in language planning and aims to supplement the ideologizing process of English with the analysis. The analysis draws on Blommaert’s sociolinguistic scales (2007; 2010), reviewed previously in Section 2.3, and also Vandebroucke’s (2015) analysis scheme to relate the contesting nature of language ideologies in the Taiwanese context to the multiple spatial identities Taiwan has. Sociolinguistic scales (Blommaert 2007; 2010) metaphorically see geographical movement as vertically layered and power-invested. The framework of sociolinguistic scales can account for the relation between spatial identities and linguistic practice. A locale (Giddens 1991) could function multiple spatial identities (Vandebroucke 2015) which semiotic resources are seen to lock intimately with (Blommaert et al. 2005; Blommaert 2007; 2010). Semiotic

practices can therefore conform to multiple references ranging from homogenous and global to situated and local, depending on the associations between the spatial identities and semiotic norms (Blommaert 2010). Vandenbroucke (2015) discusses how Brussels projects distinctive identities of Brussels as a capital, a non-official unified European city and a global city in neoliberalism with shop signs featuring French/Dutch bilingualism, Dutch monolingualism and English. As Taiwan positions itself with multiple identities, Chapter 5 discusses that discourse concerning language planning potentially invokes discussion about languages at different scale-levels.

2.4.3 Intertextuality

The third analysis, in Chapter 6, focuses on how the debate regarding a phonetic system for Taiwan Mandarin involves metadiscourse about English. In addition to the frameworks of language ideology and discursive approaches to language policy, the study also draws from the theoretical frameworks of intertextuality and indexicality to account for the observations. Metalinguistic discourse (Silverstein 1979; 1985; 1993) is one of the sites where the three frameworks, language ideologies, indexicality, and intertextuality, intersect.¹

Intertextuality describes how current discourse is a combined product of both elements from other speakers in other contexts as well as elements newly created in the current context

¹ An earlier version of the review in this first appe section ars in Lee, Wan-Hsin. accepted 2020. What does guojijiegui mean?: Language ideology, intertextuality and indexicality in online metapragmatic discourse. *Monumenta Taiwanica* 19.

(Bakhtin 1986; Fairclough 1992b; Hodges 2015). A text always both links to prior utterances and feeds later communication (Bakhtin 1986). Intertextuality could be understood as cohesion across texts (Bauman 2005; Hodges 2015). The term ‘intertextuality’ was first coined by Kristeva (1980), who developed Bakhtin’s idea where a text is seen as “a mosaic of quotations” (Kristeva 1980, 66). The act of quoting and repeating facilitates social interaction through discursive practice (Tannen 2006). For example, Tovaes (2005) discusses how utterances from TV programs are borrowed, repeated, and readjusted in family interaction. Kristeva (1980) further identifies the concept of horizontal and vertical intertextuality. Horizontal intertextuality addresses the phenomenon of how speakers select utterances from previous turns and rephrase them to sustain the current discourse (Du Bois 2014). Such a conceptualization is also discussed in different terminology (Hodges 2015). For instance, the act of reintroducing prior utterances is termed ‘recycling’ by Tannen (2006). Vertical intertextuality refers to the way that speakers see a text as belonging to a certain genre by identifying linguistic cues to salient characteristics of various types of texts (Kristeva 1980; Briggs & Bauman 1992; Johnstone 2008). Briggs and Bauman (1992) adopt the concepts of intertextuality to yield an account of how a genre is recognized and how the knowledge about various genres is circulated through discourse. They propose that linguistic features are foregrounded by speakers and picked up by recipients who link the current text to prior understanding. However, Briggs and Bauman (1992) also state that the idea of generic

intertextuality offers only a sketch, and that pragmatics and metapragmatics still play a crucial role in shaping and understanding discourse.

Silverstein (2005) adopts a related concept termed interdiscursivity. According to Silverstein (2005), intertextuality describes “a directionally neutral state of comparability of texts in one or another respect” (7), and thus differs from the inquiry of linguistic anthropology, which emphasizes the communication process where a stretch of discourse is at participants’ disposal to meet various social purposes (Silverstein 2005). Therefore, Silverstein distinguishes intertextuality from what he terms ‘interdiscursivity.’ Interdiscursivity deals with “how intertexts are created, that is, how they are generated in events of communication through techniques of interdiscursivity deployable as role strategies of the participants” (Silverstein 2005, 7). Bauman (2005) states that interdiscursivity mostly refers to discursive practice while intertextuality refers to the cohesive connections among texts. This study does not distinguish between intertextuality and interdiscursivity. The term ‘intertextuality’ is used throughout.

A discussion of intertextuality and the meaning-making process draws attention to the concept of indexicality (Hill 2005; Eckert 2008; Jaffe 2016). The fact that speakers understand and choose to use recurrent utterances shows that indexicality is constructed on a somewhat shared knowledge regarding the intended meanings of a phrase. The experience of intertextuality is also a process of indexicalization (Hill 2005). Speakers interpret linguistic

practice by linking it to social contexts where it is situated. Linguistic practice which conforms to social expectations usually go unnoticed whereas unexpected linguistic practice invites language users' attention to the practice itself (Hübler & Bublitz 2007). Anton (1998) notes the distinction between attending 'from' speech, which speakers mostly do in communication, and attending 'to' speech, which speakers do when expectations fail (199). Expectedness can be also deployed to achieve other goals. In their study on mock language in films, Bucholtz and Lopez (2011) discuss how European-American characters' portrayal of stereotypical African American English is interpreted as parodic. The European-American performers deploy linguistic features which are stereotypically considered to belong to AAE to perform inauthentic blackness (Bucholtz & Lopez 2011). In indexicalization, linguistic practice usually points to a number of potential meanings (Silverstein 2003; Eckert 2008). This suggests indeterminacy and multiplicity of indexical values (Silverstein 2003; Hill 2005; Jaffe 2016). As linguistic practice indexes multiple meanings, different indexical values coexist (Silverstein, 2003). Eckert (2008) notes that indexical meanings are not discrete from one another but are ideologically associated (Eckert, 2008). In her study on the use of the Spanish word *mañana* by Anglophone speakers, Hill (2005) states that intertextuality should be seen as both a source and evidence of indirect indexical meanings. She notes, "The apparent opacity indirect indexicality has is not inherent in its semiosis but resides in the particular context of ideological commitments and understandings of the world held by

speakers” (2005, 115). Jaffe (2016) discusses how English-speaking mothers get confused and even irritated when their Spanish-speaking mothers-in-law address their baby boys as *pobrecito*, literally ‘poor little boy.’ The address term is interpreted by the English-speaking mothers as the mothers-in-law’s accusations that they are not looking after their babies well. Jaffe (2016) elaborates that indexical meanings are constantly examined and reinterpreted. Taking a slightly different approach, the study discusses how a fixed expression invokes extra-textual knowledge (John Gumperz 1996) that the viewers deploy as a criterion for judgments.

Chapter 6 is inspired by the observations that the metadiscourse of English is introduced in the debate of Taiwan Mandarin’s phonetic systems and that the public treats the value *guojijiegui* as given, shared and needless to define. The issue is worth exploring for its theoretical and empirical implications. Theoretically, the chapter hopes to complement past studies on intertextuality by analyzing how a fixed expression such as *guojijiegui*, which is also an indexical value without a specified definition, invokes intertextual interpretations. Studies on intertextuality have focused on address terms (Hill 2005), identity labels (Wong 2005), and evaluative expressions (Adachi 2016). Studies on intertextuality have discussed how a term, when used in a new context, carries its indexical meanings from prior texts with it (e.g. Hill 1992; Wong 2005), and how indexicalization, the link between language use to social categories, is deployed to serve other sociopragmatic purposes such as scripting

parodies (Bucholtz & Lopez 2011). Furthermore, this section presents how the metadiscourse about phonetic systems can be a full-fledged ideology-laden and indexicality-fused debate. Empirically, to the best of my knowledge, past literature on intertextuality with Mandarin Chinese data has been found to focus on literature and art (H.-l. Chang 2007; Fischer 2009), information transmit in media (W. Wang 2008; C. Wang 2017) and courtroom discourse (Shi 2014). Studies on intertextuality in the Taiwanese context feature in research on drama and film (Wood 2007; W.M. Wang 2016), and EFL studies (Chi 1995). Less attention has been paid to intertextuality in everyday discourse. How intertextuality works and affects speakers' everyday discourse is thus worth exploring.

The study draws from several popular research inquiries respectively supported by great bodies of literature. The study reviews directly relevant framework to build the theoretical sketch for data observation and discussion.

CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY

A study about the ideologizing process of English starts with a definition of English. As the use of English is indigenized with local features (Mufwene 2010), English in Taiwan is also imbued with local meanings. Curtin (2007) discusses the phenomenon that some English lexical items have their unique meanings used solely in Taiwan. For example, the letter ‘Q’ can refer to chewiness. Wasserfall (in press 2021) also suggests that English lexical insertion in Taiwanese Mandarin contexts is adapted and conventionalized. For example, the noun ‘line’ can be used as a verb to mean to contact a person via line (Wasserfall in press 2021). Sometimes it becomes challenging to argue whether these indigenous features are English. Consequently, what practice can be counted as ‘using English’ is itself worth exploring. As this study addresses the public’s attitudes and language ideologies concerning English, the study approaches the issues of ‘English’ in accord with lay conceptualizations. When linguistic practice is referred to as ‘using English,’ the study considers its potential for further discussion.

The study investigates how English is ideologized through examining how it is represented in three public discourses, in crosslinguistic humorous discourse in TV programs, in directly elicited online metadiscourse about officializing English, and in indirectly elicited online metadiscourse about English in a debate regarding phonetic systems for Taiwan

Mandarin. These three public discourses contribute to respective dimensions of profiling English in Taiwan—to inform and to entertain *with* English, to debate *about* English, and to debate *around* English. The goals are double-folded: to yield an understanding of sociolinguistic vitality of English in Taiwan and to pinpoint the dynamics of the ideologizing process of English in the Taiwanese context.

This study proposes that language representation is a context-specific product of ideological interpretations. Speakers' discourse can be seen as an embodiment of reflexivity (Lucy 1993; Verschueren 2004; Caffi 2006; Hübler & Bublitz 2007) on their social knowledge about language. Namely, discourse is expected to be layered with different levels of ideologizing work. It's a combined product of anticipations and opinions on these expectations. Martin and White (2005) also address "the anticipatory aspect" (93) of utterances with the dialogistic perspective. They note,

all verbal communication, whether written or spoken, is 'dialogic' in that to speak or write is always to reveal the influence of, refer to, or to take up in some way, what has been said/written before, and simultaneously to anticipate the responses of actual, potential or imagined readers/listeners (92).

At least two levels of ideological process are identified in a given discourse, one established from long-term social interaction and one emergent in current interaction. The levels are detectable from discursive arrangement of information. When speakers react to others' discourse, the speakers' discourse reveals their values, attitudes, and beliefs concerning not others' prior discourse, but the ideological understanding of such discourse. The study terms

the outperformed attitudes, beliefs and values ‘ideological stances,’ following Jaffe’s (2016) terminology. Ideological stances tend to share the discursive structure for new information. They are the focus of a complex sentence, they follow a transition, and they contain explicit evaluative terms. The study terms the backgrounded and implicit social experiences about languages ‘established language ideologies’ because they are pieces of available knowledge with which speakers make sense of others’ discourse and proceed to evaluate. Established information tends to be treated as old information. It occupies sentence-initial position, in subordinate clauses as a subject or a topic. They can also be the preferred answers in rhetorical questions because they are the expected information. An established language ideology does not have to be embraced by the public. The study adopts Martin and White’s (2005) view that all linguistic performances reveal speakers’ attitudes toward prior discourse. Martin and White (2005) specify the evaluative nature of utterances. The use of conjunctions and connectives, for instance, introduces two opposite propositions and prefer one to the other. It justifies how utterances are evaluative to an expected, known assertion. The relations among others’ discourse, established language ideologies and ideological stances sketch what the study calls an ‘ideologization web,’ to emphasize the entanglement of language ideologies involved in interpreting linguistic practice. The sketch of the ideologization web is presented in Figure 2.




Figure 2. An ideologization web sketches the connection among others' discourse, established language ideologies and ideological stances.

The study presents others' discourse and ideological stances in concrete lines and frames as they are discursively overt. Established language ideologies mediate in-between are presented in dotted frames and lines because they are often backgrounded and remain relatively implicit.

This model captures language ideologization as progressive, layered and context-dependent when communication proceeds. As interaction continues, the ideologization process could be extended. Others' discourse is also a product of earlier multilayered ideologization. Speakers' ideological stances will also act as others' discourse that invokes further ideologization. The model can be as complicated as Figure 3 presents.




Figure 3. An extended ideologization web.

This study will analyze the three public discourses by identifying the duel ideological focuses and discuss their interaction.

The outline of the Method is as follows. Section 3.1 describes how the study collects and analyzes discourse about crosslinguistic conversational joking in variety shows. Section 3.2 outlines how the study draws from online metadiscourse regarding English in language planning in Taiwan to discuss the interaction among language ideologies. Section 3.3 describes how metadiscourse concerning English is elicited due to its social imagination in the Taiwan context.

3.1 Crosslinguistic Conversational Joking in Media

The study discusses English-related conversational joking in variety shows. Humor occurs when expectations fail. Hence, humorous discourse can be seen as incongruous and inappropriate (Monro 1951; Raskin 1985). The study defines crosslinguistic humor as humorous interaction around English use in a Chinese- or Taiwanese- dominant context. Identifying inappropriateness and sources of humor illuminates what is seen as appropriate and further reveals the ideologizing process. Since media aim at large audienceship, mediated linguistic practice along with other modalities, including subtitles and animated texts, reflect collective conceptualizations of English competence in the Taiwanese society. Moreover, how such linguistic practice is conveyed through these modalities also reveal how the societal proficiency about English is assumed. The study will present that knowledge of English, including English competence and metalinguistic knowledge of English in the Taiwanese social context, is treated as event knowledge. How speakers manage the knowledge of English for humorous purposes in media foregrounds presumably shared societal expectations about English.

3.1.1 TV programs about ‘infotainment’

The discourse of ‘infotainment’ is the focus of the analysis. The word ‘infotainment’ is used firstly to record the transformation of news discourse from impersonal and informative

to sensational (Monclús & Vicente-Mariño 2010). The term now also refers to broadcasts that offer information in a lighthearted, entertaining way (Rosenwald 2019). Discourse in three infotainment programs are analyzed—the travel program 食尚玩家 *shisang wanjia* ‘Super Taste,’ the talk show 二分之一強 *erfenzhiy qiang* ‘Half and Half,’ and WTO 姐妹會 *WTO jiemei hui* ‘WTO Sister Show.’ The travel program *Super Taste* first started with recommending local tourists spots in Taiwan. The production crew members are renowned for their relatively local, grass root identity. The program is mostly in Taiwan Mandarin and Taiwanese. After the show gained popularity, they started to feature foreign spots. *Half and Half*, a talk show, features a number of foreigners living in Taiwan and is hosted by two Taiwanese. The show is mostly in Mandarin Chinese, though the guest speakers’ native languages can also be heard on the show. Cultural issues are a common theme in the program. There are specific episodes that discuss language issues, including English education in Taiwan and the guest speakers’ non-native English use. *WTO Sister Show*, as the title suggests, assimilates the talk show to international seminars at WTO. The talk show also features a number of foreign guests sharing their experiences of living in different countries. The talk show is also mostly in Mandarin Chinese.

Several major concerns should be noted about collecting and analyzing infotainment discourse in the three programs. First, the discourse that is broadcast features an abundance of multi-party talking, partially scripted and partially impromptu. The discourse survives

post-editing. This implies that it is under repeated surveillance at the time of interaction and in post-production (Bell & Gibson 2011). As surveillance imposes regulatory force, mediated linguistic practice is expected to both conform to and actively reproduce norms shared in the speech community. These programs make the ideologizing process overt with humorous discourse. Second, the three programs are popular for at least several years. This suggests that they enjoy steady audienceship and successfully offer entertainment. The steady audienceship also entails the contents are less likely to be controversial, unrepresentative or genre-specific. This considerably lowers the undesired possibility of collecting rare examples. Furthermore, the three programs also possess respective distinctions that together further strengthen the arguments. To analyze conversational joking qualitatively, the study carefully selects episodes that cover more types of crosslinguistic humor. A foremost element is English proficiency levels, or to be more specific, onstage representations of English proficiency. The study sees the hosts' onstage portrayal of English proficiency as a threshold to include examples of English-related humor from proficient English users, intermediate English users and basic English users. The hosts from the three programs show diverse onstage images in terms of proficiency levels. *Super Taste* is hosted by a duo, AX and HZ.² AX is a basic English user while HZ is an English user at the intermediate level. *Half and Half* is hosted by Vincent and Karen. Karen is a proficient English user while Vincent has an onstage persona of being a

² There are several hosts in the program. To observe multi-party discourse and to carefully collect data from English users at different proficiency levels, the study focuses on the discourse in episodes hosted by AX and HZ.

basic English user. Ryan and Alexia, the hosts of *WTO Sister Show*, are both known for being highly educated and eloquent. The hosts' diverse competence levels in English are expected to diversify the humorous linguistic practice the study observes. The episodes analyzed in the study, all aired between Year 2012 to 2019, are viewed on their respective official YouTube channels and transcribed for later analysis. Screens pertaining to the study are captured and stored digitally. In total, data from 10 episodes with the length of approximately 561 minutes are analyzed. Table 1 shows the title, length and link of each episode.

Table 1. The titles, links and length of the 10 episodes of infotainment programs analyzed in the study.

title and link	aired on	length (min.)
食尚玩家 下一站時尚之都米蘭 (‘Super Taste. The next stop, Milan, a fashion capital.’) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nU_7fxt6myE	April 24, 2012	48
食尚玩家 美瘋了 狂歡奔放紐奧良(一) (‘Super Taste. Partying in New Orleans.’) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HmFWBlzZbAw	November 11, 2013	47
食尚玩家 美瘋了 陽光性感邁阿密(三) (‘Super Taste. Sunshine in Miami.’) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AcQ7zvahtYQ	November 26, 2013	47
食尚玩家 南美探戈(二) (‘Super Taste. Tango in South America.’) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wet9p7SZT-A	December 01, 2015	48
台灣人愛摺英文!? 新住民有話要說!? (‘Taiwanese love <i>lao yingwen</i> !? What do Taiwanese new immigrants say?’) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XCcbiggkNmQ	March 15, 2016	46
台灣人愛用英文口頭禪 老外傷透腦筋覺得煩?! (‘Taiwanese love to use English catchphrases. <i>Laowai</i> are confused and annoyed.’)	March 08, 2017	43

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_5Knc4NmTk

聯合國英語大會考！老外英文沒有你想的厲害？！ March 08, 2017 125

(‘English test! *Laowai*’s English is not a great as you imagine.’)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j_R_1NITvU8

台灣藝人英文太爛 全場集體崩潰？！ June 20, 2018 45

(‘Taiwanese artists speak English so badly that every guest on the scene cracks up.’)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=816_jVUUjqA

台式英文老外真的聽得懂？ November 15, 2018 59

(‘Do *Laowai* really understand Taiwanese English?’)

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HACenjb7YX0>

亞洲歐美老外PK！最受歡迎英文老師獎落誰家？ September 10, 2019 53

(A competition for the most popular English teachers.)

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ir4Zh7igBhE>

3.1.2 Conversational joking in ‘infotainment’ discourse

The study defines crosslinguistic conversational joking as English-related humorous discourse that either adopts linguistic elements in English or concerns metadiscourse about English use in a Chinese- or Taiwanese- dominant context. The analysis therefore leans heavily on relevant studies on Rampton (1995)’s language crossing and Myers-Scotton’s (1998) Markedness Model, both of which discuss how adopting a different language serves social purposes. Besides, the study consequently takes a broad, multimodal view on defining crosslinguistic humor. For one, the relation between laughter and humor is argued to be open to discussion (Raskin 1985). For another, what is regarded as funny varies from person to person. To determine whether a stretch of discourse is humorous, the study takes the

following criteria into consideration. Humor is immediately observable in interaction among the participants on the programs. The interactants' facial expressions to show amusement and surprise, prolonged pauses between turns to indicate unexpectedness, and their verbal feedback are taken as indications of humor. Moreover, post-produced running texts of character generator effects can frame expressions with emphasis and guide the audience to a non-serious reading. Take an episode from *Half and Half* (aired on November 5, 2018) as an example. A non-native guest speaker comments on his friend's incorrect English. Karen, the hostess who is proficient in English, quips at him, 你講人家講的英文不對?! *Ni jiang renjia jiang de yingwen bu dui* 'You're saying that the person was using English wrong?!' The sentence is presented as a running text presented in bigger fonts and situated above the subtitles. Compared to subtitles, the presence of running texts is eye-catching and interpretation-inviting. The running text is implying that the guest speaker is not qualified to evaluate others' English. The running text is thereby an indication of inappropriateness and unexpectedness. In addition to running texts, sound effects, including canned laughter, upbeat background music or instrument sounds to indicate lighthearted atmosphere, also hint at humorous readings of performances. English-related humorous discourse is transcribed for later analysis.

The study approaches humorous discourse with the theory of epistemics, affiliation and alignment (Stivers et al. 2011). As speakers adjust their discourse according to their

assumptions about the addressees' knowledge (Stivers et al. 2011), and as English is not a prevalent language compared to Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese, the study treats speakers' choices of using English as their judgments about managing knowledge in interaction. As Gal and Irvine (2019) note, "interaction and encounter are the crucibles in which knowledge of the world – simultaneously with the relations of social life – are made, unmade, and remade" (110). How knowledge about English shapes ongoing discourse manifests itself how English is situated in the Taiwanese social contexts. The study analyzes English-related conversational joking at discursive level and at ideological level. At discursive level, the study sees speakers' management of linguistic knowledge revealed through discursive construction as their responsibility to keep the conversation going. How linguistic knowledge is assumed discloses whether competence in English is presumed in the society. At ideological level, what is deployed as the 'target' of the humorous practice, in other words, what norms are breached, reflects societal expectations about English. The study proposes that scripting and interpreting crosslinguistic humor is part of the ideologizing process. Speakers interpret the texts by scanning them with established language ideologies before their expectations fail and the audience's amusement shows. The amusement out of the audience's perceived inappropriateness is their ideological stances. The study aims at identifying the ideologizing process between the TV discourse and the audience's amusement. The ideologization web in interpreting and scripting crosslinguistic humor is presented in

Figure 4.




Figure 4. The ideologization process of English in crosslinguistic humor.

Furthermore, English-related conversational joking in media discourse will be approached from two perspectives, how knowledge of English can be a target of linguistic humor in local interaction, and via which vehicles and in what languages the skit is communicated to audience. The discussion of conversational joking about English is presented in [Chapter 4](#).

3.2 English in Language Planning: Directly Elicited Metadiscourse on English

The second analysis of the study identifies the ideologizing process in the metadiscourse about English in language planning in Taiwan. If the use of English in variety shows considers a non-serious side of English use, the metadiscourse on English in language

planning addresses a more serious, prescriptive aspect of English in the Taiwanese context, an aspect that tends to be seen as ‘ideological’ from lay perspectives. The discussion is presented in Chapter 5.

The study uses “English in language planning” to refer to a series of language planning and attempts starting from October 2017. It starts with the bottom-up proposal to recognize English as Taiwan’s second official language. The issue of officializing English caught the public’s attention in October 2017. Jamie Lin, a recipient of the Ten Outstanding Youth Persons in Taiwan, suggested to the then Executive Yuan Premier, Lai Ching-te, at the award ceremony that English become the second official language of Taiwan. In the same month, a Legislative Member, Wu Szu-Yao, also called for legitimizing English as Taiwan’s second official language. Their proposals were responded positively by then then Premier of the Executive Yuan, Lai Ching-te, and the event hit the news. As English still remains a foreign language in Taiwan, Lin’s and Wu’s pleas drew public attention and elicited Taiwanese’s rationalizations, namely, their language ideologies (Woolard 1998), concerning English, official languages and practically all languages in Taiwan. In March 2018, a number of academicians at Academia Sinica, the preeminent academic institution of Taiwan, called on the government at a meeting with the President, Tsai Ing-wen, to place more emphasis on both Mandarin Chinese and English. In August 2018, Lai revealed the government’s plan to put forward a bilingual policy with hope of elevating citizens’ English proficiency. The

Executive Yuan issued The Blueprint of Developing Taiwan into a Bilingual Nation by 2030 in the following December, officially announcing the onset of planning a new language policy. The study adopts a discursive approach to analyze four types of metadiscourse on English officialization between October 2017 and December 2018:

- a) Comments from an online survey conducted by Yahoo Taiwan (October 2017),
- b) the text of The Blueprint for Developing Taiwan into a Bilingual Nation by 2030 (December 2018),
- c) the discourse of two YouTubers' vlogs (December 2018), and
- d) YouTube users' comments on the two vlogs (from December 2018 onwards)

The four sets of data allow the study not only to complement each other to make the findings well justified, but also to see how the metadiscourse about English planning is built upon through time. In the following, the data collection and analyses are introduced.

3.2.1 Survey comments: Collection and analysis

The study first discusses how individuals react to the proposal of legitimizing English in October 2017. The purposes are to empirically understand English in language planning in Taiwan and to theoretically account for varying degrees of explicitness of language ideologies. When Jamie Lin's and Wu Szu-Yao's proposals were responded positively by the then Executive Yuan Premier, their proposals and the Premier's affirmative responses hit the

news. Yahoo Taiwan, one of the major portal websites in Taiwan, conducted an online survey in October 2017. The survey was titled 有人建議英文列為第二官方語言，您的態度是？
You ren jianyi yingwen lie wei di er guanfang yuyan, nin de taidu shi? ‘What’s your opinion about recognizing English as a second official language?’ Yahoo users could vote for or against the policy proposal and comment on it. The comments are gathered manually to identify recurrent opinions. According to the survey, 1333 survey participants supported this proposal while 461 opposed it. Because the survey participants were free to leave numerous comments, a total number of 1938 comments are collected. Due to the polarized opinions the participants expressed in the online poll, the survey comments can offer a general, dichotomous imagery of English by the public.

The comments are first examined based on the viewers’ recurrent opinions on officializing English, termed ‘ideological stances’ in this study. The study identifies 13 prevailing ideological stances. These prevailing stances are further found to background and be rooted in four broader rationalizations called ‘established language ideologies’ in this study, as shown in (1a) and (1b).

- (1) a. 國際觀、加強國際競爭力並不是指把英文列為第二官方語言就會變好。 英文列為重點學習語言就可以了
(‘Making English our second official language doesn’t earn ourselves international perspective or competitiveness. We can simply focus on English education.’)
- b. 不然要用閩南語跟世界接軌嗎？
(‘Otherwise can we connect with the world in Southern Min?’)

Comment (1a) explicitly disfavors English officialization. The viewer also denies

officializing English as a means to achieve international competitiveness. By negating this claim, the comment can be seen, from a dialogic perspective, as the viewer's response to those who bear this belief (Martin & White 2005). In addition, the viewer affirms to place greater emphasis on language learning. The comment reflects the viewer's evaluation that English relates to international perspective and competitiveness. Comment (1a) shows that, through negation, the viewer is not evaluating the propositional content of the proposal text, but the rationalizations and meaning-making of the proposal. A rhetorical question in (1b) challenges Southern Min's usefulness in global market and draws on the knowledge that English is considered useful in global market, a piece of information which is implicitly stated. The fact that specific beliefs are backgrounded but evaluated, as in (1a), or implicitly mentioned, as in (1b), explains that they are treated as shared, basic and normative. They are the established language ideologies. Similar to conventional joking in infotainment discourse, English officialization is not comprehended in a literal, directed manner (Kremer & Horner 2016), but interpreted via the ideologizing process. The ideological process can lead to distinctive, even opposing, evaluations within and across comments. The discursive approaches to language policy refer to speakers' discussion on policy texts as "discourse about discourse" (Mortimer 2016: 79). In this vein, "discourse about discourse" is also language ideology on language ideology. The 13 prevailing ideological stances are further found to reflect on four established language ideologies. The ideologization web in the

metadiscourse of the policy proposal text is shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5. The ideologization web in metadiscourse about officializing English in Taiwan.

At linguistic level, the proposal text to recognize English as Taiwan’s second official language leads to viewers’ ideology-laden comments. The relationship between the proposal discourse and the viewers’ ideological stances is presented in the concrete lines and the frames because the text and the comments are verbally explicit. Between the proposal text and viewers’ stances mediate the meaning-making process. Dotted lines that connect the proposal text, established language ideologies, and ideological stances show that they are ideologically related but not necessarily verbally presented. The analysis of the survey comments is presented in [Section 5.1](#).

3.2.2 The Blueprint: Collection and analysis

The text of the Blueprint of Developing Taiwan into a Bilingual Nation by 2030 (henceforth the Blueprint) is examined carefully to investigate how English is described and what language ideologies are manifested. The Blueprint is retrieved from the Website of National Development Council.³ The study follows the instruction of investigating the ideologizing process outlined by Verschueren (2012). Verschueren (2012) approaches language ideologies in discourse from a pragmatic perspective. One of the major theses in identifying ideological interpretations addresses the commonsense nature. What is treated as commonsensical can further be exploited to explain and rationalize linguistic practice. This section of the analysis shows what is being taken as normative in officializing English. The analysis of the Blueprint is presented in Section 5.2.

3.2.3 YouTubers' vlog discourse: A perspective of self-media

The third dataset concerns YouTubers' vlog discourse, i.e. discourse from 'self-media' or 'we-media.' We-media embark "a way to begin to understand how ordinary citizens, empowered by digital technologies that connect knowledge throughout the globe, are contributing to and participating in their own truths, their own kind of news" (Bowman &

³ The Chinese version of the Blueprint is retrieved May 25, 2019 from https://www.ndc.gov.tw/Content_List.aspx?n=FB2F95FF15B21D4A&upn=5137965B2A81A120; the English version is retrieved June 24, 2019 from https://www.ndc.gov.tw/en/Content_List.aspx?n=D933E5569A87A91C&upn=9633B537E92778BB.

Willis 2003, v). Several theoretical and empirical concerns should be noted about analyzing YouTubers' vlog discourse for this study. First, with the rise of 'self-media,' the public no longer relies on traditional news media for information. YouTubers who run a news-like channel can provide their audience with both the latest information and their perspectives (Bowman & Willis 2003). These YouTubers could be equally influential, or even more well-accepted and reviewed because they are popularly believed to speak from, and probably speak for, the general public compared to traditional news media. In fact, a YouTube search of the phrase 雙語國家政策 *shuangyu guojia zhengce* 'bilingual nation policy' shows that two out of the top three most viewed clips are YouTubers vlogs. Vlog serves as a faster route for information. Furthermore, the popularity of vlogs probably best illustrates the idea that there are not simply top-down and bottom-up layers as far as language policy and planning are concerned (Baldauf 2006; Wodak 2006; Johnson 2013; Lawton 2016).

The two vlogs out of the top three most viewed clips about 雙語國家政策 are analyzed. The two vlogs are by The YouTubers RD and SS77. RD runs a popular YouTube channel on English learning and has more than two million subscribers. SS77 is a political commentator known for critiquing current events for 7 minutes, at 7 pm, 7 days a week. He has around half a million subscribers. Their respective onscreen roles as an online English teacher and a commentator make them legitimate and persuasive to comment on English in language planning. They both host a video on the issue and invite the other to be the guest


speaker. SS77's vlog includes an edit of RD talking about the language policy of Singapore.⁴ RD's vlog features a face-to-face discussion between them on the Blueprint. As this study investigates lay conceptualizations of English, popular media that lead to more heated responses are an ideal data source than news. YouTubers' vlog discourse show particular dimension of the public views, not panoramic but definitely an important dimension considering the rising popularity of self-media. The analysis of the two YouTubers' vlogs is discussed in Section 5.3.

3.2.4 Vlog comments: Divergent, non-dichotomous perspectives

The last dataset on English in language planning concerns viewers' comments on the two YouTubers' vlogs. A total number of 1493 comments (1036 comments and 457 comments from the respective vlogs) are analyzed. Though at first sight, the online survey comments and the YouTube comments seem to share some commonalities, the two sources of comments display more distinctions than similarities. Together they complement each other to yield a better developed account on the ideologizing process of English. As the survey participants must take a polarized opinion, the survey comments show generally dichotomous patterns toward the bilingual nation policy. Distinctive from the survey comments, YouTube viewers need not take absolute stances about the policy. This allows the study to observe

⁴ RD's vlog discourse is retrieved March 18, 2020 from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fDmmgPOMom8>; SS77's from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=88aTuEE5pSs>.

more intrinsic, interwoven rationalizations about English. In fact, the viewers are comparatively ‘reserved’ about their opinions. Strong preferences for the policy and stern disapproval are less frequent. Furthermore, a 14-month gap between the survey comments (October 2017) and the YouTube comments (December 2018) may suggest that different voices are likely to emerge. The characteristics of the two datasets and the time span make both exploration-worthy. To better accommodate the data, a qualitative analysis is conducted. I use the established language ideologies identified in the previous sections to discuss how contestations are discursively presented. For privacy concerns, the screen names of the viewers are shorted or changed when conversation strings are shown for analysis. The finding is presented in [Section 5.4](#).



The chapter benefits tremendously from the public’s relatively long attention to English officialization. The 14-month gap allows the study to focus on the ideologizing process of English in relation to other languages in Taiwan. Table 2 summarizes the highlights of each dataset.

Table 2. The data sources, collection and focuses in directly elicited metadiscourse

dataset	time	highlight
Online survey comments	October 2017	The conceptualizations of English and official languages
the text of The Blueprint	December 2018	How English competence is talked about
YouTubers' vlog discourse	December 2018	Language ideologization in self-media discourse
vlog comments	December 2018 onwards	Ideological contestation in metadiscourse

After Wu's and Lin's proposals to recognize English as Taiwan's second official language hit the news, the survey was conducted first. The study outlines the associations between established language ideologies and ideological stances. The Blueprint, the official document, offers the top-down perspective of how English is promoted. The study proceeds to analyze the YouTubers' vlog discourse to probe into the ideologizing process in the new form of media discourse. The vlog comments, which are also the latest and the most divergent opinions, allow the study to zoom into the contestation-oriented metadiscourse. The discussion of the officialization debate is presented in [Chapter 5](#).

3.3 Bopomofo vs. Romanization: Indirectly Elicited Metadiscourse about

English

This section of the study examines the metadiscourse about English in the online discussion of phonetic systems for Mandarin Chinese in Taiwan. This analysis, presented in [Chapter 6](#), discusses how language ideologies and indexicalities related to English shape the

online discussion of a language policy proposal.⁵ Bopomofo, the phonetic system for Taiwan Mandarin, was once proposed to be replaced with 羅馬拼音 *Luoma Pinyin* ‘Romanized phonetic schemes’ in order to *guojijiegui*, literally ‘to connect with the world.’ This proposal was initiated by a Legislative Member, Yeh Yi-jin (葉宜津, henceforth Yeh), who ran in a primary election for Tainan mayoral election in her own political party in March 2018. She explicitly stated that the adoption of Romanized phonetic schemes and the abolishment of Bopomofo were critical to *guojijiegui*. Her proposal reveals the belief that Romanized phonetic schemes index *guojijiegui*. This rationalization, or language ideology in a broad definition (Silverstein 1979), suggests that linguistic practice points to disparate social values, that is, its indexical values (Silverstein 2003; Eckert 2008). Though the policy proposal and its debate subsided shortly after the candidate’s failure in the primary election, regulating phonetic systems of Taiwan Mandarin for the goal of *guojijiegui* received great attention and sparked heated discussions among news viewers at that time. An interesting observation the study accounts regards how the metadiscourse concerning English is introduced into the current debate. The study draws from the proposal speech, online survey comments and news comments on YouTube to discuss the interaction among language ideologies, indexicalities and (meta)discourse.

⁵ Part of the analysis first appears in Lee (accepted 2020).

A major part of the analysis surrounds the fixed expression *guojijiegui*. *Guojijiegui* has been a catchy phrase in public discourse such as in news, language policy enactment, and economic activities, in recent decades. As a fixed expression, *guojijiegui* is composed of three elements. *Guoji* refers to ‘international.’ *Gie* means ‘to connect’ and *gui* is a route for vehicles or rails for trains. *Guojijiegui* is therefore a metaphor from transportation to mean to stay connected to global trends and to meet global standards. The expression can both mean an act or a state. However, seldom do we feel the need to particularly define this term. What is even more intriguing is how the state and the act of *guojijiegui* are described as desired (H.-L. Wang 2002). As one goal of this section addresses the meaning-making process of the term *guojijiegui* in relation to linguistic practice, and as most viewers do not find the need to define the term, the study uses the transliteration *guojijiegui* to avoid the potential for a biased definition with English translation

This chapter of the study also adopts a discursive approach to analyze three datasets.

- a) the discourse of Yeh’s language policy proposal at the primary election for Tainan Mayor (March 2018),
- b) the online survey comments by Yahoo Taiwan (March 2018), and
- c) YouTube users’ news comments (March 2018 onwards).

The study will present that the intertextual relations foreground the influence of established language ideologies fostered through past social experiences to the current discourse. The

study will argue that the intertextual link between English and *guojijiegui* is an established language ideology that mediates between Yeh's proposal and the news viewers' comments, as seen in Figure 6.




Figure 6. The relationship among the Yeh's proposal as the input discourse, the news viewers' established language ideologies, and their ideological stances.

The intertextual link, which is also an established language ideology, is the evaluation criterion with which Yeh's proposal text is judged by newspapers. The evaluation is revealed in the ideological stances manifested in the viewers' comments. In the following, the data collection and analyses are presented.

3.3.1 Yeh's proposal speech at the hustings: Data collection & analysis

Yeh's proposal speech on replacing Bopomofo with Romanized phonetic symbols is retrieved from the YouTube page dppsng,⁶ which belongs to one of the major political parties in Taiwan, Democratic Progressive Party. The section of the proposal speech, from 2:00:07 to 2:00:54, is transcribed for later discursive analysis (Rapley 2007; Gee 2011). The study adopts values coding (Saldaña 2016) to identify values, attitudes and beliefs related to linguistic practice in Yeh's speech. Furthermore, inferred social meanings about the referred linguistic practice are also spotted and discussed. The study will further suggest that these socio-political meanings, both explicit and unsaid, are picked up by the press and news viewers. Similar to the discursive analysis of English officialization in Chapter 5, the viewers in turn evaluate not merely the proposal itself, but mostly the inferred meanings they believe the policy proposal to carry. The analysis of Yeh's speech is presented in Section 6.1.

3.3.2 The survey comments

The second set of data consists of metalinguistic comments from an online survey

⁶ The video (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dxmySEIGTOI>) was last accessed in February 2020. The comments on the dppsng YouTube page were not included due to several concerns. The number of comments is significantly smaller than the number of comments from some mainstream news media, as will be shown later. Furthermore, the keyword search on YouTube does not lead to this particular video. It is thus inferred that most viewers did not refer to the dppsng page to get informed of this debate. Moreover, these comments contain little information about the addressed issues. Among the 17 comments the webpage has, 4 comments leave the timeframe of Yeh's speech to enable other viewers to quickly locate the section in the nearly three hours of the video. Due to the abovementioned reasons, comments on the dppsng page were not collected for this present study.

conducted by Yahoo Taiwan in March 2018.⁷ Yahoo Taiwan is one of the most frequently visited portal websites. Because the study focuses on how the public conceptualizes English, a survey from a popularly visited website serves a good data source. Nonetheless, the survey does not imply a holistic representation of the society with the survey data. Instead, the study attempts to analyze more comments to observe how rationalizations about languages are dynamic.

The survey comments allow the study to look into the correlation between stances and the metadiscourse about English. The online survey has 2143 comments, 215 from the proponents' column and 1928 from the opponents' column. Not all 2143 comments are analyzed. The comments are first identified with the mentioning of 'English,' including 英文 *yingwen*, 英語 *yingyu* and 美語 *meiyu* 'English.' To avoid over-interpretation and biased findings, comments which contain related terms, such as 外語 *waiyu* 'foreign language,' but without specific reference to English, are excluded. English and its related vocabulary are mentioned in 27 comments in the proponents' column. 'English' appears in 168 comments in the opponents' column. These comments are reviewed carefully in order to identify ideological stances concerning English. Then, both proponents' and opponents' comments are further examined for another key term, *guojijiegui*. 'English' and the term '*guojijiegui*' co-occur in three comments from proponents. Only one comment explicitly associates

⁷ The comments were retrieved February 28, 2020, from <https://tw.news.yahoo.com/pk/c0bf5760-1ded-11e8-80a0-b7f4c187cb6a/>.

English and *guojijiegui*. 77 comments from opponents mention both English and *guojijiegui*.

Table 3 summarizes the numbers of comments analyzed in this section. In total, English is mentioned in 195 comments. Due to the relatively limited number of comments analyzed, the analysis is predominantly qualitative but the numbers of occurrences are still presented without attempts to yield quantitative generalizations.

Table 3. The occurrences of ‘English’ and ‘*guojijiegui*’ and their relevant vocabulary in the online survey comments.

	‘English’	‘English’ & <i>guojijiegui</i>
Proponents’ comments (215)	27	3
Opponents’ comments (1928)	168	77

One noticeable observation lies in the near absence of mentioning both English and *guojijiegui* in proponents’ comments. The association between the two is much less discussed by proponents than by opponents. This does not entail that such a connection does not exist in proponents’ conceptualizations. Instead, because proponents vote for Yeh’s proposal, these comments find ‘nothing wrong’ with the information they are exposed to. The near absence in this dataset could be largely attributed to the possibility that these rationalizations get by unnoticed, as Kroskrity (2004) states. On the contrary, opponents disagree with Yeh. They are expected to specify their perspectives in the comments. The discussion of the ideological stances concerning English and *guojijiegui* is presented in [Section 6.2](#).

3.3.3 YouTube news comments

The third dataset comes from YouTube news comments. The dataset is aimed to examine whether English and *guojijiegui* co-index each other to further justify the claim that English is introduced into the discourse because of the term *guojijiegui*. YouTube news comments are collected for two major methodological concerns. These news clips are uploaded by mainstream television news channels. Judging from the number of views and comments, they offer ideal data sources to investigate the conceptualizations of these languages from the public’s perspectives. In addition, YouTube news channels do not require viewers to hold polarized opinions. This leads to lengthier, more informative comments when viewers evaluate. The study locates 16 news clips with the keyword search ㄅㄛㄇㄛˊ ‘Bopomo’ and 羅馬拼音 *Luoma Pinyin* ‘Romanized phonetic schemes’ on YouTube. Comments posted on these 16 pages are retrieved. A total number of 1801 comments are collected. Table 4 presents the titles, links and the numbers of comments from the 16 news clips.

Table 4. The 16 YouTube news clips and the number of comments on each webpage.

News clips	comments
喊廢ㄅㄛㄇㄛˊ改羅馬拼音 葉宜津：接軌世界 (‘Proposing to replace Bopomofo with <i>Luoma Pinyin</i> , Yeh Yi-jin “To <i>guojijiegui</i> .”’) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OVffHVNTBGM	233
南市將廢ㄅㄛㄇㄛˊ？ 葉宜津提改羅馬拼音 (‘Is Tainan about to abolish Bopomofo? Yeh Yi-jin proposes to adopt <i>Luoma Pinyin</i> .’)	209

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ecEijDEbEaw	
民調不到 1% 酸民虧葉宜津: ㄅㄆㄇ害的 (‘Poll shows less than 1% of approval. Haters quip, “It’s all about Bopomofo.”’)	211
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bfMNqZ2A-kU	
廢除注音符號改用羅馬拼音民眾普遍反對 葉宜津：為什麼害怕改變 (‘General disapproval of replacing Bopomofo with <i>Luoma Pinyin</i> . Yeh Yi-jin [asks], “Why are we afraid of changes?”’)	211
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LFHfnPsG6AY	
轟她「丟掉ㄅㄆㄇ」瞎搞 王思佳爆氣：妳改英文名出來選 (‘Describing the proposal of abolishing Bopomofo as reckless, Sophia Wang challenges Yeh, “Run for the election after changing your name into English.”’)	203
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oaebLNs7x64	
「ㄅㄆㄇㄨ有蝦咪路用？」羅馬拼音考倒民眾 怎麼念都怪 國文老師點出 關鍵是這個 (‘“What on earth does Bopomofo do?” <i>Luoma Pinyin</i> confuses people and sounds weird no matter how you read it. Chinese teachers tell you why.’)	195
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VcCBFS5pMx4	
立委提廢注音ㄅㄆㄇ與國際接軌 「施氏食獅史」繞口令翻成羅馬拼音都是輕聲？！ (‘A legislative member proposes to abolish Bopomofo to <i>guojijiegui</i> . <i>Luoma Pinyin</i> turns the tongue twister “Shi shi shi shi shi” into light tones?!’)	158
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQtPhv_SLKM	
葉宜津提廢ㄅㄆㄇ 改學羅馬拼音跟國際接軌！話一出引發論戰 (‘Yeh Yi-jin proposes to abrogate Bopomofo, and to adopt <i>Luoma Pinyin</i> to <i>guojijiegui</i> ! The proposal sparks debates.’)	105
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CqoLAUg772Y	
「ㄅㄆㄇ有啥米路用？」葉宜津提改學羅馬拼音 引發網友論戰 (‘“What on earth does Bopomofo do?” Yeh Yi-jin proposes to adopt <i>Luoma Pinyin</i> . The proposal sparks debates.’)	93
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iVEPl4cVC8w	
選到昏頭？“廢ㄅㄆㄇ”跟國際接軌 葉宜津提改學羅馬拼音 (‘Proposing to abolish Bopomofo to <i>guojijiegui</i> , Yeh Yi-jin suggests adopting <i>Luoma Pinyin</i> .’)	49
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t13k1XwIcuw	
最新》喊廢除ㄅㄆㄇ被罵翻 葉宜津：做對的事不計毀譽 (‘Latest>> Criticized for proposing to abolish Bopomofo, Yeh Yi-jin “Do the right thing despite criticisms.”’)	41

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1SnMAfliOck	
2018 九合一—拋廢ㄅㄆㄇ引論戰 葉宜津:快速因應國際化 (‘Nine-in-one elections 2018—the proposal of scrapping Bopomofo sparks debates. Yeh Yi-jin “In response to internationalization.”’)	38
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQtPhv_SLKM	
讓孩子跟國際接軌 葉宜津：教育先廢掉ㄅㄆㄇ (‘Making children <i>guojijiegui</i> , Yeh Yi-jin “Bopomofo should be scrapped from the curriculum.”’)	21
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Re13Z1BI0-Y	
立委提廢注音改羅馬拼音 語言教師表看法 (‘A legislative member proposes to replace Bopomofo with <i>Luoma Pinyin</i> . Language teachers express concerns.’)	15
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ae5CITbdKvU	
助國際接軌？ 立委倡“廢ㄅㄆㄇ”學羅馬拼音 (‘To facilitate <i>guojijiegui</i> ? A legislative member proposes to scrap Bopomofo and to learn <i>Luoma Pinyin</i> .’)	14
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ba74sVihXZw	
助國際接軌？ 立委倡「廢ㄅㄆㄇ」學羅馬拼音 (‘To facilitate <i>guojijiegui</i> ? A legislative member proposes to scrap Bopomofo and to learn <i>Luoma Pinyin</i> .’)	5
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nDhxsAmbK8k	
Total	1801

In the metadiscourse on Bopomofo and Romanized phonetic symbols, the mentioning of English is elicited indirectly. The study first identifies comments which explicitly contain phrases 英文 *yingwen*, 英語 *yingyu* and 美語 *meiyu* ‘English’. When ‘ABC’ is used to refer to English, these comments are also included. To avoid over-interpretation and biased findings, related terms without specific reference to English, such as 外語 *waiyu* ‘foreign language,’ are again excluded. The number of comments is narrowed down to 182. Another 36 comments are excluded because they do not specify explicit evaluations toward English, an example of invalid comments shown in (2) below.

(2) 中文注音不能廢。英文有 kk 音標,德文.法文也有音標。韓文也有自己的注音(類似 kk 音標)단 자 음單子音단 모 음單母音.....等等。

(‘Bopomofo cannot be scrapped. English has its own phonetic scheme, so as German and French. Korean also has its own phonetic notation (similar to KK phonetic symbols) like consonants 단 자 음 and vowels 단 모 음, etc.’)

Comment (2) states that English has a notation system of its own. Despite the arguable truthfulness of this proposition, the comment does not relate much to the social evaluations of languages. The comment is thus considered invalid. The study adopts the values coding to note the viewers’ values and attitudes (Saldaña 2016) in the remaining 148 comments. The result of values coding is further examined to identify recurrent or contrastive values and beliefs about English. The result is presented in [Section 6.3](#).

In addition to ‘English’, the 1801 comments are also examined for another key term, *guojijiegui*. Comments which mention *guojijiegui* and related vocabulary, including 國際化 *guoji hua* ‘internationalization’, 全球化 *quanqiu hua* ‘globalization’ and simply 接軌 *jiegui* ‘connecting’ are included. These comments are further analyzed with regard to how *guojijiegui* is described as related to language use and how viewers (dis)align with one another (Du Bois 2007). To avoid biased over-interpretations, only comments that overtly mention the above vocabulary with explicit references to linguistic practice are deemed valid for analysis. An example of invalid comments is shown in (3).

(3) 這真的很好，這樣的確可以跟國際接軌

(‘This is really good, this can indeed *guojijiegui*.’)

Because what the demonstrative pronouns 這 *zhe* ‘this’ and 這樣 *zheyang* ‘this way’ respectively refer to remain unspecified, this viewer could be commenting on Bopomofo

abrogation, Romanization implementation, or both. The ambiguity causes this comment to be excluded from valid comments for this study. Among the 167 comments, 59 are considered invalid. A total of 108 comments are analyzed. At this present stage, the 148 comments that mention English and the 108 comments that mention *guojijiegui*, overlap by the number of 45, as Figure 7 shows.




Figure 7. The numbers of YouTube news comments that mention English, *guojijiegui*, and both.

It has to be noted that the overlapping is interpreted as merely co-occurrences for the time being. The analysis on values coding (Saldaña 2016) will discuss how English and *guojijiegui* are ideologically linked to each other. Each comment can potentially reveal multilayered language ideologies, as the study has argued and shown. With the relatively limited number of available comments, values and beliefs have to be found in at least two comments to be discussed in this section. The indexing of linguistic practice is present in [Section 6.4](#).

The three sources of data allow the study respective dimensions of the rationalizations of English in the debate about phonetic systems. Figure 8 graphically presents how the data

are approached. A discourse analysis on Yeh’s speech gives a glimpse at how and why this proposal is attention-drawing. The survey comments allow the study to observe whether there are correlations between viewers’ dichotomous opinions and their rationalizations of linguistic practice. With the YouTube news comments, the study examines the contestation in the ideologizing process and to attend to the (non)existence of the co-indexing association between English and *guojijiegui*.




Figure 8. The datasets, their collection and categorization procedures in indirectly elicited metadiscourse about English.

This chapter will again account the observation with the model of established language ideologies and ideological stances. The model is extended to further incorporate both Yeh’s

speech and the viewers' comments. Yeh's speech can be seen as both a language policy text and a discursive representation shaped by her ideologies. The viewers who leave comments interpret the text with their own expectations, i.e. established language ideologies. The ideologization web therefore can be further modified as shown in Figure 9.




Figure 9. The ideologization web in the debate of phonetic systems.

The discussion of the debate on a phonetic system of Taiwan Mandarin is presented in [Chapter 6](#).

CHAPTER 4 ENGLISH IN CONVERSATIONAL JOKING IN INFOTAINMENT

Humor, as pointed out by Monro (1951), is all about “inappropriateness” (244). It can be seen as a form of conflicts when our socially-fostered expectations fail (Ritchie 2005). In crosslinguistic humorous settings, these conflicts exhibit how things are supposed to be in the first place. This chapter approaches the ideologizing process of English by analyzing how English is used in domains other than those where it is considered to prevail, such as at workplace and in school. This chapter is motivated by the observation that scholastic attention to English use outside classroom remains relatively scarce in the Taiwan context. The present study investigates crosslinguistic conversational joking for the following concerns. English is mostly taken as a ‘serious’ language because it is perceived to be used in serious, non-daily sectors. This does not mean that English is not used in daily conversation. Wasserfall (in press 2021) suggests that English lexical insertion is used so frequently in daily conversation that English borrowings are adapted and indigenized. Su (in press 2021) discusses how speakers’ evaluative comments on one’s ‘showy’ English reveals the ambivalent attitudes Taiwanese hold toward English. Similarly, crosslinguistic conversational joking allows the study to observe the dos and don’ts concerning English. As J.S.-Y. Park (2009) points out, the light-hearted, humorous contexts are more inclined to be reckoned as ‘ideology-free’ when they are equally ideological (130). This chapter sees the audience’s

humorous reading as the ideological stances, and identifies what the background social knowledge about English are invoked as the established language ideologies to read the humorous side. The study argues that crosslinguistic humor is ideological and ideologizing.

Crosslinguistic humor is approached from the perspective of epistemics, i.e. speakers' commitment to knowledge revealed in discourse (Heritage 1984; Heritage & Raymond 2005; 2011; Stivers et al. 2011; Heritage 2013). Heritage (1984) distinguishes speakers' access to knowledge as relative in the current interaction. Speakers at K+ position possess relatively more knowledge than speakers at K- position. To be more specific, a question tends to be initiated by a speaker at K- and targeted at a speaker at K+ position. The study adopts the terminology in analyzing knowledge management in crosslinguistic humorous joking in infotainment discourse. Drawing from how the knowledge of English is transmitted in conversational joking in media, the study discusses how humor is a vehicle of exploiting and reinforcing the ideologization of English. The study attends to three levels of discourse representation. At linguistic level, the analysis of English-related humor draws from past literature on codeswitching, codemixing and crossing (Rampton 1995; Myers-Scotton 1998). The study refers to the act of adopting multiple languages as codeswitching. At epistemic level, unlike Mandarin which is used across domains in Taiwan, the presentation of English requires more conscious management of knowledge to ensure comprehension especially in media communication where immediate feedback is absent. The communication carries


speakers' assumptions about the audience's knowledge of English (Stivers et al. 2011). In media discourse, the epistemic assessment occurs both among interactants on the scene of recording and between the programs and their target audience. Two levels of knowledge management and ideological process should be identified. The infotainment discourse is presented as a whole package to their audience. It will be presented later that media discourse anchors trances of different ideologization processes altogether as one discourse product.

To the best of my knowledge, less attention has been paid to bilingual humor in Taiwanese context. Therefore, even though the ideologizing process and pragmatics play crucial roles in both plotting and comprehending bilingual humors, the study opts for a typology of English-related conversational joking based on forms, presented in Section 4.1, and proceeds with its pragmatic and ideological significances in Section 4.2.

4.1 Types of Crosslinguistic Humor

Codeswitching between English and local languages in local-language-dominant contexts could be comparatively marked because it is risky to presume interlocutors' proficiency level. Proficient English speakers report to feel burdened with the responsibilities to retain the conversation by carefully judging interlocutors' linguistic knowledge in English (Lee 2012). When media discourse contains codeswitching, at least two levels of epistemics should be accounted for, in the interaction among the interactants in TV programs and in the

mediated communication between the programs and their audiences. Four types of crosslinguistic humor are discussed. The categorization is neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. The examples are presented in three-tiers. The first line shows the narrow transcription. It presents the ‘verbal’ element of the conversational joking. The second line shows subtitles and running texts of character generator effects on the screen. The second line presents the ‘textual’ part. The subtitles are placed between two vertical bars ‘|’ while running texts of CG special effects are in angle brackets. They are both in regular fonts. Additional notes about subtitles and running texts, such as the text arrangement, are put in italics. Line 3 notes the English translation, placed in parentheses and quotes. The English elements are put in bold both in the narrow transcript and in literal translation.




4.1.1 Overdone lexical insertion: ‘We-ness’ or ‘otherness’

Examples of codeswitching at lexical levels across sentences are eye-catching. As mentioned previously in Introduction, lexical codeswitching in the Taiwanese context is common. Yet, overdone lexical switch is marked and attention-seeking, though it is implausible to define ‘overdone’ quantitatively. The section discusses two examples of overdone lexical insertion. The practice can be further linked to identity and perspective shift, the ‘fractal pivoting’ termed by Gal and Irvine (2019, 154).

Lexical insertion of English words in a Chinese- or Taiwanese-dominant context can

explain how a sense of non-serious, non-authentic ‘other-ness’ can be brought into the conversation in order to reinforce a sense of ‘we-ness.’ Excerpt (4), taken from *Super Taste*, shows how overdone lexical insertion projects a sense of ‘not ours,’ and in return defines implicitly what is ours. The narrator of the program, Song, is feigning foreign-accented Mandarin by stylizing his introduction of the Italian city Verona. The stylized utterances are underlined in the transcript. To present the stylized speech as precisely as possible, the narrow transcription is annotated with Hanyu Pinyin instead of Chinese characters.

(4) From *Super Taste*, April 24, 2012

- 
- 1 SONG Oh
|噢|
(‘Oh,’)
- 2 qín ài de guān zhǒng
|親愛的觀眾|
(‘dear audience,’)
- 3 wōmen xiānzai zài yìdàlì zuì lāngmǎn de dūshì
|我們現在在義大利最浪漫的城市|
(‘we are visiting the most romantic Italian city,’)
- 4 Verona
|維諾納|
(‘Verona.’)
- 5 zhèlì shì cóng liànrén gēn fūqī dū hěn like lái de [plei:z]
|這裡是從戀人跟夫妻都很喜歡來的地方|
‘It is a *place* where couples *like* to visit,’
- 6 yīnwēi (.) tā shì luómìōu **and Juliet** de gùxiāng
|因為它是羅密歐跟茱麗葉的故鄉|
‘because it’s Romeo *and Juliet*’s hometown.’
- 7 But
|但是|
(‘*But*,’)
- 8 dāng nǐ de ái qīng shàng yǒu kùnǎo de shíhòu

- |當你的愛情上||有困擾的時候|
 (‘When you have relationship problems,’)
- 9 zhūliyè yě kěyǐ **help you** wò
 |茱麗葉也可以幫你喔|
 (‘Juliet can *help you* as well.’)
- 10 **Ouch**
 (‘*Ouch*’)
- 11 kěshì tiāntuán hǎoxiàng zhāo bù dào rùkǒu ní
 |可是天團好像找不到入口|
 (‘But AX and HZ can’t seem to find the entrance.’)

When Song is narrating, a portrait of himself in medieval clothing shows up at the left bottom of the screen. On the one hand, the portrait shows that Song is doing the narration. On the other hand, the clothing also associates the act of narration with playful, non-authentic foreignness. The portrayal is accompanied by two noticeable performances, including excessive lexical switch and stylized speech. The lexical insertion is probably more inclined to consider being overdone than otherwise. Unfolding information about Verona, the narrator uses “like” (line 4) rather than 喜歡 *xihuan* ‘like’ while the subtitles show the Mandarin phrase. Song continues explaining that Verona can offer relationship counseling (lines 7 and 8). Song substitutes “help you” for its Chinese counterpart 幫忙 *bangmang*. The Chinese translation of all the lexical insertions is provided in the subtitles except for the exclamation “Ouch” in line 10. The exclamation does not show in subtitles. In addition to excessive lexical insertion, the speech is also stylized. First, several words of the fourth tone are changed into the third tone. In the stylized speech, 愛 *ài* (line 2), 眾 *zhòng* (line 2), 在 *zài* (line 3), and 市 *shì* (line 3) sound similar to their third-tone counterparts. The tonal

transformation is not consistent, though. The 愛 ài, 候 hòu in line 8, and 像 xiàng in line 11 do not undergo noticeable tonal change. Also, the use of exclaimers such as *oh* (line 1) and *ouch* (line 10) adds a taste of foreignness in the discourse. Moreover, the final syllables in several sentences are lengthened. The lengthening makes the final syllable acoustically similar to the third tone. It could be possible that the third tone in Mandarin Chinese sound similar to the drawl that people tend to connect with foreign languages. The lengthening is also inconsistent. Starting from line 7, the final syllable lengthening disappears. Significantly, lexical insertions and stylized speech are not targeted at creating a sense of ‘real’ foreignness. Instead, they identify a we-ness with this performance. A foreigner is probably never expected to speak like this. The speech does not precisely imitate how a foreigner speaks. The narrator is using what is stereotypically taken as non-local to Taiwanese to create a playful sense of foreignness. The subtitles do not show English words. Therefore there is an incongruity between what is verbalized and what is textually presented. Another observation lies in the association between place and language. To construct a sentence of foreignness, Italian probably serves as a better choice. Instead of using Italian and supplementing the performance with Chinese subtitles, English is used. It will be discussed in Section 4.3 that the ideological and overgeneralized association between English and foreignness accounts for the interpretation of this performance.

Another example of overdone lexical insertion illustrates how codeswitching is

overgeneralized as a characteristic of how Taiwanese speak. At first sight, the indexing seems to contradict the previous example. Nevertheless, the study will discuss how ridiculing at overdone lexical insertion defines codeswitching as an act of disowning. In another program WTO Sister Show, the two hosts, Alexia and Ryan, start the program by demonstrating how codeswitching at lexical level between English and Mandarin Chinese is excessively done. Alexia's performance leaves the guest speakers in fits of laughter, shown in (5) below.

(5) From *WTO Sister Show*, March 15, 2016

- 3 Alexia **You know** ((*points forward with her index finger*))
 |You know|
 4 ((*laughter in the background*))
 5 我們的節目就是
 |我們的節目就是|
 ('Our program')
 6 **talk about foreign culture.** ((*hands moving in circles*))
 |討論外國的文化| <摺英文>
 ('talks about foreign cultures.')
- 7 Ryan & guests ((*laugh*))
 8 ((*guests laughing in the background*))
- 9 Alexia 你知道 (.) 就是那種 (.) **different experiences** 在台灣
 ((*points forward*))
 |你知道就是那種| <different experiences>
 <在台灣><中英混合>
 ('You know, it's about **different experiences** in Taiwan.')
- 10 Ryan 喔
 ('Oh.')
- 11 Alexia 你知道 (.) 你知道 (.) 我們這些外國的朋友們 (.) 在台灣的
 (.) ((*turns to look at the camera*)) **life**
 <外國朋友們><在台灣的><life>
 ('It's about **the lives** of those foreign friends in Taiwan.')
- 12 Ryan **Life.**

- 13 ((*guests laughing in the background*)) ((*cameras turn to guests*))
- 14 Alexia 講話一定要這樣嗎=
|講話一定要這樣嗎|
(‘Must [someone] talk like that?’)
- 15 Ryan =你不覺得中文
|你不覺得中文|
(‘Don’t you think when Mandarin Chinese’)
- 16 跟你的 **English mix** 在一起講
|跟你的 English mix 在一起講|
(‘gets **mixed up** with your **English,**’)
- 17 很讓人 **annoying** 嗎
|很讓人討厭嗎| <也中毒, *an arrow pointing at Ryan*>
(‘this sounds **annoying?**’)
- 18 Alexia 對
(‘Exactly.’)
- 19 而且我們怎麼講話都這樣
|而且我們怎麼講話都這樣|
(‘And why do we talk like that?’)
- 20 Ryan 為什麼一定要這樣子呢
|為什麼一定要這樣子呢|
(‘Why must we [talk like this]?’)
- 21 Alexia 這樣 (.) 對
|這樣 對|<好討厭>
(‘Like this. Right.’)
- 22 會有一個莫名的節奏跑出來 ((*nods her head*))
|會有一個莫名的節奏跑出來|
(‘[We talk] in an indescribable rhythm.’)
- 23 Ryan **Yeah.**
- 24 台灣人的壞習慣
<台灣人的壞習慣>
(‘What is considered a bad habit of Taiwanese’)
- 25 就是講話的時候
(‘is that when [we] talk,’)
- 26 中文跟英文 (.) 混在一起講
<中英文在一起講>
(‘[we] mix Chinese and English.’)
- 27 南部呢 (.) 還會再加上 (.) [閩南話]
<南部還會加上閩南話>

- (‘People from the South even spice it up with Southern Min.’)
- 28 Alexia [台語] (.) 對
(‘Taiwanese. Right.’)
- 29 ㄟ (.) 我覺得講台語這樣加在一起比較好聽耶
|我覺得講台語||這樣加在一起比較好聽|
(‘I think it sounds pleasant when mixing with Taiwanese.’)
- 30 Ryan 可是我一直覺得我們的習慣是學香港人的
|可是我一直覺得|
|我們的習慣是學香港人的|<拖別人下水>
(‘But I always think we learn this from Hong Kongers.’)
- 31 Alexia 喔
(‘Oh!’)
- 32 可是人家香港=
|可是人家香港|
(‘But Hong Kong’)
- 33 Ryan =看港劇的時候=
|看港劇的時候|
(When I watch those Hong Kong dramas)
- 34 Alexia =國際大都市啊
|國際大都市|
(‘[is] an international city.’)
- 35 Ryan 對啊
(‘Right.’)
- 36 啊我們也有國際化[的一面啊]
|我們也有國際化的一面|
(‘We can also be very international.’)
- 37 Alexia [我們也有]
(‘Can we, too?’)
- 38 Ryan 對啊
(‘Right.’)
- 39 其實這樣會顯得我們國際化
|其實這樣|<這樣子顯得國際化>
(‘Actually it shows that we are internationalized.’)

This performance takes place after the greetings. Alexia’s “You know” (line 3) immediately draws laughter. It shows that the use of *you know* is unexpected. The use of “you know” and

the gesture signal a swift transformation into a laid-back, young, American style of practice (Stubbe & Holmes 1995). Similar to the exclaimers *oh* and *ouch* in the previous example, these terms immediately frame a non-Taiwanese context. Her performance of mixing English in Mandarin Chinese discourse is found amusing by the other host and other guests (lines 5 to 13). The question in line 14 講話一定要這樣嗎 *Jianghua yiding yao zhe yang ma* ‘Must [someone] talk like that?’ suggests that her previous demonstration is excessive, unnecessary and somewhat criticism-prone. When Alexia switches to English, the subtitles also show English. The only exceptions are “talk about foreign culture” (line 6) which is also the longest English chunk in this excerpt, and the “annoying” in line 14. Also intriguing is the additional information in the running text. When Alexia says “talk about foreign culture,” the running texts show 撈英文 *lao yingwen*, literally “showing off English,” as seen in (4a). The comment is far from an appraisal. It indicates that codeswitching between Mandarin Chinese and English is depicted as unnecessarily marked, and showing off (Su in press 2021). The other host, Ryan, further elaborates that the mixing is irritating (line 17). When he switches to English for “annoying,” the subtitles provide the Chinese translation 討厭 *taoyan*. Ryan’s evaluation of Alexia’s overdone codeswitching is also strategically conveyed in English. Ryan’s comment can thus be seen as juxtaposition. The adjective “annoying” reveals his negative attitudes toward excessive codeswitching. At linguistic representation, he actually accommodates (Bell 1984) to Alexia’s speech by using an English word that requires

post-production to provide the Chinese subtitles. The evaluative comment 也中毒 *ye zhongdu* ‘get addicted to, get poisoned’ (line 17) describes how Ryan is negatively influenced by her. Ryan later describes codeswitching as Taiwanese’s 壞習慣 *huai xiguan* ‘bad habits’ (lines 24-26), showing again the lay belief that the mixing is not rated highly. It has established that excessive English codeswitching is perceived as negative *and* Taiwanese.

The second half of the hosts’ performance proceeds to connect codeswitching to place identity. Ryan further states that codeswitching comes from Hong Kong (line 30), a 國際大都市 *guoji da dushi* ‘international metropolis’ as Alexia characterizes it as (lines 32 and 34). The conjunction 可是 *keshi* “but” in Alexia’s statement (line 32) introduces contradictory propositions with several potential meanings (Y.-F. Wang & Tsai 2007). If a bad habit comes from Hong Kong, juxtaposition lies among Hong Kong being an international metropolis, codeswitching being a bad habit, and codeswitching being originated from Hong Kong, because inferably a speech habit from an international metropolis cannot be bad. Second, the “but” could also mean that Hong Kong is different from Taiwan, which is not as internationalized, and not as metropolitan. She could be inferring that Taiwan probably does not see the need to codeswitch to such a great extent. Third, a point that can extend from the second point is that Hong Kong is more legitimated in using English-Chinese codeswitching than Taiwan. Ryan further justifies that Taiwan can also show the internationalized side with English-Chinese codeswitching. The hosts’ stances toward codeswitching change as their

interaction proceeds. Alexia's overdone codeswitching reveals how English-Chinese codeswitching is marked to begin with. When the linguistic practice is associated to Hong Kong, it suddenly receives positive evaluations. According to Y.-F. Wang, Tsai and Yang (2010), 其實 *qishi* 'actually' moderately introduce the following discourse as the truth to contrast the prior proposition. Ryan is expressing that codeswitching marks language use not as disturbing and Taiwanese, but *actually* internationalized. The excerpt explicates that though English is considered to connect with internationalization, another ideologizing process of English is at work, one process that addresses the use of English not from a transnational perspective, from a translocal retrospect.

This section has discussed codeswitching at lexical level and several layers of contestations are discussed. Epistemically, Excerpt (4) provides Chinese subtitles of all English words. Excerpt (5) provides Chinese subtitles to longer English utterances and less common words. The Chinese subtitles indicate that English is still regarded as an additional language because the audience's English proficiency is only minimally expected. However, English being an additional language contradicts the so-called Taiwanese's bad habit of overdone codeswitching in between English and Mandarin Chinese. At sociopragmatic level, the conceptualizations of English are dynamic and inconsistent. The finding urges us to examine the rationalization of English.

4.1.2 Crosslinguistic puns

Puns are amusing in that it creates rooms for ambiguity. Meanings derived from puns may refer to two different and conflicting propositions (Attardo 1994). In media communication, audio and textual presentation collaborates to construct puns. As far as puns in crosslinguistic contexts are concerned, the two readings could be derived from two different languages. Interpreting puns thereby requires competence in two languages. How puns are successfully delivered in media discourse consequently unveils the ideologizing process of English.

An example of puns shows deliberate discursive strategies of swaying between profanity in one language and a totally innocent phrase in another. The deployment of codeswitching is related to Hill's discussion on Mock Spanish (2008). Hills outlines 4 tactics of appropriation on using Spanish in American-English contexts. Euphemism, one of the four tactics, addresses how English vulgar terms are replaced with Spanish words. The situation can work in a reversed fashion in the Taiwanese context. To draw laughter, an English term without any hint of vulgar intention can be purposefully presented in the way similar to how profanity is screened on TV in order to falsely trick the audience. An example in (6) sees how the two hosts are leading the audience to falsely read an English phrase as profanity in Taiwanese.

(6) From *Super Taste*, November 26 2013.

1 AX 如果說
 |如果說|

- (‘If you want to know’)
- 2 這條街叫什麼名字
|這條街叫什麼名字|
(‘what this street is called,’)
- 3 我也可以告訴大家
|我也可以告訴大家|
(‘I can also tell everyone.’)
- 4 這一條街就叫做 **silanba:** 街
|這一條街就叫做| <@#\$%^街>
(‘The street is called **silanba:** street.’)
- 5 HZ ((long pause))
<!!! around and above HZ>
- 6 AX 西 (.) 那個 **south** (.) **west** (.) **eight street** 的 西 (.) 南 (.) 八 (.) 街
<South=南
West=西
8 Street=八街>
(‘The *si na ba* street as in **Southwest 8th street.**’)
- 7 HZ 呼 ((lets out a long breath))
<a sign of aspiration>
(‘Phew.’)

AX and HZ are visiting Little Havana, introducing how it is a must-see in Miami. AX is talking to the camera, which signals that the following information is targeted at the audience.

AX prefaces the piece of information with a self-initiated self-answered question 這條街叫什麼名字 *zhe tiao jie jiao cheme mingzi* ‘what this street is called.’ AX later provides the answer by deliberately making the street name sound similar to Taiwanese profanity (line 4).

The running text @#\$%^ as a strategy of euphemism signals AX’s utterance as unrepresentable.

Upon hearing this, HZ stands still, with exclamation marks above him to show that he is startled. In TV programs where every single second literally counts, the prolonged pause is scripted to mean something, otherwise edited. Later, AX explains that [silanba:] actually

refers to the Southwest 8th street, which can be translated as *xi nan ba jie* in Taiwan Mandarin (line 6). HZ then expresses his relief by letting out a long breath. The CG effects show a sign of aspiration. The short stretch of discourse is a product of complex knowledge management.

The pun is a product of managing an abundance of linguistic knowledge. The two hosts are deploying the phonological similarity between *xi nan ba* in Mandarin Chinese and [silɔnba:] in Taiwanese to introduce a piece of information in English. Lew (1997) suggests that ambiguity accounts for the majority of linguistic humor. The ambiguity shows indeterminacy. The indeterminacy is however determined by HZ's startled reaction and the caption @\$^%. HZ's feigned surprise and his relief suggest that he hears something unsuitable to be aired on TV. For the performance to successfully draw humorous effects, an audience has to have the metalinguistic knowledge of how profanity is dispreferred, inadequate to screen on TV, and thus presented differently. An audience also needs to figure out how Southwest 8th Street is related first to the Taiwanese profanity, to the literal translation in Mandarin Chinese, and to the phonological similarity between the two. Significantly, the joke also demonstrates how the relative access of knowledge is shifting in crosslinguistic humor and how the pun is interpreted with the aids of the hosts' identity shifts. It is reasonable to argue that HZ and AX have already been aware of how the joke would be unfolded. That is, both of the presenters are in a K+ position (Heritage & Raymond 2005; Heritage 2013) where they know the place and the joke about to be disclosed. In a word, they

both have the access and commitment to the knowledge. There is no epistemic discrepancy between them in terms of both the event knowledge and the linguistic knowledge. Nevertheless, as the joke is unfolded, HZ positions himself as one of audience in a K-position (Heritage & Raymond 2005; Heritage 2013) who pretends to be unprepared for the profanity and to be startled. The long silence in line 5 should not be taken as HZ's own interpretation. Rather, the long pause hints the audience that the hosts are inferring beyond what is literally expressed. HZ is acting like a viewer to guide the audience toward the contrast and also an association among the English street name, its Mandarin Chinese translation and Taiwanese profanity.

Another hilarious Chinese-English pun is also taken from the show *Super Taste*. This excerpt illustrates how fixed phrases could be laughter-inducing, presented in (7).

(7) From *Super Taste*, November 19, 2013

不 象 young 女 孩
Neg. elephant young female child
'girls that misbehave'

When HZ and AX visit Louisiana, they also meet up with the Taiwan-born baseball player, Wei-Yin Chen. When AX and HZ hit the baseball court to watch Chen play, they dress themselves as cheerleaders and address themselves as 不象 young 女孩 *bu xiang young nu hai* 'girls who misbehave.' The term is a skillful pun. The word 象 *xiang* 'elephant' refers to

a baseball team in Taiwan. *Young* in English refers to the stereotypical image of cheerleaders being young and energetic. Phonologically *young* also sounds similar to 樣 *yang* ‘type, sort.’ The term 象 *young* can also be coded as 像樣 *xiangyang* to refer to stereotypical expectations of how one should behave. In other words, *xiangyoung nü hai*, as a pun, can mean either cheerleaders for the Baseball Team Elephant or also well-behaved girls. By negating the phrase, the meaning ‘cheerleaders for Baseball Team Elephant’ becomes ‘girls that misbehave.’ No epistemic discrepancy can be observed between the two hosts. To make the point clear, they dress themselves in cheerleading miniskirts. To unfold the joke, they assume that the audience knows the relation between cheerleading and baseball games, understands Team Elephant as one of the baseball teams in Taiwan, and interprets the phonological representation of *young* as polysemous. Successful bilingual puns anticipate entrenched phrases from both linguistic sources (Stefanowitsch 2002). Some might argue that 象 *young* could be used so frequently that it hardly requires English proficiency. Nonetheless, only when the audience recognizes the pronunciation of *young* could they arrive at the reading of 像樣. In fact, 像樣 could be more entrenched than 象 *young*, particularly for speakers showing no interests in baseball games. The Chinese reading of the pun probably stands out more than the English one.

The two examples also demonstrate that reading into puns is a social practice as it requires both linguistic knowledge and social knowledge. This explains why entrenched

expressions are manipulated. What deserves our attention is that the Chinese and Taiwanese readings of the pun are easier to process than their English readings. In addition to the *presentation* of these puns, the more outstanding *readings* in the two languages also indicate that English is perceptually distant. A discussion related to identity will follow in the next section.

4.1.3 Incorrect/inappropriate language use of English

Incorrect English, either intentional or incidental, is a common target for humor. Incorrect or inappropriate English use represents a powerful ideologizing process concerning how English competence is viewed as a must. When the interaction is performed in media where linguistic performance is partially planned, the audience is required to detect incorrect English use to understand the language play. The section presents how conversational joking is built around discourse about incorrect English. It will be further presented that failure to spot errors is also a source of humor because it reveals an individual's (unexpected) lack of English. Usually, teasing out of incorrect English involves interactants who possess English (K+) at interactants who show less commitment to the language (K-) (Heritage & Raymond 2005; 2011; Heritage 2013). Nonetheless, the teasing by speakers at K+ to speakers at K- is further complicated in media discourse.

Incorrect translation guarantees a laugh. The example shown in (8) below illustrates

how crosslinguistic humor can be scripted through manipulating epistemic stances (Stivers et al. 2011) with purposefully incorrect translation. The two presenters, HZ and AX, both have the linguistic knowledge about incorrect language use create a humorous context (that is, no epistemic asymmetry).

(8) From *Super Taste*, November 12, 2013

- 19 AX 而且我們那個(.)燈一打開有沒有
|而且我們那個燈一打開有沒有|
(‘As soon as we turn on the spotlights,’)
- 20 機器在拍
|機器在拍|
(‘the machine starts running,’)
- 21 開始錄影有沒有=
|開始錄影有沒有|
(‘and we start to filming,’)
- 22 HZ =對啊
|對啊|
(‘Yeah.’)
- 23 AX 大家都在看我
|大家都在看我|
(‘everyone turns to look at me.’)
- 24 我好像超級巨星這樣
|我好像超級巨星這樣| <超級巨星?>
(‘I feel like a super star.’)
- 25 我也好開[心]
|我也好開心|
(‘I am really happy about that.’)
- 26 HZ [是]沒有這樣啦
|是沒有這樣啦|
(‘Well, it’s not just that.’)
- 27 不是超級巨星
|不是超級巨星|
(‘We’re not super stars.’)

- 28 我們現在是
|我們現在是|
(‘We are’)
- 29 International (.) 國際巨星
<international?! 國際巨星>
(‘international, international stars.’)
- 30 對
|對|
(‘Right.’)
- 31 我們走國際路線
(‘We are going international.’)
- 32 AX **sure**
(‘Sure.’)
- 33 HZ 現在講英文的=
(‘We speak English now.’)
- 34 AX =**No problem.**
|沒問題|
(‘No problem.’)
- 35 **Cool.**
|酷|
(‘Cool!’)
- 36 HZ ((*points at a plate of beignets*)) 這個叫什麼
|這個叫什麼|
(‘What are these called?’)
- 37 AX **sugar**
(‘Sugar’)
- 38 → **sugar sugar circle**
|sugar sugar circle|< *beignets* 法式甜甜圈>
(‘Sugar sugar circle (donuts).’)
- 39 ((*laughs*))
- 40 **easy (.) easy**
|簡單...|
(‘It’s easy.’)

HZ and AX are in a famous French café in Miami. With the cameras and lights on, many eyes are on them. They note how flattered they feel to be superstars and even international stars

(lines 24 - 29). HZ suggests that they should go international and speak English. Their discussion about international stardom and its co-indexing of using English reveals the established language ideology between a sense of internationalization and speaking English. AX, who has been known for his less command of English than HZ, agrees to speak English by replying “No problem” (line 35). When HZ points at a plate of beignets and asks AX what they are called in English, AX replies “sugar sugar circle.” At face value, HZ asks AX a question. Supposedly, a question is initiated by a K- to a K+. Several levels of epistemic stancetaking (Stivers et al. 2011) about English occur. First, HZ’s question is not inquiring information unknown to him. Rather, based on prior utterances about international stardom and speaking English, both HZ and AX are building up a scenario where they must speak English. If they are expected to speak impressive English, the prior utterances of declaring to be able to speak English does not make sense from a dialogic perspective (Martin and White 2005). The utterances could only be understood to prepare the audience for the upcoming skit. It could be speculated that HZ expects AX to provide an incorrect answer. AX also knows that “sugar sugar circle” is not the appropriate answer. Both the question and the answer indicate no epistemic asymmetry between HZ and AX. The question does not show the knowledge transmit from K+ to K- because they both possess the knowledge. Furthermore, the absence of epistemic discrepancy in this adjacency pair is extended to the mediated discourse between the hosts and the audience. They expect that the audience know “sugar

sugar circle” to be an incorrect answer as indicated by the laughter in line 39. The incorrectness of “sugar sugar circle” is not even mentioned in the excerpt. This observation shows how basic English competence is probably assumed. In addition, they know that word-by-word translation is an effective strategy for humor in the Taiwanese context. They expect the audience to find the exchange lighthearted and amusing. The finding also corresponds to Cortés-Conde and Boxer (2002)’s discussion on how one particular code is more suitable for plotting humor in multilingual contexts. Were the context in Chinese or Taiwanese only, no humorous effects would be generated.

The previous example discusses how incorrect English use can be purposefully exploited for humorous reading. The established language ideology that English competence is required screens the linguistic inappropriateness to find codeswitching funny. It could be inferred from no explicit mentioning about the incorrect English that the audience is evaluated to have the competence required to interpret the practice. The second excerpt shows a different discursive force. This excerpt shows that failure at spotting English errors is constructed as laughter-inducing. The following excerpt is taken from an episode of *Half and Half*, where foreign visitors reflect on their experiences of teaching English in Taiwan. On the scene are two hosts, six foreign teachers and three Taiwanese guests. Prior to the current discourse shown in (9), the program has established that the three guests find English challenging. Dooley, an American, is telling others how he made a spelling error in his first

class meeting.

(9) From *Half and Half*, June 20, 2018

- 15 Dooley 因為很緊張嘛
|因為很緊張嘛|
(‘Because [I was] very nervous.’)
- 16 ((A flashboard shows “I like to play paino.”)) 然後就把這句寫在
白板上
|然後就把這句寫在白板上|
(‘I put this sentence on the whiteboard.’)
- 17 Karen **[I like to play piano.]**
|I like to play piano.|
- 18 Dooley **[I like to play piano.]**
|I like to play piano.|
- 19 然後就是 (.) 就是 (.) 就是後面有一個 (.) 一個家長就一直看
我
|然後就是...就是後面有一個家長||就一直看我|
(‘Then one parent kept looking at me.’)
- 20 然後我就是看他
|我就是看他|<沒發現異狀>
(‘And I kept looking at the parent.’)
- 21 然後就這樣子
|然後就這樣子|
(‘We stayed the way like this.’)
- 22 然後我就繼續 (.) 然後課
|然後我就繼續...|
(‘And I went on with my lecture.’)
- 23 我們就說下課
|我們就說下課|
(‘I dismissed the class.’)
- 24 然後學生就回家
|然後學生就回家|
(‘The students went home.’)
- 25 你看上面這位
|你看上面這位...|
(‘You see the...’)

- 26 這三位都不知道有 (.) 是有沒有什麼問題
|這三位都不知道||是有沒有什麼問題|
(‘These three have no idea what is wrong here.’)
- 27 <question marks over the three guests>
- 28 但是我下了課之後
|我下了課之後|
(‘After I dismissed the class,’)
- 29 那個家長來找我
|那個家長來找我|
(‘The parent came up to me.’)
- 30 他說
|他說|
(‘S/He said,’)
- 31 ㄟ (.) 你確定你是美國人嗎
<你確定你是美國人嗎>
(“‘Are you sure you’re American?’”)
- 32 Vincent ((*laughs*))
- 33 Dooley 你連 piano 都不會寫
<你連 piano 都不會寫>
(‘You can’t even spell “piano.”’)
- 34 什麼意思
|什麼意思|
(‘What was s/he referring to?’)
- 35 我 (.) 因為我 piano 是拼錯
|因為我 piano 是拼錯|
(‘Because I spelt “piano” wrong.’)
- 36 Piano 是 PIANO
|piano 是 piano|
(‘The word “piano” is spelt p-i-a-n-o.’)
- 37 Dallas 中間這裡 ((*gestures the three Taiwanese guests*))
|中間這裡|
(‘[The guests] here’)
- 38 沒半個人發現
<沒半個人發現>
(‘no one finds anything wrong.’)
- 39 Thomas 他們不知道怎麼拚
|他們不知道怎麼...|
(‘They don’t know how to spell [the word].’)

- 40 <完全狀況外>
('Completely no idea.')
- 41 Guest 1 不是
|不是|
('That's not the truth.')
- 42 Karen 不可以這樣喔
|不可以這樣喔|
('You can't be like that.')
- 43 你們再給他們兩天
|你們再給他們兩天|
('If you give them two more days,')
- 44 他們可能會看出端倪喔
|他們可能會看出端倪喔|
('they might be able to figure this out.')
- 45 Guest 1 不是
|不是|
('That's not the truth.')

Dooley does not explicitly read out the word he spelt wrong. Instead, he puts the sentence on a mini whiteboard that every guest has. At this point, no laughter or special post production effect is presented (lines 16-18). It may suggest that the error itself is not intended to draw laughter. An attention-worthy question then is why the error is not considered laughable. This interesting observation will be discussed in Section 4.2. Dooley continues telling the story. In lines 25 and 26, he stops to comment on the fact that the three Taiwanese guests do not react to the wrong spelling. In fact, no one on the scene reacts to the spelling mistake. However, the camera turns to focus on the three guests. The post-produced question marks surrounding the three guests (line 27) indicate that the three guests are presented as being oblivious to the incorrect spelling. Toward the end of his reflection, Dooley explains how he spelt 'piano'

wrong. Dallas, a Canadian, restates that the three Taiwanese guests do not spot the mistake (lines 38-39). Thomas, a British, also claims that the guests have no idea how 'piano' is spelt. At that moment, the cameras again turn to focus on the Taiwanese guests, with post-produced CG effect reading 完全狀況外 *Wanquan zhuangkuang wai* 'Completely no idea.' The inability to spot the error draws evaluations. Karen, the hostess, refutes the foreign guests' evaluations by saying 不可以這樣 *bu keyi zhe yang* 'You can't be like that'. Her statement also illustrates that the act of criticizing other's less command of English is an act of menace. The statement encompasses the established language ideology that English competence is required. The established language ideology places non-English speakers as inferior and less in power. The punch line, or sarcasm, is unfolded in Karen's later statement that the three guests would probably find something wrong if they are given more time (lines 42-43). The 兩天 *liang tian*, literally 'two days,' does not refer to exactly two days, but definitely a time longer than necessary to see how 'piano' should be spelt. In later exchange, the three guests defend for themselves. Their defense reinforces how not being able to spot English errors goes against the expectation, and is thereby face-threatening. The excerpt poses an interesting question. None of the guests reacts to the spelling error but only the Taiwanese non-English users are teased for not responding to the error. The observation could suggest that the denigration may not be solely about language proficiency, but about *whose* lack of proficiency.


The two excerpts both background the established language ideology “English competence is required,” manifested both in the interaction among the participants on the filming and in the interaction between the program and the audience, because audience is responsible for locating incorrect language use. John B Thompson (1995) discusses the mediated vision when a public figure is screened on TV. How cameras turn to focus on a figure frames a context. This established language ideology ‘selects’ the target of teasing. Crosslinguistic humor is not so much about the use of English itself, but more related to who are using the language and who initiate the teasing. In the context where English is used by non-native speakers, such as the two excerpts show, the established language ideology makes linguistic practice socially meaningful, but also selects to whom the practice is meaningful.

4.1.4 Metalinguistic comments on (lack of) English

The previous section has shown that incorrect language use can infer to an individual’s lack of English proficiency. This section turns to language play built on overt mocking and explicit self-deprecation. The act of teasing is face-threatening (Boxer & Cortés-Conde 1997). In this vein, humor built on criticism of incompetence in English shares the same ground with the theory of disparagement (Suls 1972). Speakers laugh at a non-English user’s failure in showing good English in the same manner how people deride at others’ misfortune. The act backgrounds the language ideology that English competence is desired. The rationalization

leads to the practice of lightheartedly mocking at someone's poor English. The act of mocking and teasing discussed below is followed by non-English users' self-deprecation. The deprecation keeps the mocking lighthearted and at bay. It also shows the non-English users' pressure to go along with the teasing by making it less face-threatening (Haugh 2010) because self-denigration projects positive image (Norrick 1993) and saves face.

An example of self-deprecation of English competence after making a scene is presented in (10) below. AX, a basic English user, fails at singing an English song. Both HZ and AX find the wine taster M to be friendly and attractive. HZ, the more proficient out of the duo, urges AX to serenade her.



(10) From *Super Taste*, December 1, 2015

- | | | |
|---|----|--|
| 1 | HZ | It's very sweet.
 這很甜
(‘[This wine] is very sweet.’) |
| 2 | AX | Yes. |
| 3 | HZ | Sweet wine. Yes. Yeah
 這支很甜 對
(‘This is sweet wine. Yeah.’) |
| 4 | AX | Very sweet. Like you.
 非常甜 像你一樣
(‘[It's] very sweet, like you.’) |
| 5 | M | <i>((laughs))</i> |
| 6 | HZ | 你可以唱個情[歌給她]
 你可以唱個情歌給她
(‘Why don't you sing her a love song.’) |
| 7 | M | [Thank you very much.] <i>((laughs))</i>
 謝謝你 |
| 8 | HZ | He (.) he wants to sing a song to you. |

- 9 M |他想唱歌給妳聽|
 ((laughs))
- 10 HZ **OK? Would that be ok?**
 |OK...|
- 11 M **OK.**
- 12 HZ **Yeah. Here we go. Come on. Yeah.**
 |來吧...對|
- 13 M ((laughs))
- 14 HZ **English song. English.**
 |英文歌 英文|
- 15 AX ((long pause)) **English song?**
 <英文情歌?!>
- 16 HZ **Yeah. English. Yes.**
 |對 英文||對...|
- 17 AX **OK. ((clears his throat)) ((claps his hands)) Happy birthday to you.**
 |OK|<Happy birthday to you>
- 18 Everyone ((laughs))
- 19 AX 我又不會
 |我又不會|
 ('I simply can't.')

HZ and AX taste the sweet wine made from Torrontés, an Argentine grape variety. AX uses his simple English to compliment on the wine and the wine taster (line 4) before HZ urges him to sing to her. When AX finds that he has to sing an English song, the long pause and the raised intonation (line 15) reveal that he is unprepared. In line 17, the English love song turns out to be the Happy Birthday Song. The deprecating statement in line 19 could both refer to the incapability in singing English songs, or in speaking English. Singing the Happy Birthday Song obviously violates nearly all known linguistic theories about appropriateness, as evidenced in the laughter in line 18. The deprecation excuses his inappropriate but amusing

choice of the song. Excerpt (10) contains comparatively longer exchange in English. Except for the expression “OK” and the lyrics of the Happy Birthday song, all English phrases are presented in Chinese in the subtitles. The program does not expect that the audience finds the three-party exchange easy to follow. Yet, the production team does assume the audience to understand the song because the lyrics of the song are presented in karaoke. The karaoke presentation and the use of English show that singing the song is assumed to be a shared ability.

Another example of self-deprecation is taken from the show *Half and Half*. A female guest, Caitlin, reflects how impressed she is to find Taiwanese’ enthusiasm for learning English. As she works as a DJ for an English radio, the host, Vincent, the host who has the onstage persona of being a non-English user, asks her to demonstrate how she does traffic updates, shown in (11) below.

(11) From *Half and Half*, September 10, 2019

- 1 Caitlin 我自己也覺得 (.) 台灣人非常愛 (.) 就是學英文啊
|我自己也覺得台灣人非常愛||就是學英文啊|
(‘I also feel that Taiwanese are enthusiastic about learning English.’)
- 2 我原來以為台灣人不喜歡
|我原來以為台灣人不喜歡|
(‘Originally I hadn’t thought so.’)
- 3 但是後來開始在 [radio] DJ 的時候
|但是後來開始在||廣播電台 DJ 的時候|
(‘But when I started working as a DJ at [radio],’)
- 4 發現我們聽眾 (.) 一直打電話說
|發現我們聽眾一直打電話說|
(‘I found that our audience keeps on calling in and asking’)

- 20 |你有在聽廣播電台|
 ('You tune in to [radio]?')
 不小心轉到的是不是
 |不小心轉到的是不是|
 ('You just accidentally bump into the program, don't you?')
- 21 Vincent 不小心轉到啦
 |不小心轉到|
 ('I tune in to it mindlessly.')
- 22 Karen ((*laughs*))
- 23 Vincent 然後我就接著聽他在講這個
 |然後我就聽他在講這個|
 ('Then I hear [the DJ] doing traffic updates.')
- 24 講了半天
 |講了半天|
 ('After a while,')
- 25 我真的不知道 (.) 到底哪裡塞車
 <我真的不知道 <<尷尬>>
 ? 到底哪裡塞>
 (I honestly have no idea where the traffic jams are.)
- 26 Karen ((*laughs*))

Caitlin is mesmerized about Taiwanese's unfailing interests in learning English when she works as a DJ (lines 1 to 8). Vincent abruptly asks her to demonstrate how traffic updates are done, such as reporting the traffic on 忠孝東路 and 敦化南路.⁸ The two streets are among the busiest streets in Taipei. Vincent's request reveals that he listens to the English radio. However, he is portrayed by others and by himself as a non-English user. Before Caitlin has the chance to demonstrate, Karen, the hostess, quips that Vincent has used up all

⁸ The subtitles wrongly translated 忠孝東路 *zhongxiao dong lu* 'Zhongxiao East Road' into 忠孝一路 'Zhongxiao First Road' and 敦化南路 *dunhua nan lu* 'Danhua South Road' into 敦化三路 'Danhua Third Road'. The word "east" is phonologically similar to 一 *yi* 'one' in Mandarin Chinese while "south" is phonologically similar to 三 *san* 'three.' The post production mishears Vincent's English as Mandarin Chinese. The error is not directly related to the discussion and therefore put aside.

the English words he know (line 15). Vincent's later defense again seems to suggest him being a loyal listener because he describes the traffic updates on the radio as something he hears with the use of 每次 *mei ci* 'every time' and 一直 *yizhi* 'always.' Karen shows her feigned surprise at Vincent's revelation of tuning to the English radio station (lines 19-20). Vincent's persona of being a non-English user is revealed through distancing his behavior from what typically English users do. Vincent is described to 不小心 *bu xiaohsin* 'accidentally' tune in to the English radio station He then admits tuning in unintentionally to the radio station. Karen's judgment to Vincent's behavior and Vincent's response imply their collaborative manipulation of Vincent's onstage persona as being less proficient in English. Vincent then confesses that he has no idea where the traffic jam occurs (lines 24 and 25). Different from straightforward demonstrating lack of English competence, this excerpt demonstrates one's English competence is assessed by distinguishing behaviors as what he does not normally do. The excerpt also sees how self-deprecation transforms the originally face-threatening act to lighthearted teasing.

The two excerpts present that the lack of English skills can be face-threatening. Self-deprecated claims make the teasing sting less and retain the interaction as lighthearted. The two examples reveal how the established language ideology "English competence is required" shapes the humorous discourse about English. When these excerpts are presented to the audience, the Chinese subtitles to English insertions manifest the established language

ideology that not everyone speaks English. Because bad English is considered inappropriate and criticized, teasing at one's English shares the similar theoretical grounds with Monro's concept of humor as inappropriateness (1951) and Suls's (1972) theory of disparagement. Infotainment discourse reveals seemingly contradictory established language ideologies. The contestation is discussed in the next section.

4.2 Discussion

The study approaches crosslinguistic conversational joking in infotainment discourse from epistemics (Heritage & Raymond 2005; 2011; Stivers et al. 2011; Heritage 2013) to identify the dynamics of the ideologizing process of English. The section discusses three issues, how knowledge of English is assumed and shapes conversational joking, how the joking manifests two contesting language ideologies concerning English use in the Taiwanese context and how crosslinguistic humor constructs and is built on a 'we-code.'

Reading multilingual humor is social practice because it requires metalinguistic awareness fostered through conventionalized social experiences. The humorous conversation discussed in this chapter centers chiefly on exploiting incorrect, non-standard English. To interpret incorrect or bad English as evaluation-inviting demands the social knowledge that English competence is desired but not equally shared. The individuals' defense and self-deprecation explicate that labeling as bad English users is essentially face-threatening.

Crosslinguistic conversational joking walks a thin line of teasing and criticizing (Boxer & Cortés-Conde 1997; Haugh 2010). This finding is also addressed by Hill (2008) in her discussion about white racism. White racism engages numerous aspects of understanding the social world through discourse, significantly without speakers' intention of discrimination. In the same vein, discourse about profiling English could also possess this trait-to-speaker interpretation without intending to appropriate or distance the language (and the package of social values attached to it). They are taken as simply 'out there' at speakers' disposal. When the audience finds conversational joking humorous, they are communicating via shared metalinguistic knowledge (Boxer & Cortés-Conde 1997) regarding expectations about English. The knowledge has much to do with how English is taught, viewed, and profiled in the Taiwanese society. Due to various reasons, English in formal education in Taiwan has long been notorious for its overemphasis on grammar translation and less attention paid to speaking and listening. There are still relatively a smaller number of proficient speakers despite the pedagogical efforts (C. Wang 2002; K.-h. Wu 2010). The audience finds incorrect use of English attention-drawing, not simply because they feel related to it, but also because incorrect language use contests the established language ideology that English is desired, a prominent language ideology in Expanding Circle Countries (see the discussion in Kachru 1985), including South Korea (Yoo 2005; H. Park 2007; Song 2011; Piller & Cho 2013), Japan (Kubota 1998; Seargeant 2008; 2011), and Taiwan (S.-y. Huang 2006; Y.F. Chang 2008;

Lee 2012; Price 2014). The audience feels familiar and affiliated. People in Taiwan learn to evaluate one's English and value English competence in a highly conscious state, as the example of 'sugar sugar circle' shown in (8). Furthermore, these TV programs share the identical contextualization of situating Taiwanese (and their English) in relation to people from other countries. The pursuit of English is perceived to be how *Taiwanese*, not *individuals*, suffer, as seen in Caitlin's description in (11), and Alexia and Ryan's imitation in (5). The upscale (Uitermark 2002; Blommaert 2007; 2010) from what *individuals* do to what Taiwanese do makes the referred linguistic practice, i.e. excessive codeswitching and incorrect English, a marker. It is even more obvious in (9) where a native speaker's spelling error is not described as humorous but non-native English users' failure at spotting the error is laughable. The struggle with English and the obligation to speak English are discursively constructed as shared and socially indicative. Consequently, it is not English that marks group identity. Remarkably, it is how English is discursively constructed as dis-owned by Taiwanese through lighthearted contexts in variety shows that reinforces ingroup integrity.

Epistemics refers to discursive devices that note speakers' commitment to a piece of knowledge (Heritage & Raymond 2005; 2011; Stivers et al. 2011; Heritage 2013). Knowledge of English is metalinguistic, prescriptive (with many dos and don'ts) and determinant in how conversational joking is presented in a contextually meaningful way. It has been emphasized throughout the analysis that two types of interaction and thus two levels

of epistemics are identified in the infotainment discourse, in the interaction among the participants on the set, and communication from the programs to their audience. The transmission of knowledge can be graphically presented as Figure 10.




Figure 10. The possible combinations of knowledge transmission in infotainment discourse.

Infotainment discourse as a whole repackages the communication among the interaction on the recording scene and the communication to their target audience. Because interaction on the scene can be scripted, all four epistemic combinations are possible. A question or an interaction could be initiated by a speaker at either K+ or K- position to a speaker again at either K+ or K- position. What the audience sees, however, is the harmony between K- to K+. When the infotainment discourse is communicated to the audience, they possess the knowledge and yet the audience's knowledge can only be speculated.

It may not be a coincidence that conversational joking tends to address language use surrounding simple English, including common English vocabulary and fixed expressions. As these performances are made accessible through broadcasts, it is tangible to assume that these performances are audience-oriented (cf. audience design (Bell 1984)). The effort to assure comprehension is made, indicating their unwillingness to overestimate the audience's English proficiency. Without immediate feedback, the presentation is strategic and reflexive of how the societal multilingualism is assumed. The use of Chinese subtitles and running texts disclose their assumptions whether the general basic English command is expected. Interestingly, this assumption works contrastively with the conversational joking on one's bad English. On the one hand, the media discourse constructs the lack of English competence as laughable and comment-worthy. On the other, the media discourse makes extra efforts by *not* assuming the audience's English competence in the mediated discourse to their audience. The ideologization web of infotainment discourse is presented in Figure 11 below.




Figure 11. The ideologization web of infotainment discourse

The multimodal discourse conveys two different established language ideologies. They expect English to be necessary. The interaction among the on-set participants prevalently presents teasing at one's bad English. They also expect that not every audience speaks English. When the multimodal discourse is communicated to the audience, it is more likely that the audience pays more attention to *what* is communicated than *how* the discourse is


conveyed. The established language ideology for screening the discourse is that English competence is necessary. The infotainment discourse illustrates that contradictory language ideologies can be manifested in the same stretch of discourse.

Crosslinguistic humor in media backgrounds two established language ideologies. Scripting and interpreting crosslinguistic humor relies on the knowledge that “English competence is necessary” and “Not everyone has to speak English.” When the two established language ideologies are manifested in conversational joking, Taiwanese is distanced from English. The discursively-constructed dis-owing is an ingroup code for Taiwanese. This explains why Chinese subtitles are preferred and why Taiwanese and Chinese readings of puns stand out more than English ones. It takes the metalinguistic knowledge about English in Taiwan to yield these humorous readings.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter discusses how deliberate knowledge management of English can induce humorous reading. An analysis of humorous discourse in the TV infotainment programs shows 4 linguistic strategies of presenting crosslinguistic conversational joking. These humorous discourses mostly rely on and actively reproduce the two contrasting but established language ideologies, “English competence is necessary,” and “Not everyone has to speak English.” Lack of English competence, shown through inability to use correct

English or identify English errors, is a common source for teasing. Nonetheless, the conceptualization of viewing English competence as required is not necessarily in accord with the way crosslinguistic conversational joking is presented in media discourse to their audience. The use of Chinese subtitles and running texts shows a relatively reserved assumption of the audience's linguistic competence. If the belief that English competence is required is the mainstream rationalization, the media discourse reproduces the dominant language ideology and manifests other contrastive language ideologies (Achugar & Oteiza 2009) that not everyone speaks English. In the Taiwanese context, these observations point to distinctive dimensions of profiling English apart from a domain-specific and instrument-oriented understanding of English that individuals tend to associate English with.



CHAPTER 5 METADISDISCOURSE OF ENGLISH IN LANGUAGE PLANNING

Language policy and planning serves a great site to observe how language ideologies influence social practice and vice versa. If language ideology is understood as ‘beliefs’ (Silverstein 1979) and ‘rationalization’ (Woolard 1998), which address, and are sometimes criticized for overemphasizing, the mental construct, then language policy and planning can be understood as how social practice embodies language ideologies, not merely in the act of planning itself, but also in the way of talking about the planning. Taiwan is currently at its onset of developing into a bilingual nation to urge Taiwanese to learn English. Discussing how English is talked about allows the study to probe into how metadiscourse of English is a site of negotiation and competition between a market-oriented perspective of language and multiple discursively-constructed spatial identities.

To relate metadiscourse of English about language planning, spatial identities and market-oriented conceptualizations of language use, the study analyzes metadiscourse from 4 different datasets regarding English in language planning: online survey comments on recognizing English as Taiwan’s second official language, the Blueprint of Developing Taiwan into a Bilingual Nation by 2030, two YouTubers’ vlog discourse on the Blueprint and YouTube users’ comments under the two vlogs. The study will present that diverse opinions on English in language planning are a consequence of individuals reflecting on a relatively

small number of shared, backgrounded conceptualizations of language use in the Taiwanese context. The study will also argue that these diverse stances and backgrounded beliefs, respectively termed ideological stances and established language ideologies in the study, sketch the ideological contestation associated to multiple identities.

5.1 Survey Comments: Lay beliefs

Viewing the proposal text “English as Taiwan’s second official language” as discourse (Barakos & Unger 2016), the study shows that metadiscourse on discourse manifests language ideologies concerning language ideologies. The investigation includes an effort to address the interaction between language ideologies concerning official languages and language ideologies concerning English, complementing known sociolinguistic studies on English in Taiwan (S.-C. Chen 2006; H.-Y. Lin 2007; Y.F. Chang 2008). The investigation is aimed at identifying the multilayered ideologizing process of languages through analyzing how speakers evaluate related discourse from news and the government. This section of the study discusses the online survey conducted by Yahoo Taiwan in October 2017, when the language policy proposal hit the news and when official agendas were yet disclosed. The survey comments show the primary lay conceptualizations about English and official languages.

5.1.1. The evaluated and the evaluating

The survey comments reveal thirteen ideological stances. These stances are found not to directly evaluate the proposal text, but to reflect on ideological understanding of officializing English shaped by four established language ideologies. As one comment can manifest multiple language ideologies and as established language ideologies bridge between speakers' evaluations and the text, the 13 ideological stances do not neatly fall into these four categories. Instead, the four subsections below illustrate how each established language ideology leads to varied and dynamic ideologizing process where 13 stances prevail. Table 5 presents the four established language ideologies and the 13 ideological stances.

Table 5. The established language ideologies and ideological stances in the online survey comments

Established language ideologies	Ideological stances
English represents global competitiveness.	English ability means global competitiveness.
	English being important and necessarily doesn't make it an official language.
	English threatens national identity.
Taiwanese are bad English speakers.	English has nothing to do with competitiveness.
	We can/should improve our English.
The number of official languages has to be kept to a minimum.	We won't become better in English because of officializing English.
	English is more useful.
	Chinese is more important.
Official language means mandated, nation-wide language acquisition.	Other local/native languages are more important.
	English is for everyone.
	English could become a daily language.
	We should have the right to choose.
	Nation-wide language proficiency is difficult.

The complex relationship between the four established language ideologies and 13 ideological stances will be discussed with comments in the following section. A summarizing ideologization web will be presented in Section 5.5.

5.1.1.1 “English represents global competitiveness.”

Among the 13 ideological stances, four evaluate the connection between English and global competitiveness. These four divergent stances also explicate that one language ideology could meet distinctive evaluations.

The most prominent ideological stance “English is a globally competitive language₂” found in 484 comments, sanctions the perceived instrumental connection between English and global competitiveness, as shown in (12) and (13).

(12) 想要跟國際競爭難道不需要學嗎？

(‘Shouldn’t we learn [English] if we want to join global competition?’)

(13) 看看英文水平高的國家比台灣競爭力強多少吧！

(‘Just look at countries that have better English proficiency! How far more competitive they are than Taiwan!’)

The use of the final particle 嗎 *ma* and the adverb 難道 *nandao* ‘surely it doesn’t’ turns the interrogative in (12) into a rhetorical question (Shao 2013). The negative rhetorical question which prefers the positive reading (Shao 2013) strengthens the perceived association between English and global competitiveness. Comment (13) connects 英文水平高 *yingwen shuiping gao* ‘better English proficiency’ with being 競爭力強 *jingzhengli qiang* ‘more competitive’ and favors English officialization. English officialization is popularly understood as an

attempt to enhance competitiveness. This ideological stance corresponds to the long-held belief that English plays a critical role in competitiveness and social mobility (Y.F. Chang 2008; S.-C. Chen 2010; Tsai 2010).

A contesting ideological stance “English being necessary and important doesn’t make it an official language,” with 33 occurrences, is observed in the viewers’ doubts regarding the legitimacy to officialize English. Despite its disapproval to English officialization, the ideological stance affirms that English represents competitiveness, as presented in (14) and (15).

(14) 國際語言有學習必要，沒有列為官方第二語必要

(‘It is necessary to learn an international language, but unnecessary to make it a second official language.’)

(15) 英文重要但不用刻意列為官方語言

(‘English is important, but there is no need to deliberately implement [it] as an official language.’)

Viewer (14) explains that the need to acquire a 國際語言 *guoji yuyan* ‘international language’ does not support the need to officialize it. Viewer (15) also disagrees to officialize English simply out of its recognized importance. This ideological stance sanctions that however important English does not meet certain criteria which an official language is conceptualized to possess. This conceptual gap will be further discussed.

The ideological stance “English threatens Taiwan’s national identity,” seen in 31 comments, addresses the dominant role of English and its undesired impact on local languages and identities (Phillipson 1992). Although whether English brings negative

influence to local languages and identities still remain debated (House 2003; Smolicz & Secombe 2003; Byram 2008; Jenkins 2009), the ideological stance also presupposes that English is globally dominant. Two examples are shown in (16) and (17).

(16) 而由功能性需求訂定第二官方語言，這樣國語又情何以堪呢？

(‘If we recognize English as an official language simply because of its instrumental functions, how do we see our *Guoyu*?’)

(17) 鼓勵語言學習有必要列為官方語言？自貶國格還是民族自賤？

(‘Do we need to officialize a language to promote language learning? Is that nation deprecation or ethnicity denigration?’)

Viewer (16) believes that English officialization places 國語 *guoyu* ‘the national language’ inferior to English. The 功能性 *gongneng xing* ‘instrumental values’ reveals the viewer’s awareness that English officialization is aimed for competitiveness lift. The comment also implies that official languages mean *more* than instrumental values. Comment (17) sees English officialization as 自貶國格 *zi bian guoge* ‘nationality self-deprecation’ and 民族自賤 *minzu zi jian* ‘ethnicity denigration’ and thus as an act of submission to English dominance. This stance reveals that the conceptualization of official languages associates with national identity and that English could not fulfill such a requirement for identity recognition. The ideological stance explains that language ideologies concerning English and those concerning official languages are interacting but competing.

The ideological stance “English has nothing to do with global competitiveness,” with 13 occurrences, explicitly dissociates English from competitiveness, as presented in (18) and (19).

- (18) 「國際競爭力」從來不是因為語言而來。產品的好壞，價格的高低，才是。...(23words)...。「國際競爭力」一說，只是個話術。
 (“Global competitiveness” never comes from language, but from the quality of products and the price. ... “Global competitiveness” is just a sales pitch.)
- (19) 國家競爭力不是靠英文來提升的。真的有產力與能力才是真的。
 (‘We can’t boost our competitiveness with English. Only productivity and capability count.’)

Comment (18) protests that competitiveness out of language competence presents a 話術 *hua shu* ‘a sales pitch’ and both comments (18) and (19) value productivity over language. However, from the dialogic perspective which Martin and White (2005) discuss, denial itself also presents the negative with the assumption that the positive exists. Put simply, the negation responds to the positive claim that global competitiveness comes from English (Martin & White 2005, 118). Explicitly denying the link between English and boosting competitiveness simultaneously suggests that the viewers are disapprovingly aware of such a positive connection. The dialogic function of negation also justifies the argument in this study that specific rationalizations are assumed. These rationalizations, i.e. established language ideologies, are not necessarily popularly supported. They serve the function of *being there* for language users to pick up and to re-evaluate in a current context (Gal & Irvine 2019).

These four distinctive ideological stances are not responding directly to the proposal text alone, but reflecting on the conceptualization that English officialization is predominantly perceived to be an attempt to boost Taiwan’s competitiveness. The meaning-making process shows that the ideologization process rationalizes language management and decision (Woolard 1998; Shohamy 2006).

5.1.1.2 “*Taiwanese are bad English speakers.*”

Metadiscourse on English officialization inevitably involves speculations about how this policy proposal could influence individuals, leading to two conflicting ideological stances. Some affirm that officializing English potentially boosts English proficiency. The opposing stance argues that English officialization may not contribute much to improving the current situation. Noteworthy, the conflicting stance does not defend with the contrary understanding that “Taiwanese speak good English.” The two opposing ideological stances both reflect on an established language ideology that Taiwanese are bad English speakers.

The ideological stance “We could/should improve our English,” found in 56 comments, celebrates the potential boost in English proficiency as an anticipated result of English officialization. It is expected to see that the appropriation of English is also connected to the established language ideology that English represents global competitiveness, as seen in (20) and (21).

- (20) 台灣人語文程度太差，難以與國際接軌，有個國際通用的語言當第二語言是好事
(‘Taiwanese suffer from low language proficiency. This makes it difficult to go international. Things might change to have an international language as Taiwan’s second [official] language.’)
- (21) 有助於提升國民英語能力對促進台灣的國際化有幫助。
(‘[English officialization] helps improve Taiwanese’s English and internationalization.’)

Comment (20) reflects that Taiwanese suffer from low English proficiency and attributes low global visibility to self-deprecated English proficiency. The viewer uses two negative evaluation 差 *cha* ‘bad’ and 難 *nan* ‘difficult’ to accentuate the established link between

language proficiency and international connectedness. English officialization is expected to ameliorate the problem. Viewer (21) also argues that officializing English boosts English competence and in return facilitates Taiwan's internationalization. The comments manifest the belief that English is a tool for global connection and that there is a need for competence improvement for global connection.

The contrastive ideological stance “We won't become better in English because of officializing English,” with 14 occurrences, casts doubt on whether English officialization can substantially alter the situation, as revealed in (22) and (23).

(22) 台灣人部會因為這個白癡政策英文變好⁹

(‘Taiwanese won't become better English speakers because of this stupid policy.’)

(23) 台南市將英語訂為第二官方語言台南路上有多少人會講英文啊?¹⁰

(‘Tainan recognizes English as a second official language. How many people in Tainan can actually speak English?’)


Comment (22) denies the possibility of English improvement with the implementation of this 白癡政策 *baichi zhengce* ‘stupid policy.’ The ideological stance reflects on that Taiwanese's poor command of English and further questions the validity of legitimizing English. Comment (23) also suspects the effectiveness of Tainan's attempt to make English the second official language city-wide. Similar to the previous ideological stance, this ideological stance reflects on Taiwanese' less command of English. Contrary to the previous ideological stance, this ideological stance further questions the validity of English officialization on

⁹ 部會 *bu hui* is a typography, which remains as the way the viewer did. It should be 不會 “not.”

¹⁰ Tainan, a city in Southern Taiwan, has attempted to list English as its second official language citywide. In the current debate about legitimizing English as Taiwan's second official language, the instance of Tainan is brought up occasionally.

improvement.

Self-deprecation of English proficiency implies the anxiety of non-native-English speakers in response to the conceptualization that English competence is a must (J.S.-Y. Park 2009). When individuals self-identify as bad English speakers and debate whether officializing English makes substantial change, the two opposing discursive forces illustrate that identical rationalizations about languages can invite strikingly different evaluations. Language ideologization is dynamic and multilayered (Kroskrity 2004). A bigger question along the ideologizing process lies in how proponents and opponents are interpreting the language policy proposal with identical, shared, established language ideologies despite their stances.



5.1.1.3 *“The number of official languages should be kept to a minimum.”*

Language learning is viewed as an investment with an economic perspective of language (De Swaan 2001). Investment in one language is commonly thought to risk or bargain at the expense of other languages. Multilingualism is therefore conceptualized as a site for language competition (Wiley 2000). When viewers argue for the most appropriate official language, the efforts to allocate official status to one or a few languages reflect viewers' ideation to keep the number of official languages to a minimum.

The ideological stance “English is more useful,” with 31 occurrences, prioritizes the

perceived instrumental values of English (Oladejo 2006; Y.F. Chang 2008; Tsai 2010; S.-C. Chen in press 2021) and background the established language ideology “English represents global competitiveness.” Two examples are shown in (24) and (25).

(24) 至少在我們有生之年英文還是比中文有用

(‘At least English stays more important than Mandarin Chinese in our lifetime.’)

(25) 可以跟國際接軌總比把時間花在學啥台語,客家語當個井底之蛙來的強

(‘Learning English to go international is more practical than learning Taiwanese and Hakka which will only allow people to become narrow-minded’)

Viewers (24) and (25) believe that learning English is more 有用 *you yong* ‘useful’ and 強 *qiang* ‘practical’ than learning Mandarin Chinese, Taiwanese and Hakka. Both comments reveal a willingness to limit resources for learning other languages to enhance English competence. Learning more languages or legitimizing more languages seem much less prominent. The viewers express a conflict-oriented understanding of language learning because when time and resources should be spent on a more useful language. The debate of a most appropriate official language also shows how official languages are conceptualized differently. Some value local identities, as revealed previously in “English threatens Taiwan’s national identity” whereas some prioritize the usefulness of English.

The ideological stance “Chinese is more important,” manifested in 73 comments, emphasizes Mandarin Chinese learning, as shown in (26) and (27).

(26) 現在國人的中文能力已經很掉漆了,還有母語也很糟沒必要硬規定列第二官方語¹¹

(‘People nowadays suffer from embarrassingly low Chinese proficiency, let alone proficiency in native languages. There is no need to recognize a second official language.’)

¹¹ The phrase 掉漆 comes from Taiwanese *lak-tshat*, used to refer to an embarrassing situation.

(27) 當大家都在說現在人的中文造詣越來越差時,應該先把中文學好再來學英文!!
(‘When everyone acknowledges receding Mandarin Chinese proficiency, we should put Mandarin before English.’)

Taiwanese are thought to suffer from receding Mandarin Chinese and local language proficiency in the two comments. In response to receding Mandarin proficiency, learning Mandarin is prioritized to improving English. The viewers hold diverse opinions about the role of Mandarin Chinese. Some consider Mandarin Chinese to be a local language in Taiwan while others disagree. To better accommodate the data, Mandarin Chinese and local languages are labeled differently in this study.

The ideological stance “Local languages are more important,” with 54 occurrences, values local language preservation over English learning. Two comments are presented in (28) and (29.)

(28) 自己國家的母語都搞不好了還要將外來語言當成官方語言! ?
(‘We can’t even settle our own native languages and now we’re having a foreign language as our official language!’)

(29) 第二官方語言應該是各族群母語, 自己的母語都不好好推廣, 推甚麼英語。
(‘Native languages are the entitled second official languages. Why are we promoting English when we are neglecting our native languages?’)

Viewer (28) finds it dissatisfactory to give a 外來語 *wailaiyu* ‘foreign language’ the official status when the native languages still struggle for recognition. Viewer (29) also believes that the native languages should serve as official languages. Valuing local languages more than English, this stance contests the ideological stance “English is more important.”

The three ideological stances prioritize respective languages in the discussion of language officialization. The act of weighing importance among languages also indicates that

having additional official languages is a much less prominent belief.

5.1.1.4 “An official language is a language for all.”

An official language is generally understood as a language that everyone in a social group speaks, or should learn to speak. Officializing English is therefore understood as having the obligation to speak English. Four ideological stances reflect on this mandated English competence.

The ideological stance “English is for everyone,” with 19 occurrences, celebrates the fact that language learning becomes equally available to all. This ideological stance also backgrounds the established language ideology “English represents global competitiveness,” as illustrated in (30) and (31).

(30) 語言學習不應該分貧富，如果列為第二官語就能讓全民更具國際化，給弱勢家庭更多的機會

(‘Language learning should be equally available to everyone. If English is recognized as a second official language, [this] makes everyone more international and gives underprivileged families more opportunities.’)

(31) 許多新技術及生活資訊第一時間都是英文，能多學一種全球常用語言還是很大幫助的，... (19 words)...，許多學習是需要強制的

(‘A lot of first-hand information is available in English. It helps to acquire a common global language. Learning takes place when it is compulsory.’)

Comment (30) links English learning to 機會 *jihui* ‘opportunity’ of underprivileged families, inferring the instrumental functions of English in social mobility. The notion that language learning 不應該分貧富 *bu yinggai fen pinfu* ‘should be equally available to everyone’ implies that English learning was originally considered to be socially discriminative, as also

discussed in Tsai (2010) and Price (2014). The positive attitudes revealed in Comment (30) also indicate that English officialization is reckoned to be likely to lead to successful language learning. Comment (31) states that English allows speakers to stay tuned to new information and that language learning should be mandated. Legitimizing English seems to promise successful English learning. English has already long been a required school subject, just as enhancing English ability has been seen as an issue. Nonetheless, Price (2014) discusses that social division is entrenched in mandatory English-in-education in Taiwan, making English learning available to an exclusive group of people.

Mandated societal language learning is viewed as facilitative in developing an English-speaking environment. The ideological stance “Officializing English creates an English-friendly environment,” with 29 occurrences, hopes that officializing English could immerse Taiwanese in speaking English. The ideological stance backgrounds the established language ideologies that Taiwanese do not speak good English and that English competence represents competitiveness. Speaking English is treated as normative and advantageous, as (32) and (33) reveal.

(32) 若英文成為第二官方語言，本人認為可以營造英語的使用環境，並增加國人的外語能力

(‘If English is made a second official language, I think this can build an environment where English is actually used and boost English proficiency.’)

(33) 沒有先天的歷史條件，只能倚靠後天創造環境，才有希望趕上星、馬、港等。

(‘Without historical backgrounds, we have to put efforts in creating environments so that we can keep up with Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong.’)

Comment (32) believe that English officialization helps to develop an English speaking

environment and improve Taiwanese's foreign language proficiency. The viewer associates English implementation to actual language environment. Recognizing Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong as role models for Taiwan, Comment (32) states that officialization allows to keep up with these places. The 歷史條件 *lishi tiaojian* 'historical backgrounds' probably refers to English implementation as a colonization legacy. The lack of this historical background is considered a setback that Taiwan needs to overcome. The statement shows a different discursive dimension how English is desired in the Taiwanese society. The ideological stance also reveals that the present Taiwan does not use English in daily sectors and that this is considered a disadvantage in mastering English.

The ideological stance "We should have the right to choose," with 20 occurrences, challenges the concept of mandated language learning, as shown in (34) and (35). This reveals the viewers' understanding that an official language is spoken by all obligatorily.

(34) 身為台灣人民，至少應該有不學英文的自由吧！

(‘As Taiwanese citizens, [we] should at least enjoy the freedom not being forced to learn English!’)

(35) 應該讓自己選擇要學什麼語言

(‘We should be able to choose the language we want to learn.’)

Comment (34) notes the freedom to decide whether to acquire English or not, a right Viewer (34) believes to be denied with English officialization. Comment (35) emphasizes self-will in choosing in language acquisition. The ideological stance reflects disapprovingly on compulsive language learning as a consequence of language officialization. "A language for all" simultaneously prohibits people from choosing.

The ideological stance “Nation-wide English proficiency is difficult,” with 47 occurrences, makes explicit the gap between nation-wide competence, which an official language is believed to advocate, and the current situation with English in the Taiwanese society, shown in (36) and (37).

(36) 官方語言要全面化，但現在民間英文有這麼普及嗎？

(‘An official language has to be pervasive, but is English this prevalent in non-official sectors?’)

(37) 你希望之後你收到公文是英文嗎？罰單什麼的是英文，看不懂也是一樣有 法律效力

(‘Do you want to get official documents in English? Things like tickets will also come in English, and they have validity whether you read English or not.’)

Comment (36) questions how practical officializing English would be because English is not prevalent enough. The explicit criterion that an official language 要全面化 *yao quanmian hua* ‘has to be pervasive’ is topicalized, indicating the pervasiveness of an official language being known information. The evaluation after 但 *dan* ‘but’ reflects on this piece of old information. Comment (37) states that incompetence in English leaves citizens defenseless if government documents are written in English. With the understanding that an official language demands nation-wide language competence, the viewers who take this ideological stance are reserved about officializing English.

These four ideological stances individually specify how nationwide proficiency, a widely acknowledged property of official languages, conflicts with the current state of English use in Taiwan. For proponents, nationwide proficiency is the ideal goal of officializing English, as seen in Comments (30), (31), (32) and (33). However, the opponents’

comments suggest that nationwide proficiency should be a precondition for language officialization, as seen in Comment (36). The two voices both rationalize the connection between an official language and its nation-wide proficiency. The ideological stances suggest that rationalizations about language could be evaluated differently from various perspectives.

The debate about officializing English is a site for norm contestation. A summarizing

Table 6 shows the occurrences of each ideological stance.

Table 6. Language ideologies concerning English and concerning official languages.

Established language ideologies	Ideological stances	#
English represents global competitiveness.	English ability means global competitiveness.	484
	English being important and necessarily doesn't make it an official language.	33
	English threatens national identity.	31
	English has nothing to do with competitiveness.	13
Taiwanese are bad English speakers.	We can/should improve our English.	56
	We won't become better in English because of officializing English.	14
The number of official languages has to be kept to a minimum.	English is more useful.	31
	Chinese is more important.	73
	Other local/native languages are more important.	54
Official language means mandated, nation-wide language acquisition.	English is for everyone.	19
	English could become a daily language.	29
	We should have the right to choose.	20
	Nation-wide language proficiency is difficult.	47

The 13 diverse ideological stances reflect on four established language ideologies, two concerning English, the other two concerning official languages. Moreover, language

ideologies concerning English and those concerning official languages are interacting and competing in the current debate, as will be discussed in the next section.

5.1.2 The ideologizing process in interaction

This section presents how discourse is interpreted with established language ideologies and how established language ideologies are evaluated differently in interaction. Furthermore, these ideological differences, along with linguistic differences, are discursively constructed as binary social distinctions, a semiotic process which Gal and Irvine (2019) call ‘axis of differentiation.’ An ideological stance is constantly connected to one or multiple attributes. A different ideological stance tends to be understood in opposition both in attitudes and in these social attributes.

The conversation (38), initiated by a proponent, centers on the practicality of English officialization.

(38)

- 1 Viewer A 想要跟國際競爭難道不需要學嗎？
(‘Don’t we need to learn English if we want to connect with the world?’)
- 2 Viewer B 學跟列為官方語言是兩回事
(‘Learning English is one thing and officializing it is another.’)
...(63 words, 9 lines omitted)...
- 12 Viewer F 所以如果不是英國人跟美國人
(‘So people other than American and British’)
- 13 學英語都自我矮化？
(‘are belittling themselves when learning English?’)

- 14 矮化的結果如何?
(‘What is the result of belittling?’)
- 15 你鎖在台灣
(‘You are stranded in Taiwan.’)
- 16 全球自我矮化的人遨遊暢通無阻
(‘Those who belittle themselves can go anywhere in the world.’)
- 17 Viewer G 沒看到台南市官方就是用在公文上啊，
(‘Can’t you see that offices in Tainan issue English documents?’)
- 18 你不懂喪失權益就你家的事，
(‘If your rights are infringed upon because you don’t [read English], you are responsible for that.’)
- 19 像是支付命令你阿公阿罵看不懂就 GG 了。¹²
(‘For example, elders at home may have trouble understanding paying warrants.’)
- 20 別以為那麼簡單。
(‘Don’t oversimplify the issue’)
- 21 Viewer G¹³ 還有一些公文名詞都要英文再去官方定義，
(‘Some official terms need to be redefined in English.’)
- 22 你沒再去學，
(‘If you don’t deliberately learn about them,’)
- 23 會英文也沒用，
(‘your English won’t help much.’)
- 24 官方這個詞就是有法律效益，
(‘Official terms have legal warrant.’)
- 25 中文公文你都看無了，
(‘If you can’t read Chinese documents,’)
- 26 換成英文你就慢慢去體會吧，
(‘what makes you think you can read English documents?’)
...(31 words, 3 lines omitted)...
- 30 Viewer H 全台灣人工作跟英文掛的上關係的有多少，
(‘How many people in Taiwan need English at work?’)
- 31 你這輩子用不太到英文卻為了要和鄰居聊天而學英文……
(‘You don’t use English extensively in your lifetime and now you’re learning it to go global……’)

¹² 阿公阿罵 is a transliteration from Taiwanese *a-kong a-má* to Chinese characters. Frequently coded as 阿公阿嬤, the term refers to grandparents and elders generally. The term GG is an acronym for “Good Game,” a phrase used to end a competition in online games to show good sportsmanship. It has been used to refer to end a life game and to get in trouble.

¹³ Based on the identical username, Viewer G left two comments consecutively.

Viewer A takes an affirmative ideological stance of the established language ideology “English represents competitiveness.” Viewer B refutes Viewer A’s stance by distinguishing between language learning and language officialization, though s/he probably still recognizes English learning as required. The refutation makes apparent a discrepancy concerning how an official language is conceptualized. Simply put, Viewers A and B share the established language ideology “English represents competitiveness” but conceptualize official languages differently. Several turns of verbal abuse among viewers are omitted. Viewer F derides the view that learning English is an act of identity menace (lines 12-16). Viewer I’s statement explicates how linguistic differences are constructed as opposing social distinctions. S/he first criticizes the view that non-American and non-British are interiorizing themselves learning English. The viewer relates language to essentialized identity (Bucholtz 2003), i.e. the idealized one-to-one correspondence between language and nationality. S/he frames this overgeneralization as opponents’ disapproval of legitimizing English. It remains unknown whether Viewer F deploys this discursive strategy to make opponents seem less objective and lose their grounds. The binary distinctions stay in the later statements (lines 15 and 16). S/he pronounces that English provides a ticket to 暢行無阻 *changxingwuzu* ‘go anywhere in the world’ and that without English one is geographically confined. English competence is depicted as a criterion for mobility by Viewer F, and the global status of English is inferred. Several contrastive pairs are constructed in the discourse. The comment starts with refuting

contrastive pair between native language users and non-native language learners (lines 12-13), to the contrast between approval and disapproval regarding English officialization. The approving vs. disapproving contrast then maps to the contrast between mobility and confinement in his/her argument in legitimizing English (lines 15-16). Viewer G blames an excessively cheerful view on English officialization (lines 17-20) and constructs English competence as socially indicative. Elders are depicted as being less likely to acquire English and thus at disadvantage (line 19). This opposing view to English officialization manifests the established language ideology “An official language is a language for all.” In Viewer H’s comment, the 多少 *duoshao* implies that a comparatively limited number of English users. Only the interpretation of 少 ‘few’ is picked up. The statement that you (any individual) 這輩子用不太到英文 *zhebeizi yong bu tai dao yingwen* ‘don’t use English extensively in your lifetime’ (line 31) explicates that English does not serve as a daily language and that the efforts to acquire English are not well justified. The excerpt shows that viewers rely on a limited number of established language ideologies to interpret English officialization, but take diverse stances on them.

The following interaction in (39), initiated by an opponent, illustrates how shared established language ideologies critically maintain the conversation even without being made verbally explicit. The interaction starts with Viewer I challenging the usefulness of English in daily communication.

(39)

- 1 Viewer I 你平時講英文嗎?
(‘Do you speak English in daily life?’)
- 2 用到時機有多少?
(‘How often do you have to speak English?’)
- 3 Viewer II 用到的時機挺多的幾乎每天用
(‘I speak English frequently, almost daily.’)
- 4 Viewer III 很多啊，
(‘Frequently,)
- 5 你要去做工地的話大概就不用天天用
(‘you probably don’t use [English on a daily basis] if you are a construction worker.’)
- 6 Viewer IV 天天寫英文信，
(‘I write mail in English every day.)
- 7 講中文多
(‘I speak Chinese more frequently.’)
- 8 但寫英文比寫中文多，
(‘But I write in English a lot.’)
- 9 另外本人多益 700 多分，
(‘By the way, I scored more than 700 at TOEIC.’)
- 10 在台灣超過平均約 300 分
(‘It’s about 300 more than the average score in Taiwan.’)
- 11 但到韓國自由行發現遇到的路人有一半英語比我好
(‘But I discovered that half of the Koreans I ran into speak better English than me when I went backpacking in Korea.’)
- 12 Viewer V 上班每天都得用吧?
(‘I think we use English at work every day.’)
- 13 Viewer VI 民眾也許不高，
(‘Not so common for the average public)
- 14 官方活動..商業貿易活動..科學研究處處需要...
(‘But it’s necessary in official activities, business and science.’)
- 15 Viewer VII 樓主你是井底之蛙吧你(笑翻)
(‘OP, you must live in your own world, (lol).’)
- 16 Viewer VIII 我講英語,年薪五百萬..
(‘I speak English. My yearly income is five million..’)
- 17 Viewer IX 要嗆樓主至少也用個英文回吧!!!!

- 18 ('Respond to OP in English if you contradict with the opinion!
學校基本要教，
(‘Schools teach basics.’)
- 19 要深入自由學習就好，
(‘People can decide whether to go advanced.’)
- 20 有需要的自然去學。
(‘You’ll learn English when you need it.’)
...(37 words, 4 lines)...
- 25 Viewer XI 等你覺得要用到時才學，不會太晚嗎？
(‘Don’t you think it’s too late to learn a language when you
find there is a need?’)
- 26 Viewer XII 本人在國外念書
(‘I study abroad.’)
- 28 英文真的很重要
(‘English is really important.’)
...(27 words, 2 lines)...
- 30 台灣人民需要去看看世界了解世界到底在做什麼
(‘Taiwanese people need to see the world and know what’s
going on around the world,’)
- 31 才能培養自己的競爭力
(‘in order to cultivate our competitiveness.’)
- 32 Viewer XIII 因為不會講才覺得用不到吧
(‘Because you don’t speak the language, you don’t think you’ll
need it’)
- 33 (因為也沒人要你用)
(‘as no one would ask you to, anyway.’)
- 34 會講的很常用到
(‘You will frequently use English if you can speak the
language.’)
- 35 甚至因此多了很多機會更有競爭力
(‘You can even get more opportunities and become more
competitive.’)

Viewer I uses two rhetorical questions to state that English does not serve as a daily language.

The comment presupposes that an official language has to be used frequently. The rhetorical questions, aimed for emphasizing and aligning (Shao 2013), are deliberately answered by

Viewer II, who claims to use English on a nearly daily basis. By answering the rhetorical questions, Viewer II distances him/herself from Viewer I. Viewer II is showing an affirmative stance to the use of English, though his/her stance to English officialization remains unknown.

Viewer III quips that a person probably does not use English daily if s/he 要去做工地 *yao qu zuo gongdi* 'is a construction worker.' The evaluation is rich in ideological assumptions. The 工地 *gongdi*, literally 'construction site,' refers to blue-collar jobs. Labor-intensive jobs are thought to be less relevant to English, which commonly indexes better paid, white-collar occupations. Put differently, the distinction between English competence and incompetence is mapped to the overgeneralized distinction between white-collar jobs and blue-collar jobs, another instance of linguistic differences to social differentiation. Viewer IV reflects on the understanding that Taiwanese generally are bad speakers of English (lines 9-11). Viewers V and VI also affirm that English is commonly used at work and in formal domains (line 12). These viewers collectively voice the importance of English and the urge to acquire English.

Viewer VII describes Viewer I as 井底之蛙 *jingdizhiwa* 'narrow-minded' (line 15). The comment also reveals implicitly that recognizing English shows how one's 'vision' is judged. Embracing English presents a person as knowledgeable, open-minded, with an international perspective. Conversely, denial of English also denies a person from these abovementioned traits. Comment VIII sequences English proficiency and income in the way that invites causal reading of the two. Though it is unknown whether the comment is intended for irony, the

syntactic structure reveals indexicalization of English to higher income. Comment IX believes that speakers will acquire English when they find it necessary. It reflects on the established language ideology, although less obviously, that an official language demands societal competence. Viewer IX is apparently less positive about mandated English proficiency. The ideological stance is however challenged by Viewer XI with a rhetorical question. The question voices his opinion that it is too late to learn English when the realization of its importance dawns on the viewer. Viewer XII states that English is important (line 28) and that Taiwanese should learn to know more about the world. The two statements collaboratively invite the inference that English is regarded as a medium to stay informed about the world (lines 28-31). Though this conversation thread is initiated by an opponent to English officialization, English is also co-constructed by the following viewers as an emblem for white-collar occupation, mobility, competitiveness, higher income, world vision and international perspectives. Speakers who disapprove of English officialization and who do not find English necessary are discursively presented as speakers without these aforementioned traits.

The two excerpts explicate how the policy proposal is understood with established language ideologies and how these shared established language ideologies are critiqued differently. The belief of having an official language surrounds mandated language learning. Besides, English is perceived as a domain-specific language and this property is taken as

advantageous socioeconomically by some and as disadvantageous in terms of daily conversation by others. Language competence and the ideological stances are both discursively constructed as binary and understood in terms of differences in social attributes. Gal and Irvine (2019) state that qualitative contrasts anchor the meanings of each other. These qualities are mostly abstract and they are defined by projecting an image regarding what each other is not. This accounts for the observation that the differentiations are commonly discursively constructed as either-or.

This section discusses the interaction of the ideologizing process of officializing English and identifies established language ideologies and ideological stances. Several observations are noteworthy. First, established language ideologies and ideological stances present ideological processes as dynamic and heterogeneous (Kroskrity 2004). Second, language officialization is intimately associated with intensive, even successful language learning and national identity acknowledgement. Third, the distinction between English competence and incompetence is discursively constructed as binary, and mapped onto social distinction also in binary fashion (Gal & Irvine 2019). Speakers with English competence enjoy global mobility, better jobs, higher income, and wider perspectives whereas people without English competence are confined in Taiwan, narrow-minded, and keep blue-collar jobs. On this ground, incompetence is discouraged and argues for English officialization.

However, elders are described as less likely to possess English ability. On this ground, incompetence is presented to argue against English officialization. Viewers rely on established language ideologies, such as “English represents competitiveness” and “An official language is a language for all,” to comprehend English officialization. Semiotic process of differentiation makes ideological distinction socially meaningful by both understanding differences as oppositions and extending opposition to attributes (Bishop & Jaworski 2003; Gal & Irvine 2019). The metadiscourse regarding the proposal to officialize English is a field of ideological competition which surprisingly originates from a limited number of shared established language ideologies.

5.2 The Blueprint: An Analysis of a ‘Top-down’ Perspective of English

The Blueprint of Developing Taiwan into a Bilingual Nation by 2030 outlines how English is situated in both the globalized contexts and the Taiwanese context. The purpose of analyzing the Blueprint is to discuss how English is defined and how bi-/multilingualism is conceptualized. Section 5.1.1 overviews the contents of the Blueprint of Developing Taiwan into a Bilingual Nation by 2030. Section 5.1.2 discusses the ideologizing process in the Blueprint. The study analyzes the text of the Blueprint in Mandarin Chinese and supplements it with English directly quoted from the English version.

5.2.1 An overview of the Blueprint

The Blueprint of Developing Taiwan into a Bilingual Nation by 2030, issued both in Mandarin Chinese and in English, lays out a twelve-year, stage-by-stage plan to bilingualize Taiwan in official and public domains. The bilingual nation policy is taken as a preparation stage for promoting English as a second official language. As the foreword of the Blueprint notes,

至於推動英語成為第二官方語言，則於 2030 年後，視雙語政策推動成果之執行檢討，再行研議。

(the Executive Yuan 2018, 2).

[Promoting English as the nation's second official language] would be studied and discussed again after 2030, in light of the executive review of the results of the bilingual policy's implementation.

(the Executive Yuan 2018, 8).

The Blueprint covers six sections, including Forward, Promotion Rationale, Targets, Strategies, Implementing Agency and Budget, and Key Performance Indicators. Each section is summarized below.

The Foreword introduces the motivations to enhance English proficiency and to develop Taiwan into a bilingual nation. The Blueprint relates the mastery in English to global competitiveness and describes English competence as essential for all non-English-speaking countries. This bilingual policy is suggested to be built on the positive results of three previous English-related language policies, i.e. the Action Plan for Creating an English-friendly Environment (2002-2007), the Plan for Creating an International Living Environment (2008-2009) and the Plan for Enhancing National English Proficiency

(2010-2012). These three English-related language policies are noted to have focused on bilingual infrastructure. Different from previous three policies' emphases on bilingual infrastructure, the Blueprint aims at what it terms as 軟實力 *ruan shili* 'soft power.'

To promote Taiwan as a bilingual nation, National Development Council outlines 4 rationales in the Blueprint. They include

從需求端全面強化國人英語力
以數位科技縮短城鄉資源落差
兼顧雙語政策及母語文化發展
打造年輕世代的人才競逐優勢

(the Executive Yuan 2018, 2-4)

strengthening people's English proficiency from the demand side
reducing urban-rural divide with digital technology
bilingual policy and native language policy run in parallel
forging competitive advantage for young talents

(the Executive Yuan 2018, 4-6)

The first rationale, “從需求端全面強化國人英語力” *cong xuqiu duan quanmian qianghua guoren yingyu li* “strengthening people's English proficiency from the demand side,” expects citizens to actively engage in boosting the national English competence. The second rationale, “以數位科技縮短城鄉資源落差” *yi shuwei keji suoduan chengxiang ziyuan luocha* “reducing urban-rural divide with digital technology,” acknowledges the difficulty of nationwide competence because of unequal resource allocation. The Blueprint proposes to alleviate the urban-rural division with digitalized learning. The third rationale, “兼顧雙語政策及母語文化發展” *jian gu shuangyu zhengce ji muyu wenhua fazhan* “bilingual policy and native language policy run in parallel,” states the government's determination to promote

both English and local languages. The rationale clarifies that English is promoted alongside, not at the risk of, the promotion of native languages and culture. The last rationale, “*打造年輕世代的人才競逐優勢*” *dazao nianqing shidai de rencai jingzhu youshi* “forging competitive advantage for young talents,” connects English competence to competitiveness and career development. It reasons that better English proficiency brings quality occupation opportunities. Countries such as Singapore, India and Romania are described in the Blueprint to have advanced rapidly owing to their English proficiency.

The four rationales lead to two targets of developing Taiwan into a bilingual nation. The bilingual policy is aimed at, first, “*厚植國人英語力*” *hou zhi guoren yingyu li* “cultivating people’s English proficiency” and, second, “*提升國家競爭力*” *tisheng guojia jingzheng li* “elevating national competitiveness.” The two targets outline two types of 力 *li* ‘power.’ The 英語力 *yingyu li* ‘English proficiency’ is the first goal, and invites the reading that it leads to 競爭力 *jingzheng li* ‘competitiveness,’ which is the second goal. English competence is constructed as prerequisite to competitiveness. The graphic presentation of the two goals in the Blueprint places *yingyu li* as the foundation of *jingzheng li*, as shown in Figure 12. An arrow pointing from *yingyu li* to *jingzheng li* also invites a sequential, causal reading, as will be further discussed in Section 5.5.




Figure 12. The targets of the Blueprint (Executive Yuan 2018: 4)

The two objectives are materialized into 8 common strategies and 16 individual strategies. The eight common strategies devote to making English available in public sectors.

The eight common strategies are:

- 推動各部會官網全面雙語化
- 與外國人相關文書雙語化
- 公共服務場域第一線服務雙語化
- 落實政府公開資訊雙語化
- 與外國人相關法規雙語化
- 推升文教場館之雙語服務
- 培育公務人員英語溝通力
- 全國技術士技能檢定考試及證照雙語化

(the Executive Yuan 2018, 5-7)

promoting all bilingual websites of central government agencies,
 bilingualizing documents relevant to foreigners,
 bilingualizing front-line services at public service venues,
 implementing bilingual government information,
 bilingualizing laws and regulations relevant to foreigners,
 promoting bilingual services at cultural and educational facilities and venues,
 cultivating English proficiency of government officials,
 bilingualizing the examination and certification of National Skill Test

(the Executive Yuan 2018, 9-11)

The 16 individual strategies demand each ministry, agency and commission to work collaboratively to put forth bilingualization. The 16 individual strategies include:

全面啟動教育體系的雙語活化、培養臺灣走向世界的雙語人才(教育部、外交部、僑委會、經濟部、科技部、通傳會、各地方政府)

implementing in full scale the bilingualization of Taiwan's educational system, cultivating bilingual talents and international perspective (Ministry of Education, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Overseas Community Affairs Council, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Science and Technology, National Communications Commission, local governments),

推動設立全英語電視臺頻道及鼓勵公廣集團製播英語節目(文化部、通傳會)

promoting the establishment of all English TV channels and encouraging Taiwan Broad casting System to produce and broadcast English programs (Ministry of Culture, National Communications Commission),

增加廣播電臺(如教育、警廣)之英語節目(教育部、內政部、交通部)

increasing English programs of broadcasting radio stations (such as National Education Radio and Police Broadcasting Service) (Ministry of Education, Ministry of the Interior, National Communications Commission),

政府採購文件雙語化(工程會、各部會、地方政府)

bilingualizing government procurement documents (Public Construction Commission, ministries and commissions, local governments),

鼓勵促參案件雙語化(財政部)

encouraging bilingualization of PPIP cases (Ministry of Finance),

營造友善雙語觀光環境(交通部、內政部、原民會、客委會、農委會、地方政府)

cultivating friendly bilingual tourism environment (Ministry of Transportation and Communications, Ministry of the Interior, Council of Indigenous Peoples, Hakka Affairs Council, Council of Agriculture, local governments),

重大案件與涉在臺外國人或外商之起訴書，提供英文摘要內容；另建議司法院對重大判決摘要英譯(法務部、司法院)

providing English digest of indictments for significant cases and relevant to foreigners or foreign businesses in Taiwan; and also suggesting the Judicial Yuan to provide English digest for significant judgments (Ministry of Justice, Judicial Yuan),

建置科學園區及產業園區雙語友善投資環境(科技部、經濟部、地方政府)
creating bilingual friendly investment environment for science parks and

industrial parks, (Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Economic Affairs, local Technology, Ministry of Economic Affairs, local governments),
強化醫療院所及社福團體英語力(衛福部)
strengthening English proficiency of hospitals and social welfare groups,
提升金融機構從業人員英語力，營造友善雙語金融服務環境(金管會)
elevating English proficiency of financial institution practitioners, cultivating friendly bilingual financial service environment (Financial Supervisory Commission),
鼓勵企業提升英語力(經濟部)
encouraging enterprises to enhance English capabilities (Ministry of Economic Affairs),
提升勞工英語力(勞動部)
elevating English proficiency of labor force (Ministry of Labor),
提升農漁業產銷雙語力(農委會)
elevating bilingual production and marketing capabilities of agricultural & fishery sectors (Council of Agriculture),
推動青年及文化活動進行雙語交流(外交部、教育部)
promoting bilingual youth and cultural exchange activities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Education),
協調跨軍種雙語教育政策，提升國軍人員軍事英語能力(國防部)
coordinating cross military bilingual education policies, elevating English proficiency of the nations military force (Ministry of National Defense),
提高新進涉外事務人員相關特考(如外領、商務)之英文科目比重(外交部、經濟部)
raising the ratio of English subject in recruitment examinations of foreign affairs related personnel (such as consular and commerce) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs).

(the Executive Yuan 2018, 7-12, 11-21)

The strategies show that the government makes an effort to bilingualize the government-directed activities. It will be discussed in the next section that an emphasis on bilingualism indicates a perceived association between parallel language ideologies and language competence.

The fifth section of the Blueprint illuminates the implementing agencies and budget

allocation in developing Taiwan as a bilingual nation. The Blueprint ends with seven Key

Performance Indicators for 2019. The 7 KPIs are:

建置整合式英語資料庫平臺網站

establishment of an integrated English database platform portal

鬆綁「國民教育法」、「高級中等教育法」及「私立學校法」等及其子法

relaxation of the Primary and Junior High School Act , Senior High School Education Act, Private School Law , and the associated sub laws and regulations

各部會官網全面雙語化比率

the ratio of all bilingual official websites of central government agencies

與外國人相關文書、證照等雙語化比率

the ratio of bilingual documents and credentials relevant to foreigners

公共服務場域第一線服務櫃檯提供雙語諮詢服務比率

the ratio of bilingual consultation service provision at the front line

政府招標文件內重要名詞標準化英譯

standard English translation of important terminologies in government procurement documents of public service venues

與外國人相關法規雙語化比率

the Ratio of bilingual laws and regulations relevant to foreigners

(the Executive Yuan 2018, 13, 23)

The Blueprint defines English in the Taiwanese context by overtly telling speakers how

English competence should be achieved and what English competence can achieve. The

Blueprint can be seen as a stretch of discourse which is both a product of the ideologizing

process and input discourse for further ideologizing process, as shown in the ideologization

web in Figure 13.




Figure 13. The Blueprint in the ideologization web

The next section will discuss the ideologizing process of English in the Blueprint.

5.2.2 Language rationalization behind bilingualization

This section discusses how English abilities are described, and how bi-/multilingualism are conceptualized in the Blueprint and how these acts are ideological. As an official document, the Blueprint serves as a window to observe how the institute situates English in the Taiwanese context and how in return Taiwan is situated in this social world where English is described to have its currency. The contextualization refers to defining the use of English by relating it to the social contexts where it occurs, including the ways how English is describe, how other languages are made absent, and how individuals are required to change

their linguistic behaviors in the Blueprint. The following subsections present four major themes of English-related rationalization, including the analogy of English competence as power, the analogy of a trend under globalization to a global trend, parallel language ideology in multilingualism and the ideology of homogenization at the national level behind multilingualism.

5.2.2.1 *The analogy of English to power*

The ability to speak English is discursively related to power 力 *li* ‘power’ in the Blueprint. Instead of using 英語能力 *yingyu nengli*, which refers to English competence, the Blueprint phrases English competence as 英語力 *yingyu li*. The phrase materializes English competence from an abstract, non-concrete proficiency to physical power. The discursive strategy to objectify abstract entities is also seen in 競爭力 *jingzheng li* and 軟實力 *ruan shili*. English proficiency is mostly related to competitiveness, which is phrased as *jingzheng li*. *Jingzheng li* is composed of two lexical elements, 競爭 *jingzhen* ‘competition’ and 力 *li* ‘power.’ *Jingzheng li* therefore is understood as the ability to compete. In the Foreword alone, the first section of the Blueprint, the concept that English ability leads to competitiveness is mentioned five times. The use of *li* to describe English competence is also seen in the phrase 軟實力 *ruan shili* ‘soft power.’ The phrase *ruan shili* is mentioned three times in the Blueprint. An example is shown in Excerpt (40) below.

(40) 為於此基礎上，進一步提升國人運用英語的軟實力

(the Executive Yuan 2018, 1)

(“Building upon these foundations, the next step is to improve the soft power of our people’s English proficiency.”)

(the Executive Yuan 2018, 1)

The analogy of language competence to strength reveals an overall positive image of English that the top-down perspective projects. In a word, it remains unknown whether mentioning the three types of *li* is a deliberate discursive strategy. Nonetheless, the three types of *li* do invite readers to link all three *yingyu li*, *ruan shili* and *jingzheng li* together. The ability to compete in a non-physical sense pictures the existence of the labor market where possessing English makes a person more powerful, desired and well-prepared. This is also evidenced in the promotion rationales. The 4th rationale “打造年輕世代的人才競逐優勢” *dazao nianqing shidai de rencai jingzhu youshi* “forging competitive advantage for young talents” specifies that Singapore, India and Romania attract international conglomerates because of their excellence in English. The attachment of English competence to power can be taken as price-tagging in labor market (Bourdieu 1977; 1986; 1991).

5.2.2.2 *The analogy of a trend under globalization to a global trend*

A noticeable observation lies in how English, the sense of globalness and power are discursively linked together in the Blueprint. The Foreword states clearly that the bilingual nation policy is motivated by the trend of globalization. The globalness of English does not merely refer to the observation that English is recognized as *the* global language. Also, the

conceptualization that English represents global competitiveness is described to be universal across the globe, as Excerpt (41) shows below.

(41) 「英語力」已是敲開全球化大門的必備關鍵能力，如何提升國民英語力以增加國際競爭力，已成為非英語系國家共同的重要課題，臺灣自然無法置身事外。

(the Executive Yuan 2018, 1)

(“Therefore, how to raise citizens’ English ability to a more internationally competitive level has become a vital issue common to all non-English speaking countries. Taiwan certainly cannot except itself from this.”)

(the Executive Yuan 2018, 1)

The ideology of ‘globalness’ of English is manifested in the explicit metadiscourse that the spread of English is universally valued. This naturalized connection between a social practice and globalization corresponds to what Fairclough (1992a; 2006) calls ‘globalist discourse.’ This analogy probably also accounts for the phenomenon that though globalization is perceived to be a form of hegemony, entering global markets and joining global competition are still reckoned to be desired and even obligatory. It will be discussed in Section 5.3 that a globalist discourse rationalizes English necessitation.

5.2.2.3 *Parallel language ideology in bilingualization*

The Blueprint emphasizes 雙語化 *shuangyu hua* ‘bilingualization,’ particularly evident in the 8 common strategies and 16 individual strategies. The term 雙語化 *shuangyu hua* is mentioned in six common strategies and three individual strategies. The term 雙語 *shuangyu* occurs in one comment strategy and seven individual strategies. The Blueprint also

notes in the third rationale that the bilingual language policy is promoted along with local languages (The Executive Yuan 2018, 3). Therefore, the Blueprint promotes two strands of parallel linguistic practices, between the default common language and English, and between official languages and indigenous languages. The bilingualization of Mandarin Chinese and English and the promotion of English and native languages manifest parallel language ideology. It refers to the rationalization that multiple languages are given equal prominence and recognition by strategically making these languages simultaneously available. Nevertheless, the parallel language use is more of a language ideology than linguistic practice. Hultgren (2016) discusses the parallel language use in Nordic policy discourse and states that parallellingualism (158) is an underspecified notion. A consequence of underspecification is treating two languages as equally mandated. The underspecification, as will be shown later, causes the bilingualization between Mandarin Chinese and English to be perceived as mandated proficiency in both languages across domains. This contradicts with the Blueprint's emphasis of exploiting the instrumental functions of English. Simply put, on the one hand, the metaphorical extension of English as power distinguishes English from other languages in Taiwan. On the other hand, bilingualism or parallellingualism seems to advocate mastery in both languages. The interpretations expectedly lead to further reflections. It will be discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 that mandatory competence across domains is reflected on.

5.2.2.3 *The ideology of homogenization*

Cooper's (1989) famous quote on language planning "who plans what for whom and how?" (31) shows that language planning and policy is an attempt, though not necessarily successful (Spolsky 2004), at changing the current language use of a given social unity. The second rationale to reduce urban-rural divide with digital technology accentuates how the lack of English is considered disadvantageous, problematic and necessary to fix. It presupposes that English is an unevenly distributed resource and that children can 享受 *xiangshou* "enjoy" (3) this resource with the help of digital technology. Besides, the rationale also entails a mandated universality of English learning intra-nationally. On the one hand, as discussed previously, learning English is described to be a universal trend. On the other hand, it is not equally available to every individual. If English is connected to globalization, proficient English speakers are probably left unaffected. Those who are considered disprivileged without English competence are influenced the most. This rationalization embodies what Hobsbawm (2007) states, "the impact of this globalization is felt the most by those who benefit from it least" (4). A tension emerges in how rationalizations of English and its resource are believed to spread.

The section looks into rationalizations of English in the Blueprint, which represents a top-down perspective of profiling English in Taiwan. English ability is assimilated to *li* 'power' in the globalized labor market. English becomes an asset in free-trade market,

strongly sought, not equally accessible to everyone, and required to make available from a top-down execution. Several ideological contestations deserve the attention. An emphasis on the instrumental value of English “decouple language from identity” (Duchêne & Heller 2012, 13). The entirely instrumental function also shows that English still serves distinct functions from other languages in Taiwan. Yet, bilingualism could also be interpreted as mastery and obligation to use both languages across social contexts. The meaning-making of globalness leads to the conceptualization that English is similarly desired and learned in *every* non-English speaking country. However, the perceived universality both within and across nations collides with it being a form of capital which not everyone gets to deploy (Bourdieu 1977; 1986; 1991). Its function to mark social distinction and to make an individual more privileged in the labor market seems to contradict with the government’s effort to boost societal competence in English. These contradictions all feed on further discussions, as will be presented in the next two sections.

5.3 Discourse of YouTubers’ Vlogs: Discourse of Self-media


An analysis of vlog discourse situates the study with the strand of discourse analysis in social media. As far as media language is concerned, newly-rising YouTube discourse poses an empirical niche. As far as language planning and policy is concerned, YouTubers are both passive because they are affected by language implementation and active because they

potentially influence the audience's attitudes toward language implementation. YouTubers' discourse probably best illustrates the idea that language policies concerns multilayered discourse (Baldauf 2006; Wodak 2006; Johnson 2013; Lawton 2016) in addition to the dichotomous top-down and bottom-up distinction (cf. Kaplan & Baldauf 1997) as Sections 5.1 and 5.2 have presented. YouTubers' discourse explicates a market-oriented perspective of language use because they benefit from the new form of knowledge economy by making information available through discourse (Heller 2010a).

As a new occupation, YouTubers illustrate the commodifying process of language because "the circulation of goods that used to depend (mainly or exclusively) on the deployment of other kinds of resources now depends on the deployment of linguistic resources" (Heller 2010a, 102). The discourse in the two vlogs respectively by RD and SS77 is analyzed because of the following empirical concerns. First, as previously mentioned in Method, they are among the most viewed clips on the bilingual nation policy. Besides, the two vlogs are respectively monologic and dialogic. Analyzing the discourse in both the vlogs reduces possible biased findings caused by the vlogs being monologic or dialogic (cf. Frobenius 2011; 2014). Most importantly, RD's and SS77's perspectives differ. Running an English learning channel, RD speaks for those who 'get' what English learning is about. He is also seen as an individual who benefits tremendously from possessing this linguistic capital (Bourdieu 1986; 1991). SS77, a civic commenter, takes a more reserved stance. Although the

study makes no attempt to evaluate the Blueprint, how the vlogs transmit related information and how their rationalizations influence their stancetaking is worth the attention. The section starts with discussing how English is ‘profiled’ in discourse about other countries and about Taiwan in Section 5.3.1. Put differently, the competence of citizens’ English proficiency becomes a feature of a nation with which people talk about a country. The observation shows a different discursive representation that English is considered globally dominant. This study then addresses how vlogs construct English learning experience as ingroup knowledge in Section 5.3.2.

5.3.1 ‘Profiling’ English



The entrenched association between English and globalization contributes to making English a ‘profile’ feature to characterize a country. To be specific, individuals get to know a country and its people not merely in terms of population, history and geography, but also with regard to how its people speak English. Such discourse embodies the hegemony of English because English is taken as a language supposedly spoken by all corners of the world.

The long-held belief that English is globally dominant can be manifested in explicit metadiscourse regarding how English is associated with national competitiveness, development, and its people’s proficiency. This established language ideology is seen in

SS77's own perspective on official bilingualism¹⁴, as shown in (42), and in his description that Japanese speak better English, as presented in (43).

(42) SS77's vlog, from 00:05:20 to 00:05:28.

- 136 SS77 我個人是覺得
(‘Personally,’)
- 137 就台灣是個「海島國家」
(‘judging from the fact that Taiwan is an island’)
- 138 很依賴「世界貿易」
(‘that relies heavily on world trade’)
- 139 還有希望跟更多國家做交流的觀點來看
(‘and that yearns for more frequent contact with more countries,’)
- 140 雙語國家這個政策方向感覺是還滿不錯的！
(‘the bilingual nation policy sounds quite great.’)
- 141 只是我也滿懷疑最後執行下來
(‘Though I also doubt’)
- 142 到底能不能達成這個政策的初衷
(‘whether the policy can achieve what it has originally intended to do.’)

(43) RD's vlog, from 00:05:45 to 00:05:58.

- 246 SS77 但其實 (.) 實際上去日本玩就會發現
(‘But actually [when you] travel in Japan, [you] will know’)
- 247 他們年輕人英文超級好的
(‘that young people speak great English.’)
- 248 RD 恩恩
(‘Hmm.’)
- 249 SS77 我覺得這跟 (.) 國際化其實是有點關係
(‘I think this has something to do with internationalization.’)
- 250 他們生活中有非常多的外來的旅客
(‘They have a lot of foreign tourists.’)
- 251 RD 對 (.) 對
(‘Right. Exactly.’)
- 252 SS77 然後你走在路上你就是會被問

¹⁴ The study distinguishes between societal multilingualism and official bi/multilingualism. As Taiwan is essentially multilingual, the terms bilingualism and multilingualism itself is underspecified and confusing. Therefore, societal bi/multilingualism is used to refer to the current state of language use in Taiwan whereas official bilingualism refers to the debate about English in language planning.

(‘And you come across [foreigners] asking you [for information/directions].’)

253 RD 恩

(‘Hmm.’)

254 SS77 然後你英文就開始變好

(‘And your English starts to improve.’)

SS77 states in (42) that Taiwan’s reliance on international trade makes official bilingualism look 還滿不錯的 *hai man bucuo de* ‘quite great’. By saying so, he chains international trade and cross-border contact with the use of English. SS77 also reveals in RD’s vlog, shown in (43), that young people in Japan speak better English. He attributes their great English to 跟國際化其實是有點關係 *gen guoji hua qishi youdian guanxi* ‘have something to do with internationalization’ (line 249). SS77 reasons that Japanese come across foreign visitors frequently and that frequent encounters with foreigners motivate Japanese to speak better English (lines 250-254). It remains unknown whether Japanese do frequently come across foreigners on street. The three events, namely, internationalization (line 249), running into foreign visitors (line 250), and speaking better English (line 254), are phrased as sequential, particularly with the use of 然後 *ranhou* ‘then’ in lines 252 and 254 (C.-c. Wang & Huang 2006). This association also presupposes that foreigners can speak English. The presupposition reveals how the notions of ‘foreignness,’ ‘internationalization,’ and ‘speaking English’ are bundled together (see the related discussion about ‘foreign’ labels and linguistic performance in Lee and Su (2019)). Encounters with foreign visitors asking for information are phrased as a motive that urges Japanese to improve their English. J.S.-Y. Park (2009) has

discussed the similar scenarios in South Korea where South Korean are required to obtain English just in case they run into a foreigner. This ‘obligation’ to speak English to foreigners, rather than foreign visitors speaking local languages, reveals the anxiety which non-native English-speaking countries face. Blommaert et al. (2005) have suggested that space can work as an agent that determines regimes of language use and competence. Studies have also shown that various sociopragmatic concerns determine language choices (Rampton 1995; Eckert 2000; Myers-Scotton & Bolonyai 2001). The overgeneralization of feeling obligated to speak English in a non-Anglophone country accentuates how dominant English is in crosslinguistic interaction.

The perceived global status of English is also observed in how different countries are understood and described in relation to the spread of English. Such discourse suggests that English can be used as a reference to say *something* about a country. Regardless of the different status individual countries give to English, the act that one can always understand a country concerning the spread of English presupposes that the dominance of English reaches everywhere. SS77’s examples of Nordic countries, Ghana and Singapore, are presented in (44) and (45).

(44) SS77’s vlog, from 00:03:36 to 00:03:44.

- 94 SS77 好比說是瑞典啊 (.) 丹麥這些北歐國家
 (‘Take Nordic countries like Sweden and Denmark for example.’)
- 95 英文也都不是他們的官方語言
 (‘English is not their official language.’)

- 96 但他們的人民也能具備不錯的英語能力
(‘but their people also have fairly good command of English.’)
- 97 而且 (.) 國家競爭力也都還滿強的
(‘And these countries are also globally competitive.’)

(45) SS77’s vlog, from 00:05:47 to 00:06:15

- 150 SS77 像是迦納這個西非國家
(‘Like Ghana, this West African country’)
- 151 因為之前曾被英國殖民
(‘was previously colonized by the British,’)
- 152 所以獨立後也一直以英語作為官方語言
(‘so English has served as the official language after Ghana’s independence.’)
- 153 即使它在西非算是發展相當不錯的國家
(‘Even though the country develops fairly well in Western Africa,’)
- 154 但是在這種語言政策的數十年影響下來
(‘under the influence of such a language policy for decades,’)
- 155 國內許多人民也都變得不太會使用自己原有的語言
(‘their people become less proficient in their native languages.’)
- 156 這也使得迦納政府在幾年前曾提出一條政策
(‘This caused the government of Ghana to propose a policy a few years ago,’)
- 157 規定公立的中小學教育不再使用英語授課
(‘and to stop primary and secondary public schools from lecturing in English.’)
- 158 目的似乎就是要保存自身的語言文化
(‘The policy seems to aim to preserve their languages and cultures’)
- 159 對抗殘留許久的殖民化陰影
(‘and to fight against the colonization legacy.’)

The two excerpts from SS77 regard how people in these countries speak good English, a scenario Taiwan has long sought to achieve. Nordic countries in Excerpt (44) serve as an example of how their people speak great English and enjoy national competitiveness without legitimizing English. It needs to be pointed out that the understanding however remains stereotypical. Phillipson (2001) reflects on the laissez-faire attitudes toward English in

Denmark and calls for an imperialistic awareness of English. The laissez-faire perspective values the harmonious, idealized function division between English and one's native languages. It neglects the potentially threatening influence English should have to indigenous languages. Bolton and Kuteeva (2012) investigate how using English as a medium of instruction in Swedish tertiary education is pragmatic on the one hand but threatening on the other. These countries also face their own issues with regards to language policies about English. Ghana, as seen in (45), is described to be caught in possible native language demise as a consequence of the British colonization. The country's current development is related to its English language policy (lines 153 to 155). Ghana is introduced as an example of linguicism (Phillipson 1992), i.e. the impact of English on the vitality of local languages, because SS77 concerns that English officialization could potentially overshadow other local languages in Taiwan. These excerpts show how metadiscourse about English is discursively connected to evaluation on national development to characterize a country.

Mentioning Asian countries such as Singapore, Japan and South Korea in the vlog discourse is particularly noteworthy. Asian countries share the similarities of being geographically distant to Anglophone countries, excluded from Inner-circle norms, and striving to keep up with the global trend. With this impression and under such pressure, Taiwan has depicted Singapore as an ideal linguistic and economic example, as seen in the

survey comments, the Blueprint¹⁵ and the two vlogs. SS77 and RD relate English officialization to Singapore's official multilingualism and discuss the plausibility of following Singapore in becoming a bilingual nation. Excerpt (46) reports a preference for Taiwan to become a bilingual nation after Singapore whereas (47) recognizes Singapore's official multilingualism as an impractical goal for Taiwan. Regardless of the distinctive opinions, the excerpts both manifest the ideological link between describing Singapore's multilingualism, their success in English implementation, and its national competitiveness.

(46) SS77's vlog, from 00:02:25 to 00:02:37.

- 62 SS77 台灣教師聯盟理事長蕭曉玲也提到
(‘The chairperson of Taiwan Teachers’ Union, Hsiao, also notes that’)
63 新加坡自從把英文訂為官方語言之後
(‘since Singapore made English the official language,’)
64 就讓國家變成東南亞經貿中心
(‘this has turned the country into a Southeast Asian economic and
trade center.’)
65 所以同樣身為小國的台灣
(‘Taiwan, which is also a small country,’)
66 也應該要效法新加坡的做法才對
(‘should follow Singapore’s lead.’)

(47) SS77's vlog, from 00:04:56 to 00:05:13.

- 127 RD 所以我覺得它在歷史上面 (.) 文化上面 (.) 社會上面
(‘I think that historically, culturally and socially, [Singapore]’)
128 都是有它的獨特性

¹⁵ Singapore is mentioned in the fourth rationale of the Blueprint. It notes,
放眼國際，新加坡及印度，甚至羅馬尼亞，皆由於當地人民具有良好英文能力，因而爭
取到許多跨國企業進駐，提供當地人民許多優質工作機會。

(the Executive Yuan 2018, 3)

Looking around the world, we can see the examples of Singapore and India, or even Romania, where because of the local population's good English ability, they are able to lure in many multinational corporations, which provide local people with many quality job opportunities.

(the Executive Yuan 2018, 6)

- (‘has its uniqueness.’)
- 129 才能夠造就它現在的雙語教育的
(‘so that Singapore has made its bilingual education the way it is right now.’)
- 130 因此 (.) 如果說我們台灣要仿造 (.) 或者是效仿新加坡
(‘Therefore, if Taiwan wants to imitate or copy Singapore’)
- 131 來去實施它所實施的雙語教育
(‘to implement the bilingual education that Singapore does,’)
- 132 我覺得是 (.) 比較 (.) 不切實際一點
(‘I think it is a bit impractical.’)

In Excerpt (46), SS77 reports how the chairperson of Taiwan Teachers’ Union urges Taiwan to learn from Singapore (lines 65-66). The sentence that Singapore’s English policy 就讓國家變成東南亞經貿中心 *jiu rang guojia biancheng dongnanya jingmao zhongxi* ‘has turned the country into a Southeast Asian economic and trade center’ (line 64) centralizes the role which English officialization plays in Singapore’s economic development. Though the excerpt is a reported quote, SS77 does not deliberately reflect on this rationalization. He could be possibly reporting this piece of information without making commitment to it or not finding this rationalization particularly worth commenting on. This implicates that the rationalization between English competence and competitiveness is established. In Excerpt (47), RD believes that the uniqueness of Singaporean history, cultures and society makes it 不切實際 *bu qie shiji* ‘impractical’ for Taiwan to imitate Singapore. Despite RD’s negative opinion, Singapore is idealized as a successful country because of its English implementation policy. These excerpts show how English becomes a profile feature in determining the prosperity of a country.

If Singapore is recognized as an ideal example, Japan and South Korea are probably understood as companions and competitors with Taiwan in terms of English proficiency. This is observed in how the three countries are compared. An example of comparing Taiwan with Japan and South Korea is shown below in (48). RD and SS77 are reflecting disapprovingly on how the news media claim that Taiwan is running ahead of Japan and South Korea with the new English language policy (lines 239-242).

(48) RD's vlog, from 00:05:22 to 00:05:42.

- 231 RD 而且 (.) 我還看到另外一個是
(‘I also saw another piece of’)
- 232 新聞裡面 (.) 他們是說
(‘news. It is said that’)
- 233 我們這樣子的政策已經超越了鄰近的其他
(‘our policies have surpassed the other neighboring’)
- 234 SS77 恩
(‘Hmm.’)
- 235 RD 亞洲的國家 (.) 像比如說日本 (.) 韓國
(‘Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea.’)
- 236 他們都沒有規定說這麼早
(‘They didn’t stipulate such an early exposure’)
- 237 就要開始學英文
(‘to English.’)
- 238 SS77 恩
(‘Hmm.’)
- 239 RD 語意就是說我們做了這個政策之後
(‘This somehow suggests that after we enact this policy’)
- 240 我們之後的英文會超越韓國跟日本
(‘our English will surpass Korean and Japanese.’)
- 241 SS77 對對對 (.) 他想呈現這樣
(‘Exactly. This is what the news intended to mean.’)
- 242 可是我覺得這個可能就真的就是盲點
(‘But I think this could really be a blind spot.’)

The comparison of Taiwan to Japan and South Korea is far from a coincidence. All these three are neighboring Expanding-Circle countries in Asia (Kachru 1985), struggling to perform well in international standardized English proficiency examinations, and known internationally to value diplomas in instrumental sense. These imply the anxiety and eagerness to perform better English which Taiwan believes to share among the three countries. Lagging behind the other two countries is undesired. People in these countries are ‘profiled’ in media to speak humble English.

The essentialized mapping between a country and English proficiency of its people is shaped by the established language ideology that English is globally dominant. The information of English competence functions similarly to a piece of information on a nation’s profile. However, to talk about the spread of English at national level overgeneralizes intra-national heterogeneity (Jenkins 2009; J.S.-Y. Park & Wee 2009) and reinforces the political history with the spread of English (Bruthiaux 2003). The discourse also reveals how crucial essentialism still seems under this broader social context that is characterized with constant mobility and transformation.

5.3.2 ‘Profiling’ English in Taiwan

The previous excerpts have shown that English proficiency can characterize a country. The survey comments and the Blueprint in the previous section have presented that

Taiwanese frequently self-report to be struggling with English. Crosslinguistic conversational joking in Chapter 4 also discusses how incorrect English relies on the unspoken but shared background knowledge about English necessitation to generate humorous effects. These two rationalizations are also found in the two vlogs. Taiwanese are characterized to speak humble English and to share a struggle in learning English at school.

SS77 reports four distinctive ideological stances about the Blueprint that he claims netizens to take. These ideological stances all derive from the established language ideology that English poses barriers to Taiwanese. The ideological stances diverge in whether this barrier could be lifted with such a language policy, as presented in (49) below.

- (49) SS77's vlog, from 00:02:37 to 00:03:44.
- 67 SS77 而我看網路上也有不少鄉民覺得
(‘And I learn that quite some netizens think that’)
- 68 這個政策 (.) 方向正確
(‘this policy is heading in the right direction.’)
- 69 例如他們認為這可以降低台灣人出國工作或是做國際交流時
(‘For example, they think that when Taiwanese work overseas or
conduct international business,’)
- 70 遇到的語言障礙
(‘language barriers encountered could be dealt with.’)
- 71 讓台灣人真正走向全世界
(‘This allows Taiwanese to truly go global.’)
- 72 但也有人認為這項政策太過異想天開了
(‘However, others think this policy is too whimsical,’)
- 73 因為政府只打算用 12 年的時間
(‘because, within only 12 years, the government intends to’)
- 74 就讓台灣變成雙語國家
(‘make Taiwan a bilingual nation.’)
- 75 但是我們的教師大多都沒有受過英語教學訓練

(‘But most of our teachers are not trained to lecture in English’)
76 而且 (.) 全英語師培也沒有辦法速成啊
(‘And it takes time to complete the EMI training.’)
77 又或者是 (.) 未來的師資數量
(‘Or maybe, in the future, the number of teachers’)
78 如果只能提供一部分的學校
(‘is only available for part of schools [around Taiwan].’)
79 做全英語授課的時候
(‘When English is promoted as a medium of instruction,’)
80 想必是大城市的學校優先
(‘presumably schools in big cities have the privilege.’)
81 但這樣一來就會更加加劇城鄉之間的落差
(‘Yet, this will further exacerbate the gap between urban and rural
areas.’)
82 另外
(‘In addition,’)
83 也有人指出這個政策看起來非常沒有必要
(‘Still some point out that this policy seems totally unnecessary.’)
84 如果只是想要提升人民的英語能力
(‘If [the government] just wants to improve the citizens’ English,’)
85 那改善英語教學方法才是重點
(‘the point is how to make our English education better.’)
... (54 words) ...
91 另外 (.) 也有人認為
(‘Furthermore, still others think that’)
92 就算是要提升競爭力
(‘even if [the government] wants to boost competitiveness,’)
93 這可能也跟雙語國家政策之間沒有一個必然的關係
(‘this may not serve as a sufficient condition to promote official
bilingualism.’)
94 好比說是瑞典啊 (.) 丹麥這些北歐國家
(‘Take Nordic countries like Sweden and Denmark for example.’)
95 英文也都不是他們的官方語言
(‘English is not their official language,’)
96 但他們的人民也能具備不錯的英語能力
(‘but their people have fairly great command of English.’)
97 而且 (.) 國家競爭力也都還滿強的
(‘And these nations are also very competitive globally.’)

The first ideological stance (lines 68-71) sanctions the efforts to legitimize English. The stance presupposes that there exists a language barrier difficult for Taiwanese to overcome. Netizens who find official bilingualism to be an appropriate policy believe that the 語言障礙 *yuyan zhangai* ‘the language barriers’ could be dealt with. Moreover, the use of a generic noun 語言障礙 *yuyan zhangai* ‘language barrier,’ rather than the specific 英語障礙 *yingyu zhangai* ‘English barrier’ neutralizes the role English plays and phrases the sentence as factual and needless to be further specified. This could be attributed to how normalized the belief is. A less positive ideological stance describes officializing English as 異想天開 *yixiangtiankai* ‘whimsical’ (lines 72-81). The ideological stance, similar to “We won’t become better English speakers because of the policy” in the survey comments in Section 5.1, reflects on the downside of adopting English as a medium of instruction. It argues that most teachers are not trained to lecture in English (lines 75 to 76). The reason also backgrounds the conceptualization that that English is not used pervasively and that it demands extra efforts to speak the language. The uneven distribution of English resources is assumed to 更加加劇城鄉之間的落差 *geng jia jiaju chengxiang zhijian de luocha* ‘exacerbate the gap between urban and rural areas’ (lines 78-81). SS77 expresses a similar concern to Price (2014), who suggests that English education in Taiwan further entrenches the social division. The third ideological stance (lines 82-85) elaborates that the goal to boost English competence is not necessarily achievable through developing Taiwan into a bilingual nation. Having said so,

this ideological stance also affirms the necessity to elevate English competence. The comment about modifying English education (line 85) reports a common distrust about how English education can help equip students with English skills (see Williams (2016) for further discussion). The last ideological stance (lines 91 to 97) explicitly dissociates official bilingualism and national competitiveness, so as to argue against the bilingual nation policy. Nonetheless, dissociating official bilingualism from competitiveness does not dissociate English competence from national competitiveness (lines 95-96). As abovementioned, Nordic countries are portrayed to manage a good command of English without legitimizing the language. Mentioning the Nordic examples invites the interpretation that a nation's competitiveness has something to do with how proficient its people are, not with whether the language is given the official status. These four divergent stances reflect on the established language ideology that Taiwanese are bad speakers of English. This finding is discussed in the survey comments in Section 5.1. It will be discussed in next chapter that this established language ideology is established (and mostly agreed) across contexts.

The other characteristic of English learning in Taiwan concerns unhappy, stressful, and test-oriented learning experience. The experience is narrated as shared and familiar. The sharedness significantly creates an ingroup knowledge through the use of inclusive pronouns and overlapping turns. As also mentioned in crosslinguistic play, the way English is discursively constructed as disowned by Taiwanese creates an ingroup bond. This can be

observed in how SS77 phrases his personal learning experience in the way that the audience has also undergone, as shown in (50).

(50) RD's vlog, from 00:03:23 to 00:03:50.

- 142 SS77 就是觀眾朋友應該也會知道說
(‘Even the audience would probably also see this.’)
- 143 自己最好的 (.) 英文的那個成績的時期
(‘Our English competence peaked when’)
- 144 大概就是高三
(‘[we were] seniors in high school.’)
- 145 RD 對
(‘Exactly.’)
- 146 SS77 一考完試之後就爆掉了 (.) 因為
(‘As soon as we finished the entrance exam, it drastically regressed because’)
- 147 為什麼會這樣就是因為
(‘Why is it the case? Because’)
- 148 我們的生活中你到了大學的時候
(‘when we reach university,’)
- 149 你根本不會用到英文啊
(‘we don’t have the chance to speak English’)
- 150 RD 恩
(‘Hmm.’)
- 151 SS77 那這樣子我們過去累積的這些教育
(‘Then what we have learned in school so far’)
- 152 它其實 (.) 就 (.) 就只是課堂上的一部份
(‘is only part of in-class lecture.’)
- 153 RD 恩 (.) 考試裡面的一部份
(‘Hmm. A part of examination.’)
- 154 SS77 對
(‘Right.’)
- 155 你離開了考試
(‘When you no longer need to take English examinations’,)
- 156 你離開了那個學校空間之後
(‘when you no longer attend English classes,’)
- 157 [它就不存在了]

(‘it vanished.’)

158 RD [就不會用到了]

(‘You are not going to use [the language].’)

SS77 engages the audience with the preface 觀眾朋友應該也會知道說 *guanzhong pengyou yinggai ye hui zhidao shuo* ‘Even the audience would probably also see this’ (line 142). He discursively frames his experience as shared and common. The upscale (Uitermark 2002; Blommaert 2007; 2010) of his personal experience to a shared experience of learning English among viewers characterizes English learning in the Taiwanese context. He emphasizes the drastic, rapid regression of English competence after the college entrance exam (lines 142-144). He reasons that Taiwanese have a slim chance to encounter daily situations where English is required (lines 148-149). The use of 我們 *women* ‘we’ in lines 148 and 151 creates an ingroup bond. As a native speaker of Mandarin Chinese, I have no difficulty interpreting SS77’s utterance. However, when I translate the YouTubers’ discourse, the inconsistent use of pronouns does make translation challenging and jumpy. This further evidences that SS77 describes his own experience as what the audience also acknowledges. Furthermore, RD reiterates SS77’s statement (line 52) in line 53, inferring that they share similar perspectives. The overlapping in lines 157 and 158 and similar propositional contents again imply that they are addressing expected notions. I, who completed my degree in Taiwan, taught English in high school and work as a lecturer now, know that this speaks for a certain population in Taiwan. Through depicting the struggling learning experience as shared, English has the profiling function to characterize English learning in Taiwan.

An analysis of the two YouTubers' vlog discourse shows that English is developing into a profile feature, which shows another dimension to observe the hegemony of English. Figure 14 summarizes the established language ideologies and ideological stances in the YouTubers' discourse. The discourse about how well people of a country speak English embodies the language ideology that English is globally dominant. The vlog discourse describes that Taiwanese are generally profiled to speak humble English and to share stressful learning experience. Though vlogs are viewed as not as institutionalized as traditional news media, the expected editing and post-production could mean that the discourse is a product of collaborative effort. As their channels are designed to attract more viewing, they are still influenced by social constraints. The language ideologies manifested are what Cameron (2003) defines as "social construct" (448) that await viewers to take up and evaluate, as well be discussed in Section 5.4.




Figure 14. The ideologization web of the text of the Blueprint and YouTubers' discourse

5.4 YouTube Comments: Contestation within and across Comments

This section of the study draws from YouTube comments to discuss the ideological contestation which can occur both within and across comments. The comments, retrieved from RD's and SS77's "leave your comment" of their respective vlogs on the Blueprint, are the most updated and thereby the most likely to diverge from previous observations. The section of the analysis extends the distinction between established language ideologies and ideological stances to better account for ideological contestations.

A total number of 1493 comments are qualitatively examined. The 14-month gap between the survey comment and the YouTube comments expects swaying stances and multilayered language ideologies. The diversity allows the study to closely examine the relation between metadiscourse and language ideologies. Past studies take metapragmatics as a means to disclose language attitudes (Kristiansen 2004). A single comment does not necessarily associate to a particular language ideology or a particular stance of the language policy in a downright straightforward way, as evidently shown through the use of hedges, transitions, and complex sentence structures in contestation-oriented discourse. To better present the stance shifts, the sentences in each comment discussed in this section are numbered. The following sections are ordered according to the four established language ideologies identified in Section 5.2.

5.4.1 English represents global competitiveness: Why English? Why go global?

The link between English and global competitiveness is comparatively established and highly conscious. It has also been presented that dissociating national competitiveness from English is a way of contestation to this established language ideology. This section shows two more discursive strategies to question the connection between established language ideologies and ideological stances.

At sentence representation, information backgrounding and foregrounding in lengthier comments reveal swaying stancetaking in one comment. An example is shown in (51) below.

(51)

- 2 我認為這樣的政策立意是好的，
(‘I think that such a policy is good.’)
- 3 多認識一個語言我覺得沒什麼不好，
(‘I don’t find it inappropriate to know one more language.’)
- 4 提升個人競爭力。
(‘[This] enhances personal competitiveness.’)
- 5 像是想找工作，
(‘Take job hunting as an example.’)
- 6 如果第二外語學的不錯就可以嘗試往外找。
(‘If [a person] is good at a second foreign language, [he/she] can go for overseas opportunities.’)
- 7 選擇權變多的感覺。
(‘[They] seem to have more choices.’)
- 8 但是我覺得台灣要走向這步...真的很理想式。
(‘But I think if Taiwan heads to official bilingualism... it’s really ideal.’)
(...4 lines, 45 words...)
- 13 像是為了更好達到要求，
(‘For example, in order to meet the required proficiency level,’)
- 14 不少人選擇補習班加強自己啦，
(‘quite some people choose to attend cram schools.’)
- 15 這樣的政策是不是圖利了英文補習班？

- (‘Does such a policy make a lucrative deal for English institutes?’)
- 16 且加重了個人經濟負擔；
(‘And [going to English institutes] increases personal financial burdens.’)
- 17 或者是父母和新一代受雙語教育的小孩產生了更嚴重的代溝等。
(‘Or parents may suffer from a more entrenched generation gap with their offspring who receive bilingual education.’)
- 18 問題感覺勢必層出不窮。
(‘Countless problems await.’)
- 19 讓人有既期待又害怕受傷害的感覺 XD
(‘I’m looking forward to it but also feel pessimistic.’)
(...8 lines, 68 words...)

Viewer (51) starts with his/her affirmation on the good intention of the policy. Learning English is phrased as 沒什麼不好 *mei sheme buhao* ‘nothing wrong’ and 提升個人競爭力 *tisheng geren jingzhengli* ‘enhancing personal competitiveness.’ The generic noun 一個語言 *yi ge yuyan* ‘one language’ which in fact refers to English neutralizes the bilingual policy. At linguistic representation, a generic sentence typifies the event of language learning and treats all language learning as equally advantageous. The use of transition 但是 *danshi* ‘but’ in line 8 shows that the viewer treats the abovementioned as background knowledge. A dialogic perspective of conjunctions cancels the speakers’ commitments to prior utterances (Martin & White 2005). The conceptualization that language learning is considered an ‘investment’ (De Swaan 2010) leads to several doubts, including whether the policy 圖利了英文補習班 *tuli le yingwen buxiban* ‘makes a lucrative deal for English institutes’ and 加重了個人經濟負擔 *jiazhong le geren jingji fudan* ‘increases personal financial burdens.’ This comment explicates that the viewer sees English learning from a market-oriented perspective (J.S.-Y. Park & Wee 2012).

Those who argue against English officialization may not necessarily hold negative attitudes toward English. The observation has been discussed in the ideological stance ‘English being important doesn’t make it a second official language’ in Section 5.1. Layers of language ideologies are ordered and prioritized, an example shown in (52).

(52)

- 1 我有個可能不太討人喜歡的看法：
(‘I have a less-than-flattering opinion.’)
- 2 英語終究只是一種「通用語」，
(‘English is only a “common language” after all.’)
- 3 拿來給不同語言的使用者間交流用的，
(‘used for communication between users of different languages.’)
- 4 至少在非英語系國家如台灣是這樣。
(‘At least this is the case in non-English speaking countries such as Taiwan.’)
- 5 台灣人確實該認真學英文、加強國際交流的能力沒錯，
(‘It is true that Taiwanese should learn English and strengthen their ability for international contact.’)
- 6 但它對台灣人的意義就應該止於一種用於對外交流的工具而已，
(‘but it should remain a tool for external communication to Taiwanese.’)
- 7 要將英語的地位上升到「國家語言」這個等級上就顯得有點怪怪的了。
(‘To give English the status of “national language” sounds a little weird.’)
- 8 官方語言為英語的國家通常都是實際上平時就有使用英語溝通交流之必要的，
(‘Countries that make English their official language are those that find it necessary to communicate in English.’)
(...2 lines, 59 words...)
- 11 儘管台灣應該加強英語教育，
(‘Although Taiwan should work on English learning.’)
- 12 但是如影片中雙語國家政策這種誤用了「國家語言」之意義的作法實在是個錯誤的方向，
(‘as seen in the video, the bilingual national policy misuses the definition of “national language” and steers this language policy toward wrong directions.’)
- 13 而人民也不該被政策強求或潛移默化而改變語言使用的習慣。

(‘And the people should not be forced to change their linguistic practice.’)

14 (回憶起什麼了嗎？

(‘(Does this ring a bell?’)

The viewer prefaces his/her comment with a disclaimer 可能不太討人喜歡的看法 *keneng bu tai taoren xihuan de kanfa* ‘a less-than-flattering opinion’ The disclaimer tones down the subjective claim (Martin & White 2005), indicating that the viewer is aware of the popular conceptualizations concerning English. English is specified as a 通用語 *tong yong yu* ‘common language,’ merely taken as 一種用於對外交流的工具而已 *yi zhong yongyu duiwai jiaoliu de gongju eryi* ‘a tool for external communication.’ The viewer attends to the instrumental role of English (lines 6 and 7). Interestingly, the term 上升 *shangsheng* ‘rise’ reveals how an official language is conceptualized as an ‘uplift’ of a language’s status. The penultimate sentence (line 13) reflects on the mandated competence, i.e. the established language ideology “an official language is a language for all.” The question 回憶起什麼了嗎？ *huiyi qi shenme le ma* ‘Does this ring a bell?’ (line 14) shows the viewer’s attempt at relating English officialization to the past National Language Movement. As mentioned in the Introduction, the implementation of Chinese and English share the same ground of introducing foreign languages to a population that did not speak the language pervasively at the time of implementation. The experience of undergoing the National Language Movement becomes the background knowledge with which the viewer conceptualizes the bilingual nation policy and evaluates it negative. Multiple language ideologies are manifested in this long excerpt. The comment starts with defining English as a mutual language. It proceeds to

sanction the competitiveness English indexes. Then the viewer disagrees to officialize English because the role English plays does not fit into what an official language is defined as. The comment specifies the discrepancy of pursuing English competence and recognizing a national or official language. The comments ends with the viewer's refutation of mandated English proficiency. The excerpt illustrates how multiple stances are verbalized and turned around.

Another strategy deployed for ideology contestation is direct refutation. The following excerpt (53) is attention-worthy. Though these comments belong to one conversation string, each comment is challenging respective established language ideologies. The excerpt explicates how an established ideology 'chains' comments together.

(53)

- 1 マ 外語科系畢業，
 ('I have a degree in foreign languages.')
- 2 覺得全面實施英語教育不一定能夠提升國家整體競爭力。
 ('I don't think that the implementation of English education
 may improve the overall competitiveness.')
- 3 非常認同義大利人韋佳德說的「越在地，越國際」，
 ('I agree with what the Italian says, "The more local [we are],
 the more international [we become]."')
- 4 看看東亞的鄰國，
 ('Looking at our neighboring countries')
- 5 扶植國家特色產業應該比全面英語教育務實。
 ('cultivating nation-distinctive industries should be more
 practical than emphasizing comprehensive English education.')
- 6 品 認同越在地，越國際
 ('I also think that the more local [we are], the more international
 [we become].')

- 7 我們台灣有很多獨有的特色文化，
 (‘Taiwan has many unique and special cultures,’)
- 8 更不用說正體中文了
 (‘not to mention the traditional Chinese script.’)
- 9 擁有不錯的英文能力當然有助於我們在國際上發聲發展，
 (‘Good English of course helps make us heard internationally.’)
- 10 英文能力應該是一種國際經濟發展的工具而已，
 (‘English should be a tool for international economic development.’)
- 11 要讓我們成為雙語國家勢必會打壓甚至碾碎不少本土的在地文化，
 (‘Turning into a bilingual country will inevitably impact and even oppress many local cultures.’)
- 12 如果這樣反而讓我們失去特色，
 (‘This way we lose our uniqueness.’)
- 13 那我們還能用什麼跟國際介紹台灣？
 (‘Then how can we introduce Taiwan to the world?’)
- 14 Shan 韓國日本英文都普普，
 (‘Korean and Japanese do not speak great English,’)
 照樣有國際競爭力
 (‘but they are still very competitive internationally.’)

The first viewer, ㄇ, claiming to have a degree in foreign languages, believes that English education 不一定 *bu yiding* ‘does not certainly’ lead to national competitiveness boost (line 2). With this adverb, this viewer contests the established language ideology that English represents global competitiveness. The second viewer defines the function of English as instrumental (lines 9-10) and positively evaluates this established language ideology. Moreover, the viewer 品 expresses the concern that official bilingualism threatens local cultures (line 11). The last viewer claims that South Korea and Japan do not speak perfect English, arguing that English and national competitiveness are less relevant. The comment again sees that Taiwan positions itself in competition with South Korea and Japan in the

metadiscourse of English. The three comments share the similar disapproval of the bilingual nation policy, but they hold different opinions about how English relates to global competitiveness.

This section shows how the established language ideology “English represents global competitiveness” can be backgrounded despite different opinions. It is foregrounded when contested or reinforced. The comments also demonstrate that in addition to direct refutation against the ideological link between English and competitiveness, the conceptualization of official languages, including mandated competence and national representativeness, can also contest the established language ideology.

5.4.2 Self-deprecation: Why do we have to speak good English?

The established language ideology that Taiwanese speak poor English is taken to be factual and seldom claimed otherwise. Even when contested, the established language ideology is seldom challenged by the reversed conceptualization that “Taiwanese speak good English.” Instead, the contestation lies chiefly in doubting how the new language policy is going to substantially help Taiwanese learn English better and how Taiwanese do not need to speak good English. The following three excerpts outline three types of discourse found in YouTube comments.

The first type of discourse concerns how officializing English or bilingualizing is

associated with Taiwanese' current English proficiency level. An example in (54) starts with the viewer's argument that bilingualization should wait because of the limited number of proficient speakers.

(54)

- 2 黃 我覺得要先提升英語能力，
 ('I think, foremost, we must improve our English ability.')
- 3 雙語國家應要等到全國有一定比例的國民英文具備一
 定的水準再談。
 ('Implementing the bilingual nation policy should wait
 until a certain percentage of the population has fairly good
 command of English.')
- 4 因為在英文能力不足的情形下，
 ('In the case of insufficient English proficiency,')
- 5 用英文授課的學科，
 ('[students who study] subjects taught in English')
- 6 學習效率也會不好。
 ('suffer from low efficiency.')
- 7 Richard 那個....
 ('Well,')
- 8 不就是因為英語能力欠佳才要推動雙語國家嗎？
 ('isn't it the case that our poor English urges us to
 promote the bilingual nation policy?')
- 9 如果人民的英語能力不錯政府還需要特別推動雙語嗎？
 ('If the people speak good English, does the government
 need to promote bilingualism?')

The viewer 黃 believes that developing Taiwan into a bilingual nation should wait until English is used by a larger population than it currently is. The comment suggests that the use of English remains restricted. The second viewer, Richard, starts the comment with 那個 *nage* 'that'. The distal demonstrative acts as a discourse marker to indicate and also to mitigate the viewer's following face-threatening disagreement (Y. Wang 2011). S/he argues that

不就是因為英語能力欠佳 ‘isn’t it the case that our poor English [urges us to promote the bilingual nation policy]?’ Both the viewers are reflecting on the established language ideology that Taiwanese speak bad English. Yet, the second viewer seems relatively positive about English officialization. The excerpt explicates that identical language ideologies could lead to divergent opinions and evaluations, as discussed in the analysis of the survey comments. A broader, more socially significant issue is why the talk centers on the necessity to speak English and what English competence and the lack it respectively index. When the two viewers state the necessity to boost English competence, it can be inferred that lacking English competence is considered equivalent to lacking something more than merely the linguistic competence.

The second type of discourse concerns self-report about Taiwanese’s poor English. The self-deprecation is manifested in discourse about how other places, Hong Kong and Singapore to be specific, make comparatively more effort than Taiwan does in implementing English. An excerpt shown in (55) discusses the multilingualism in Hong Kong.

(55)

- | | | |
|----|-------------|---|
| 9 | Hugo | 香港算是一個三語的地區嗎
(‘Can Hong Kong be characterized as trilingual,’) |
| 10 | | 普通話廣東話英文
(‘Putonghua, Cantonese and English?’)
(...I turn, 30 words...) |
| 13 | Ts
@Hugo | 法律上算，
(‘Legally yes, [Hong King is trilingual.]’) |
| 14 | | 但实际上英语和普通话都难以实现真正通用。 |

- (‘But in fact English and Putonghua are not as prevalent.’)
(...1 turn, 6 words...)
- 16 vault 我本人粵英國都流利,
@Hugo (‘I am fluent in Cantonese, English and *Guoyu*.’)
- 17 但實際上大部分香港人的第二跟第三語言都沒有到流利的程度,
(‘But in fact most Hong Kong people are not fluent in the second and third languages.’)
- 18 要看教育程度和本人有多常使用第二第三語言.
(‘It depends on how educated and how often the person uses the second and third languages.’)
- 19 台灣要學的話其實學香港比較學新加坡要好.
(‘If Taiwan is thinking about bilingualization, it is better learn from Hong Kong than from Singapore.’)
- 20 特別是要顧及台語的情況下,
(‘especially when Taiwanese needs to be taken into consideration.’)
- 21 變成台國英三語的話真的不太能跟新加坡那套.
(‘To aim at trilingual, Taiwan could not follow Singapore.’)
(...1 turn, 27 words...)
- 24 Richard 我在香港讀大學,
@vault (‘I study in Hong Kong.’)
- 25 我認為儘管香港人不在日常生活中使用英語,
(‘Although Hong Kongers don’t use English in their daily lives.’)
- 26 但是至少在課堂上,
(‘at least in class’)
- 27 香港的大學生英語還是不錯啊,
(‘undergraduates in Hong Kong have great command of English.’)
- 28 香港最普通的學生的英語程度在台灣的標準來看雖不是頂尖,
(‘Although the proficiency level of an average Hong Kong student may not seem that impressive.’)
- 29 但也絕對可以當上每個班的前兩名了吧
(‘he or she is definitely the top two in class [with Taiwan’s standard].’)

- 30 vault 你也應該知道香港的大學有多難考吧,
@Richard ('You should know how difficult it is to get admitted to
universities in Hong Kong.')
- 31 我那年只有成績前百分之十八的才進的了大學,
(‘Only the top 18% of the students could enter universities
in my year.’)
- 32 用香港大學生跟台灣大學生比對台灣大學生不公平啊
(‘It is unfair to compare undergraduates in Hong Kong with
those in Taiwan.’)
- 33 而且別忘了香港的大學基本上是全英文教學。
(‘Don’t forget that Hong Kong uses English as a medium
of instruction in universities.’)

The conversation starts with the question whether Hong Kong is trilingual. Interestingly, Taiwanese’s proficiency is constantly compared to Hong Kong undergraduates throughout this conversation string. The third viewer, vault, replies that Hong Kong serves as a more ideal example than Singapore for Taiwan to learn from (lines 19-21). It can be inferred again that Taiwan views Hong Kong and Singapore as desired role models in language planning. A viewer, Richard, who claims to complete the Bachelor degree in Hong Kong, states that undergraduates in Hong Kong speak relatively good English. The comment that average students outperform outstanding Taiwanese students in English proficiency (lines 28-29) deprecates Taiwanese students’ proficiency. The viewer vault34overseer describes the comparison between Hong Kong and Taiwan 不公平 *bu gongping* ‘unfair’ (line 31). The evaluation concerning fairness is particularly intriguing. Fairness could be understood in two senses. It could mean that English comprehension is an obligation with a specified threshold. The unfairness lies in the perceived requirement to ask Taiwanese to perform equally well as

Hong Kong undergraduates do. Myers-Scotton (1998) proposes that language choice is a consequence of negotiating between rights and obligations. The fairness shows that language as a necessity and as a resource are the two sides of the same coin. Though the entire conversation does not explicitly verbalize Taiwanese's humble English, the comparison reveals how the established ideology serves as a piece of background knowledge to sustain this conversation.

The last type of discourse is a rare case where the self-deprecation is explicitly denied and English proficiency of Taiwan is affirmed. Taiwanese possess the English proficiency that can be described as 堪用 *kang yong* 'getting by.'

(56)

- 2 加 自從普通話成為台灣官用語之後，
(‘Since Putonghua became the official language of Taiwan,’)
- 3 我們就可以觀察到閩南語及客語的衰敗甚至 90 後都有以使用這些語言是一種難登大雅之堂的態度，
(‘we can observe the decline of and even negative attitudes towards Southern Min and Hakka by younger speakers,’)
(...57 words...)
- 7 目前的英文教育已經足夠台灣人參與外語約談，
(‘The current English education can equip Taiwanese with English required to participate in foreign contact.’)
- 8 台灣人也能有效的閱聽英文，
(‘Taiwanese can also effectively read and listen to English.’)
- 9 在會話上雖不流利但堪用，
(‘Taiwanese are not fluent in conversation but can get by.’)
- 10 端出這樣的政策只會更突顯這些 4、5 年級當權者的自卑情節嚴重作祟而作出的偃苗胡為之舉。
(‘Presenting such a policy will only highlight the serious inferiority of the middle-aged in authorities.’)

- 11 目前的 8090 後英文能力皆屬優秀¹⁶
(‘Currently, people who were born in the 80s and 90s speak great English.’)
- 12 (甚至日文、韓文能力也有不錯的展現) ，
(‘(They even have great commands in Japanese and Korean.)’)
- 13 是故大肆放大雙語國此舉無異於脫褲放屁。
(‘The bilingual nation policy and its promotion are simply tantamount.’)
- 14 楊 認同
(‘I’m with you.’)
- 15 我 就是自卑作祟
(‘It is purely out of our inferiority,’)
- 16 還有為了去中國化
(‘and the purpose to de-Chinese-ize.’)
- 17 可惜自身血統是無法改變的
(‘Unfortunately you can’t do anything about your ethnics.’)
- 18 自己夠強文化夠強勢根本不用去學人家的語言
(‘If you’re strong enough, you don’t need to learn others’ languages.’)
- 19 是人家來學你的文化和語言
(‘Others will learn yours.’)
- 20 把祖先的臉丟光了
(‘[We are] disgracing our heritage.’)
- 21 台灣政府每天只會喊國際化每件事都做半套
(‘All the government does is promote internationalization and leave things half-done.’)
- (...2 lines, 25 words...)
- 24 erioru 結果反而不去推廣原本就是大多數臺灣居民的母語，
(‘The government ends up not promoting what has been used in Taiwan,’)
- 25 而且廣泛分布在南向國家：星、馬、菲跟其他東南亞國家的福建話(閩南語)、客家話、和台灣南島語言。
(‘and what has been used widely in southbound countries. Southern Min, Hakka and Austronesian languages.’)
- 26 然 目前觀望了一圈幾乎都是反對，
(‘I found that opposing stances prevail.’)

¹⁶ The 四五年級 *si wu nianji* refers to people born in the 40s and 50s of the official Republic of China calendar, which are roughly equivalent to Year 1951-1970 in the Gregorian calendar.

- 27 蠻欣慰，
(‘This is relieving.’)
- 28 因為家人全部都覺得雙語很棒棒，
(‘Because all my family members think that bilingual is great.’)
- 29 然而他們本身的英文卻都不好.....
(‘But their own English is not good.’)

The viewer 加 lists two scenarios. S/he first labels Mandarin Chinese as 普通話 *Putonghua* and specifies it as a foreign language that negatively influences Taiwanese, Hakka, and people’s attitudes toward these two languages (lines 2 to 3). 加 affirms that currently the English proficiency level for Taiwanese can 堪用 ‘get by.’ The evaluation makes this conversation stand out among deprecation-oriented comments. Having English as Taiwan’s official language is labeled to be out of 自卑感 *zibei gan* ‘a sense of inferiority’ (line 10), indicating that a national language probably indexes identity and a sense of autonomy. The use of *zibei gan* directs the discussion to the potential threat of English to local languages and identity. This viewer is taking an imperialistic view (Phillipson 1992; 2001) about English. The mentioning of people at different ages, such as 四五年級生 *si wu mianji sheng* ‘people born in 1960s and 70s’ and 8090 後 *baling jiouling hou* ‘people born in 1980s and 1990s’ indicates that age is perceived to be a significant variable of English competence. The statements show several indexical links. The so-called 四五年級生 *si wu nianji sheng* are people in power, but recognized to be less proficient in English. This leads to their eagerness to English related policy. The act does not index the pursuit of global competitiveness, but a sense of inferiority. The 8090 後 *baling jiouling hou* refers to younger generations that

master English and other foreign languages. The correlation between age and English proficiency challenges a long-held belief. That is, 加 contests the established language ideology “Taiwanese speak poor English,” but the contestation is achieved by foregrounding another established language ideology that English competence is an age-grading in Taiwan. 加’s statement shows how intertwining the daily discourse and these established language ideologies are. Another viewer doubts the effectiveness of the language policy (15-23), and expresses distrust. The last viewer 然 expresses his/her relief on seeing that the Blueprint meets mostly disapprovals and reserved concerns. The viewer explains that his/her family members, described by 然 as not being proficient in English, favor the bilingualism policy. Their less command of English and their positive attitudes in the bilingualism policy are connected by a transition 然而 *raner* ‘however’ (lines 28-29). The use of 然而 indicates that poorer command of English and positive stances toward the policy are conceptualized as contrastive. It can be observed that the public are getting divergent about the bilingualism policy in the YouTubers’ vlog comments compared to the survey back in October 2017. This excerpt shows a novel perspective between language competence and the bilingualism policy.

This section describes that the established language ideology of self-deprecation, its reinforcement and its contestation in three types of discourse. A language policy concerning English already conveys the message *We need to do something with English*. Evaluations on proficiency levels are already embodied in the language policy itself even before the viewers

start talking about it. The established language ideology about Taiwanese's humble English can be related to the act of disowning the language. As also presented in crosslinguistic conversational joking, the discursive act of disowning English is ingroup practice

5.4.3 A minimum of official languages: Why English? Why bilingual?

Legitimizing multiple official languages (or national languages) is a less prominent idea in this heated debate. This shows the conceptualization that keeping the number of official languages to a minimum is preferred, as discussed in Section 5.1. As also mentioned previously, the Blueprint does not specify which language, in addition to English, is the other language in this 'bilingualism.' The conceptualization has led to two types of discourse—the discourse regarding which two languages should be given the official status, and the discourse concerning why there are only two official/national languages.

It has been presented that English officialization is thought to relate largely to international trade. An example that questions the necessity of English officialization and promotes Taiwanese instead is presented in (57).

(57)

- 1 Joe 雙語不一定是英文！
(‘The “bilingual” [in the bilingual nation] doesn’t necessarily refer to English.’)
- 2 美國成長率及外匯都輸中國了！
(‘US growth rate and foreign exchange have lost to China!’)

- 3 Ball Joe 台灣人人本來已是說中文，
(‘Taiwanese already speak Mandarin Chinese.’)
- 4 哪麼另一種是什麼？
(‘Then what is the other [language]?’)
- 5 Joe Ball 他們想變成英文與國語，
(‘They want the bilingualism to be English and Guoyu,’)
- 6 但是論實戰台語比英文重要！
(‘but realistically Taiwanese is more important than English!’)
- 7 我合作的老闆都是講台語！
(‘The business owners I work with all speak Taiwanese!’)
- 8 Ball Joe 我明白，
(‘I see,’)
- 9 但台灣人也是時候與世界接軌。
(‘but it’s also time for Taiwanese to connect with the world.’)
- 10 Joe Ball 郭董級才有那個能耐與世界接觸！¹⁷
(‘Only people like Terry Guo have the capability to connect with the world.’)
- 11 其他的小老闆與台灣人接觸已經很夠了！
(‘As far as the rest of business owners are concerned, connecting with other Taiwanese seems pretty enough.’)

The first viewer, Joe, states that the bilingualism does not necessarily concern English, as s/he believes that China has economically outperformed America (line 2). Inferably, the viewer is taking an economics-oriented perspective to evaluate this second language in ‘bilingualism’ (Ammon 2010). As far as the viewer is concerned, China’s economic development makes the acquisition of English lose its prospect. The viewer regards Taiwanese to play a more decisive role in business (line 6) because the business owners he works with 都是講台語 *du shi jiang taiyu* ‘all speak Taiwanese.’ The description 論實戰 *lun shizhan* ‘realistically’

¹⁷ 郭董 *guo dong* refers to Terry Guo, the founder of Foxconn.

indicates that English is regarded as *theoretically* important. The excerpt is attention-grabbing because English and Taiwanese are both judged based on their market values. Ball, the second viewer, also advocates that it is the time for Taiwanese to 世界接軌 *shijie jiegui* ‘connect with the world’ (line 9). The comment backgrounds the established conceptualization of linking English to globalization. The first viewer, jeybonney Joe, claims that only a limited number of people 有那個能耐 *you na ge nengnai* ‘have the capability’ (line 10) to go global. This comment suggests that first, connecting with the world and speaking English are discursively connected and second, that connecting with the world (and probably also speaking English) are abilities that not everyone possesses. When the established language ideology is situated under the debate of English officialization, it becomes a rationalization that not everyone needs English. This extract explicates that the discourse of profit (Duchêne & Heller 2012) governs the interaction. Gal (2012) suggests that discourse of profit and discourse of pride are conceptualized as two opposites of an axis of differentiation. Namely, the use of one language tends to lean toward one pole than the other. Profit and pride are ideologically contrastive. However, this discussion also sees that discourse of both pride and profit resides in metadiscourse about Taiwanese. The term 能耐 *nengnai* distinguishes English from Taiwanese as the English ability is deliberately recognized and achieved through efforts. It also entails that competence in Taiwanese is naturalized and unmarked. The observation by no means indicates that Taiwanese is fixated

at the pride pole in the pride/profit axis. Rather, when Taiwanese is considered a suitable language for conducting business deals, it is also commodified (Heller 2003; 2010b; 2010a). Yet, the metadiscourse of Taiwanese regarding 小老闆 *xiao laoban* ‘owners of small businesses’ and 很夠了 *hen guo le* ‘more than sufficient’ also reveals discursively emergent distinctions between English and Taiwanese. This rationalization further contests the established language ideology of nationwide proficiency, as will be discussed later. This conversation questions why English is (and also why Taiwanese is not) listed as a language in the bilingual nation policy.

As abovementioned, legitimizing more languages seems a less prominent belief. The latest comments are expected to take different perspectives from those discussed in the survey comments. Excerpt (58) shows how the viewers specify that there could be more than two official languages, as presented in (58) below.

(58)

- 1 艾 為何是英文，國文，
(‘Why [does bilingualism refer to] English and Guoyu?’)
- 2 國家官方語言也可以四種，5種阿，
(‘[We can] also have four or five national official languages.’)
- 3 閩南語，客家話，原住民話
(‘such as Southern-Min, Hakka and Aboriginal languages.’)
- 4 Vjj 而且他們太短視近利，
(‘And they are too short-sighted.’)
- 5 等越來越多人習慣講英文後，
(‘When more and more people are used to speaking English.’)
- 6 中文在台灣就會越來越少人講，
(‘Mandarin Chinese will be used by less and less people.’)

- 7 一代接著一代就越來越不會講，
(‘It will become less and less spoken by generation after generation.’)
- 8 很多地方都有這種例子，
(‘There are many examples like this.’)
- 9 像現在冰島人越來越習慣講英文，
(‘For example Icelanders are more and more accustomed to speaking English now.’)
- 19 就發現有人冰島語不能講得流利，
(‘And some found out that they can’t speak Icelandic fluency.’)
- 11 詞彙量不夠的現象，
(‘[They] seem not to have enough vocabulary.’)
- 12 台灣的閩南語也是一個例子
(‘Southern Min in Taiwan is also an example.’)

The first viewer questions why the ‘bilingual’ in the bilingual nation refers to English and Chinese. According to the viewer, official languages could potentially include Taiwanese, Hakka and Aboriginal languages (lines 2 to 3). The second viewer starts his/her comment with 而且 *erqie* ‘also,’ aligning with the first viewer. Emphasizing English and simultaneously neglecting other languages are described as 短視近利 *duanshi jinli* ‘nearsighted.’ The viewer is criticizing the act of relating English to discourse of profit (Duchêne & Heller 2012). The comment shows that indexical values of English (the Nth indexical in Silverstein’s (2003) term) point to another evaluative term of being near-sighted (the N^{+1st} indexical). Though this indexical value (Eckert 2008) seems to contradict with the more conventionalized indexical value of English, the two values, viewing English as beneficial and favoring English as nearsighted, are what Eckert (2008) says to be “ideologically related” (454). They both embody how English is understood in economic

terms. The inclination toward English and its benefit is thought by the viewer to sacrifice the vitality of other languages (line 5 to 7). The link between the indexical values of English to a higher order of indexical value *nearsighted* is mediated by the consequential neglect and threats to local languages. While the first viewer approaches the issue of official languages from the multilingual perspective of multilingualism, Vjj takes an imperialist view to the hegemony of English (Phillipson 1992). Their stances should be contesting. However, at linguistic representation, the second viewer seems to align with the first viewer with the use of 而且 *erqie* ‘as well.’ This alignment but ideological distinction again suggests that the approval-disapproval poles does not reflect the agile ideological process. Nonetheless, the excerpt unfolds how the ideological process is overgeneralized in binary terms.

Official languages of a nation are conceptualized to be preferably kept at a minimum. As also discussed, this accounts for the observation that viewers are more inclined to question why English makes it to the official language, than to debate why there are ‘only’ two official languages. The YouTube comments start to show that diverse patterns where the debate extends beyond English.

5.4.4 An official language as everyone’s language: Must we?

An official languages is considered to be a language which everyone is obliged to speak. Nonetheless, mandated language proficiency and the current sociolinguistic profile of

English in Taiwan are taken to pose a gap. The viewers evaluate this gap distinctively. Opponents see the gap as inconvenience or even unimaginability of using English in local daily domains. Under the situation where Taiwan does not enact an official language, the questioning reveals how the idea of official languages features both in individual and societal multilingualism.

A light-hearted example that specifies the domain clash between English and local daily domain is presented in (59). The viewer states that s/he may starve to death if s/he has to order breakfast in English.

(59)

- | | | |
|---|------|--|
| 1 | S H | 以後跟早餐店阿姨點早餐時要用英文點，
(‘In the future [I/we] will have to order my breakfast to
the aunties at the breakfast stands in English.’) |
| 2 | | 那應該會餓死 XD
(‘Then [I/we] will probably starve to death. XD’) |
| 3 | Chan | C H may not, |
| 4 | | if they have pictures on the menu, |
| 5 | | you can order with your fingers. |
| 6 | | “i want this, this, and this. thank you” |

The viewer S H does not specify a subject in the comment. The viewer could refer to him/herself, an inclusive ‘we,’ or ‘you.’ Such a short comment contains rich information.

First, if s/he is referring to him/herself, the viewer him/herself probably does not speak average English. If the viewer is referring to an inclusive *we*, then s/he is referring that generally people do not speak average English. Consequently, deprecation of English proficiency is evident. Moreover, ordering breakfast is framed as daily and interactive. It is a

local domain in the Taiwanese context, where English is less expected. The viewer's reflection on how English is required in local domains manifests the ideology of societal multilingualism. At discourse level, the act of ordering breakfast in English is presented as amusing because the viewer ends the comment with an emoji 'XD.' This also brings out the unexpectedness because it signals a lighthearted tone. The second viewer states that ordering breakfast requires only basic English by pointing at pictures on the menu. This short English comment is interesting for several observations. The comment is in English when the viewer possibly reads S H's comment in Mandarin Chinese. Replying to a Chinese Mandarin comment in English about the difficulty in using English is considered extremely marked from a sociopragmatic perspective. The second viewer possibly picks up the lighthearted tone and plays along. Or, s/he believes that a comment like this hardly poses comprehension difficulty, suggesting that minimal English proficiency is again expected. This lighthearted conversation manifests how a bilingual nation policy is perceived to clash with expected linguistic practice in daily domains.

A similar deployment of deriding speaking English in daily domains is presented in (60). Viewer (60) points out that not everyone finds English necessary in the Taiwanese context.

(60)

(...49 words...)

4 我不相信今天政府把英文訂為官方語言或學校提前上英文課程，

- (‘I don’t believe that if English is made the official language or if the school starts English courses earlier,)
- 5 大家出門買蚵仔煎就會用英語跟老闆點餐。
(‘everyone will order their oyster pancake in English.’)
(... 90 words...)
- 12 我們都可以自己想想看，
(‘Let’s face this.’)
- 13 有多少人是真正到了出社會才發現英文有多重要的。
(‘How many of us never realized how important English is until we started job hunting?’)
- 14 更何況一個社會中並非所有的人都需要學外語，
(‘Not to mention that not everyone in a society needs to learn foreign languages.’)
- 15 除了台北可能比較多外國人外，
(‘Except for Taipei, where it is more likely to see foreigners,’)
- 16 其他縣市的餐廳一年能有幾個外國人上門？
(‘how many foreign customers do restaurants in other cities and counties greet in a year?’)
- 17 這是一個專業分工的社會，
(‘The society values labor-division.’)
- 18 我對一個廚師的要求只有他煮飯好吃，
(‘All I ask of a chef is to cook delicious food,’)
- 19 並不會需要他跟我說英文。
(‘not to speak English to me.’)

The viewer uses the sentence 我不相信...大家出門買蚵仔煎就會用英語跟老闆點餐 *wó bu xiāngxìn dàjiā chūmen mǎi ezìjiān jiù huì yòng yīngyǔ gēn lǎobān diǎncān* ‘I don’t believe that [...] everyone will order their oyster pancake in English’ to state the disapproval against nation-wide English proficiency. The mention of 蚵仔煎 *ezìjiān* ‘oyster pancake’, a local Taiwanese dish is not taken literally. Instead, 蚵仔煎, which is mostly pronounced in Taiwanese *ô-á-tsiān*, frames a locale (Giddens 1991) that exaggerates the division between local sectors and English (line 5). The viewer’s later statements from lines 14 to 19 also

explicate that English marks specific language practice associated with specific locations, limited people, and certain occupations. The comment considers English to be domain-specific. In brief, English still serves socially distinctive functions and is still comparatively marked.

To argue against nation-wide proficiency associated with the bilingual nation policy, domain clashes pose a major concern. The following comments (61) also attends to whether the efforts and investments pay off.

(61)

(...147 words...)

- 12 連用不不到的內需市場職位都硬套上英語能力，
(‘Even the workforce in the domestic market is forced to use English.’)
- 13 是問路邊攤、餐飲業、工廠技術員、計程車，
(‘For those vendors, catering, mechanics, and taxi drivers,’)
- 14 這些人一輩子有多少機會會用到英文？
(‘how often do they have to use English in their lifetime?’)
- 15 就算用的到，
(‘Even if English does come in handy,’)
- 16 花了大量金錢、時間的這些成本，
(‘are the time and money invested [in learning English]’)
- 17 有回收嗎？
(‘worth the efforts?’)
- (...249 words...)

The viewer finds it confusing to demand English proficiency in the 內需市場 *neixu shichang* ‘domestic market,’ implicating that English governs a market which is not domestic.

The construction 連...都 *lian...duo* ‘even’ places a scalar focus (Xing 2004) on the noun it modifies, namely, 內需市場職位 *neixu shichang* ‘workforce in the domestic markets.’ The

construction infers that jobs in the domestic market *originally and normally* do not require English proficiency. The question 有多少機會 *you duoshao jihui* (line 4) entails the rarity of using English. The question in lines 16 and 17 manifests the belief that language learning is like an investment (De Swaan 2010). It implies the dispreferred, negative answers that the time and resource invested in building English competence are not worth the efforts. The three comments share the similarity in attending to the domestic market, which is close to daily life, interactive, and immediate. The shifting emphasis from the global market to the domestic market brings the commodification (e.g. Heller 2003, 2010a, 2010b) of local languages. In the case of ordering breakfast in (59), buying oyster pancake in (60) and numerous businesses that do not require English competence in (61), these economic activities are supported by languages other than English. Put differently, investing in English will not pay off.

This section draws from YouTubers' vlog comments by netizens to discuss how established language ideologies are layered, prioritized, and interacting with ideological stancetaking. Compared to the survey comments with polarized opinions, the YouTube comments are lengthier, and more updated. The viewers are also comparatively more informed than they were at the time the survey was conducted, with the Blueprint and the information made more accessible. More available information expectedly leads to more

diverse opinions. The viewers' discursive strategies also make their ideological stances less obvious when multiple language ideologies are manifested in one comment. These comments also reveal that bilingualism is conceptualized as requiring using the two languages across domains. These excerpts from light-hearted teasing to stern rhetorical interrogatives establish that the idea of English clashes with local and domestic language use.

5.5 Discussion

The discussion about legitimizing English first as Taiwan's second official language and then as one language in official bilingualism is a site where multilayered ideologizing process is laid out. Ideological stances are viewers' explicit and descriptive evaluations on language beliefs and assumptions which are rationalized as part of common knowledge. These ideological stances are further found to reflect on four major rationalizations. These rationalizations, termed established language ideologies, are backgrounded and treated as given. They are mostly in reduced forms, in subordinate clauses, or topicalized for further evaluations. Established language ideologies contribute tremendously to interpreting English in language planning. The interaction between ideologies of English and those of official languages reveals the diversified and dynamic ideological processes (Spitulnik 1998; Kroskrity 2004; Verschueren 2012).

The discussion of English in language planning engages viewers to attend to the concept of official languages when, significantly, Taiwan does not have a de jure official language. An official language denotes a series of social practices concerning not one, but all languages in Taiwan. At issue is not merely which language to legitimize, but why other languages are not recognized. Even when no de jure official language has been designated in Taiwan, the ordinal number “second” and the later “bilingual” nation policy both presuppose the existence of one foremost official language. A second official language or a language in bilingualism also suggests its higher status than languages without official status. The viewers’ justification on which language to be given more prominence manifests the belief “The number of official languages should be kept to a minimum.” The established language ideology “An official language is a language for all” is understood by some as an opportunity to improve English competence. Others view it as deprivation of freedom to choose, and as a problem because Taiwan has relatively limited number of proficient English users (S.-C. Chen 2010). Though the two established language ideologies shape how an ‘official language’ is broadly conceptualized, the diversified ideological stances also suggest that clearer definitions of official languages, particularly their impact and interaction with other languages, are still required. Figure 15 shows the ideologization web and summarizes the interaction between established language ideologies and ideological stances discussed in Sections 5.1 and 5.4.




Figure 15. The ideologization web in the survey comments and YouTube comments.

Though Taiwan is fundamentally multilingual, official multilingualism is perceived differently from societal multilingualism, as Dupré (2016) states in his study on the drafting of the language equality law. Societal multilingualism, which is reckoned as a fact, defines societal vitality. Official multilingualism, which defines language use as obligation and autonomy, is thought to guarantee the vitality of legitimized language at the expense of non-legitimized languages. The conceptual gap makes the discussion of English officialization a site for ideological contestation.

The metadiscourse about English in Taiwan is a site of norm agglomeration, related to the multiple place identities that Taiwan projects. The norm agglomeration is evidently shown in the established language ideology “The number of official languages should be kept to a minimum” and its three contesting ideological stances, namely, “English is more important,” “Chinese is more important,” and “Local languages are more important.” The contestation could be accounted for with Blommaert’s framework on sociolinguistic scales (2007; 2010). A locale (Giddens 1991) can commit to multiple spatial identities. In the study on shop signs in Brussels, Vandenbroucke (2015; 2016) theorizes that identity multiplicity can be conceptualized as structured, ranging from global and local. He further elaborates that the different layers of spatial identities can associate with the multilingualism of a locale because linguistic norms also range from global to local (Blommaert 2007; 2010). Taiwan displays multiple spatial identities, due to the yearnings to preserve the vitality of local languages and

cultures, to gain recognition of nation autonomy, and to become an Asia-Pacific Regional Operation Center. These layers of Taiwanese identities can be seen to be situated at local, national and transnational scale-levels respectively. The three spatial identities are linked to different preferred language choices. At the transnational level, concepts such as ‘globalness,’ ‘internationalization,’ and ‘competitiveness’ are highly valued and thought to be regulated by English, as also seen in the discussion about the Blueprint in Section 5.2. Languages other than English, such as Mandarin Chinese, Taiwanese, Hakka, and Aboriginal languages are considered inadequate and peripheral. At the local scale-level, norms center on local languages. Taiwanese, Hakka and Aboriginal languages rule. Mandarin Chinese has a debatable identity as a local language or a foreign language. Situated between the local and transnational levels is the national scale-level, where Mandarin Chinese has long served as the pragmatic norm (Tsao 1999; 2008; S.-C. Chen 2010; Dupré 2013) and where English is currently proposed to be another norm. Table 7 summarizes the three scale-levels, spatial identities and the perceived norms.


Table 7. The three scale-levels and their corresponding spatial identities and norms in Taiwan.

scale-level	perceived norms	spatial identity
local	(Taiwan Mandarin), Taiwanese, Hakka, Aboriginal languages	multilingual and multicultural diversity
national	Taiwan Mandarin	Nation autonomy
transnational	English	global recognition as an Asian Pacific Regional Operation Center

At national scale-level, if English is made the center, the planning is seen as an attempt to assimilate norms at a national scale-level to those at the transnational scale-level. Languages except English (and Taiwan Mandarin) are made peripheral. Citizens without English competence are silenced and considered incompetent (Blommaert et al. 2005). In contrast, viewers who propose to officialize local languages attempt to correspond local norms to national norms. This is believed by many to place English at a peripheral position at national scale-level and to reject prosperity and competitiveness conceptually associated with English (Kachru 1985; Crystal 2003; J.S.-Y. Park & Wee 2012). Viewing the debate of English in language planning with sociolinguistic scales (Blommaert 2007; 2010), the study presents the debate as clashes of norms and multiple identities.

Divergent understandings of English in language planning map onto social distinctions in a contrastive dichotomy (Irvine & Gal 2000; Gal & Irvine 2019). Gal and Irvine's (2019) axis of differentiation addresses that differences tend to be perceived as opposition. Languages under discussion undergo semiotic processes where each links to different social images. These abstract qualities coin with certain linguistic practice. Other linguistic practice is discursively denied its speakers with these qualities. Local languages and Taiwan Mandarin represent Taiwanese identity and autonomy (Dupré 2013). English is associated with advancement (Tsai 2010; H.-Y. Lin 2014; Price 2014). Between English and local languages, favoring one tends to be discursively constructed as denial of the others. As far as proponents

are concerned, opponents' disapproval of officializing English represents their blamable disinterests in pursuing competitiveness in global market. For opponents, proponents' approval to give English more recognition means abandonment of local identity and national autonomy. The study has presented that four established language ideologies lead to multiple disparate ideological stances. Nonetheless, these ideological focuses are not necessarily opposite or contradictory. They tend to be generalized as binary. Conflict-oriented interpretations about English officialization overgeneralize the debate but prevail in the metadiscourse. This explicates that in Taiwanese sociocultural context, English and official languages are conceptually different, in terms of their functions and social significances.



5.6 Conclusion

The chapter adopts a discursive approach (Barakos & Unger 2016) to analyze the online metadiscourse regarding legitimizing English first as Taiwan's second official language and then as a language in the bilingual nation policy. This chapter makes an effort to analyze related discourse from four sources. The Blueprint shows that the institute defines English as entirely instrumental and detached from identity and culture. A homogeneous, market-oriented perspective is pronounced in a top-down manner. The online survey comments, the YouTubers' discourse and the YouTube comments reveal a complex web of interacting established language ideologies and ideological stances. On theoretical grounds,

the study suggests that the public's attention is drawn to the ideological understandings of officializing English and bilingualizing Taiwan, instead of to the text of the policy (proposal) alone (Kremer & Horner 2016). Two levels of language ideologies are thus proposed to identify and to present the ideologizing process as dynamic and heterogeneous (Kroskrity 2004). Established language ideologies are relatively stable rationalizations about languages mostly phrased as background knowledge. Ideological stances show transient, situated evaluations of established language beliefs in the current discussion. News viewers rely on a limited number of established language ideologies to comprehend English in language planning and further comment on these beliefs about English and official languages. Empirically, the chapter has presented how English and official languages are conceptualized in the Taiwanese context. English is commonly described as being connected to global competitiveness, and recognized as a language that Taiwanese are less fluent in. An official language is understood to be everyone's language and the number of official languages is also preferred to be kept at a minimum. Because English and official languages are conceptually different, the metadiscourse regarding the two displays a site of norm contestation. At first, proponents of English officialization took up the majority of the public's opinions, as shown in the survey comments in Section 5.1. This indicates that the pursuit of competitiveness was prioritized to the conceptualization of official languages. The YouTube comments in December 2018 show that polarized opinions are less frequent. A comment can itself reveal

multiple and contesting beliefs. The metadiscourse also sees that distinctive ideological stances and linguistic competence are discursively constructed as contrastive social distinctions (Gal & Irvine 2019). This chapter shows that the ideologizing process defines a language and its speakers, remarkably in relation to other languages and speakers.



The ideologizing process in metadiscourse around English

The discussion on English as an official language in Taiwan in Chapter 5 centers on the interaction between the ideologizing process of English and that of official languages and languages generally used in Taiwan. The previous chapter is seen as metadiscourse directly *about* English. This chapter on the debate between Romanized phonetic systems and Bopomofo addresses how the conceptualizations of English are invoked and inferred to fulfill the meaning-making of other linguistic practice, i.e. the discussion between Bopomofo and Romanized phonetic systems in this study. According to Page et al. (2014), discourse analysis allows researchers to probe into questions of what motivates particular linguistic (and social) practice in these contexts (82). An answer this chapter aims to discuss, then, is why rationalizations of English matter to such a great extent when English seems irrelevant to the debate. When the question is presented graphically with the model of the ideologization web, Yeh's proposal of replacing Bopomofo leads to the viewers' comments on English, as shown in Figure 16.




Figure 16. The research focus of the debate on Bopomofo and Romanized phonetic systems

This chapter then identifies what established language ideologies mediate between Yeh's proposal text and the viewers' comments on English, and what linguistic cues invoke the ideologizing work. This chapter starts with a discursive analysis on Yeh's proposal speech in Section 6.1. Sections 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 triangulate the claims the study makes. Section 6.2 analyzes the associations between the approval-disapproval dichotomy and ideological stances in viewers' comments. Section 6.3 proposes three established language ideologies in between Yeh's proposal text and the viewers' comments. Section 6.4 argues that a fixed

expression *guojijiegui* invokes social knowledge about English, i.e. the established language ideologies concerning English.¹⁸

A few notes need to be taken about the debate on phonetic systems for Mandarin Chinese in Taiwan. The current phonetic system for Taiwan Mandarin, Bopomofo, also called 注音符號 *Zhuyin fuhao*, 注音 *Zhuyin*, Mandarin Phonetic Symbols, and National Phonetic Symbol 1, has been practiced since 1918 (Tsao 1999). Developed based on components of traditional Chinese script, Bopomofo is critical to Mandarin Chinese literacy because it bridges the gap between traditional Chinese characters and the phonetic system (Tsao 1999). This merit is, however, thought to have disadvantages in an increasingly computerized world because Bopomofo is not an in-built layout for computer keyboards (Tsao 1999). Furthermore, the fact that Bopomofo is practiced in Taiwan makes it ‘local’ and less preferred to Romanized phonetic schemes by some (see further discussion in Her (2005)). The issue of opting for a Romanized phonetic system for Taiwan Mandarin is further complicated by the fact that Taiwan has employed several Romanized phonetic schemes and is known to have inconsistently applied these systems in the public sectors (Chiung 2001; Her 2009). At least four Romanized phonetic schemes are available for transliteration, including 漢語拼音 Hanyu Pinyin, 通用拼音 Tong-Yong Phonetic Scheme, National Phonetic Symbol 2 and Wade-Giles (Her 2005). Each has its pros and cons of considerations from history, accuracy,

¹⁸ An earlier version of the analysis in this chapter first appears in Lee (accepted 2020).

to political implications (see Tsao (1999) and P.-y. Lin (2015) for further discussion, and see Chiung (2001) and H.-L. Wang (2002) for a detailed review on Taiwan's orthography and political status).

Lacking a unified Romanized phonetic system for Taiwanese Mandarin leads to inconvenience and possible confusions. Take international post as an example. On the webpage of Chunghwa Post Co., Ltd¹⁹, the chief postal service in Taiwan, one can choose to transliterate an address with Hanyu Pinyin and Tong-Yong, as shown respectively in Figures 17 and 18.



Figure 17. Hanyu Pinyin transliteration service on Chunghwa Post Co., Ltd.



Figure 18. Tong-Yong Pinyin transliteration service on Chunghwa Post Co., Ltd.

A similar scenario occurs when one looks up his/her transliterated name for passport application on the website of Bureau of Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²⁰ An applicant can choose among four Romanized systems, as shown in Figure 19.

¹⁹ <https://www.post.gov.tw/post/internet/Postal/index.jsp?ID=207>

²⁰ <https://www.boca.gov.tw/sp-natr-singleform-1.html>

外文姓名中譯英系統 (本系統僅提供首次申請護照外文姓名參考)

單筆翻譯 批次翻譯

使用說明:
例如: 王小明, 姓氏請輸入"王", 名字請輸入"小明"; 歐陽小美, 姓氏請輸入"歐陽", 名字請輸入"小美"。

姓氏

名字

必須 圖型驗證碼 055321

- 本系統可翻譯「漢語拼音」、「通用拼音」、「國音第二式拼音」及「威妥瑪(WG)拼音」結果。
- [護照外文姓名拼音對照表](#)
- 姓氏在前、名在後, 姓之後加逗號(以利區分姓氏及名字)。另外文名字音節中間之短橫, 係為便於名字斷音, 易於辨識之用, 倘外文名字之間不加短橫, 本局亦尊重申請人意願, 可於申請護照時免議。
- 曾領護照者, 外文姓名應與舊護照一致, 姓氏拼音應與親屬一致。

Figure 19. The webpage of Bureau of Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Though this allows one to choose a phonetic system that has perceived accuracy, the issue causes some evident inconvenience, as also noted on this webpage. The first bulletin point, reproduced in (62a), specifies that 4 transliteration systems are available. The fourth bulletin point, reproduced in (62) below, writes that one's transliterated name has to be identical to the name on the out-dated passport and one's transliterated surname has to be identical with that of other family members.

- (62) a. 本系統可翻譯「漢語拼音」、「通用拼音」、「國音第二式拼音」及「威妥瑪(WG)拼音」結果。
(The system can transliterate with Hanyu Pinyin, Tong-Yong Scheme, National Phonetic Symbol 2, and Wade-Giles.)
- b. 曾領護照者, 外文姓名應與舊護照一致, 姓氏拼音應與親屬一致。

(‘For those who renew the passport, the transliterated names should be identical to those on the outdated passports, and the Pinyin of the surname should be consistent with the relatives’.’)

Inconsistent transliteration is also addressed by Curtin (2007), who discusses linguistic landscapes in Taipei in her study, and notes the potential confusion inconsistent transliteration creates when foreigners attempt to read street signs. The inconsistency makes it apparent that the so-called *Luoma Pinyin* ‘Romanized phonetic schemes’ does not refer to a single, agreed-upon phonetic system. It serves as an umbrella term that is applied to several distinctive Romanized phonetic scripts. This lack of specificity also urges the present study to use “Romanized phonetic schemes” in the plural form in the discussion and to retain the term *Luoma Pinyin* when quoting from the viewers’ comments.

The association between *Luoma Pinyin* and its social implication, namely, *guojijiegui*, is no less complicated than the confusion of different Romanized phonetic systems. Yeh’s proposal in March 2018 is not the first attempt to relate the adoption of phonetic schemes to *guojijiegui*. Attempts have been made by the government and by academe to settle the Romanization of Taiwan Mandarin. An earlier debate in 2000 between Tong-Yong Scheme and Hanyu Pinyin saw how complicated the Romanization of Mandarin Chinese is. Hanyu Pinyin, which is used by Mainland China and internationally, appeared as an economic choice (e.g. Her 2005). Tong-Yong Scheme, developed in Taiwan and favored by the government at that time, was said to cater to both the need for localization and the urge for globalization (L.-Y. Wang 2002). Tong-Yong Scheme distinguishes itself from Hanyu Pinyin

with a 15% of transliteration differences (Her 2005). Due to Taiwan's fluctuating political relationship with Mainland China, Hanyu Pinyin and Tong-Yong Scheme are criticized by their respective opponents for ideologizing the linguistic issues with politics and neglecting the need to *guojijiegui*. H.-L. Wang (2002) finds that adopting either scheme is discursively constructed as a means to *guojijiegui* by their respective proponents. He discusses that the homogenizing forces under globalization frame *guojijiegui* as desired. He also accounts for the eagerness and anxiety for countries to *guojijiegui* from a politics-oriented perspective. This present study discusses the meaning-making of *guojijiegui* from a linguistically-oriented perspective.

The two events, the debate in 2000 and Yeh's proposal in 2018, display some interesting discrepancies that make the present analysis significant. A major difference notes the revelation of lay perspectives concerning Yeh's proposal. With rise of social media, how individuals respond to Yeh's proposal is immediately observable. It is of theoretical, empirical and social significances to investigate how public events such as a language policy proposal are discussed in everyday discourse. These unsettled issues, including which phonetic schemes Yeh and the news viewers were respectively referring to, and what exactly *guojijiegui* means, are however backgrounded, if not absent, in the current discussion. In addition, the prior discussion in 2000 seldom questioned the use of Bopomofo. The then debate occurred with the unspoken, then therefore agreed, premise that Bopomofo stayed

even though concerns about the role of Bopomofo from curriculum design were raised (L.-Y. Wang 2002). The debates in 2000 and in 2018 have respective focuses but both place equal amount of prominence to *guojijiegui*.

The study draws from online metalinguistic discussion and identifies recurrent ideological focuses surrounding *guojijiegui* to investigate the interrelation among intertextuality, language ideology and indexicality. Section 6.1 presents a discursive analytical discussion on Yeh's proposal speech. Section 6.2 describes how the online survey participants evaluate the proposal with their meta-knowledge about English. Section 3 and Section 4 discuss how the meta-knowledge about English is invoked.

6.1 A Discursive Analysis on Yeh's Speech about Scrapping Bopomofo at the Hustings

Yeh's proposal speech discursively constructs *guojijiegui*, the use of Bopomofo, and the use of Romanized phonetic schemes as related to one another. Her proposal speech about replacing Bopomofo with Romanized phonetic schemes is one of her two education policies. The part directly related to the phonetic debate is presented in (63). During the speech Yeh codeswitched between Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese. Her use of Taiwanese is put in bold texts.

(63) Yeh's proposal at the hustings in March 2018

- 1 我的教育重點在哪裡？
(‘What’s my education focus?’)
- 2 在跟國際接軌
(‘It’s on how [we can] *guojijiegui*.’)
- 3 這個標題很大
(‘This issue is huge.’)
- 4 怎麼做？
(‘What will [I] do?’)
- 5 很簡單
(‘ Very simple.’)
- 6 第一個要做的就是
(‘The first thing is to’)
- 7 丟掉ㄅㄆㄇ
(‘discard Bopomofo.’)
- 8 ㄅㄆㄇ **ū siánn-mih lōo-īng ?**
(‘**What on earth does Bopomofo do?**’)
- 9 He sī tsit tsióng ê 注音
(‘**That is** a phonetic system for one [language].’)
- 10 這是一種的注音而已
(‘This is merely a phonetic system for one [language].’)
- 11 **Lí buē khì līm-hô tiōng-iàu ê khó-tshì lái-té**
(‘**You won’t take any important examinations**’)
- 12 **beh kā lí khó** ㄅㄆㄇ
(‘**on Bopomofo.**’)
- 13 我們應該學什麼？
(‘What should we learn [instead]?’)
- 14 我們應該學羅馬拼音
(‘We should learn *Luoma Pinyin*.’)
- 15 羅馬拼音 ē-tàng tsù siánn-mih im ?
(‘**What languages can *Luoma Pinyin* notate?**’)
- 16 **ē-tàng tsù Kok-gí, tsù Tai-gi, tsù Tik-gi, tsù Lit-gi, tsù sóo-ū ē gú-giân.**
(‘[They] can be used with Chinese, Taiwanese, German, and Japanese, to write in all these languages.’)
- 17 任何一種語言都可以用羅馬拼音
(‘Any language can be phonetically notated with *Luoma Pinyin*.’)
- 18 Hōo lán ê gín-á 不會害怕蝌蚪文
(‘**[This] frees our children** from fearing *kedouwen*.’)
- 19 這是一個跟國際接軌的第一步

(‘This is the first step to *guojijiegui*,’)

20 非常重要的一步

(a very critical step..’)

The term *guojijiegui* is repeated twice (lines 2 and 19) but not defined in Yeh’s speech. The meaning of this expression is treated as old information, possibly inviting a shared and conventionalized interpretation. Yeh proposes that in order to *guojijiegui*, Bopomofo should be 丟掉 *diudiao* ‘discarded’ (line 7), instead of using less negative verbs such as 取代 *qudai* or 替換 *tihuan* ‘to replace’. The negative evaluation toward Bopomofo is also evident in the rhetorical question (line 8) *Bopomofo ū siánn-mih lōo-īng?* ‘What on earth does Bopomofo do?’ This rhetorical question which is intended for a reversed interpretation (Han 2002) of Bopomofo’s uselessness reinforces her derision of Bopomofo. The 而已 *eryi* ‘merely’ in 這是一種的注音而已 *Zhe shi yi zhong de zhuyin eryi* ‘This is merely one phonetic system (for one language)’ (line 10) diminishes the importance of Bopomofo. It also denies Bopomofo’s attachment to culture and identity. Yeh further downgrades Bopomofo by noting how Bopomofo is not a subject in any important examinations (lines 11 and 12). Her choices of words and discursive strategies reveal her disapproving attitudes toward Bopomofo.

The perceived usefulness of Romanized phonetic schemes is advocated in Yeh’s speech. The 應該 *yinggai* ‘should’ in line 14 her subjective judgment to prepare to acquire Romanized phonetic schemes. She also highlights the applicability of Romanized phonetic schemes to notating a wider range of different languages (lines 15 to 18). *Guojijiegui* is

phrased as a value gained from adopting Romanized phonetic schemes. Furthermore, employing Romanized phonetic schemes is thought to free children from fearing *kedouwen* (line 8). What *kedouwen* refers to stays unspecified in Yeh's speech. Nonetheless, as will be shown later, it is understood as foreign scripts and even English by some news viewers. The claim presupposes that children originally are afraid of learning foreign languages. It entails that adopting Romanized phonetic schemes makes students keen on foreign language learning. Despite its truthfulness, foreign language acquisition is phrased as a problem in Yeh's speech and the exposure to Romanized phonetic systems could help to alleviate this problem.

Another notable finding concerns the use of self-initiated interrogatives. Lines 4, 8, 13 and 15 respectively contain wh-words in Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese, including 怎麼 *zenme* 'how' (line 4), *siánn-mih* 'what' (lines 8 and 15) and 什麼 *shenme* 'what' (line 13). These interrogatives tend to end with a falling intonation. These interrogatives in this monologic speech serve rhetorical functions because they are not intended to elicit responses from the audience. These questions reinforce the certainty of the following propositions and invite procedural reading of scrapping Bopomofo with Romanization for *guojijiegui*. When Yeh relates *guojijiegui* to adopting Romanized phonetic schemes, the rhetorical questions present the association as factual and normative. The discursive strategy makes her speech sound strong and convincing. Proposing a language policy from the concern of applicability

also presents the speech as ‘ideology-free’ because it seems politically neutral. Nonetheless, her speech corresponds largely to the debate between Tong-Yong Scheme and Hanyu Pinyin back in 2000. Individuals who publicized their opinions at then time tended to claim that their concerns were apolitical. This shows how ‘ideology’ is perceptually politicalized, when political ideologies and linguistic ideology are inseparable (Hill 1998).

A discourse analysis (Rapley 2007; Gee 2011) of the proposal reveals the presence of the connections among language ideologies, indexical values and linguistic practice. *Guojijiegui* is phrased as an indexical value (Silverstein 2003; Eckert 2008) that adopting Romanized phonetic schemes can point to. The adoption of Romanized phonetic schemes is discursively linked to being keen on foreign language learning, which is depicted as originally scary to school children (lines 15-18). Figure 20 graphically presents the indexicality in Yeh’s speech. Languages are in regular fonts and indexical values are put in italics. Even though Mandarin Chinese, Hakka, Taiwanese, Japanese and German are mentioned (line 16), she does not specify what these languages respectively lead to in her speech.




Figure 20. The indexicality in Yeh's speech.

A closer examination of the speech shows how information is left unspecified. What *kedouwen* refers to and how it is related to *guojijiegui* remain unknown. How *guojijiegui* is defined is not verbalized. How Romanized Taiwan Mandarin is positioned in the pursuit of *guojijiegui* is unsaid. However, it will be presented later that these gaps do not pose comprehension difficulties because language ideologies, indexicality and intertextuality as news viewers' social knowledge about the said languages and phonetic systems are at work in the meaning-making process to fill in these gaps.

6.2 Survey Comments: Links between Romanized Phonetic Systems and English

To probe into what metadiscourse around English contributes to the debate, the study draws from the online survey comments to address whether the conceptualizations of English affects the viewers' polarized perspectives. The study will argue that proponents and opponents do not differ greatly in the ideologizing process of English. They show discrepancies, however, in linking these language ideologies to one another. A major difference centers on whether an indexical link exists between English and Romanized phonetic schemes. The ideologizing process in the proponents' comments is presented in 6.2.1 and that in the opponents' comments is introduced in Section 6.2.2.

6.2.1 Proponents' ideological stances and missing links

Among the proponents' comments, 27 comments mention 'English.' The analysis is motivated by the observation that English seems to appear so abruptly and yet so naturally. This observation indicates that information is left unspecified but rationally interpreted. The unspecified information is where the established language ideologies are at work. The established language ideologies address the social images of English, the connection/disconnection between English and Romanized phonetic scripts, and anxiety caused by foreign language learning. Three ideological stances are discussed before a

discussion about the ‘missing information’ of these comments is presented. This implies that specified information is unnecessary and treated as conventionalized. What is missing could also be seen as what is ‘needless to mention.’ Missing information is also where language rationalizations dominate (Rumsey 1990; Anton 1998; Cameron 2003; Kroskrity 2004).

The metadiscourse about English in the survey comments appears abruptly. Four comments from proponents talk about English without textually linking it to other linguistic practice in this debate about phonetic systems. Two proponents’ comments are presented in (64) and (65).

(64) 台灣國人英文程度明顯落後許多，在國際上是很吃虧的

(‘Taiwanese’s English proficiency level is obviously lagging behind, and (it) puts us at disadvantage internationally.’)

(65) 這樣學英文才很快進入狀況，出社會後我英文不好，真的被害慘了，升遷都沒機會。

(‘This way we learn English faster. I entered the workforce with a poor command of English. I was at a disadvantage. I seldom got the chance for promotion.’)

Comment (64) reflects on how Taiwanese’s English proficiency is falling behind and how it places Taiwan at disadvantage. The established language ideologies “English represents global competitiveness,” and “Taiwanese speak bad English,” appear to support the replacement of Bopomofo with Romanized phonetic schemes. Viewer (65) states that the lack of English competence stops him/her from getting promoted. The two comments both sanction the instrumental functions of English. Nonetheless, their comments are not discursively anchored in the current discussion about phonetic systems. The observation

indicates that the metadiscourse around English and the debates are ideologically related and even sequential. A deeper question therefore lies on what triggers this ideological connection.

A rationalization relates English to the employment of Bopomofo. The ideological stance “Bopomofo is bad for English learning,” with two occurrences, reveals that Bopomofo imposes negative impacts on learning English, as shown in (66) and (67) below.

(66) 台灣學生英文要好，唯一的途徑是不要學"ㄅㄆㄇ"，因為兩個系統不相容，歐洲人可以講多國語言(英法德義等)，因為他們是相容的。

(‘If Taiwanese students want to speak better English, the only way is to get rid of Bopomofo, because the two [phonemic] systems are incompatible. Europeans can speak multiple languages (such as English, French, German, and Italian) because these languages are compatible.’)

(67) (...66 words...)學生往往會用注音符號拼出很奇怪的英語發音 (...22 words...)

(‘[S]tudents often end up notating English pronunciation strangely with Bopomofo symbols.’)

Comment (66) claims that Bopomofo and English are 不相容 *bu xiangrong* ‘incompatible.’

The viewer also overgeneralizes Europeans as polyglot, attributing their multilingual competence to 相容 *xiangrong* ‘compatibility’ among European languages. As Yu (1998) and H.-M. Hsu, Wang and Hu (2015) suggest, 要 *yao* expresses desire and hypotheticality.

It demonstrates a willingness to achieve a goal. It describes a scenario Taiwan has yet reached. This comment thereby backgrounds the established language ideology “Taiwanese speak bad English.” The viewer further attributes Taiwanese’s bad English to the employment of Bopomofo. Similarly, Comment (67) holds Bopomofo responsible for 拚出很奇怪的英語發音 *pin zhu hen qiguai de yingyu fayin* ‘notating English pronunciation strangely.’ Since Bopomofo notates Mandarin Chinese, its exclusiveness is described in

terms of its incompatibility with other languages and the inability to precisely notate English. This economical concern of phonetic system fosters an intriguing question. Why does English act as a criterion to judge how practical and useful a phonetic system for Taiwan Mandarin is? Also intriguingly is the fact that Romanized phonetic systems are not mentioned in either comment, but only inferred. So far it has been established that many missing links are spotted but they do not hinder comprehension. As a native speaker of Bopomofo-annotated Mandarin Chinese, I find no difficulty interpreting the comments. In fact, spotting the missing information is more challenging than interpreting the comments because I am so accustomed to these related rationalizations. The next ideological stance shows the ideological link more explicitly.

If Bopomofo is described to hinder English learning, expectedly Romanized phonetic systems would be understood to offer much appreciated assistance in English learning. A total number of 18 comments evaluate the scaffolding role which Romanized phonetic scripts are thought to play in English learning, as two example show in (68) and (69).

- (68) 用羅馬真的容易多了 不只有利學英文拼音 對英文以外的語文也學習較快上手
(‘It is much easier to adopt *Luoma* [*Pinyin*].’ It facilitates learning English pronunciation and spelling, and languages other than English.’)
- (69) 我不贊成但也不反對，因如果是羅馬拼音也會帶動英文進步只是大家現在都習慣注音而已 o
(‘I remain neutral, because *Luoma Pinyin* can also boost English competence. The concern is that people are accustomed to Bopomofo.’)

Comment (68) specifies that Romanized phonetic systems 有利學英文拼音 *youli xue yingwen pinyin* ‘facilitate [...] English pronunciation and spelling.’ This comment reveals a

similar rationalization of evaluating a phonetic system based on its applicability to other languages, chiefly to English. Yeh's proposal is perceived to have *something* to do with English. The implication is also evident in Comment (69). Even though the viewer claims that s/he remains neutral, the viewer indeed reveals more positive attitudes toward adopting Romanized phonetic symbols. Adopting Romanized phonetic symbols 帶動英文進步 *daidong yingwen jinbu* 'boosts English competence.' As this ideological stance is the most prevalent among the 27 English-related comments from proponents, it is plausible to say that the perceived connection between Romanized phonetic systems and English is one chief reason why the metadiscourse about English appears.

These examples show different levels of discursive explicitness in how English is situated in this debated context. These missing links point to a more fundamental issue—Why does Romanized phonetic systems' (perceived) role in facilitating English learning matter so much?

6.2.2. Opponents' ideological stances and found links

An analysis on the disapproving comments against Yeh's proposal is particularly rewarding because disagreements also indicate potential discrepancies between viewers' conceptualizations and Yeh's. The refutations make ideological links discursively apparent. If the missing links in the proponents' comments show 'nothing wrong,' the explicitness in the

opponents' comments answers 'what's wrong.' It will be presented in this section that the association between English and Romanized phonetic scripts is considered blamable and non-existent. Moreover, though it is re-enunciated that English, not Romanized phonetic systems, leads to *guojijiegui*, the established language ideology does not justify scrapping Bopomofo.

A relatively large number of comments specify the connection between *guojijiegui* and English. These comments refute Yeh's statement and suggest that English can *guojijiegui*. Nonetheless, the opponents could hold further diverse evaluations. The five examples below from opponents show varying degrees of commitment to this established language ideology. They also express different levels of explicitness in linking the ideologizing process concerning English to the debate between two phonetic systems, as shown from (70) to (74).

- (70) 基本常識，真要與國際接軌不是要去學英文嗎??
(‘Isn't it basic common sense that you should learn English to *guojijiegui*?’)
- (71) 我們的文化都捨去，幹嘛不直接改英文當美國人更直接國際接軌
(‘Our culture is discarded. Why not directly change to English and become Americans? That can downright *guojijiegui*’)
- (72) 要與世界接軌，就應該加強英文能力，並培養國際觀。
(‘To *jiegui* with the world, we should strengthen our English ability and cultivate an international perspective.’)
- (73) 要接軌國際化就要中英一起來，不學羅馬拼音還不是很多人學英文嚇嚇叫
(‘To *guojijiegui*, [we] have to learn both Chinese and English. Without *Luoma Pinyin*, many people still learn to speak excellent English.’)
- (74) 要跟國際接軌是學美語及其他語系，改變國語拼音並無法提升增加第二種或第三種語言的認識
(‘To *guojijiegui* is to learn English and other languages. Changing the phonetic system for Guoyu does not familiarize the people with a second or third language.’)

Comment (70) phrases the connection between English and *guojijiegui* in a negative rhetorical question to affirm (Shao 2013) and to frame the established language ideology as truth (Eagleton 2007). The viewer terms this piece of information as 基本常識 *jiben changshi* ‘common sense.’ According to Fairclough (2015), what has been treated as common sense is ideological. Comment (71) ironically proposes to adopt English nationwide and to 當美國人 *dang meiguo ren* ‘become American.’ The comment reveals an essentialized link between language and identity. Viewer (71) distinguishes languages based on ownership (Widdowson 1994) where English is considered to be *others*. Speaking an *others*’ language questions a person’s identity. The one-to-one mapping between language and one’s identity does not describe how identity recognition is multiple and dynamic (Bucholtz & Hall 2004; 2005; 2010). However, the essentialized mapping is critical in anchoring identity and linking linguistic practice to social spheres (Bucholtz 2003). Though the comment backgrounds the established language ideology “English represents *guojijiegui*,” the comment simultaneously evaluates this established ideology (and the social practice which is believed to be thus motivated, i.e. scrapping Bopomofo) negative. Comment (72) claims that strengthening English competence and cultivating an international perspective are required to *guojijiegui*. This comment reveals a less obvious ideological stance to *guojijiegui* and English because other elements are also involved in the pursuit of *guojijiegui*. Similarly, Comment (73) gives Mandarin Chinese and English equal prominence in *guojijiegui* instead

of favoring English solely. Comment (74) states the importance of a second, even third language in the pursuit of *guojijiegui*. Viewer (74) criticizes the false belief that substituting the phonetic systems for *Guoyu* makes language acquisition demand less effort. From the dialogic perspective on negation (Martin & White 2005), the use of negation implies the existence of the positive assumption. That explains why the viewer feels the need to explicitly negate this belief. These comments illustrate that an established language ideology could be voiced and meet varying evaluations. In addition, the established link between *guojijiegui* and English is currently being re-examined. The dynamics is evident and accountable. The five comments dissociate *guojijiegui* from employing Romanized phonetic systems. The observation indicates that Yeh's association between Romanized phonetic systems and *guojijiegui* invokes the metadiscourse about English and *guojijiegui*. Another related analysis to further justify the observation will be presented in Section 6.4.

Though Romanized phonetic schemes are mostly distanced from *guojijiegui* in the opponents' comments, they 'define' Romanized phonetic scripts differently. Some assimilate Romanized phonetic symbols to English alphabets. The analogy is noteworthy because numerous languages are phonetic languages with Latin alphabets. However, the viewers tend to straightforward debate on whether Romanized phonetic systems are English letters, but not any other languages, such as Italian.²¹ Therefore, the analogy and the denied assimilation are

²¹ One comment states that *Luoma Pinyin* is used by Roman and therefore Taiwan should not adopt Romanized phonetic scripts. Another comment questions whether Yeh is Roman. These comments are interesting and in a

common. Seven comments phrase Romanized phonetic symbols as English alphabets. Yet they also make it explicit that employing Romanized phonetic schemes does not help improve English. Three comments are shown in (75), (76) and (77).

- (75) (...98 words...)用 26 個英文字母來拼國字的音，你學英文就駕輕就熟了嗎？DOG、BOY、SCHOOL，英文字詞文法這些你就可以不背了嗎？可以看了英文字就能正確的朗朗上口嗎？(...185 words...) ²²
(‘[You] notate phonetically *Guozi* with 26 English alphabets. Does that make learning English any easier for you? Don’t you need to learn and memorize DOG, BOY, SCHOOL, and grammar? Can you read English words correctly when you see one?’)
- (76) 為什麼使用羅馬拼音學中文叫做與國際接軌？明明從中能學到的也就只是先認識英文字母而已，文法發音什麼的有誰是透過會羅馬拼音學到的？(...17 words)
(‘Why can adopting Romanized phonetic systems for Taiwan Chinese be called *guojijiegui*? Apparently it is only English alphabets that we acquire. Who learns grammar and pronunciation via learning Romanized phonetic systems?’)
- (77) 羅馬拼音又不是英文 是哪來的接軌國際 外國人要學那是另一回事，我學外語他們也沒改成注音呀(...18 words...)
(‘*Luoma Pinyin* is not English. How do we *jiegui guoji* with *Luoma Pinyin*? Foreigners learning Chinese is a totally different issue. When I learned foreign languages, they didn’t change their phonetic notation systems to Bopomofo either.’)

Viewer (75) refutes the assumption that Romanized phonetic symbols facilitate English learning, but phrases the Romanization of Chinese Mandarin as *yong 26 ge yingwen zimu lai pin guozi* ‘notating *Guozi* with 26 English alphabets.’ The viewer uses 就 *jiu* ‘then’ to connect the prior utterance about annotating Chinese with 26 English alphabets and the three questions about English learning in sequence. The viewer further challenges this sequential order by phrasing them in rhetorical devices. The negations signify his/her assumption that these assumed advantages of adopting Romanized phonetic schemes to learning English

way lighthearted. However, due to their limited number of occurrences, these comments are not attended to.
²² 國字 *guozi*, literally ‘national characters,’ refers to the traditional Chinese scripts.

effectively are held by others (and from this context, possibly by proponents). The negative rhetorical questions refute these claims and emphasize that efforts still have to be made to learn English. On the one hand, Romanized phonetic symbols are English letters. On the other, they are not English. Comment (76) takes a similar ideological stance of both linking Romanized phonetic symbols to English letters and yet distinguishing it from actual English learning. Viewer (77) claims that foreigners did not change their notation to Bopomofo when s/he acquired foreign languages. The statement infers the viewer's disapproval in changing the phonetic system of Taiwan Mandarin for foreigners to acquire Mandarin better. These comments illustrate the unspecificity of what Romanized phonetic systems are, a distance between Romanized phonetic systems and English, and the certainty that it demands a lot more efforts to master English (than adopting phonetic symbols). These statements make it apparent that a discrepancy between proponents and opponents is not the index between *guojijiegui* and English. Rather, proponents and opponents show diverse opinions in whether an index exists between Romanized phonetic schemes and English.

This section addresses the relation between the viewers' polarized perspectives and their metadiscourse about English. Though the viewers' attitudes vary, opponents and proponents predominately share the identical established language ideology—that English can *guojijiegui*. It has been made clear that a major difference between proponents' and

opponents' stances lies in whether an analogical link resides between English and Romanized phonetic symbols. Three major ideological stances can be identified in the proponents' comments, including "English leads to *guojijiegui*," "Bopomofo leads to bad English," and "Romanized phonetic systems make English better." Three ideological stances are also identified in opponents' comments, including "English leads to *guojijiegui*," "Romanized phonetic systems are English letters, but not English," and "Romanized phonetic systems do not make English better." When they are graphically presented as Figure 21 below shows, interesting patterns could be spotted.




Figure 21. Language ideologies in proponents' and opponents' comments

An arrow indicates an indexing, or attributing relation. Because the number of proponents is smaller, the arrows are presented in thinner lines while the arrows representing opponents'

ideas in broader lines. A cross on an arrow shows verbally explicit dissociation of the two. The figure illustrates that both proponents and opponents discuss the links between Romanized phonetic schemes and English and that between English and *guojijiegui*. The latter is chiefly affirmed. Though the study discovers that the debate sits at the existence of the link between English and Romanized phonetic symbols, the finding does not explain why some comments mention English without further linking it to the current debate. The next section draws from one comment to discuss how the metadiscourse of English ‘behave.’


6.3 YouTube Comments: the Ideologizing Process of English

Drawing from news comments on YouTube, this section discusses what the metadiscourse about English concerns when the viewers are no longer taking polarized perspectives. This allows the study to probe into contestations among and within comments. Together with Section 6.4, these two sections are aimed to investigate whether there exists more textual evidence to account for the emergence of the metadiscourse concerning English. The 110 comments manifest ideological stances on three established language ideologies, on English and *guojijiegui*, on English and Romanization and on English and self-deprecation. Table 8 briefly summarizes the 9 ideological stances and the three established language ideologies.

Table 8. The established language ideologies and the ideological stances in YouTube news comments.

Established language ideologies	Ideological stances
English represent competitiveness.	English leads to competitiveness
	English doesn't promise <i>guojijiegui</i> .
	English crucial to competitiveness doesn't justify Bopomofo abrogation.
Romanization facilitates English learning.	Romanized phonetic systems make it easier to learn English.
	Romanized phonetic systems facilitate English pronunciation learning.
	Romanized phonetic symbols are English alphabets
	Romanized phonetic symbols are not English.
English competence is desired.	My bad English stops me from learning Romanized phonetic systems well
	Yeh can't speak English.

Due to the relatively smaller number of comments, language ideologies with 2 occurrences and more are discussed.



6.3.1 Ideological stances on “English represents competitiveness.”

Three ideological stances concern the established language ideology “English leads to competitiveness”. The most prevailing ideological stance “English can *guojijiegui*” with 44 comments, can be seen both in approving and disapproving comments. The ideological stance distinguishes it from the established language ideology because it is foregrounded. The association is explicitly affirmed and naturalized, as shown in (78) and (79) below.

(78) 英文學好自然可以國際接軌 跟注音完全無關 (...7 words...)

(‘Good English naturally *guojijiegui*. [This] has nothing to do with *Zhuyin*.’)

(79) 雖然很不甘願 但是以大範圍去思考 如果改用羅馬拼音的話 可以減輕學習壓力 同時可以更快認識英文 而不會出現中文跟英文完全是不同語言 學習起來更消耗時間 現在英文是世界主流 且台灣正在落後 想要加速跟上世界 這提案是對台灣有幫助 (...14 words...)

(‘Even though I’m reluctant to [use *Luoma Pinyin*], we have to see the bigger picture. If we adopt *Luoma Pinyin*, this can lessen our scholastic pressure and we can pick up English faster. We will not be disturbed by the fact that it is time consuming to pick up English, which is totally different from Mandarin Chinese. English is the global mainstream and Taiwan is regressing. If we want to keep up with the world, this proposal is beneficial to Taiwan.’)

The 自然 *ziran* ‘naturally’ in the statement 英文學好自然可以國際接軌 *yingwen xue hao ziran keyi guojijiegui* ‘Good English naturally *guojijiegui*’ neutralizes the connection between English and *guojijiegui*. From the dialogic perspective, the term introduces shared values and beliefs that are treated as commonsensical (Martin & White 2005). The connection is phrased as undoubted and thus ideological (Fairclough 2015). The term is what Martin and White (2005) call ‘contractive’ in that the expression excludes possibility of other opposing evaluations by treating this conceptualization as factual. This comment also explicates that English is introduced into this current discourse because of the term *guojijiegui*, a term that Yeh promotes in her proposal speech. The point that will be further discussed in Section 6.4.

The negation 無 *wu* ‘no’ in 跟注音完全無關 carries and argues against the positive claim that *guojijiegui* has something to do with Bopomofo (see Martin and White (2005) on the dialogic nature of negation). Comment (79), from a self-claimed reluctant proponent of the language policy proposal, believes that Romanized phonetic scripts make Taiwanese 更快認識英文 *gen gkuai renshi yingwen* ‘pick up English faster..’ However, the disclaimer 很不甘願 *hen bu ganyuan* ‘(I’m) very reluctant’ also shows his/her compromising attitudes toward adopting Romanized phonetic schemes. The two comments make it clear that the role

Romanized phonetic systems play is debatable.

A contesting ideological stance “English does not promise *guojijiegui*,” found in 4 comments, questions the association between English and *guojijiegui*. Expectedly, these viewers tend to offer their own perspectives about what defines *guojijiegui*, and what can be counted as a globally dominant language, as examples shown in (80) and (81).

(80) 世界接軌???. 中文使用人數不比英文少 還不推廣注音?!

(‘Global connection??? The Mandarin-speaking population is not smaller than the English-speaking population. Aren’t we supposed to promote Bopomofo?!’)

(81) [...] 你想去中化²³,那是你的想法。關全球接軌有關嗎?非洲不也很多國說英文,他們在西方眼中的那裏

(‘If you want to distance our language from Chinese heritage, this is simply your idea. Does it have anything to do with global connection? Don’t quite a number of African countries speak English? Where are they in the eye of Western countries?’)

Comment (80) places three question marks after 接軌 *jiegui*, expressing the viewer’s doubt and even disapproval of this connection between English and *guojijiegui*. The growing Chinese-speaking population wanes the perceived need to acquire English. Comment (81) uses African countries to invite a counter-reading of the link between English and *guojijiegui*, inferring that it is not English that leads to *guojijiegui*. This contestation also discussed in Section 5.3 shows that contesting views to prominent language ideologies are expected (Woolard 1998).

Another ideological stance is manifested in the sarcastic propose to abrogate Mandarin Chinese and to officialize English. The proposal of abandoning Mandarin Chinese cannot be

²³ Some viewers believe that the abrogation of Bopomofo has political concerns. Though probably all language policy is expected to have political implications and ideologies, the cross-strait political issues go beyond the scope of the study. The study addresses the issue when necessary.

read at face-value. These comments, in a total number of 25, tend to naturalize the link between *guojijiegui* and English. The drastic proposals are intended to emphasize how absurd they take the proposal as. Two examples are shown in (82) and (83).

(82) 廢除國語直接英文接軌不就接軌國際更快，自己的文化都不支持，你自己還剩下什麼啊？

(‘Wouldn’t it be more effective to simply abolish Guoyu and to speak English? [You] do not identify with your own culture. What is left of you?’)

(83) 那乾脆連國字都不用學 直接全面英文化 當一個外國人 不是更好 還當甚麼台灣人

(‘Wouldn’t it be better if [we] quit learning *Guozi*, simply English-ize everything and become foreigners? Why bother being Taiwanese?’)

In Comment (82), Bopomofo is phrased as 自己的文化 *ziji de wenhua* ‘own culture.’ A phonetic system is shown to carry sociocultural meanings. The interrogative 你自己還剩下什麼啊 *Ni ziji hai shengxia shenme a?* ‘What is left of you’ first relates linguistic practice to culture and then to identity (Bucholtz & Hall 2004; 2005; 2010). Comment (83) sarcastically proposes to English-ize everything to become foreigners. The question 還當甚麼台灣人 *Hai dang shenme taiwan ren* ‘Why bother being Taiwanese?’ describes the perceived essentialized identity link between speaking *Guoyu* and Taiwanese identity (Dupré 2013). Remarkably, unless the viewers deliberately dissociate English from Romanized phonetic systems in their comments, this ideological stance placed under this current situation could assume the viewers’ assertion that employing Romanized phonetic schemes was intended to relate to English learning. Otherwise the emergence of the metadiscourse of English and the criticism against it could not be accounted for.

The three ideological stances, “English leads to competitiveness,” “English doesn’t promise competitiveness,” and “English crucial to competitiveness does not justify the abrogation of Bopomofo,” are repetitively manifested in metadiscourse about English in data from different sources discussed so far. However, seldom do the viewers reflect critically on what *guojijiegui* means, and how ‘fixed’ it is with English. A section that examines the associations between *guojijiegui* and linguistic practice will be presented later in Section 6.4.

6.3.2 Ideological stances on “Romanized phonetic schemes are related to English.”

It has been shown previously that English is introduced into the debate because it has been more conventionally associated with the term *guojijiegui* than Romanized phonetic symbols. Four ideological stances evaluate Romanized phonetic symbols and their (lack of) connections with English. Some viewers think that Yeh wrongly believes that Romanized phonetic systems help English learning. Put differently, these viewers comment on the assumption that the proposal was thus motivated. However, affirmative comments are also seen. This established language ideologies and its ideological stances also explicate that an established language ideology can be prevalingly disfavored and evaluated. It however has to be noted that popularly criticized established language ideologies seem less common due to the normalizing nature of language ideologies.

The ideological stance “Romanization makes English learning easier,” with 19

occurrences, values the beneficial role Romanized phonetic systems play in English learning.

The ideological stance also backgrounds the established language ideology that English means competitiveness, two examples shown in (84) and (85).

(84) 所以中國現在才能進步快速 學習羅馬拼音同時也在認識英文 就不用要學習注音
又要學中文又要學英文 多出的時間還可以學習別的知識 這樣才能跟上世界 別人
已經在學別的知識 結果台灣還在教注音

(‘That’s why China is developing swiftly. [They] get to know English whilst learning *Luoma Pinyin*. [They] don’t have to learn Zhuyin, and Mandarin Chinese, and English. The time spared can be invested in learning other subjects. This way [they] can keep up with the world. While others are acquiring new knowledge, Taiwan is still learning Zhuyin.’)

(85) 為了國際化丟掉台灣特有文化? 為何不注音跟羅馬一起學? 從小一, 注音英文同
步學習都好過捨棄原有文化吧!

(‘Abandoning unique Taiwanese culture just for internationalization? Why can’t [we] learn both Zhuyin and *Luoma* [Pinyin]? Acquiring both Zhuyin and English since the first year in elementary school is way better than discarding the heritage.’)

As can be seen in (84), Romanization of Mandarin Chinese is attributing to China’s swift development. The viewer continues to elaborate that speakers are assumed to get familiar with English while learning Romanized phonetic systems. Viewer (85) also reflects that scrapping Bopomofo spares time for children to learn more in order to 才能跟上世界 *zheyang caineng genshang shijie* ‘keep up with the world.’ This investment-oriented perspective on language learning (De Swaan 2010) urges the viewer to favor a most economic choice to language learning. An emphasis on instrumentality is therefore expected and seems “rational”. Viewer (85) suggests learning both Bopomofo and Romanized phonetic symbols but patently for distinct motivations. Viewer (85) does not oppose learning Romanized phonetic systems, implying his/her positive attitudes toward Romanization. The

viewer first refers to the two phonetic systems as 注音跟羅馬 *Zhuyin gen Luoma* ‘Bopomofo and Luoma [Pinyin].’ Yet, the phrase becomes 注音英文 *Zhuyin yingwen* ‘Bopomofo [and] English’ in the next sentence. The two statements reveal the viewer’s analogy that Romanized phonetic schemes are related to English learning. The ideological stance in the two comments acknowledges that adopting Romanized phonetic schemes facilitates English learning though they hold contrastive opinions about preserving Bopomofo. The comments also illustrate the significance of adopting a discursive approach to language planning, as a discursive analysis shows that the complicated ideologizing process behind an approval-disapproval poll.

An ideological stance specifies that Romanized phonetic schemes can help improve pronunciation and spelling. For example, the ideological stance “Romanized phonetic systems facilitate English pronunciation learning” is found in four comments, as an example shown in (86).

(86) 羅馬拼音對學英文有很大好處，英文字就算看不懂意思，也能唸個大概。電腦時代也有好處，全世界鍵盤有印注音符號的只有台灣。要是出國用電腦，不會盲打的人，就無法打字了。(…227 words…)

(‘*Luoma Pinyin* benefits English learning a lot. Even [when we] don’t recognized a word, [we] can still get the pronunciation roughly right.’)

Viewer (86) asserts that adopting a Romanized phonetic system allows English learners to 唸個大概 *nian ge dagai* ‘get the pronunciation roughly right’ even when they could not grasp the meaning. (Hymes 1971; 2000 [1965]) uses the term ‘communicative competence’ to claim that competence refers to the knowledge of speaking in grammatically and socially

appropriate manner. The act of roughly reading an unfamiliar word deviates from how competence is defined. Yet the comment also reveals the viewer's eagerness to get closer to English. The comment also evidences that the positive evaluations are not targeted at adopting Romanized phonetic systems solely. Rather, the positive attitudes should be understood as a reflection on the societal eagerness and pressure to acquire English, which is believed to become more manageable with a Romanized phonetic system for Mandarin Chinese.

Another ideological stance concerns how Romanized phonetic symbols are English alphabets. The symbols are referred to as 英文 *yingwen* 'English' or 英文字母 (母) *yingwen zi(mu)* 'English alphabets.' The direct link of Romanized phonetic symbols to English, but seldom to other phonetic languages such as German and Italian, accentuates how the ideological stance shapes the viewers' interpretations of this language policy proposal. With 12 occurrences, this ideological stance can be manifested in both proponents' and opponents' comments, respectively shown in (87) to (88).

- (87) (...96 words...) ㄅㄆㄇ是一套落伍的系統，他的功能完全可以由英文字母取代，學ㄅㄆㄇ只是增加小朋友的負擔，長大就忘了，毫無用處！(...92 words...)
(‘Bopomofo is an outdated system. Its function can be entirely replaced by English alphabets. Learning Bopomofo is purely toilsome for kids. They forget Bopomofo when they grow older. [Bopomofo is] totally useless.’)
- (88) 08 從小跟父母學客語也沒有用英文阿，從小都是一個個生活詞彙學起，然後在生活中慢慢融會貫通，就自然而然會了，用英文學客家話？妳去問問傳統的客家人這樣學？²⁴

²⁴ The number 08 is the euphemized transliteration from the Taiwanese characters 恁爸 *lín-pē*. According to the online New Holo Dictionary by Ministry of Education (https://twblg.dict.edu.tw/holodict_new/default.jsp),

(‘I learned to speak Hakka with my parents without using English. Since young, I’ve learned daily vocabulary word by word. And I gradually mastered the language as I lived with it. Naturally I picked up the language. Learn Hakka with English? Go ask some Hakka natives. Who would learn Hakka this way?’)

Viewer (87) welcomes to have 英文字母 *yingwen zi(mu)* ‘English letters’ to replace

Bopomofo, which is described as outdated and toilsome to acquire. The mentioning of

‘English letters’ suggests that the viewer assimilates Romanized phonetic systems to English.

Viewer (88) reflects on how s/he acquired Hakka from daily vocabulary in natural

environment 也沒有用英文阿 *ye meiyou yong yingwen a* ‘without using English’. The

comment is likely to respond to Yeh’s statement that a Romanized phonetic system could

notate all languages (see Section 6.1). Romanized phonetic systems are phrased as 英文

yingwen ‘English’ in the comment, implicating that they are possibly treated as similar. The

use of generic nouns 傳統的客家人 *chuantong de kejia ren* ‘Hakka natives’ asserts the

viewer’s stance as shared and factual (Scheibman 2007). As noted by Scheibman (2007),

“speakers use these generalizations to evaluate and strengthen stance; and to create

intersubjective ties both by generalizing experience and attitude and by ratifying others’

points of view” (118). The common knowledge and past experience are deployed by the

viewer as rhetorical devices to exert higher authority to challenge Yeh’s assertion that a

Romanized phonetic system expectedly notates every language. In spite of Viewer’s (86) and

this is a vulgar term mostly used by a male to refer to oneself. Literally ‘your father,’ the term usually accompanies a sense of derogation.

(87)'s respective attitudes, the two examples show the discursive generalization of Romanized phonetic systems to English.

A contesting ideological stance distances Romanized phonetic symbols from English, with 30 occurrences. Some viewers believe that the incorrect association between Romanized phonetic symbols and learning English motivates such a proposal. These viewers would refute the assumption which they think certain proponents to hold, as shown in (89) and (90).

(89) 我覺得他可能是以外國人的角度來看吧，應該是大多數外國人都是用羅馬拼音來學中文，至於我們自己要不要也學，這就有點牽強了吧，羅馬拼音跟英文根本也是兩種不同的東西啊，何必要重新學習這個東西，不如好好改改學英文的方式還比較好

(‘I think perhaps [Yeh] is saying this from a foreigner’s perspective. Maybe most foreigners learn Mandarin Chinese with *Luoma Pinyin*. [The discussion on] whether we should also learn [*Luoma Pinyin*] is a bit far-fetched. *Luoma Pinyin* and English are two fundamentally different things. Why do [we] have to start all over again? It’s more practical to modify the way of learning English.’)

(90) 如果要丟掉勺夕冂匸走向國際話那乾脆直接廢除國文就好啦！全世界的人都用英文嘛！用羅馬拼音有個毛用

(‘If Bopomofo has to be scrapped to go internationalized, why [don’t we] abandon Guowen altogether! People around the world speak English anyway! What can adopting *Luoma Pinyin* achieve?’)

Viewer (89) treats Romanized phonetic systems and English as 根本也是兩種不同的東西 *genben ye shi liang zhong butong de dongxi* ‘two fundamentally different things.’ Together with the last sentence 不如好好改改學英文的方式還比較好 *buru haohao gaigai xue yingwen de fangshi hai bijiao hao* ‘It’s more practical to revise the way of learning English,’ the viewer presupposes that adopting Romanized phonetic schemes is aimed for improving English. A similar ideological stance manifested in an irony is also seen in Comment (90).

The sentences 全世界的人都用英文嘛 *quanshijie de ren du yong yingwen ma* ‘People around the world all speak English anyway!’ overgeneralize the homogeneity of treating English as a global language. The quantifier 全世界的人 *quanshijie de ren* ‘everyone in the world’ could be said to be a generic noun or a hyperbole because not every individual on this planet speaks English. The rhetoric interrogative 用羅馬拼音有個毛用 *yong Luoma Pinyin you ge mao yong* ‘What can adopting Romanized phonetic systems achieve?’ specifies that English is valued over Romanized phonetic systems. The irony makes the viewer’s negative attitudes toward employing Romanized phonetic systems apparent. These comments evaluate an ‘incorrect’ established language ideology that these viewers believe to prevail in Yeh’s proposal—that Romanized phonetic symbols are connected to English. Established language ideologies are still challenged to contest what viewers believe to be rationalized by others. In the current discourse, these viewers take a higher epistemic stance through their use of generic nouns.

This section presents four ideological stances of the established language ideology “Romanized phonetic scripts facilitate English learning,” including “Romanization makes it easier to learn English,” “Romanized phonetic systems facilitate English pronunciation learning,” “Romanized phonetic symbols are English alphabets,” and “Romanized phonetic symbols are not English.” Despite the polarized perspectives, a bigger issue that requires

stance is particularly interesting in how deprecation toward one's English is brought up in the first place. It could be possible that the viewers are extending their own experience of learning English to Romanized phonetic symbols. The ideological stance assumes that Romanized phonetic systems and English are related. The rationalization stereotypically associates English with possible disorientation to Romanized phonetic symbols.

The other ideological stance regards evaluations on Yeh's English. The short proposal speech at the hustings (see Section 6.1) shows her codeswitching between Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese. Her pronunciation of Bopomofo is criticized by some for sounding non-standard. No information concerning English competence is revealed at the hustings. The non-standard pronunciation is mapped onto her lack of English competence. The fractal recursivity (Irvine & Gal 2000; Gal & Irvine 2019), i.e. the phenomenon of extending one pair of contrasts to other dimensions through discourse, is evident in (93) and (94).

(93) 聽他講話，我大概也知道她英文程度到那裡

(‘Judging from the way she speaks, I can probably know how she speaks English.’)

(94) 你用羅馬拼音唸完一本書給我聽。講話都台灣國語，ㄅㄆㄇ發音都不標準，你還ABC,

(‘I dare you to read a book with Romanized phonetic symbols. [You] speak Taiwanese-accented Mandarin, [you] can't even pronounce Bopomofo correctly, let alone English.’)

Though Comment (93) itself contains no explicit evaluative terms concerning Yeh's English, the comment is far from an appraisal of Yeh's competence. The phrase 聽他講話 *ting ta jianghua* ‘judging from the way she speaks’ refers her linguistic performance at the hustings, where she spoke only in Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese. Significantly, the judgment is

extended to Yeh's English proficiency. The viewer is implying that Yeh probably does not speak the idealized standard English. Viewer (94) criticizes her non-standard pronunciation. The use of the adverbial 還 *hai* 'still' shows the viewer's subjective counter-expression to introduce the following situation as unlikely (G. Wu 2009). The viewer questions Yeh's capability of using Romanized phonetic symbols and speaking English. Both comments see how the viewers extend their negative evaluations of Yeh's accented Bopomofo to refute her proposal of abolishing Bopomofo and to challenge her ability to speak English. Put differently, accented speech discredits the contents of Yeh's speech. The observation is in line with Lippi-Green's (1997) standard language ideology. Lippi-Green defines an ideal for non-accented speech as "a bias toward an abstract, idealized homogeneous language, which is imposed and maintained by dominant institutions and which has as its model the written language, but which is drawn primarily from the spoken language of the upper middle class" (1997, 64). In this case, Yeh's perceived non-standard pronunciation of Bopomofo is extended to her other linguistic performance. Irvine and Gal (2000) propose that a linguistic quality can recursively extend to other social attributes in a contrastive sense. Gal and Irvine (2019) term this mechanism 'axis of differentiation.' In Comments (93) and (94), non-standard Bopomofo contrasts with standard pronunciation. The contrastive pair is mapped to the ability to master Romanized phonetic schemes and English, and remarkably to the lack of credibility in proposing to replace Bopomofo with Romanized phonetic systems.

Her non-standard pronunciation forms a ‘fractal blockage’ (Gal & Irvine 2019, 158) that stops her from being recognized to possess the more desired attributes in the contrastive pairs.

Table 9 summarizes the axis of differentiation of standardness in the two viewers’ comments.

Table 9. The non-standards/standards axis of differentiation

Nonstandard pronunciation	Standard (inferred) pronunciation
bad in English	Fluent in English
can’t master Romanized phonetic systems	Has the right to talk about adopting Romanized phonetic systems
speak Taiwanese-accented Mandarin	Speak standard Taiwan Mandarin
can’t get Bopomofo right	Know how standard Bopomofo should sound
You (Yeh)	I (the viewers)

This section has discussed news comments which include the metadiscourse about English. Nine ideological stances are identified. The 9 ideological stances background three established language ideologies. The ideologization web is presented in Figure 22 below. The numbers in the parentheses note the number of comments where these ideological stances are manifested. In discussing *guojijiegui* and Romanized phonetic systems, English is introduced into the discourse either to refute or to affirm Yeh’s statement that adopting Romanize phonetic systems can *guojijiegui*, as revealed in the established language ideology “Romanized phonetic systems facilitate English learning” and its four ideological stances. Yet, the established language ideology could not account for comments that do not refer to Romanized phonetic systems. That is, Sections 6.2 and 6.3 have shown with different datasets that Romanized phonetic schemes and English are ideologically related. Could it be possible

that something also invoke the metadiscourse of English in addition to the perceived assimilation (both received or refuted) between Romanized phonetic symbols and English? The next section proposes an account of this observation with the theory of intertextuality, i.e. the connection among various texts (Briggs & Bauman 1992; Bauman 2004; Hill 2005; Tovares 2005; Tannen 2006).






Figure 22. The ideologization web in YouTube news comments

6.4 *Guojijiegui* and Linguistic Practice

As already discussed in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, the viewers differ in opinions on how Romanized phonetic systems help English learning. This section further argues that the perceived similarity/relevance between English and Romanized phonetic systems are not a sufficient condition to introduce English into the discourse. The metadiscourse is shaped by a dominant established language ideology that urges speakers to relate the discourse of the Bopomofo abrogation and Romanization promotion to the metadiscourse of English. This section discusses how the trendy expression 國際接軌 *guojijiegui* is conceptualized in relation to language practice in Taiwan and what role language ideologies and indexicality play in the meaning-making process. YouTube comments gathered from 16 news pages are examined to analyze how *guojijiegui* is inked to linguistic practice. All comments where *guojijiegui* is specifically mentioned are retrieved and analyzed. Though the term is catchy, it has no direct referent. Also based on the previous discussions in this chapter, it is established that *guojijiegui* has implicit, unspecified, but shared meanings ‘out there’ that speakers probably seldom question. With the term being so popular yet undefined, the public’s discussion on the language policy proposal by Yeh to achieve *guojijiegui* also offers a perfect opportunity to explore how the term is ideologized with regard to linguistic practice and language choices. The section of the study will show that the viewers’ understanding of *guojijiegui* from earlier texts becomes “extra-textual knowledge” (John Gumperz 1996, 397)

that influences their interpretations of Yeh's proposal and shapes the current metalinguistic discussion, as an example of how forms and meanings travel along texts, namely, intertextuality (Kristeva 1980; Bakhtin 1986; Briggs & Bauman 1992).

A total of 108 comments are analyzed. With the relatively limited number of available comments, this section does not aim at drawing generalizations. Rather, the study takes advantage of the overt metadiscourse to examine dynamics of language ideology and indexicality related to *guojijiegui*, which have been taken as normative, and are seldom questioned and challenged (Silverstein 1979; Schieffelin et al. 1998; Kroskrity 2004). Each ideological stance has to be found in at least two comments to be discussed in this study. The 108 comments where the conceptualizations of *guojijiegui* are explicitly associated with linguistic practice reveal that the discussion about *guojijiegui* is not restricted to phonetic schemes, but extended to several languages. The five subsections discuss the ideological links between *guojijiegui* and Romanized phonetic schemes, English, Bopomofo, Chinese and Taiwanese, as well as their respective indexical values (Eckert 2008).

6.4.1 *Guojijiegui* and Romanized Phonetic Schemes

Yeh proposes to adopt Romanized phonetic schemes in order to *guojijiegui*, leading viewers to critique on the association between *guojijiegui* and the practice of Romanized phonetic schemes. It has been established in Section 6.2 that a major site of contestation lies

in whether Romanized phonetic systems and English are conceptually related. The conceptualization distinction leads to contesting ideological stances. Two contradictory ideological stances are found, “Romanized phonetic systems can *guojijiegui*,” and “Romanized phonetic systems can’t *guojijiegui*.”

Some deliberately rebut the notion that adopting Romanized phonetic schemes would lead to *guojijiegui*, an indexical link between *guojijiegui* and Romanized phonetic schemes which these viewers believe Yeh to hold. Two comments are shown in (95) and (96) below.

(95) 原來廢除注音，使用羅馬拼音就是和國際接軌啊！我智商太低，可以解釋一下邏輯在哪嗎??

(‘So abrogating Zhuyin and adopting *Luoma Pinyin* mean *guojijiegui*! I’m simply too dumb, can (someone) show me how this logic works?’)

(96) 羅馬拼音跟英文是一樣東西嗎？不是所有英文字母的事物都是英文好嗎？羅馬拼音這麼簡單需要學嗎？台灣沒有注音還算台灣？學了羅馬拼音就能國際化？

(‘Do *Luoma Pinyin* and English refer to the same thing? Not everything with English letters is English, OK? Do we need to learn *Luoma Pinyin* when it is so easy? Is Taiwan still Taiwan without Bopomofo? With *Luoma Pinyin*, can we call ourselves internationalized?’)

In the form of a sarcasm following a self-deprecation 我智商太低 *wo zhishang tai di* ‘I’m simply too dumb,’ Comment (95) derides the lack of logical reasoning behind replacing Bopomofo with Romanized phonetic schemes to *guojijiegui*. Comment (96) believes that Yeh incorrectly associates Romanized phonetic symbols with English. Though it remains unknown why Yeh made such a proposal, Viewer (96) presupposes that English plays a part in Yeh’s rationalization between Romanized phonetic schemes and *guojijiegui*, as also seen in the previous Sections 6.2 and 6.3. The refutation and rhetorical questioning accentuate the

fact that the viewers deploy shared but unspecified knowledge of *guojijiegui*. It also shows that an abstract quality such as *guojijiegui* can be defined by outlining a contrastive image of what is not *guojijiegui* (see Gal and Irvine (2019)). The deployment is particularly frequent in the discussion about this fixed expression. The contrastive pairing is further extended to differences in linguistic practice. The significance will be discussed in Section 4.5.

Some affirm the existence of a connection between Romanized phonetic schemes and *guojijiegui*. This ideological stance is found in the viewers' general assertion that Taiwan should adopt Romanized phonetic schemes, either because Romanization facilitates English learning, as seen in Comment (97), or because Romanized phonetic schemes help foreigners learn Taiwan Mandarin, as seen in Comment (98).

(97) 注音可以不用完全廢掉.我贊成羅馬拼音.因為這樣學英文時會更加容易.這是事實.想跟國際接軌.英文真的很重要.無關出賣台灣文化.而是有沒有遠見.羅馬拼音也可以是一種選項.

(‘Zhuyin does not need to be completely abolished. I agree that *Luoma Pinyin* should be adopted. Because this makes English learning easier. This is a fact. [If we] want to *guojijiegui*, English is of great importance. [This] is not about betraying Taiwanese culture. It is a matter of having the foresight. Adopting *Luoma Pinyin* can be an option.’)

(98) 羅馬拼音讓外國人更能學習中文。確是有點符合"國際接軌"

(‘*Luoma Pinyin* indeed makes it easier for foreigners to acquire Mandarin Chinese. This kind of corresponds to *guojijiegui*.’)

Viewer (97) affirms the connection between Romanized phonetic schemes and *guojijiegui* because adopting Romanized phonetic schemes makes English learning more manageable.

Viewer (97) does not find adopting Romanized phonetic schemes and Bopomofo necessarily conflicting. This illustrates that Bopomofo and Romanized phonetic schemes are not

conceptualized as either-or. The rationalization differs from Yeh's proposal. The disclaimer to deny a sense of betrayal accompanied by adopting Romanized phonetic schemes implies the viewer's awareness that Bopomofo is a cultural symbol from the dialogic perspective (Martin & White 2005). Using Romanized phonetic schemes is linked to 有遠見 *you yuan jian* "having the foresight." The comment explicates that the differences in opinions on the proposal are mapped onto personal traits of viewers having the foresight or not. Viewer (98) sees a positive cultural contact mediated by Chinese learning as a definition of *guojijiegui*, but only 有點 *youdian* 'kind of.' The use of the adverb *youdian* presupposes that particular languages can entirely *guojijiegui*, not just 'sort of.' In other words, a generally agreed-upon but implicit definition for *guojijiegui* in terms of linguistic practice exists. The comment instantiates that the act of *guojijiegui* is also understood as how to make Mandarin Chinese more accessible for foreigners. The concern corresponds to the debate of phonetic schemes in 2000 (cf. Chiung 2001; H.-L. Wang 2002; L.-Y. Wang 2002; Her 2005). Yet, the adverb shows that there is more entrenched understanding of *guojijiegui* than the Romanization of Mandarin Chinese. In addition to *guojijiegui*, adopting Romanized phonetic schemes is also described by other viewers to be "foreign," and to lead to "non-standard Chinese pronunciation." Other more prevalent values of Romanized phonetic systems will be discussed in Section 6.5.

The two conflicting ideological stances make it apparent that adopting Romanized

phonetic schemes is comprehended differently with regard to its (lack of) association with *guojijiegui*. The viewers' perceived absence of the connection between Romanized phonetic schemes and *guojijiegui* suggests that the intertextual link between *guojijiegui* and the debate in 2000 is not as established, leading the viewers to either refute the indexical link or discursively tone down the association.

6.4.2 *Guojijiegui* and English

The observation that English is mentioned is noteworthy as Yeh's proposal does not explicitly mention English. The section thus proposes that English is introduced into the current discourse because the expression *guojijiegui* links Yeh's discourse about phonetic schemes to prior texts where *guojijiegui* occurs, and contributes to shaping the viewers' metalinguistic discussion. Two types of discourse about English and *guojijiegui* are identified, but they both background the established language ideology that English is the language for *guojijiegui*.

A majority of the viewers explicitly disagree that adopting Romanized phonetic schemes could lead to *guojijiegui*. These comments claim that English should be promoted instead. The term *guojijiegui* is discursively linked to English and introduces the metadiscourse of English into the current debate, as exemplified in (99) and (100).

(99) 跟國際接軌就學英語！

(‘Learn English if [we] want to *guojijiegui*.’)

(100) 跟國際接軌應該多推廣英文..

(‘To *guojijiegui*, English should be promoted more vigorously.’)

The comments that link *guojijiegui* with English tend to phrase *guojijiegui* mostly as a goal while learning English is discursively constructed as the solution and the means, as the two examples present. The structural similarities in describing *guojijiegui* and English suggest that the “extra-textual knowledge” (John Gumperz 1996) of the association between *guojijiegui* and English is shared. The association can be said to be in direct indexicality because the viewers “can easily characterize it with the same or almost the same metapragmatic expressions” (Hill 2005, 114).

The ideological stance can also be manifested in the viewers’ sarcastic proposals, such as to officialize English, as seen in (101), and to demand government officials to adopt English as the language at work, as shown in (102). These comments acknowledge the indexical relation between *guojijiegui* and English. However, the sarcastic suggestions embody the viewers’ strong disapproval against abolishing Bopomofo. In such metadiscourse, conceptualizations about national/official languages and identity are at work and dominate the ideologization of English.

(101) 減輕負擔？直接廢除中文改學英文就好啦！要與國際接軌嘛~等台灣全面廢除中文改學英文時，台灣人就可以說自己是美國人了，這樣夠減輕負擔了嗎？

(‘To alleviate the burden? How about simply banning Mandarin Chinese and learning English instead! Since we want to *guojijiegui*~ When English becomes pervasive and Mandarin Chinese is abolished entirely, Taiwanese can self-identify as American, does this alleviate the burden?’)

(102) 丟掉ㄅㄆㄇㄏ，會怎樣？剛學會注音的小學生要重學？怕英文的人不是照樣怕？要廢注音來與國際接軌，在國會的時候，都講英文，不僅接軌，還領先世界。

(‘Abolishing Bopomofo, what would that be like? School kids who have just learned Bopomofo have to start over again. Don’t people who are afraid of English still feel intimidated? (Rather than) abolishing Bopomofo to *guojijiegui*, when (at interpellation) in the Legislative Yuan, speak English only. This way we are not merely *jiegui*, but also making a pioneering move.’)

Viewer (101) proposes English to become the official language. Similarly, Viewer (102) suggests to list English as a language at the Legislative Yuan.²⁵ They both relate the language use of English to an official sector to disapprove Yeh’s language policy proposal. Viewer (101) states that adopting Romanized phonetic schemes does not relieve the burden caused by learning English. Similarly, Comment (102) states that the proposal does not help make English learning less dreadful. The 怕 *pa* ‘feeling intimidated’ echoes Yeh’s statement *hōo lán ê gín-á* 不會害怕蝌蚪文 ‘[This] frees our children from fearing *kedouwen*.’ The observation also evidences that *guojijiegui* is an intertextual cue which invokes viewers’ prior knowledge to interpret current discourse. Adopting Romanized phonetic schemes is perceived as abandoning Taiwanese identity and legitimizing English is referred to as accepting American identity. Essentialized indexical links between languages and identity labels play a critical role in interpreting language practice in a socially meaningful way (Bucholtz 2003).

The two ideological stances evaluate the indexical link between *guojijiegui* and English. Regardless of their respective opinions and regardless of the truthfulness of this belief, the significance lies in how viewers relate this language policy proposal to English.

²⁵ 國會 *Guohui* is not a current institute in Taiwan’s democracy. And Legislative Yuan serves similar functions. Therefore the study translates *guohui* into the Legislative Yuan to avoid confusion.

6.4.3 *Guojijiegui* and Taiwan Mandarin

The associations between Mandarin Chinese and *guojijiegui* are mostly seen in two types of discourse, rhetorical sarcasm to propose to ban Mandarin Chinese, and explicit attachment of Bopomofo first to Mandarin Chinese and then to Taiwanese, i.e. the public's recognition of Taiwanese sociocultural and sociolinguistic phenomenon as positive, local and unique (Zemanek 2017). Though the two discursive strategies both distance Mandarin Chinese from *guojijiegui*, they show strong preference for Mandarin Chinese. Two examples are shown in (103) and (104) below.

(103) 接軌...? 要不要乾脆廢除國語、台語，全部講英語不是更快？外國人想學中文可以自己加註羅馬拼音就好，為何我們要配合別人的習慣？有必要那麼委屈求全嗎？

(*Jiegui*...? Wouldn't it be more effective to simply abolish Guoyu and Taiwanese, and speak English instead? Foreigners can always phonetically mark Mandarin Chinese with *Luoma Pinyin* when they learn the language, why do we have to cater to others? Do we have to make such a concession?')

(104) 與國際接軌是很好，但不尊重自己的母語，就沒有值得被尊重，中文之美果然不是每個人都能了解的

(*'It is good to guojijiegui, but if people don't respect their own mother tongues, they are not worth the respect, indeed not everyone learns how to appreciate the beauty of Mandarin Chinese.'*)

Comments (103) and (104) label phonetic schemes and languages in terms of ownership (Parmegiani 2010). A contrast between Bopomofo and Romanized phonetic schemes is discursively constructed as the contrast between 我們 *women* 'us' and 別人 *bieren* 'others.' This evidences that both phonetic schemes undergo the semiotic process where they can mark group membership. Comment (104) firstly affirms the importance of *guojijiegui*; yet the use

of 但 *dan* ‘but’ suggests that the latter sentence is given more recognition, namely, the respect for one’s own native language. Viewer (104) characterizes speakers who vote for Bopomofo abrogation as those who cannot learn to appreciate the beauty of Mandarin Chinese. The diverse stances are discursively constructed as a sense of aesthetics, a cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986) that distinguishes individuals according to their understanding of Mandarin Chinese as precious heritage (Irvine & Gal 2000; Silverstein 2003).

An unsettled but interesting issue which the comments seldom address regards the “identity” of Romanized Mandarin Chinese. Mandarin Chinese, as will be seen in Section 6.5, is more prone to be perceived to be less related to *guojijiegui* compared to Romanized phonetic systems, whose association to *guojijiegui* is equally debatable. When Mandarin Chinese is Romanized, how people see it on the scale of *guojijiegui* is exploration-worthy with a larger set of data.

6.4.4 *Guojijiegui* and Bopomofo

Yeh’s proposal to scrap Bopomofo is understood by many as Yeh’s criticism of Bopomofo as a hindrance to *guojijiegui*. The most prevailing ideological stance shows that the viewers consider Bopomofo and *guojijiegui* to be irrelevant, as shown in (105) and (106) below.

(105) 全世界都在致力於保護自己的文化，只有台灣立委致力於讓自己文化被丟失，而且注音到底為何得罪了國際化？

(‘Countries worldwide are devoted to preserving their own cultures. And here is a Taiwanese Legislative Member suggesting we dump our own culture? Also, how is Bopomofo preventing internationalization?’)

(106) 我學英文也從 ABC 開始學，那外國人學中文從ㄅㄆㄇ開始學怎麼了 這是文化的脈絡 接軌國際應該可以想到其他方式吧 怎麼會想到迎合外國人捨棄自己的文化?

(‘I started with alphabets when learning English, why can’t foreigners start with Bopomofo when learning Mandarin Chinese? This is our cultural heritage. There should be some other ways to achieve *guojijiegui*. How did [she] come up with the idea of discarding our own culture to appeal to foreigners?’)

Viewer (105) characterizes Bopomofo as irrelevant to *guojijiegui*. The questioning 注音到底

為何得罪了國際化 *zhuyin daodi weihe dezui le guojihua?* ‘how is Bopomofo preventing

internationalization?’ implicates that the viewer bears his/her own rationalization in how the

connection ‘is supposed to’ work. The phrase 到底 *daodi* ‘on earth’ and the questioning

phrase 為何 *weihe* ‘why’ disguise the viewer’s disapproval as confusion. With *duodi*, the

viewer is not intended to ask the question or elicit a response from other viewers (S.-M.

Wang 2010). Instead, s/he is expressing that Bopomofo does not interfere with the pursuit of

guojijiegui. Viewer (106) terms Bopomofo as 文化的脈絡 *wenhua de mailuo* ‘cultural

heritage’ that should be preserved. The sentence 接軌國際應該可以想到其他方式吧 *jie gui*

guoji yinggai keyi xiang dao qita fangshi ba ‘There should be some other ways to achieve

guojijiegui’ illustrates that the viewer holds specific conceptualizations about *guojijiegui*

where Bopomofo does not play a part. By commenting on how linguistic practice is

(dis)connected from an indexical value, viewers actively participate in and contribute to

indexicalization process by talking about it. It also needs to specify that whether an indexical

link is acknowledged does not necessarily correspond to viewers' evaluative and affective stances (Du Bois 2007) of the referred indexical links.

6.4.5 *Guojijiegui* and Taiwanese

The indexical associations between *guojijiegui* and Taiwanese are explicitly mentioned in four comments. The fact that Taiwanese is seldom brought up in the discourse about *guojijiegui* shows that the two do not interact much. One comment lists Taiwanese as a local language and ironically proposes to eradicate Taiwanese and to speak English instead. The other three evaluate how Yeh's use of Taiwanese at the hustings makes her un-international. These comments reflect on the (dis)association between Yeh's proposal for *guojijiegui* and her codeswitched speech between Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese. The viewers further deploy this dissociation to discredit Yeh's linguistic practice and her proposal, discussed in Section 6.33 and also shown in (107) and (108) below.

(107) 政見發表用台語，表示非常不國際化 建議公開場合禁講台語，不然外國人聽不懂 外國人只學過中文而已，正式演講還摺台語 有沒有想過外媒的痛苦？自己都沒國際觀了

(‘Speaking Taiwanese at the hustings, this is far from being international. I suggest that using Taiwanese in public should be prohibited; otherwise, foreigners may have difficulty comprehending [what is being said]. Foreigners learn to speak only Mandarin Chinese. (Yeh) spoke Taiwanese while making her formal public speech. Did (Yeh) think about the foreign media? She is not internationalized, anyway.’)

(108) 跟國際接軌學英語就好啦，跟注音符號有什麼太大關聯，那跟國際接軌那你講英文別用台語

(‘(We) learn English to *guojijiegui*, why does (it) have anything to do with (abandoning) *Zhuyin fuhao*? To *guojijiegui*, you stop using Taiwanese and speak English.’)

Comment (107) reveals multiple layers of indexicalization with Taiwanese. Speaking Taiwanese at the hustings is described as 非常不國際化 *feichang bu guojihua* ‘not very international.’ The sarcastic suggestion to ban Taiwanese in public backgrounds the established language ideology that Taiwanese is more prevalent at private domains (Liu et al. 2016). In addition, foreigners are portrayed to probably understand Mandarin Chinese, but not Taiwanese. These characteristics of being local and private distance Taiwanese from the image of *guojijiegui*. Comment (108) also manifests multilayered language ideologies and indexical values without explicitly referring to Romanized phonetic symbols. The sentence 跟國際接軌學英語就好啦 *gen guojijiegui xue yingyu jiu hao la* ‘(We) learn English to *guojijiegui*’ again explicates that English is introduced into discourse because of *guojijiegui*. Daring Yeh to stop using Taiwanese is an instance of counterdiscourse (Hill 1998). The counterdiscourse shows the viewers’ defense that the yearning for a better global connection and visibility should not override the preservation of local language and culture. Literally, to *guojijiegui* means no Taiwanese. However, this ideological stance and its non-literal, inverse evaluation illustrate that establish language ideologies, ideological stances and viewers’ attitudes are not necessarily in accord with one another.

This section has presented how *guojijiegui* is discursively related to linguistic practice, including Romanized phonetic schemes, English, Bopomofo, Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese. Complementing the findings in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 regarding how similar or

distinctive English and Romanized phonetic symbols are associated and whether the discussion is sufficient to lead to a debate around English, the section presents that the term *guojijiegui* invokes the intertextual relationship between Yeh's proposal on *guojijiegui* and prior texts where *guojijiegui* occurs. The viewers specify their understanding about *guojijiegui* from prior texts when they evaluate Yeh's proposal and contribute to this online metadiscourse. *Guojijiegui* is conceptualized as achievable by learning English though speakers' opinions differ regarding whether Romanized phonetic schemes play a facilitative role, as seen in (96) and (97). *Guojijiegui* is also described as attainable by making Chinese more accessible to foreigners though whether Bopomofo or Romanized phonetic schemes should be adopted is debated, as presented in (98) and (106). The ideological link between *guojijiegui* and English seems established. Significantly, the link is not necessarily viewed as positive, as suggested by the ironic plea to officialize English and to scrap Mandarin Chinese in (101), (102), and (103). These comments illustrate that contestation is a feature of the ideologizing process (Silverstein 1979; Woolard 1998). The viewers' discussion on English, Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese makes it explicit that phonetic systems are associated to language, and to sociocultural values attached to languages. The shared indexical values of Taiwan Mandarin and Bopomofo such as 自己的 *ziji de* 'our(s)' in (104), (105), and (106) reveal that the viewers do not draw a line between discourse about Bopomofo and that about Mandarin Chinese. The inseparability notes that the discussion about phonetic systems

escalates to a debate about languages. Table 10 summarizes the ideological stances mentioned in this section without occurrences. The table is intended not to make generalizations but to show how the ideologizing process can be in comprehending a short proposal speech.

Table 10. The occurrences of ideological stances concerning *guojijiegui*.

Ideological stances	#
To <i>guojijiegui</i> doesn't mean no Bopomofo.	41
The need to <i>guojijiegui</i> shouldn't be prioritized over preserving local language and culture.	40
English can <i>guojijiegui</i> .	37
Romanized phonetic schemes cannot <i>guojijiegui</i> .	21
Romanized phonetic schemes can <i>guojijiegui</i> .	14
Speaking Taiwanese cannot <i>guojijiegui</i> .	2

Among all these ideological stances about *guojijiegui*, several remarks should be made. The 3 ideological stances “To *guojijiegui* doesn't mean no Bopomofo,” “Romanized phonetic schemes cannot *guojijiegui*,” and the contesting “Romanized phonetic schemes can *guojijiegui*” emphasize ideologies concerning phonetic symbols. The three other prominent ideological stances “English can *guojijiegui*,” “The need to *guojijiegui* shouldn't be prioritized over preserving local language and culture,” and “Speaking Taiwanese cannot *guojijiegui*” attend to language use. The study suggests that phonetic symbols have the capability to carry indexical values, and embody social decorum just as languages do. Similar to what has been discussed in Chapter 5, the ideologizing process reveals a tension between

an instrument-oriented perspective of language and a prevalent sociocultural-oriented conceptualization of language.

6.5 Discussion

This chapter discusses how and why English is mentioned in the online metadiscourse on the debate between Bopomofo and Romanized phonetic systems for Taiwan Mandarin. The study proposes that a dominant established language ideology foregrounds the perceived (dis)associations between Romanized phonetic symbols and English. The study justifies the decisive role of the established language ideology with the intertextual cohesion linked by the abstract term *guojijiegui*. Though denotationally and textually English seems irrelevant to choosing a phonetic system for Taiwan Mandarin, discursively and ideologically English plays a role that is not, and cannot be, ignored. A language policy proposal that aims to change the status quo is discussed feverishly. This proposed change gives the chapter a valuable chance to observe what have been treated as commonsensical and frequently unnoticed. Methodologically, as I am also an ingroup member of the social group examined in this study, contestation and negotiation allow me to reflect on what may have been missed in addressing ideological stances concerning English. The major ideological themes of English include *guojijiegui*, deprecation of self and others, the (dis)connection with Romanized phonetic systems. The intriguing point, a case of the juxtaposition, is that Yeh did

not mention English in her speech. Nonetheless, the survey comments and the YouTube news comments show otherwise.

A first observation regards how Romanized phonetic systems are defined. The issue of which Romanized phonetic scheme should be adopted for Taiwan Mandarin remains relatively unattended by the public because there is no agreed scheme for Taiwan Mandarin. Moreover, Romanized phonetic systems play less an indispensable role than Bopomofo in daily communication (compared to typing Bopomofo on phones and computer to input Chinese characters). According to Tsao (1999), deciding a phonetic system for Taiwan Mandarin places two issues under spotlight, whether Bopomofo is more ideal than a Romanized phonetic system in language learning, and which system should be adopted. Tsao (1999) speculates that early exposure to English may lead to a lay preference for Romanized phonetic systems. What Tsao addresses focuses on attitudinal aspects. This chapter finds that Romanized phonetic systems are evaluated by making references to English learning.

Contestations lie in what Romanized phonetic symbols are and how adopting Romanized phonetic schemes facilitates English learning. As previously presented in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, some viewers refer to Romanized phonetic symbols as “English letters” or “English alphabets” whereas some treat the two different. Whether viewers acknowledge the association or not, the dialogic perspective of such comments show that the viewers are responding to the association. The viewers do not have to agree with it, but the metadiscourse

reveals their awareness of the existence of this association (Martin & White 2005). The connection, rough more refuted than accepted, is the established language ideology in this study. It is apparent to see why the viewers dwell on such an association if we look at the connection between Traditional Chinese characters and Bopomofo. Bopomofo does not merely notate phonemic sounds in Taiwan Mandarin; they are also components of Chinese characters. This component-character relationship between a phonetic system and a language helps Chinese character learning (Tsao 1999) and is probably mapped to Romanized phonetic symbols and English in an alphabet-language relationship. This could probably account for the observation why Romanized phonetic symbols are sometimes referred to as “English letters” by some and why adopting Romanized phonetic systems is thought to make English learning more manageable.

The section also discusses how indexical links influence the viewers’ evaluations, how layers of the ideologizing process are manifested, and how intertextual connections between the current discourse and prior texts are invoked by the term *guojijiegui*. When Yeh suggested replacing Bopomofo with Romanized phonetic schemes so as to *guojijiegui*, her speech is interpreted to materialize her belief that *guojijiegui* can be achieved with the Romanization of Taiwan Mandarin, and not with Bopomofo-notated Taiwan Mandarin. The heated discussion on YouTube and the online survey shows that these news viewers, also as agents who are affected by potential language implementation, vigorously participate in interpreting this

language policy proposal (Ricento & Hornberger 1996; Johnson 2011; Barakos 2016). A significant finding concerns the dynamic indexicalization process of languages and phonetic schemes, including how an indexical link is constantly examined and how individuals conceptualize the links differently. The dynamics of indexicalization is best observed in comparing indexicality in Yeh’s speech and in the viewers’ 108 YouTube news comments.

Figure 23 presents the prevailing indexical links found in the viewers’ 108 comments.




Figure 23 The prevailing indexicality in the viewers’ comments.

An arrow represents the existence of an indexical link. A cross on the arrow specifies that the indexical link is refuted and taken as non-existent. Conflicting views on an indexical link are presented with a question mark on an arrow. Several findings are noteworthy. First, compared

to the indexicality in Yeh's proposal (Figure 20 in Section 6.1), more languages and more indexical values are involved in the metadiscourse, even when these comments all center on one indexical value, namely, *guojijiegui*. With such a complicated web of indexicality, Figure 23 reveals that discussion on linguistic practice is seldom excluded from social contexts and from interrelationships with other linguistic practice. Other linguistic practice apparently also participates in the indexicalization process. Second, there is no mentioning of *kedouwen* in viewers' comments. Nonetheless, Comment (97) mentions how adopting Romanized phonetic schemes makes English learning more manageable. Comment (102) notes that school kids will still be afraid of English. The two comments correspond to Yeh's *hōo lán ê gín-á bu hui haipa kedouwen* '(Adopting Romanized phonetic schemes) frees our children from fearing *kedouwen*,' and elucidate that *kedouwen* is understood as English by the viewers. Third, it has been argued that English is brought into the discourse because *guojijiegui* invokes the intertextual relations. The term is also a fixed expression and a linguistic practice in which the mere mentioning of the expression is sufficient to take on another layer of indexicalizing process. The term points back to English, similarly as how other languages point to their respective values. Moreover, besides from *guojijiegui*, the linguistic practice is distinguished based on the indexical values regarding identities and ownership, as shown in Comments (105) and (106). Bopomofo, used by an exclusive number of users, has the capability to mark group membership. It indexes a sense of Taiwanese-ness, the positive

recognition of Taiwan's sociocultural uniqueness (Zemanek 2017). The indexical links, whether acknowledged or absent, are not necessarily evaluated accordingly. When Taiwanese is considered irrelevant or even contesting with *guojijiegui*, as seen in (107), and (108), the viewers do not necessarily hold that against the language. Rather, the counterdiscourses of Taiwanese (Hill 1998) contradict the discourse of *guojijiegui* and maximize the contrast between Yeh's performance and her discourse in pursuing *guojijiegui* to further disqualify Yeh from talking about *guojijiegui*. The multiplicity in social function allocation, value acknowledgements, and context-specific evaluations conform to Blommaert's (2010) concept of polycentricity, which accounts for the phenomena that speakers recognize multiple norms and adjust their language choices in accord with situational contexts.

In addition to multiplicity, also remarkable is the finding that these indexical values contest one another. (Silverstein 2003). The contestation can be observed in the indexical links between *guojijiegui* and respective linguistic practice. The observation suggests that the indexing process is evolving and that *guojijiegui* is not semantically fixed. Figure 24 graphically presents how the viewers talk about linguistic practice in relation to the value *guojijiegui*. Each language and phonetic system is placed on a field of two values, *guojijiegui* and its counter-value, not *guojijiegui*, based on the viewers' judgments.²⁶ The field of

²⁶ The counter-value "not *guojijiegui*" is named so because the category intends to include the values "unable to *guojijiegui*" and "irrelevant to *guojijiegui*." The two counter-values reveal different attitudes. Yet, identifying the two counter-values is challenging with the current data because discourse about *guojijiegui* is explicit and discourse about the counter-values seems less overt. The current study does not distinguish between the two.

guojijiegui is framed in concrete lines because the viewers have comparatively stabilized but unspoken beliefs about *guojijiegui*. The field of the counter-values is framed in dotted lines because there is no a clear-cut boundary between “irrelevant to *guojijiegui*” and “unable to *guojijiegui*.” Each circle represents a language or a phonetic scheme. The larger a circle is, the more involved it is in the discourse about *guojijiegui*. The numbers in the parentheses note the respective number of occurrences that make explicit (dis)association between the value *guojijiegui* (the number on the right) and its countervalues (the number on the left). The figure shows that English, Romanized phonetic systems, Mandarin Chinese and Bopomofo index both values though they all index one indexical value more entrenched than the other. Figure 24 shows that indexicalization is contesting and dynamic. What has been treated as normative, intuitive and ‘nothing wrong’ is in fact not fixed and constantly reevaluated (Silverstein 2003; Eckert 2008).




Figure 24. The mapping of linguistic practice and *guojijiegui*. The numbers in the parentheses notes the numbers of comments that overtly mention the respective values.

Also significant is the observation that English is introduced into the discourse. The study explains that the indexical relationship can go from linguistic practice to value, as shown in Yeh's speech, and from values to languages. English and *guojijiegui* are in direct indexicality as the viewers are aware of the indexical relation (Hill 2005). According to Tsao (2008), speakers' awareness of associating English to certain social images was established in the early 1990s. This awareness is verbalized in the viewers' refutation of Yeh's statement, as seen in Comments (107) to (108). This study suggests that the term *guojijiegui* invokes the intertextual reading of *guojijiegui* and causes Yeh's proposal to be evaluated accordingly. Though, as mentioned previously in Method, the debate about the Romanization of Mandarin

Chinese has addressed the issue of *guojijiegui* in 2000, apparently certain conceptualizations are far more established. A number of possible reasons could account for this scenario. As the ideologization process is ideational rather than truth (Cameron 2003), the study is not aimed to argue in what way English can, whereas other languages cannot, *guojijiegui*. Rather, the study addresses why English is framed as so critical to *guojijiegui* that the mentioning of *guojijiegui* is able to introduce English into this current discourse. This finding echoes what Blommaert (2007) states in saying that intertextuality “makes particular terms sensitive” (8). The viewers deploy the similar discursive strategies by phrasing *guojijiegui* as a goal to achieve and seeing English as the solution. The similar structure explicates that the news viewers have shared knowledge regarding how *guojijiegui* is conceptualized along with linguistic practice, possibly due to the previous exposure to related news and information. The similar structures also explicate how ‘recycling’ discourse is pivotal in recognizing and interpreting discourse (Tannen 2006). The concerns of the Romanization of Taiwan Mandarin are brought up occasionally, and for public scrutiny for a relatively short period, both in 2000 and in 2018. Comparatively, the attention to English is lasting. It is expected that the viewers find English more pronounced than Romanization of Taiwan Mandarin in the discourse about *guojijiegui*. Second, the viewers’ refutation to indexical links that *go wrong* reveals their rationalizations about how indexicalization *should be*. Indexicalization leads the viewers to reckon Yeh’s, and also some viewers’, rationalizations as incorrect. These viewers further

provide their *correct* rationalizations. The viewers' discussion elucidates that the indexical links between languages and their social values become part of the meanings that also travel through discourse. This awareness becomes a judgment criterion, narrows down linguistic interpretations to a limited number of possibilities, and regularizes speakers' linguistic behaviors by criticizing perceptually inappropriate linguistic practice (Silverstein 1979). All these associations are fostered via discourse and discourse further reinforces or challenges these relationships, as suggested in the contesting relationship of language ideologies (Schieffelin et al. 1998), indexical links and ideological stances these viewers take.

6.6 Conclusion

Drawing from Yeh's proposal speech to abrogate Bopomofo and to adopt Romanized phonetic schemes for Taiwan Mandarin and the online metalinguistic discussion on the proposal, the study shows how the ideologization and indexicalization are foregrounded, and how intertextuality accounts for the meaning-making process in everyday discourse with the abstract fixed expression *guojijiegui*. Though the term *guojijiegui* is common, we seldom question how *guojijiegui* is perceived in relation to linguistic practice, in what way *guojijiegui* could be achieved, and why *guojijiegui* is framed as desired. This study has approached the metadiscourse on a language policy proposal from an ideological perspective to examine critically what has been treated as 'nothing wrong.' Several remarks can be made.

Phonetic schemes possess indexical values as languages do. The example of *guojijiegui* illustrates that established indexical links between linguistic practice and values can go from linguistic practice to values, and significantly from a fixed discursive element to languages use. In Gal and Irvine's (2019) framework, the phenomenon of using English is an evaluated object. Through social practice, people pick up and attend to particular qualities of speaking English, namely, it being globally dominant and a tool for global interconnectedness. The mentioning of one seldom occurs without addressing the other in the Taiwanese context, mostly at the metapragmatic level. The frequent co-occurrence leads the two to form a sign-object relation through what Gal and Irvine call a "metasemiotic move" (91). The linking of the two, a conjecture (Gal & Irvine 2019), becomes part of shared knowledge which is further taken up to interpret other attempted sign-object relations, i.e., the proposed connections between adopting Romanized phonetic systems and achieving *guojijiegui*, between abrogating Bopomofo and achieving *guojijiegui* and, as discussed in this chapter, between adopting Romanized phonetic systems and speaking English.

A generalization that *guojijiegui* is predominantly linked to English seems both normative and arbitrary. The statement easily misplaces and fixates languages on the two extremes of the *guojijiegui* axis when complications could be further accounted for. In this post-globalization era with a critical re-examination of nearly all established constructs, the differences among languages in terms of *guojijiegui* are learned, gradable, and relative. The

viewers' indexical link between *guojijiegui* and English is also found to be more entrenched than the link between Romanized phonetic schemes and *guojijiegui*. The practice of phonetic schemes invokes both ideological and indexical interpretations about phonetic schemes as well as about the languages they notate. The interaction among language ideologies, indexical values, and intertextuality is also discussed. Intertextuality strengthens the social indexing of linguistic practice. Indexicality is further reinforced through discourse because linguistic practice that changes the status quo tends to be re-evaluated (Anton 1998; Kroskrity 1998; 2004; Hübler & Bublitz 2007). The evaluative discourse further entrenches established language ideologies. The study also presents that linguistic practice is distinguished in relation to other languages used in a community and that linguistic practice seldom stands alone.

The chapter uses two datasets to examine intertextuality in daily discourse regarding the social representations of languages in relation to *guojijiegui*. This inevitably allows a single dimension of direct indexicality and overt ideologizing process. A larger amount of data from other media is sure to shed more light on the discussion of indirect indexicality, such as the distinction between 'unable to *guojijiegui*' and 'irrelevant to *guojijiegui*.' Furthermore, the influence of media representation is definitely worth further attention. How Yeh's speech is edited and represented and how different editing from different media shapes viewers' comments could be further explored.

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION

This dissertation discusses the ideologizing process of English in the Taiwanese context by drawing from three public discourses. The study sees discourse both as a product and an influential element of social experiences (Fairclough 1992a; van Dijk 1996). English in the three public discourses serves respective roles and shows a different dimension of how this global language is imagined in the local Taiwanese context. The present study adopts the term ‘metadiscourse’ (Hyland 2017) to refer to individuals’ reflexive discourse on one’s discourse. The infotainment discourse in Chapter 4 concerns how knowledge in English is deployed to script crosslinguistic humorous skits. The debate on English in language planning in Chapter 5 foregrounds how English interacts with and impact on local linguistic practice. The debate on replacing Bopomofo with Romanized phonetic systems, as discussed in Chapter 6, explicates how the ideologizing process of English shapes interpretations of the policy proposal discourse. How speakers use English, how they talk about English, and how they talk around English together allow this study to sketch how this language is contextualized in Taiwan. This concluding chapter summarizes the findings in the three public discourses and discusses the theoretical and social implications of this dissertation. Major findings about the ideologizing process of English are summarized in Section 7.1. In Section 7.2, the study sketches an updated sociolinguistic profile of English in Taiwan in the light of the

ideologization webs in the three discourses. The dissertation ends with future directions and an attempt to propose the social contributions of this dissertation.

7.1 Summaries

The study analyzes discourses about English in crosslinguistic play in infotainment programs, online metadiscourse regarding English in language planning, and in the online debates on phonetic systems for Taiwan Mandarin, in order to attend to the multilayered ideologizing process of English. The study proposes to distinguish between established language ideologies, which are backgrounded, critical to meaning-making, and discursively presented as old information, and ideological stances, which show transient, context-specific reflexivity on established language ideologies. The three public discourses explicate the dynamics of ideologizing process of English as at times conflicting and at times forging.

Crosslinguistic humorous discourse in infotainment programs exploits normative rationalizations concerning English by breaching them for humorous purposes. The multimodal discourse in TV programs, including verbal, facial, bodily, textual presentation, and the mediated ‘view’ the audience sees through cameras, is refrained by and actively reproduces specific established language ideologies. The study identifies four types of crosslinguistic conversational joking, lexical insertion, puns, inappropriate language use and metalinguistic comments on one’s struggle with English. As various studies on epistemics

have established, speakers' assumptions about addressees' knowledge urge speakers to adjust their utterances for conversation congruence (Heritage 1984; Heritage & Raymond 2005; 2011; Stivers et al. 2011). With English being less prominent language but considered important, the study takes the (intended) amusement as the ideological stances to infer back what happened between the infotainment discourse and the reaction. There are two strands of analysis: the ideologization in what is scripted as the target of humor, and the ideological work in how humor is conveyed to audience. These examples of crosslinguistic humor are chiefly found to be built on the established language ideology that one should know English. This accounts for why not knowing English becomes the target of teasing. Nonetheless, the twist is that media discourse is scripted. A question is not always initiated by a K- speaker to a K+ speaker (Heritage 1984; Heritage & Raymond 2005; 2011). The multimodal communication between TV programs and the audiences shows that the media take comparatively reserved assumptions about the audience's English competence because Chinese subtitles are more often offered than not. Media discourse plays a duo role of both reproducing the established language ideology that one should know English and embedding a counter assumption that not each of the audience reads English. Nonetheless, without conducting a survey, the measure of providing Chinese subtitles remains a conceptualization that Chinese subtitles *have to* be supplemented. The observation shows that an established language ideology does not prevail consistently in all aspects of linguistic practice in

infotainment programs. If the established ideology “English competence is desired” accounts for non-English users becoming the target for teasing, the counter assumption “Not everyone has to speak English” probably explains why English users feel more obliged to make sure that a conversation about English can sustain. Another inconsistency lies in the attitudes toward the use of English in Chinese- and Taiwanese- dominant interaction. Lexical insertion on the one hand can be deployed to symbolize a change of perspective and to construct non-authentic, playful foreignness. On the other, codeswitching is also described to be a characteristic of how Taiwanese talk but the practice mostly draws negative evaluations. The contrast between ‘non-Taiwanese’ and ‘Taiwanese on a negative side’ explicates that the discursive practice of English constitutes an ingroup code, because English is collectively constructed as ‘disowned’ by Taiwanese. Without shared metalinguistic knowledge about English (Canestrari, Dionigi & Zuczkowski 2014), the conversational joking would probably fail. This is an ideological work for humor, but it is also an ideological work to discursively constructed English as dis-owned in the Taiwanese context.

The second discourse concerns the still ongoing public debate regarding English in language planning in Taiwan. Starting from October 2017, a series of proposals to call for measures to enhance Taiwanese’ English competence came to the Blueprint of building Taiwan as a bilingual nation by 2030. The study adopts a discourse analytical approach to analyzing the text of the Blueprint, online surveys comments, YouTubers’ vlog discourse and

viewers' comments under the two YouTube vlogs. The four datasets also record the transition of the public stances on a time span of 14 months. The Blueprint is seen both as a product of and an input for the ideologizing process of English. As the official document, the Blueprint also exerts its influence on defining English competence in the Taiwanese context. The study addresses that the news viewers' understanding of the text about officializing English are shaped by a number of established language ideologies concerning English and official languages. The news viewers' online metadiscourse is thereby proposed to be regarded as reflexive ideological stances on ideologized interpretations of the policy texts. It turns out that proponents and opponents do not necessarily hold contesting beliefs about English. It is found in we-media discourse that English has a profiling function at national level. People understand a country based on how its people speak the language and how national prosperity is associated with English proficiency. The finding fits what the title of the dissertation is. We picture a world where English goes everywhere. Adopting Blommaert's sociolinguistic scales (2007; 2010) and Vandembroucke (2015) analysis scheme of relating scales to identities, the study discusses how the debate of legitimizing English is conceptualized as a norm agglomeration in accord with the various spatial identities Taiwan yearns to project. Viewers make choices about the most suitable official languages because they prioritize one particular identity more than the others. The dynamic ideologizing process is even more evident as the

debate progresses through time. More diversified, inconsistent, and conflict-oriented ideological stances are identified in later online comments.

The third public discourse concerns the once heated debate about phonetic systems for Taiwan Mandarin. A language policy proposal to replace Bopomofo with Romanize phonetic system is described to aim to *guojijiegui*. The study analyzes the proposal speech, the online survey comments and news comments on YouTube. The investigation is inspired by the observation that English is mentioned in this current debate where no direct relevance between the two is immediately transparent. The study first discusses how the (dis)sociation between Romanized phonetic system and English brings discourse about English into the debate. Then the study specifies that a more dominant ideology makes the viewers attend to the (dis)sociation between Romanized phonetic systems and English. The study adopts the theoretical framework of intertextuality (Bakhtin 1986; Fairclough 1992b; Hodges 2015), namely, the cohesion among texts, to account for the existence of this dominant ideological link. The viewers' knowledge from prior texts where *guojijiegui* is mentioned comes to evaluate the language policy proposal. It is found that *guojijiegui* as a fixed expression, though underspecified, is taken to be more intimately related to the use of English than to the adoption of Romanized phonetic systems. The indexing between English and *guojijiegui* leads the news viewers' to evaluate, and mostly to refute, this language policy proposal of replacing Bopomofo with Romanized phonetic schemes.


The dynamics of ideologizing process of English in the Taiwanese context could be understood as contestation-oriented in essence. The distinction between established language ideologies and ideological stances is the one between global, decontextualized norms and local, situation-specific norms. The observation deserves both social and academic attention because individually and collectively we are acknowledging the desire and the risk of placing greater emphasis on English. The three dimensions of discourse about English discussed in this study present the societal evaluations toward English as dynamic.

7.2 From Ideologization Webs to a Sociolinguistic Profile of English in

Taiwan

The three public discourses manifest vivid ideological process. It is not surprising to see that the established language ideologies are not necessarily in accord with one another. For example, the infotainment discourse manifest the established language ideology ‘Everyone should speak English’ and “Not everyone speaks English.” Woolard describes language ideologies as “piecemeal and internally contradictory” (1998, 6). Each established language ideology constitutes a part of the social knowledge about English. Though this dissertation finds that the dominant language ideologies “English represents global competitiveness” and “Taiwanese speak bad English” prevail across discourses, contradictions occur and deserve our attention.

The discussion in various discourses manifests not entirely similar established language ideologies. When the ideologization webs of the three discourses are placed together, they yield a better view for a sociolinguistic profile of English. Figure 25 summarizes the established language ideologies identified in the three discourses. A graphic presentation shows that specific established language ideologies are domain-general while some are more context-specific. The dotted lines of established language ideologies acknowledge that they are less verbally explicit in form. The dotted lines also present the observation that established language ideologies are more inclined to cluster with other established language ideologies as a large body of knowledge that serves further sociopragmatic sense-making.






Figure 25. The categorization of the established language ideologies in the three discourses.

These established language ideologies illustrate how Taiwanese see English, how Taiwanese see themselves in relation to English, and how Taiwanese see English in relation to other languages. The established language ideology that English represents competitiveness is

manifested in all three discourses. An account of relating English to a capitalized resource in a free, globalized, market is extensively explored in the Taiwanese context (Oladejo 2006; Wei 2006; Y.F. Chang 2008; S.-C. Chen 2010; Tsai 2010; Lee 2012; Price 2014; S.-H. Huang 2016; Yang 2016). The instrumental view of English can be said to be the status quo of the language in the Taiwanese context. Equally prominent and domain-general is the established language ideology that Taiwanese speak bad English. These two established language ideologies summarize what English is like in the Taiwanese context.

The study sees that the status quo of English enjoys becomes part of commonsense knowledge with which speakers make sense of advertisement, media discourse, English in language planning and a policy proposal for phonetic systems.. Complementing a market-oriented view of *the* English, the present study finds the marketization of an indigenized English use in the Taiwanese context. Indigenized English, or Taiwan-ized English, is also commodified (Heller 2003; 2010b; 2010a). When TV programs feel the need to talk about incorrect English or scripted skits around one's poor English, there lies a market. What languages are marketized and what values are exchanged are also different. Standard, norm-abiding English competence is priced in the free, globalized market, the access to which is also regulated by the language. This explains how the image of English is projected. When TV programs exploit non-standard English, incorrect spelling, or the absence of the language, TV programs and the audience probably see different exchange values (Bourdieu

1977; 1986). As far as TV production is concerned, viewership represents lucrativeness. They use non-standard English in exchange for profit. For audience, they relate themselves to the humorous, non-hostile reading of accented and incorrect English. Through distancing English, they show affiliation in collectively dis-owning the language. Nonstandard English thus has a private market value. Therefore, not merely the idealized, native-like English, but also incorrect, non-native, even Taiwanese-ized English has market values. The marketization or commodification of the linguistic practice (Bourdieu 1977; Heller 2003; Blommaert 2010; Heller 2010b; 2010a) connotes a sociolinguistic change regarding attitudes toward English. Put differently, the standard English is believed to have its market and the concept prevails in all three public discourses. Significantly, a less acknowledged domestic market where counter practice is valued is also emerging.

If the established language ideologies account for what we already know about English, the ideological stances probably tell us what is altering. It is unknown at this stage whether these ideological stances will become ‘established’ or remain transient. They show ideologization as an ongoing process. The study has shown through discursive elements that the ideologization is constantly evolving. The study points to the empirical significance to investigate language ideologizing process in different discourses. As far as the ideologizing process of English is concerned, the investigation in different discourses and interaction out language-learning contexts are definitely worth further academic attention.

7.3 Social Implications and Future Directions

We do not position ourselves in the objective world. Instead, Taiwan is trying to identify itself in the world where English is thought to dominate and where Taiwan is marginalized. This study is completed during the time when Taiwan is in the process of planning official bilingualism. The dissertation thus has a humble goal to record the current sociolinguistic condition of English so as to urge a more profound, multi-dimensional and socially oriented understanding of English. At a societal, collective level, societal understandings about English revealed in language use and the metadiscourse are more diversified and dynamic. The current language-in-education and the ongoing bilingual nation policy attempt to bring English into Taiwan, or bring Taiwan to embrace English. Nonetheless, the emphasis on language acquisition and competence boost generally takes relatively passive measures to the possible social implications. The Blueprint, which is also the latest policy announcement related to English, excludes English from other concerns but instrumental functions. The crosslinguistic conversational joking and the online metadiscourse by the public show otherwise. Whether the public vote for or against a related language policy by no means suggests that their discourse manifests contesting language ideologies. These ideological distinctions however are indeed found to discursively constructed as binary and conflicting. The study argues that a language and its ideologizing

process never operate exclusively without interacting with other languages in the social context. The concerns call for attention from both the academia and the public. S.-C. Chen (in press 2021) also finds that although local languages and English are both promoted, English implementation is apparently more effective and influential. To contextualize English in Taiwan, the interaction of English with all the languages in Taiwan should be discussed and evaluated with more caution.

At a local, individual level, an emphasis on instrumental functions of English never refrains individuals from bestowing English with other social implications and being further pressured by these implications, as the study has shown in the discussion. Downright English-to-instrument and English-to-internationalization associations are simplistic but stressful. For example, the teasing about one's (lack of) English can bond via media, but it can potentially bite (Boxer & Cortés-Conde 1997) in everyday interaction, not to mention when English is believed to play a decisive part in social selection. The pressure can work both for English users and non-English users. Prior to Taiwan, South Korea attempted to pressure the society to boost English competence, and unfortunately led to intensified social division (Song 2011). To the best of my knowledge, in the local imagination of English as a global language, Japan and South Korea also play indispensable role in Taiwanese' picturing of the world because Taiwanese constantly position itself as in rivalry with them in terms of English performance. Japan and South Korea could be recognized as predominantly

monolingual and they are not free from the worries of English threatening the national languages (see the discussion in H. Park (2007), Song (2011) and Seargeant (2008)). Though in addition to Mandarin Chinese, local languages are receiving more recognition due to curriculum design, standardized proficiency tests and even drafting of laws, at language use they individually prevail in different domains and some are indeed comparatively peripheral. Due to Taiwan's current state, rejecting English is probably never a solution. How the government prepares and takes account into these aforementioned concerns is what we need to critically reflect on.

English has been a foreign language in Taiwan. On the one hand, it diversifies language use (C.W.-Y. Chen 2006; Su in press 2021; Wasserfall in press 2021). On the other, being merely a foreign language has led to the zealous pursuit, the flooded English institutions and teasing. It could be foreseeable that English will be given more currency, at least in the Taiwanese context. English as an additive language enjoys a higher social profile than some of the local languages in Taiwan, let alone other foreign languages. One's Japanese competence or even competence in Hakka and Aboriginal languages rarely undergoes such harsh scrutiny. Though the motives behind the promotion of English are well-justified, the motives speak solely to the language itself, not to the people who will use this language in actual contexts. With this dissertation, I hope to advocate the necessity to acknowledge multi-dimensional aspects of English in addition to a capitalized, marked-oriented

perspective.

The dissertation has made an effort to address a familiar issue with everyday discourse from a sociolinguistic and ideological perspective. Due to the time and scope limitation, the dissertation leaves the following aspects for further directions. The study relies heavily on media discourse and discourse on social media and acknowledges their significance in shaping and interpreting discourse. The present study does not see media discourse as a less preferred type of data discourse. As mediated communication is gaining its prominence, the academic attention to mediated communication offers a novel and critical perspective to linguistic practice. Anonymity to a certain extent reinforces the sharedness of the ideologization process because these participants maintain the online interaction without knowing each other. The sharedness makes these comments in a thread cohesive. However rich the online data are in making abovementioned claims, a more profound understanding of language ideologization will be achieved with more varied types of data. The study also expects interactive spoken data to further enrich and complement the understanding of the ideologizing process of English. For example, contestations may be discursively mitigated in face-to-face interaction. Moreover, the study also elaborates on a societal overemphasis on the instrumental values of English. The established belief supports diverse stances about English in the three discourses. A follow-up study will benefit tremendously by conducting interviews. Interview data allows to investigate the indexicalizing and the ideologizing

process of English with interviewees' elaborated thoughts. An analysis of interview that addresses demographic differences, particularly with perspectives from both English users and non-English users, will definitely contribute to bringing the conceptualization of English from the currently homogenized national level to a dynamic and heterogeneity-acknowledged level.



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